Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002393
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62300/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

MRDE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME OFFICE
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Murphy, instructed by MBM Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier judge dated 2 March 2026 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal to grant her protection claim.
2. The appellant is a 46-year-old Filipino national. In 2017, she started a relationship with R, who was resident in the US, whilst he was on holiday in Manilla. Throughout 2018 and 2019 the appellant carried on a long-distance relationship with R holidaying with him on four occasions. In 2019, the appellant became pregnant but sadly miscarried.
3. In 2020 the appellant became aware that R had a partner in the US, J, but R assured her that he was separated but only kept in contact with her due to a shared son, business interests and J’s family connection to the Philippine’s government. Additionally, R promised the appellant that he would leave J and settle with her.
4. R arranged another holiday in UK and the appellant arrived on 4 January 2023 but R did not join her at their arranged meeting place without any warning and since that time she has not heard from R.
5. A short time after the appellant’s entry to the UK, her sister informed her that people had come looking for the appellant at her house and had pointed a gun at her mother informing her they wanted to kill the appellant due to her ruining J’s family life. This resulted in the appellant’s mother suffering a heart attack and her sister told the appellant not to return to the Philippines. Additionally in 2024, two unknown men went to the appellant’s house and threatened her mother and issued threats to kill the appellant once they found her.
6. The respondent refused the appellant’s application for asylum and humanitarian protection on 23 April 2024 on the basis that the appellant had not established there were credible death threats against her and hence she did not have a well-founded fear of persecution on any return to her home country and, even if her narrative of events was accepted, there would be sufficiency of protection from police on her return and that relocation was also available.
7. The judge dismissed her appeal. The judge found the appellant’s evidence on the death threats and J’s family as being influential in the Philippines as unreliable and that state protection and internal relocation would be available on any return to the Philippines.
8. The appellant sought permission to appeal on 16 March 2026 on two grounds, the first being errors relating to the judge’s dismissal of evidence on the influence of J’s family and the death threats and second relating to failure to properly consider the evidence on sufficiency of protection and relocation.
9. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier judge Aspinall on 11 May 2026 on both grounds.
Submissions
10. Mr Murphy referred to his grounds of appeal. Mr Murphy noted that there had been a delay of over three months between the hearing and the promulgation of the decision and reminded me of the Court of Appeal’s dicta in SS (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1391 of the need to review the judge’s decision with care to ensure that the delay has not caused injustice. On the first ground, the judge had concluded, solely based on the fact that it was R who had made the claim, that the evidence on J’s family being influential in the Philippines, was not reliable. The appellant had made it clear in her interview that the information had come from R’s sister who had first informed the appellant about R’s relationship with J. Additionally, the appellant’s own sister had warned her not to return due to J’s family having “connections and influence”. By failing to refer to this additional evidence the judge made an error of law in his conclusion on the lack of J’s family’s influence.
11. The judge rejected the appellant’s account of the threats to her made to her mother in 2023 and 2024 based on inconsistencies without specifying the nature or extent of those inconsistencies other than identifying the use of a gun and whether the appellant’s mother had had a heart attack or had fainted. The discrepancy in the date given by the appellant in her oral evidence on the second incident as April 2024 when the police report indicated 15 June 2024 can be explained by the appellant relying on her brother’s supporting letter given the appellant had not previously given April as the date in her previous witness statement. Additionally, the judge failed to explain why he had not given greater weight to the police report.
12. On the second ground, the judge failed to take into account the appellant’s mother evidence that the police took no action on her complaint which demonstrated their inefficiency. Nor did the judge engage with any of the arguments raised in the skeleton argument on sufficiency of protection or internal relocation containing case law and background country materials. This failure to consider material evidence amounted to an error of law.
13. Mr Tufan relied on his Rule 24 response. On ground 1, the judge provided adequate reasons for his decision and the grounds do not identify any mistake of fact or the failure to consider material evidence. The judge did consider the witness evidence from the appellant’s family members and engaged with it before making his conclusion in the round on the credibility of the appellant’s account which he was entitled to do.
14. On ground 2, given the judge had concluded that the appellant would not be at risk from J on any return, the issues of sufficiency of protection and relocation did not arise in the manner suggested in the grounds. Additionally, the judge expressly said that he had considered the relevant CPIN and was not required to expressly refer to relevant parts and gave sufficient reasons for his conclusions on the adequacy of state protection and relocation.
Initial Matter
15. The start of the hearing was delayed as the consolidated bundle had not been available to me through the Upper Tribunal IT system. Mr Tufan, who had received the bundle consisting of 182 pages, helpfully emailed it to me.
16. Prior to the hearing I was able to get access to the key documents presented to the First-tier Tribunal through their system and confirmed I was content to proceed on this basis but asked Mr Murphy to identify any particular evidence he was relying on in his submissions by reference to the consolidated bundle page number.
17. Having considered the explanation from MBM Solicitors for the failure to file the consolidated bundle and having discussed it with the court staff responsible for the system there appears to be no good reason for it. MBM Solicitors are reminded of their responsibilities to comply in a timely manner with standard directions.
Discussion and Decision
18. At the outset, I note Mr Murphy’s submissions on the delay in the promulgation of the decision and, in writing this decision, I am mindful of the dicta in SS (Sri Lanka) of the need to ensure that the delay has not caused injustice to the appellant.
19. The issue which I have to determine is whether there is an error of law in the First-tier’s tribunal decision. If I conclude that there is, I then need to consider whether the error requires me to set aside that decision in whole or part. If I set aside the decision, then I must determine whether it should be remade in this Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
20. In light of the first ground relating to the judge’s view of the credibility of the appellant’s evidence my starting point is the observation made by the Court of Appeal in R(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at paragraph 8 that a tribunal would only “very rarely” be able to overturn a finding of fact based on oral evidence and the assessment of credibility. Additionally, for the failure for a judge to give reasons to amount to an error of law the appellate court must find that it cannot understand the original judge’s thought process when making material findings.
21. I am also guided by the recent Court of Appeal decision in MN Vietnam v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 at paragraph 35 which requires an appellate court in reviewing a First-tier tribunal decision in this chamber to make a “straightforward down to earth reading “ of the decision to identify whether there is room for genuine doubt over what had been decided rather than taking an overly forensic approach and interpreting the decision as if it were a contract or statute.
22. Turning to the first ground, Mr Murphy contends that the judge in determining, at paragraph 31, that R’s account given to the appellant about J having an influential family in the Philippines was not reliable overlooked the evidence that this fact came from R’s sister rather than R himself and referred to answers that the appellant gave in her asylum interview on 4 April 2024. Mr Murphy referred me to the answer to question 72 in the asylum interview when the appellant was asked where the general in the police, who was a relative of J’s family, was based. The answer was:
“In Manilla. But I’m not sure, they live in Manilla near the airport, but I’m not sure of the name of the place or location. My boyfriend’s sister was the one on my side”.
I do not find that it can be reasonably inferred from that answer that R’s sister was necessarily the source of the information about the influential family connection. If this was a key point in the appellant’s case presumably it would have been addressed in her oral evidence or witness statement but Mr Murphy could not direct me to any further place where this issue was subsequently mentioned or elucidated upon.
23. Mr Murphy also submitted that in answer to question 32 it was clear that the appellant’s sister had also said that she should not go back to the Philippines because “they will kill you because they have connections and influence and can pay someone to kill me”. This supported the appellant’s account of J’s family bring influential and was overlooked by the judge. It is important to note that this evidence was given by the appellant and not her sister and the submission assumes that the judge should have accepted it at face value, whilst it is clear the judge had identified concerns about the quality of the appellant’s evidence. This statement is a second-hand account of a conversation and was made by a person who, being unconnected with J, would not necessarily have knowledge of the connection. I asked Mr Murphy if he could direct me to additional evidence whether in the appellant’s sister letter or elsewhere that could provide further support for the assertion of influence but he was unable to do so. The judge based his conclusion as to the influence of J‘s family on the evidence of R which he did not find reliable given he had deceived the appellant on already being in a relationship and having a child and abandoning her in the UK. Mr Murphy suggested that weight should be placed on R’s evidence and just because he deceived the appellant on his existing relationship that it did not necessarily follow that his evidence on J’s family influence. Whilst that may be true, it is a purely a matter for the judge, in the context of the evidence as a whole, to determine how much reliance he places on it. The judge gave clear reasoning for his decision and was not required to set out reasons for rejecting any particular piece of evidence no matter how weak.
24. The second part of the first ground relates to the judge’s finding of the appellant’s evidence on the threats to kill being, in paragraph 32, “full of inconsistencies, particularly the use of a gun, and unreliable”. Mr Murphy submitted there was insufficient evidence to suggest “a blanket adverse finding on this core material issue “.
25. The evidence which was available to the judge and upon which he made his findings on the threats to kill was limited to the appellant’s second-hand version of the two death threats in the absence of a witness statement from the appellant’s mother, the letters from the appellant’s brother and sister and a police report for the second incident.
26. The judge considered the evidence of the death threats in paragraphs 22 to 27. His stated reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence on this issue was (i) the inconsistencies between the appellant’s version of events and the supporting letters from her brother and sister as to whether a gun was brandished and whether the appellant’s mother had a heart attack or had fainted and (ii) the inconsistency of dates of the second threat which the appellant had stated was April 2024 which was inconsistent with the police report of 15 June 2024; (iii) the fact the appellant had never received a threat during the course of the appellant’s relationship with R which been “contradictorily confirmed” in oral evidence. Additionally, the judge was entitled to take into account his concerns about the appellant’s narrative more generally and, in particular, the lack of any attempt by the appellant to contact R, given their six-year relationship, for his non-appearance in London and to discover the nature of any risk to her from J. The weight to be attached to the brother’s and sister’s letters, as the grounds themselves note, were of limited evidential value given that neither was a witness to either incident and provided some significant time after the event occurred. The judge could also take into account the absence of any police report in respect of the first incident of death threats.
27. Mr Murphy’s submitted that the judge had treated the police report as not being genuine for no good reason and hence unfairly failed to take into account evidence which supported the appellant’s narrative. I do not find merit in this suggestion. The judge clearly had taken the police report into account as one of the reasons for his concerns about the appellant’s evidence was the discrepancy between the date of the incident contained in the police report of 15 June 2024 and the appellant’ reference to the incident occurring in April 2024. Additionally, looking at the report itself, it is very short on detail as outlined by the judge in paragraph 26, the report made no mention of threats or a gun being visibly brandished. The judge did not overlook the evidence given his express reference to it but did not accept that it was of such probative value that it was able to discharge the appellant’s burden of proof in light of his other concerns with the appellant ‘s evidence. Mr Murphy’s submissions to explain away the inconsistences in the appellant’s evidence are legitimately made but amount to no more than a disagreement with the judge’s view of the evidence and rely on an undue emphasis on individual paragraphs of the decision rather than looking at the decision in its entirety. I find no error of law.
28. Given that I find no error of law on the first ground, the issue of sufficiency of state protection and relocation cease to be relevant in the absence of risk to the appellant on her return to the Philippines but, for the sake of completeness, I will consider the second ground.
29. On whether there was sufficient state protection, the judge had found that police protection was available as demonstrated by their willingness to investigate the incident of 15 July 2024. Mr Murphy’s submission was that the judge overlooked the appellant’s evidence that her mother’s complaint to the police did not result in any action being taken which was demonstrative of the inefficiency of the police. Looking at the police report, it appears that they attended the scene but the unidentified men had already fled in an unknown direction and the police could not find them. The appellant’s mother’s conclusion that this amounted to police inefficiency is not borne out on the face of the report nor, even if it were, to entitle an inference to be made from one incidence that that the entire police force is incapable of performing its responsibilities effectively. The judge was entitled to come to the conclusion he did notwithstanding that evidence.
30. The grounds also refer to an error of law arising from the fact that the judge had not engaged with the submissions made in the skeleton argument before the First-tier judge particularly paragraphs 25. I found this ground difficult to follow and Mr Murphy was unable to assist me further. The starting point is that the judge did expressly refer to the CPIN Philippines, Women Fearing Domestic Violence, March 2023 but did not elucidate further in considering whether police protection would be available to the appellant. Turning to the skeleton argument the reference to paragraph 25 is centred around the difficulties that woman, who are subject to domestic violence, obtaining adequate protection from the local police. No explanation is given as to how this is relevant to the appellant. This is not a case of the appellant being physically or mentally being abused by R but a threat of violence from a third party, J, which would, in absence of evidence to the contrary, be treated as a non-domestic, albeit serious, crime and, accordingly, the CPIN would be of little weight in the judge’s view of whether state protection was available. Accordingly, I find no error of law.

Notice of Decision
For the reasons set out above, there are no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and I decline to set the decision aside. 

Mark Stamp

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 July 2026