Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002399
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/71954/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

N K
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A. Chaudhry, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr M. Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 22 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Metcalfe) promulgated on 4 March 2026. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 30 September 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The appellant is a national of Afghanistan who entered the United Kingdom on 17 May 2022 and made a claim for asylum on 18 May 2022. He completed a screening interview on 20 May 2022. He was interviewed in respect of that claim on 5 September 2024 . The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 30 September 2024 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality and identity the respondent rejected the factual account given by him concerning the events in Afghanistan and that he had conducted a secret relationship there. The respondent in the decision letter and the review set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim and also considered that behaviour under Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 was present on the facts of the case. The decision letter also addressed humanitarian protection and Article 8 of the ECHR.
4. The factual background to the claimant was summarised by the FtTJ as follows. The appellant claimed that when in Afghanistan, from the age of 17 he embarked on a pre-marital relationship with S, a woman he met at a cousin’s wedding which lasted for some months and was a relationship without permission of either family. The relationship was discovered and S was killed by her brothers who are members of the Taliban.
5. The appellant’s claim was that if returned to Afghanistan he would be in fear of the family of his girlfriend who would find him and kill him for dishonouring their family.
6. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 4 March 2026, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 17-42. The FtTJ addressed the issue of Convention reasons between paragraphs 18-29 but concluded that it had not been demonstrated that the appellant fell within a Particular Social Group (“PSG”) on the basis which had been advanced before him. The FtTJ also dismissed the appeal having rejected that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Afghanistan on the factual basis as he had claimed and in so far as it related to his relationship with S and risk of harm from the Taliban.
7. The appellant sought permission to appeal on four grounds.
8. Permission to appeal was granted by a FtTJ on 11 May 2026.
9. The hearing took place on 22 July 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was present at the hearing and was represented by Ms Chaudhry, of Counsel. The respondent was represented by Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer.
10. Ms Chaudhry submitted that she relied upon the grounds of challenge. She provided her additional oral submissions on the grounds as advanced on behalf of the appellant.
11. Mr Diwnycz in behalf of the respondent indicated that there was a Rule 24 response dated 28 May 2026 and that the appeal was opposed on all grounds and provided his submissions in response.
12. It is not necessary to set out the submissions and they will be considered in the context of the grounds advanced on behalf of the appellant.
13. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion:
14. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
15. There are four grounds of challenge. They are as follows:
Ground 1 asserts that the FtTJ made a misdirection in law and/or failed to take into account material considerations when applying Section 8 of the 2002 Act.
Ground 2 is entitled : Mistake of fact/Misdirection in law/inadequate reasons directed towards the purpose of the screening interview.
Ground 3 seeks to challenge the credibility findings at paragraphs 38 (c ) (d) (h) (i) and (l) on the basis of giving weight to immaterial considerations and inadequate reasoning.
Ground 4 is headed “ Misdirection in law and relates to the assessment of the Convention Reason.
16. Before addressing the grounds of challenge, there are two important overarching considerations when approaching my assessment of whether the judge materially erred in law. The first is the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Over the course of many years, the higher courts have emphasised the importance of the application of such restraint before interfering with a first-instance decision. Examples include: Biogen Inc. v Medeva plc [1996] UKHL 18, at [54]; SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL; [2008] 3 WLR 832, at [30]; Fage UK Ltd. v Chobani UK Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 5, at [114] and [115]; UT (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [19]; MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC, at [45]; Lowe v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 62, at [29]; Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2]; HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, at [72]; Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51]; and most recently Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47].
17. For present purposes, the essential principles derived from these authorities can be summarised as follows:
(a) Although "error of law" is widely defined, the Upper Tribunal is not entitled to set aside the decision of the FTT simply because it does not agree with it, or because it thinks it can produce a better one ;
(b) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that the judge was "plainly wrong";
(c) What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached;
(d) The judge must consider all the relevant evidence relied on by the parties, although it need not all be specifically addressed in the judgment;
(e) The weight attributed to relevant evidence is pre-eminently a matter for the judge;
(f) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable;
(g) The reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract;
(h) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account;
(i) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out.
18. I confirm that I have had regard to these propositions, amongst others, when considering the challenges brought to the decision of the FtTJ.
19. Rather than considering the grounds in the order in which they are set out, I begin my consideration with ground 2.
Ground 2:
20. This ground challenges part of the factual findings made by the FtTJ which related to the assessment of his credibility and the FtTJ’s reliance on material set out in the screening interview.
21. In this respect Ms Chaudhry makes the following submissions. First, at paragraph 34 the FtTJ misunderstood the purpose of the screening interview by stating that it was the first opportunity to provide a detailed account. Second, that this is inconsistent with the instructions given in the screening interview and third, the FtTJ’s approach was contrary to that set out in the decision of YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004]UKIAT 00145.
22. The respondent submits that the FtTJ did not err in law and that the FtTJ was entitled to consider the discrepancies arising from the screening interview as part of the overall credibility assessment.
23. Having considered the grounds and the submissions made by the advocates, I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision of FtTJ on the basis of the matters submitted or as set out in ground 2. Whilst the grounds seek to challenge the assessment made of credibility by reference to paragraphs 34, 36 and 37, those paragraphs should not be read in isolation or out of context but in the light of the other paragraphs within the decision.
24. Contrary to the grounds of challenge, the FtTJ did not misunderstand the purpose of the screening interview. Whilst the grounds rely on paragraph 34, and the reference made to it being the opportunity to provide a detailed account, the FtTJ properly directed himself later in this assessment paragraph 37 in the following terms, “ I remind myself that screening interviews are usually brief interviews from which no verbatim record is made..” Thus, the FtTJ did recognise the limited nature of the screening interview. This is further reinforced at paragraph 33 where the FtTJ referred to the question the appellant was asked and to outline “briefly “all of the reasons why he could not return to his home country.
25. When reading the decision, it is in substance consistent with paragraph 19 of the decision in YL(China) (as cited). That paragraph states: " 19. When a person seeks asylum in the United Kingdom he is usually made the subject of a 'screening interview' (called, perhaps rather confusingly a "Statement of Evidence Form - SEF Screening-). The purpose of that is to establish the general nature of the claimant's case so that the Home Office official can decide how best to process it. It is concerned with the country of origin, means of travel, circumstances of arrival in the United Kingdom, preferred language and other matters that might help the Secretary of State understand the case. Asylum seekers are still expected to tell the truth and answers given in screening interviews can be compared fairly with answers given later. However, it has to be remembered that a screening interview is not done to establish in detail the reasons a person gives to support her claim for asylum. It would not normally be appropriate for the Secretary of State to ask supplementary questions or to entertain elaborate answers and an inaccurate summary by an interviewing officer at that stage would be excusable. Further the screening interview may well be conducted when the asylum seeker is tired after a long journey. These things have to be considered when any inconsistencies between the screening interview and the later case are evaluated. "
26. In this context the FtTJ set out at paragraph 30 that when he was considering the evidence before him and as it related to this particular appellant, he bore in mind that at the time of arrival and initial interview in the UK the appellant had just turned 18 years old and was travelling alone. He set out the age of the appellant at the date of the hearing (it was 22 years of age), and he further recorded the submission that the appellant was an uneducated young man and that this may have an impact on his presentation. Again, that was a factor that he said he took into account when considering the appellant’s evidence.
27. Thus, when considering the circumstances of the screening interview and as set out in YL (China), the FtTJ was aware of the age of the appellant at the time of the interview. The FtTJ was also aware of the time of arrival. The appellant had arrived in the UK on 17 May 2022 having been encountered by immigration officers and was released on 18 May 2022. The screening interview was conducted on 20 May 2022 at 13.10 with an interpreter in the appellant’s first language. The screening interview records that the appellant was asked if he was fit and well to be interviewed and he stated that he was. Taking those issues into account the judge was plainly aware and took into account the age on arrival and at the initial interview when assessing the contents and the circumstances of the interview. As also set out above he took into account the appellant’s personal characteristics such as level of education, and his age not only at the time of interview but also when giving evidence.
28. Having set out those factors the FtTJ turned to the core of the appellant’s claim as follows, “the appellant asserts that, when in Afghanistan, from the age of 17 he embarked upon a premarital relationship with S, a girl he met when at a cousin’s wedding, which lasted for some months “ ( see paragraph 31). It is not suggested that was not an accurate summary of the core of appellant’s account. I make the observation that this was not a complex factual scenario. Furthermore, when interviewed in 2024 (Q42) the appellant identified this is the reason why he was in fear in Afghanistan and when asked any other fears in Afghanistan, the appellant stated, “no not other than this”.
29. Against that background the FtTJ assessed the appellant’s evidence in terms of consistency of the claim. The FtTJ set out the matters set out in the SCR and what the appellant had said in relation to his factual account. The FtTJ correctly recorded that the appellant’s response at question 3.1 where he was asked, “why have you come to the UK”, to which he responded, “to seek asylum here because of the fighting in Afghanistan”. The FtTJ then set out the following answer to an open question, “please outline your journey” (see question 3.4) where the appellant gave a detailed description having travelled to at least seven countries, the length of time spent in some of those countries, and the mode of transport. The FtTJ recorded the appellant’s answer to the question why he had failed to claim asylum in another country prior to the UK, the appellant responded, “I did not want to stay in any of those countries. I like the UK and wanted to come here” and that he “did not feel safe” in any of the other countries ( see 3.6 and 3.7).
30. The FtTJ then turned to the appellant’s answer at question 4.1. This asks, please BRIEFLY explain ALL of the reasons why you cannot return to your home country. The appellant’s response was that. “There was and still is fighting in Afghanistan. It is not safe to stay in that country. The country was destroyed. There was no way of supporting yourself. If I were to remain there my life would be in danger.”
31. Having viewed that evidence the FtTJ was correct in my view to identify that in the answer given the appellant provided no mention whatsoever of any relationship with a girl in Afghanistan called S and that this was the cause of him leaving Afghanistan, which was said to be the core of the appellant’s account as to why he left his home country. As the FtTJ stated “there was no mention whatsoever of any premarital relationship or any of the facts that he now seeks to rely upon as part of his claim “which the FtTJ summarised at paragraph 35 and as taken from his interview in September 2024. The appellant had identified that there had been problems relating to his premarital relationship with S which were the problems that had begun at the end of July 2021 and had directly led to him leaving Afghanistan in October 2021. Thus, the events had taken place not long before his arrival in the UK the following year in 2022.
32. Thus returning to the decision of YL(China) the assessment that the FtTJ undertook was consistent with that decision, having reminded himself a screening interview is usually a “brief interview from which no verbatim record is made” (see paragraph 37), the evidence relating to this particular appellant’s characteristics (paragraph 30), the timing of the interview (paragraph 30) and properly took into account the appellant’s explanation as given by him for the failure to mention his relationship with S.
33. In this context it is clear that the appellant had been asked why he had failed to mention his relationship with S when asked to briefly explain all the reasons why he could not return to his home country, this being the core of his account, and the FtTJ recorded the explanation given by as follows, “the explanation provided was that he’d spent a month “in the jungle” and then six or seven hours on a boat which caused him to be mentally and physically tired and the interpreter told him to “tell short stories and not to give any details.”
34. Having considered the contents of the screening interview alongside those other factors referred to in the preceding paragraphs, and in light of what was the core of this appellant’s claim and the explanation for the omission, the FtTJ concluded,” I remind myself that screening interviews are usually brief interview from which no verbatim record is made but, nonetheless, I do not accept that an interpreter would warn the appellant against providing the core detail as to what prompted his departure from Afghanistan. The premarital relationship with S was at the very heart of the problem that the appellant claims he faced and so, in my judgement, a wholesale failure to mention this material feature upon his arrival into the UK during the 50 minute interview, causes me to question the credibility of his account.”
35. I reject the submission made by Ms Chaudhry and as set out in the grounds that the FtTJ rejected his explanation on an incorrect basis. The explanation was that he was told to “tell short stories and not to give any details”. The appellant’s explanation was properly interpreted by the FtTJ that he was told to give a “ short “ account and not to give “any details” but that the FtTJ did not accept that an interpreter (through the interviewer) would warn the appellant against providing the core detail as to what prompted his departure from Afghanistan. In other words, he did not believe the appellant’s account as to what he had been told and not to give “any details”. If that explanation was truthful, the appellant would not have given the details that he gave at paragraph 4.1.
36. Whilst the grounds at paragraph 16 of the grounds refers to the introductory paragraphs which sets out that “the officer will only ask you for a brief outline of why you are claiming asylum today. I/the officer will not be making the decision on your asylum claim” , it ignores the questions in the interview itself at question 4.1. This asks, “please BRIEFLY explain ALL of the reasons why you cannot return to your home country”. The words BRIEFLY and ALL are in capitals and underlined, which underscores that whilst they may be brief, all of the reasons why a person cannot return to their home country should be given. In the introductory paragraphs, a person interviewed at the screening interview is also told, “you must answer all the questions fully and truthfully.” When the screening interview was conducted, the appellant confirmed that he understood all of the questions at the end of the interview. Furthermore, he confirmed to the interviewing officer during his asylum interview in 2024 that all the information that he had given in the screening interview was correct (Q45).
37. That being the case, having been told that he should give all the reasons for leaving Afghanistan the appellant did not do so, even in brief terms. In the circumstances the FtTJ was entitled to assess the explanation and reject it for the reasons he gave and having properly identified the core of the appellant’s claim which was having a relationship with a woman called S, that the problems began at the end of July 2021 and thus were in close proximity to his arrival in 2022, that the appellant had wholly failed to mention any of this during the screening interview and as such was a matter adverse to his credibility.
38. It is also clear from the decision that the FtTJ took into account that the appellant was able to give a detailed answer to other questions that he was asked in the screening interview as set out at paragraph 32 of his decision. This was contrary to the claim made that he was told “not to give detail”.
39. The grounds and submissions made in respect of ground 2 do not establish that the FtTJ erred in law in the way asserted.
40. This was not a determinative finding of credibility on the part of the FtTJ but was one of a number of findings made. Those, in part, are the subject of challenge in ground 3.

Ground 3:
41. Ms Chaudhry submits that the FtTJ gave inadequate reasons for his credibility findings and submits that the FtTJ’s assessment that, “during his oral evidence, I found the appellant to be an unimpressive witness. His answers to cross examination expose inconsistencies in his account and, at times answers that I simply did not accept” to indicate simple disbelief on the part of the FtTJ and that to do so is inappropriate. In essence it is submitted that it is an error of law to simply disbelieve in appellant in such a way without providing reasons.
42. Before turning to an assessment of ground 3, I remind myself of the guidance given when considering the assessment of a FtTJ and the findings of fact an assessment of the evidence undertaken. It is important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view. These are not controversial observations: see Customs and Excise Commissioners v A [2002] EWCA Civ 1039; [2003] 2 WLR 210; Bekoe v Broomes [2005] UKPC 39; Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318; [2006] UKCLR 1135".
43. The grounds and the submissions made assert that the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons in his decision. The scope of the duty to give reasons was set out MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and reiterated in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC) at [43]:
“[The duty to give reasons] does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the Judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. […] It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the Judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision.” (citing English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605)
44. The SPT’s Practice Direction of June 2024 on Written Reasons is also of relevance, particularly paragraph 6 which sets out the following
“6. Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.”
45. Returning to the decision, and following the opening part of paragraph 38, the FtTJ in fact went on to give his reasons for his decision on credibility between paragraphs 38 (a) and (l), and did so by reference to the evidence, including the answers given by the appellant during cross-examination, but also the other written evidence which identified inconsistencies and implausibility in the account that he had provided.
46. Whilst the grounds assert that there was no evidential analysis from the FtTJ in his reasoning and by reference to the findings at paragraph 38 (e ) (d) and (f), those findings need to be considered in the context of the decision as a whole. By way of example the finding made paragraph 38 (c ) relates to the evidence given by the appellant and as recorded by the FtTJ at paragraph 38 (a) and (b). Those paragraphs relate the appellant’s account as to how he conducted the relationship which was by telephone using a “communal telephone” which was in the girl’s home. Question 48 he confirmed it was a “cell phone” used by the girl’s mother and elders which was used to communicate with her for the first 20 days ( see paragraph 38 (a)). At paragraph 38 (b) the FtTJ set out the evidence about how they communicated after the house phone described in paragraph 38 (a) and that he gave her a mobile telephone. This was given to her during the night where she came close to the main door and he passed the phone through the main door and she took it.
47. The FtTJ’s assessment of that evidence is set out at paragraph 38 (c ) where he gave his reasons for rejecting both parts of the appellant’s account as to how the parties had communicated with each other as claimed. Contrary to the grounds, the FtTJ gave his reasons by reference to the appellant’s own evidence of the high degree of risk involved embarking upon a pre-marital relationship in Afghanistan between two unmarried members of the opposite sex. The FtTJ rejected the appellant’s account as not being reasonably likely that he would send a text message to a communal phone in the circumstances that he had claimed and in doing so “a high degree of risk” that another relative or member of the household would intercept the message first. Nor did he accept as credible that the appellant was able to attend at her home carrying a secretly bought telephone which he had asked her to contact him on a device which was unknown to her family.
48. The reasoning underpinning those credibility findings was based on the assessment made of the plausibility of the appellant’s account set against the objective evidence which the FtTJ had before him and plainly had regard to and also based on the appellant’s own evidence as to the circumstances in Afghanistan and the social mores which applied between members of the opposite sex. The appellant’s evidence before the FtTJ was that it was forbidden for someone to speak on the phone without marriage and that in Afghanistan if a boy or girl are caught speaking to each other without marriage they are both killed (see question 40). He stated that talking in secret over the telephone was forbidden and if caught would be killed in the name of honour ( paragraph 9.1 of witness statement). The appellant was also aware that her brothers were members of the Taliban of “big rank”.
49. The FtTJ also was clearly aware of the objective material advanced on behalf of the appellant which was before him as itemised at paragraph 9 of the ASA. The thrust of this objective material was that relations between males and females are heavily constrained due to cultural mores and traditions within Afghan society as well as by law both before and after the Taleban. The Taleban also kill those engaged in relationships outside of marriage (see paragraph 8). The ASA also referred to the EUAA report at paragraph 3.15 highlighting the restrictions placed on women and the risk of honour crimes against women in those circumstances. The ASA also stated that relationship such as this appellant’s were against Islamic law and the social mores of Afghanistan especially in Pashtun culture and in the Conservative province that the appellant lived in (ASA paragraph 7).
50. The FtTJ plainly had regard those documents because he referred to having considered all of the evidence including the documentary evidence (see paragraph 17). Furthermore, it is clear that he had read and had regard to the objective evidence in the appellant’s bundle having referred to the EUAA report at paragraph 20 and also the ASA at paragraph 21.
51. Taking all those matters together it is not demonstrated that the FtTJ’s reasoning was not set against any evidential background nor that the judge failed to explain why the conduct he had considered and was found by him to be inconsistent with the context of Afghan social norms. It is clear in my judgement that the reference to Afghan society and unmarried members of the opposite sex alongside the “high degree of risk in embarking upon a premarital relationship in Afghanistan” referred to the objective material to which the FtTJ had regard but also the appellant’s own evidence on these issues.
52. Ms Chaudhry also seeks to rely upon the grounds and the challenge made to the finding at paragraph 38 (h ). Again, this finding made by the FtTJ is set against the evidence he records at paragraphs 38 ( e) and (f). Those paragraphs set out the inconsistencies identified by the FtTJ as to the length of the relationship before it came to the knowledge of the Taleban. The judge identified that the appellant’s earlier account was that the relationship between him and S lasted for four months before it came to the attention of her brother who was in the Taleban. However, during cross examination, the appellant gave inconsistent evidence and that it was extended to being five or six months and that the answer given of four months was either a mistake or that he did not understand properly. The FtTJ assessed that claim but reached the conclusion that the appellant had been attempting to extend the duration of the relationship to give it the appearance of it being a more subsisting and involved relationship. However, the judge reasoned that the later evidence given also impacted on the credibility of the appellant’s account because it “exposes inconsistencies in the timeline of events that he says happens thereafter”. They were set out at paragraphs (f) and ( g) and that not only was his account inconsistent but that if his account was true as given in interview and that the Taliban have found out about his relationship in July 2021 the account of continuing his relationship in October 2021 was not plausible or reasonably likely.
53. This formed the finding made at paragraph (h) . Contrary to the grounds and submissions made, the FtTJ did not substitute his own view for that of the appellant but considered the factual account given by him and that he continued the relationship notwithstanding his knowledge that the girls brothers were in the Taleban and of “big rank”. As the judge found, he did not find it plausible that a person who was embarking upon a premarital relationship that he knew to be against social and moral norms of the country would continue in the relationship knowing that the other family were members of the Taleban and of a “big rank”. The FtTJ did not make that finding in isolation but took into account the explanation given by the appellant that he really liked the girl and wanted to marry her and therefore “I didn’t think too much about the risk associated with this (links to the Taliban)”. The FtTJ took account of that but did not find that to be a credible explanation when set against the other parts of the appellant’s evidence that the FtTJ had previously identified and the high degree of risk.
54. The grounds at paragraphs 29 and 30 amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision of the FtTJ. It is entirely clear from the decision that the FtTJ undertook an assessment of the appellant’s evidence taking into account his age at the time of events (see paragraph 30).
55. There is also no merit either to the challenge to paragraph 38 (i). The FtTJ was entitled to make the finding he did when assessing the appellant’s evidence as to the profile of the appellant’s brothers. The appellant was not able to give any detail about their position in the Taliban other than they were of “big rank” . The FtTJ set that evidence against the factual claim made that the appellant had been told that the brothers were members of the Taleban but on becoming aware from S herself, he did not ask any further questions about them. The FtTJ did not find that that was credible nor plausible that he would not have enquired further about their position to enable him to appreciate the risk in continuing the relationship with S.
56. Ms Chaudhry also relies upon the grounds which challenge paragraph 38 (l). However, the grounds failed to take into account the earlier paragraphs at (j) and (k) against which that finding is made. In those paragraphs the FtTJ assessed the two documents provided by the appellant in support of his claim to be at risk on return. They are described as the “killing letter” dated 13 February 2025 (which post-dated his asylum application and interview) and on title documents which related to the appellant being sought to present himself to the police station dated 10/1/2022 (this predated the application for asylum but post-dated his departure from Afghanistan).
57. Paragraph 38 (k) set out the evidence given by the appellant in cross examination about the authenticity of both documents and paragraph 38(l) is a continuation of that evidence as given by the appellant. The FtTJ was wholly entitled to consider the explanations given by the appellant concerning the provision of those documents in his claim. Both were said to have emanated from his father with whom he was still in contact with. When asked why he did not provide 10 January 2022 document as part of his asylum claim the appellant first stated that the respondent had not asked for any documents. The FtTJ was entitled to find that explanation was inconsistent with the written evidence in the asylum interview and as set out at paragraph 38 (k). Furthermore, the FtTJ was entitled to find on the evidence that when that was identified to him as an inconsistency, the appellant then changed his account stating “the time I had no documents, I did not know about these documents, my family had not told me anything about this and I do not know about any threatening letters or any such thing at this stage”. That was an explanation the judge rejected as one that he was not willing to accept even applying the lower standard, when set against the factual account as he did not accept that the appellant’s family would conceal information relevant to his safety having left his country to seek asylum. That was a finding open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence.
58. In summary, the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim and mde clear adverse credibility findings based on that evidence including inconsistencies identified from his evidence. Ground 3 is not made out.
Ground 1:
59. This is a challenge to paragraph 39 of the FtTJ’s decision and addresses the issue raised in the decision letter at paragraph 8 relating to section 8 (4) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc ) Act 2004 and the failure by the appellant to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to make an asylum claim or human rights claim one in the safe country.
60. It is not in dispute that the appellant to travelled through a number of safe countries and did not make a claim of asylum in any of those countries. The appellant’s explanation both in this witness statement and oral evidence was that he was under the control of an agent to obey their commands.
61. Whilst the grounds refer to the decision in AA (unattended children) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 16 (IAC), that decision does not appear in the appellant’s skeleton argument (“ASA”) nor is there a copy in the consolidated trial bundle. It has not been demonstrated that that decision was put before the FtTJ to address. In any event, whilst I would accept that decision does refer to Afghan minors and provides a background to the smuggling of children and references the way in which smugglers maintain their control over them, each appeal has to be considered on its own facts. In this appeal there was no factual account given by the appellant about who he travelled with or in what circumstances other than that set out in general terms at paragraph 10 of the witness statement. The objective material cited at paragraph 115 refers to the strategy of the smugglers splitting up children who had been travelling together. The appellant was not saying that he was travelling with groups of other children which was part of the factual matrix of that decision. However, the FtTJ did consider the factual matrix before him.
62. When assessing whether he had a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum, the FtTJ was entitled to take into account the detailed factual account given in the screening interview paragraph 3.4 not only to the number of countries that he had travelled through but also the length of time spent in some of those countries which the judge referred to both the Bulgaria and Austria being of 20 days. The appellant also claimed to have been fingerprinted in Italy then released before travelling on. The FtTJ was further entitled to take into account the methods used to transport including foot, vehicles and public transport but that contrary to the explanation that he gave as to why he did not claim asylum in any of those countries because he was under the control of the agent and had to obey them, the FtTJ identified that he had made no mention of any agent’s assistance save to say, “I paid smugglers to arrange this journey”.
63. Given the inconsistency between the information the screening interview and his later explanatory account, the judge was entitled to find that he was not satisfied that the explanation was true. He did not consider this in isolation but in the light of the other available evidence. This included the appellant’s stated intentions that “I did not want to stay in any of those countries. I like the UK wanted to come here” and “I don’t like the other countries and did not feel safe there.” The assessment made that this was a choice rather than being necessary was a finding open to the judge to make.
64. Ms Chaudhry further places reliance upon a report in the bundle dated 17 March 2025. She submitted that the document referred to an area of hair loss at the left frontal scalp attributed by the appellant to scarring from a head injury sustained while being beaten on his journey. The diagnosis refers to mixed anxiety and depression and therefore it is submitted that that was further evidence to support mistreatment of him during his journey.
65. Whilst the appellant attributed the hair loss to an earlier injury, the report does not make any assessment of whether the injury was consistent with that claim but simply records what the appellant said. It is also inconsistent with the information given by the appellant upon arrival set out in part 2 under health needs in the screening interview. The diagnosis of mixed anxiety and depression was reported as to be as a result of the asylum refusal.
66. However, the FtTJ did not refer to that report at paragraph 39. Even if it could be said that the FtTJ should have placed some weight on those matters set out above in his assessment at paragraph 39 the section 8 issue was not determinative of this appellant’s credibility. The FtTJ had given sustainable evidence-based findings when considering the core of this appellant’s account which related to the events in Afghanistan and concluded when assessing the material “in the round” that he was not satisfied applying the lower standard of proof that the appellant had not told the truth about the events that occurred in Afghanistan. It is therefore not been shown that any error was material to the outcome.

Ground 4:
67. Ground 4 seeks to challenge the assessment of whether there was a Convention reason. It is not necessary to address that ground. The decision on whether a Refugee Convention reason applied could not be a material error of law requiring the decision to be set aside in light of the above assessment that relates to grounds 1,2 and 3. That is because the grounds which have sought to challenge the factual findings made on the evidence relating to events in Afghanistan have not been established for the reasons set out above.
68. For those reasons and having considered the decision of the FtTJ in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law which was material to the outcome, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error on point of law material to the outcome and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

3 August 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds