Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002405
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01429/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

22nd October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

IOA (Nigeria)
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J. Greer ,Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 30 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge King) promulgated on 20 February 2026. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 27 March 2025 to refuse her protection and human rights claim. The appellant’s husband and children are dependants on the claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that her rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know her identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above. The names of the family members have redacted.
Background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant, her husband and children are nationals of Nigeria. The basis of the claim was that the appellant’s eldest daughter was subjected to female genital mutilation (“FGM”) as a newborn by her husband’s family. The appellant feared the same treatment for her youngest daughter and also feared retribution for herself and her husband if they objected to this.
4. The respondent considered the application and, in her decision letter dated 27 March 2025 refused the claim. The respondent accepted that the appellant’s elder daughter had undergone FGM against her parent’s wishes. What was not accepted was the risk to the appellant’s younger daughter on return to Nigeria. The respondent’s position was that the appellant’s family could internally relocate within Nigeria to avoid the risk, and that there would be sufficiency of state protection if she were to do so.
5. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 20 February 2026, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence on the appellant’s claim between paragraphs 15-35. Whilst the FtTJ had concluded that the appellant’s daughter would be at risk of FGM in her home state ( see paragraphs 15-21), the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having found that it would be not be unreasonable or unduly harsh for the family as family unit to relocate to a different part of Nigeria and that on the particular factual circumstances would be able to obtain sufficient state protection. The FtTJ dismissed the appeal.
The appeal before the Upper Tribunal:
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal on 9 March 2026 (“the original grounds” Those grounds firstly sought to argue that the issue of sufficiency of protection should have been considered before the issue of internal relocation and that had this been undertaken, the FtTJ would have found that there would be insufficient protection available in the home area. By considering the issue of internal relocation first the FtTJ erred in law by refusing the appeal on the basis of “ sufficiency of protection on relocation” and that by doing so applied the wrong test for relocation ( see paragraphs 2-4 of the original grounds).
7. Paragraph 4 of the grounds it is asserted that although the expert report was partially agreed with, the FtTJ failed to make clear at paragraph [25] how the expert assessment was made on an “ unstable foundation” or therefore strayed into advocacy. It stated that expertise of the expert was never challenged and it was unclear why she would not be capable of understanding and commenting on how Nigerian Royal families would operate.
8. Paragraph 5 asserted that the FtTJ failed to explain how the civil registration system could not be used to trace someone in light of the appellant’s claim that the family were wealthy. Thus, the FtTJ erred in law by asking itself whether the family could exert authoritative control as a Royal family over national agencies ( and see paragraphs 6-8).
9. Paragraphs 9-10 asserted that the FtTJ misapplied the test of internal relocation and that it was not necessary to show persecution anywhere in Nigeria in order to succeed and that the family cannot be expected to relocate to a slum and that the FtTJ failed to consider whether relocation was reasonable.
10. Permission to appeal was granted by a FtTJ on 30 April 2026.
11. Following this the appeal was listed for hearing on 19 June 2026 as set for 22 July 2026. On 20 July 2026, an application was sent to me directly and to the respondent seeking to amend the grounds of challenge. This was later uploaded to the CE File. At the hearing submissions were made by Counsel for the appellant in support of the application to vary the grounds of appeal. At the conclusion of those submissions Mr Diwnycz, who at that stage represented the respondent, provided his response whereby he did not oppose the application to amend the grounds although he was not able to address the merits of those additional grounds. There were some aspects of the amended grounds which required clarification and in the circumstances the appeal was adjourned with directions that on the basis that the respondent should provide her Rule 24 response dealing with both the original grounds and the amended grounds, although no formal decision had been made on the application for permission to rely on the amended grounds. Having reflected on the circumstances and in view of the respondent’s stated position that there was no opposition to the amendment of the grounds, and the direction made at the hearing, that a case management order should be made to reflect that. I therefore granted permission for the amended grounds and gave reasons for doing so in a decision and directions dated 10 August 2026.
12. The hearing took place on 30 September 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was represented by Counsel Mr Greer who did not appear before the FTT. The respondent was represented at the hearing by Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer. Prior the hearing Mr Wain had filed and served a Rule 24 response as directed and Mr Greer had also filed a Rule 25 response. Both advocates confirmed that they had been able to consider each parties respective written submissions as contained in those documents.
13. I heard submissions from each of the advocates. It is not necessary to set out the submissions as they are matter of record and they will be considered in the analysis of the issues as set out below.
14. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give and by reference to the decision of the FtTJ, the material before him and in the context of the submissions made, both oral and in documentary form as advanced by both advocates.
Discussion:
15. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
16. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal's decision in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm AR 535.
17. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
"There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen's summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
'It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see  AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 ;  [2008] AC 678  per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see  MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2010] UKSC 49 ;  [2011] 2 All ER 65  at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see  R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal   (Social Entitlement Chamber)   [2013] UKSC 19 ;  [2013] 2 AC 48  at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.
18. Mr Greer helpfully summarised the grounds he relied upon by reference to the original grounds and the amended grounds. In doing so he confirmed that he did not seek to advance the argument in the original grounds ( paragraphs 2-3) where it has been argued that the FtTJ had erred in addressing internal relocation before sufficiency of protection. This was the principal ground addressed by the FtTJ who had granted permission to appeal.
19. The appellant claimed asylum on 3 February 2024. It follows that the legal framework applicable to this appeal is that set out in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”) which applies only in relation to a claim for asylum made on or after 28 June 2022.
20. The relevant NABA provisions are as follows:
21. S.32 of NABA describes the approach to be taken when determining whether an asylum seeker's fear of persecution is well-founded, for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, and provides as follows:
(1) In deciding for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention whether an asylum seeker's fear of persecution is well-founded, the following approach is to be taken.
(2) The decision-maker must first determine, on the balance of probabilities—
(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic.
(See also section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (asylum claims etc: behaviour damaging to claimant's credibility).
(3) Subsection (4) applies if the decision-maker finds that—
(a) the asylum seeker has a characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a) (or has such a characteristic attributed to them), and
(b) the asylum seeker fears persecution as mentioned in subsection (2)(b).
(4) The decision-maker must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence)—
(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and
(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.
(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation).
22. JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 encapsulates these into five questions. This is said to require first determining on the balance of probabilities whether:
(i) Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, there is a convention reason?
(ii) The Appellant fears persecution for that convention reason?
And if so, then determining whether it is reasonably likely that:
(iii) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(iv) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(v) The Appellant could not internally relocate.
23. The FtTJ correctly set out the applicable legal framework at paragraphs 10-13 of the decision. Whilst the original grounds sought to advance an argument that the FtTJ had erred in the sequence in which he had considered the issues of internal relocation and sufficiency of protection that is no longer advanced.
24. The appropriate approach to the issue of reasonableness is set out in Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5, [2006] 2 AC 416, AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678 and SC (Jamaica) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 15; [2022] 1 WLR 3190. In Januzi Lord Bingham gave guidance on the proper approach at [21]:
“The decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so…there is…a spectrum of cases. The decision-maker must do his best to decide, on such material as is available, where on the spectrum the particular case falls … All must depend on a fair assessment of the relevant facts.”
25. In ASJ (Somalia) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 282. Lewis LJ said at [28]:
“There is a danger of overanalysing and over-refining the relevant test. As Lord Bingham observed in relation to questions of internal relocation in AH (Sudan) at paragraph 5, “the difficulty lies in applying the test, not in expressing it”. The decision-maker must decide whether it would be unduly harsh, and so unreasonable, to expect the person claiming protection to relocate internally within his country of origin. In answering that question, the decision-maker must have regard to all the relevant circumstances of the person claiming protection and his country of origin as explained in Januzi and AH (Sudan), see the quotations set out at paragraphs 11 and 12 above. That has been described as a “holistic assessment, encompassing all relevant considerations” (see per Underhill LJ in AS (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 873, [2019] 1 WLR 5345 at paragraph 68). Having considered all the circumstances, it must decide whether it would be unduly harsh, and so unreasonable, for the person to relocate internally within his country of origin.” His Lordship went on at [41]:
“…as a matter of principle, consideration of internal relocation is an aspect of whether a person can establish that any fear of persecution is well-founded within Article 1A of the Refugee Convention (see the observations of Lord Bingham at paragraph 7 of his judgment in Januzi). If that is correct, then, strictly, the burden is on the appellant to show to a reasonable degree of likelihood that internal relocation would be unduly harsh and so unreasonable. In practice, however, decisions of internal relocation are unlikely to be determined or influenced by considerations of the burden of proof. The appropriate approach is that set out in Januzi, AH (Sudan), and SC (Jamaica). The question the decision-maker has to decide is whether it would be unduly harsh, and so unreasonable, for a person to relocate internally within his country of origin. That will involve the decision-maker considering all the relevant circumstances. In the light of the view that the decision-maker forms of the circumstances, the decision-maker will then decide whether internal relocation is unduly harsh, bearing in mind that that is a high threshold to cross.
26. The grounds seeks to challenge the issue of internal relocation and seek to do so by reference to the FtTJ’s treatment of the expert report. Paragraph 25 of the FtTJ’s assessment is challenged on the general grounds of fairness and that it amounted in substance to a finding made that the expert failed to maintain the independence and objectivity required of an expert when no such criticism was advanced on behalf of the respondent. The phrase “strayed into advocacy” is the focus of the submissions and it is asserted that this was a “significant adverse finding” and that the informed reader is unable to understand why it was made.
27. Having had the opportunity to hear the submissions and consider them in the context of the documentary material and the issues raised, I am satisfied there is no error of law on the basis advanced. My reasons are as follows.
28. The submissions were described by Mr Greer as a “knockout blow” in other words if there was any unfairness on the part of the FtTJ at the hearing the decision cannot stand whatever reasoning was applied subsequently ( see paragraph 8 of the Rule 25 reply and oral submissions).
29. In this context it is accepted on behalf of the respondent that if the expert’s independence either as an expert or as a witness was impugned by the FtTJ that would be a matter that should have been raised with the parties. However, the position maintained by the respondent is that the FtTJ did not make any assessment or finding that the expert was not acting independently but what the FtTJ was considering at paragraph 25 was the weight going to aspects of that report.
30. I begin by setting out some general observations relating to the role of a judge and expert evidence. It is the judge’s role to determine the issues based on the evidence adduced by the parties. There is a long-standing rule in civil proceedings that a party is required to challenge by cross examination the evidence of any witness of the opposing party on a material point that they wish to submit to the court that evidence should not be accepted. This provides the witness with an opportunity to explain any contradiction or alleged problems with their evidence. This is often referred to as the rule in Browne v Dunn (18930 6R 67), and as explained in Griffiths v Tui(UK)Ltd [2023]UKSC 48. The rule extends to expert witnesses as well as to witnesses of fact and also the principles apply the field of public law (see Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201. The rule is not applied rigidly and its application depends on the circumstances of each individual case and the criterion of the overall fairness of the trial.
31. In terms of the reformed procedure, which is applicable to the FTT, it requires the parties jointly to focus on identifying matters which require to be decided and to concentrate on the material bearing upon those issues.
32. In general terms the FtTJ as the factfinder reaches his or her conclusions having assessed all the evidence which includes the expert evidence provided.
33. As stated in Griffiths v Tui UK Ltd (as cited) at [37], Because an expert’s task is to assist the judge in matters outside the judge’s expertise, and it is the judge’s role to decide the case, the quality of an expert’s reasoning is of prime importance.” When dealing with expert evidence a country expert report, I take into account what was said in MS (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2021]EWCA Civ 941 at paragraph [61] where it was held: “it is trite that a tribunal of fact is not bound to accept expert evidence where it disagrees with that evidence .That is so even if the expert witness is not cross-examined. The tribunal of fact is entitled, and obliged, to examine the analysis and reasoning in the expert’s report. It is obliged to reach its own conclusions on any questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact and law, which it must decide in order to determine a case. It may accept guidance from expert on its questions but it is not obliged to accept it.”
34. Laing LJ , who gave the only reason judgement of the court went on to conclude at paragraph [62] of the judgment that: “I would reject any suggestion that the UT was obliged to accept the conclusions in paragraph G of the brief summary, just because they were the conclusions of an experienced expert. The UT was entitled, and obliged, to ask itself whether those conclusions were rational conclusions, and whether, and if so, to what extent they were supported by the material cited in the report. The more inscrutable an expert’s conclusion is, the less likely to set a tribunal of fact will be obliged to accept it.”
35. In other words, it is therefore for the FtTJ as a tribunal of fact to decide whether to accept or reject any piece of evidence, including expert evidence.
36. Turning to the present appeal, the respondent did not contend that the expert lacked the requisite qualifications, experience, or expertise to provide an opinion on the issue of FGM. Rather, the challenge advanced in the respondent’s review was directed to particular aspects of the report and the weight that ought properly to be attached to them by the First-tier Tribunal Judge. That challenge did not amount to an assertion that the expert lacked independence. Instead, it was relevant to the assessment of the weight to be attached to the report’s conclusions concerning the identified risk factors, including matters relating to internal relocation and the availability of a sufficiency of protection.
37. Returning to the decision, whilst paragraph 25 was the principal focus of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary, in my judgment, to consider the decision as a whole as this reflects on the issue of whether the FtTJ did consider that the expert either lacked objectivity or independence as asserted.
38. When viewed in its entirety, it is apparent in my view that the First-tier Tribunal Judge undertook an assessment of the evidence that was consistent with the approach set out in the authorities relied upon in the grounds of appeal and that the FtTJ undertook a careful assessment of the expert report in the context of the evidence “in the round”.
39. In addressing the factual and legal issues arising in this appeal, including those relating to the risk of FGM, internal relocation, and the availability of a sufficiency of protection, the judge plainly took account of the expert evidence. At paragraphs 16 and 17, the judge set out and considered the relevant passages from the expert report. The report was then assessed alongside the respondent’s country evidence contained in the CPIN (see paragraphs 17 and 18). The judge returned to that evidence in his conclusions at paragraph 21, where he expressly stated that he preferred the evidence contained in the expert report on the matters in dispute.
40. In considering the issue of internal relocation, the FtTJ identified the factors relevant to the assessment. In that regard, he considered the respondent’s position as reflected in the CPIN (see paragraphs 22 and 23), which he found properly identified the personal circumstances commonly relevant to an individual’s ability to relocate internally. Those circumstances included gender, marital status, ethnicity, religion, educational background, and employment prospects, amongst other matters. The FtTJ considered those factors in conjunction with the evidence contained in the expert report and concluded that both the CPIN and the expert evidence were broadly consistent in recognising that the viability and reasonableness of internal relocation depended upon an individual’s particular personal circumstances. That approach was consistent with the applicable jurisprudence governing the assessment of internal relocation.
41. Standing back and considering the decision in the round, I am satisfied that the FtTJ properly evaluated the country evidence relied upon by both parties in a fair and permissible way. He did not seek to reject the contents of the expert report on the basis that the expert lacked objectivity but fairly assessed the report. He compared and contrasted the competing sources of evidence before him and from both parties, assessed their respective cogency, and determined which evidence he considered more persuasive and therefore deserving of greater weight. That was an approach that was plainly open to him and discloses no error. It demonstrates that he approached his evaluative task with care and did not seek to impugn the expert’s independence.
42. I am satisfied that the FtTJ at paragraph 25 was addressing the adequacy of its reasoning rather than seeking to criticise the expert’s objectivity. To consider this it is necessary to look at other paragraphs of the decision. At paragraph 24 the judge assessed the evidence including that which related to the asserted profile of the appellant’s husband’s family and their social standing and influence. The FtTJ referred to the family background and the appellant’s evidence that they held influence across central and western Nigeria due to their royal status. He recorded her oral evidence that they were prominent in the banking sector were very wealthy and had the means to locate anywhere in Nigeria.
43. In this context the judge referred to the submission made by Counsel who then appeared for the appellant and who had referred the judge to sections of the expert report which related to the Royal household. As recorded by the FtTJ this was relied upon by Counsel in support of the appellant’s evidence. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to direct his attention to the parts of the report identified by Counsel and as relevant to the assessment of that evidential issue. The FtTJ therefore referred to the section in the report set out at paragraph 53.
44. It is not in dispute that the FtTJ correctly summarised the contents of the report at paragraph 53 or that at paragraph 54. The expert could not confirm or deny the authenticity of the letters provided and the expert was not familiar with the (X redacted name of royal house) or with the letterheads they use. At paragraph 54, the expert referred to the name being derived from Yoruba but also that she did not know about the status of royal house in the hierarchy of royalty but placed weight on the fact that he was called by that particular name. The expert therefore stated that “as such the family will enjoy an elevated status and considerable influence within their respective home grounds…”
45. Paragraph 25 of the FtTJ’s decision took account of the evidence in this regard and in the section that referred to the availability of protection. At paragraph 44 the expert referred to the royal and influential paternal family and at paragraph 45 the expert referred to corruption in Nigeria of state officials and police ( also see paragraph 50). Whilst the expert’s opinion was that the appellant’s husband belonged to an influential Royal family who practiced FGM and that the appellant could be at a severe risk irrespective of where she resided, the expert considered that would be little reason for the police to provide protection because of his father’s influence.
46. Pausing there, the assessment in the earlier paragraph preceded the assessment made profile of the appellant’s husband’s family which is set out at section (d) and assessed by the judge at paragraph 24.
47. This leads to paragraph 25 where the FtTJ also took into account the expert’s view that there was widespread corruption in Nigeria and that the existence of the civil registration system would enable the appellant to be found through bribery if she relocated. The FtTJ then turned to the expert report where it was considered that relocation would lead to effective destitution because they could not risk using the civil registration system because of the husband’s families reach. This again reflected the contents of the report at paragraph 51, where the expert report referred to the “An extended Royal family will obviously have elevated social status and will be even more able to exert its influence both vis-à-vis it’s individual family members and state authorities. As there are many bankers in the family concerned, they will also have considerable financial resources at their disposal which elevates them well above the large majority of Nigerians.” Also see paragraph 52 where reference is made to the police being less inclined to interfere when being asked (and likely paid) for their noninterference by “influential members of the Royal family” and that the paternal family would be more able to make the police act in its interests and that this seems “obvious given the correct nature of the Nigerian police and the positive or indifferent attitude towards FGM and the lack of influence and resources” on the parents part. At paragraph 58 the expert referred to the civil registration system and made the link between the increased risk of being located by the paternal family in the context of corruption and that it would be possible for someone determined to find out that person’s whereabouts. At paragraph 65 the expert referred to the paternal family being able to locate them.
48. In my judgement the FtTJ summarised the contents of the report albeit briefly but by reference to the key points identifying the issue of the Royal family and their asserted influence, wealth and ability to locate the family in the context of the risk of FGM but also in the context of the oral evidence given by the appellant which the expert would not have had the opportunity of either hearing or considering. That was set out in paragraph 28, where he recorded that when pressed on the specific means or motivation that her husband’s family would have to locate them elsewhere in Nigeria, the appellant was unable to provide details other than an assurance that it could be done. He recorded the cross-examination and that she clarified that there were countless loyal families in Nigeria, that there are multiple Royal families in X state alone and the royal status denotes being the head of one particular village. On that basis the judge was entitled to find that in light of what the expert had stated at paragraphs 53 and 54 and as relevant the risk on relocation, that this was based on an “unstable foundation”. The grounds focus on the words that follow namely “strayed into advocacy” without considering the whole of that sentence or in fact the decision when read as a whole. When the decision is so read, it is plain in my view that the FtTJ had undertaken a careful analysis of the expert report and had not sought to challenge the independence of the expert, nor had the judge failed to consider the paragraphs in their context and that of the report generally.
49. I reject the submission made that the FtTJ had failed to consider that internal relocation was not grounded on the position of the in-laws but related to a number of reasons. The instructions sent to the expert were set out as five issues (see page 1 of the report). Issue two stated, “the availability of protection available to the client and the family should they return to Nigeria, given the risks posed by her husband’s family. Issue three stated “the impact that client has been being part of the Royal family has on the risk of his daughter would face in terms of being subjected to FGM. If possible, comment on the existence of the ex-royal family and the veracity of the letters which have been provided by the client. Issue four reads as follows, “whether the client and her family will be able to relocate to another town or city within Nigeria to flee from her husband’s family.” A large part of the opinion sought was an assessment of the issue of protection in the context of the family and was expressly asked to consider the impact of the appellant’s husband’s family being part of the Royal family and the risk in terms of FGM. Also, the expert was expressly asked to comment upon the existence of ex-royal family and the veracity of the letters provided. The expert was therefore expressly asked to give an opinion on the position of the family in connection with the royal status and also its influence. Extraneous evidence in the form of letters which have been purported to have been written by the family on a particular letterhead were also referred to in the instructions and the expert was asked to provide her opinion on the veracity of those letters. The content of those letters made reference to their considerable influence. The expert was unable to comment on the veracity of those letters however the FtTJ was able to assess their reliability in the content of the evidence taken “ in the round.”
50. The contents of the report did consider the position of the family members in the context of their Royal, higher and influential status and as relevant to the issues (see paragraphs 44, 51, 52, 54, 58 and by inference paragraph 65). Therefore ,the profile of the family were linked to the issues raised as relevant to internal relocation therefore properly an issue to be addressed by the FtTJ.
51. Whilst Greer submits that by reference to paragraph 25, that the FtTJ did not set out in his decision which parts of the report were discounted by reference to the words “ unstable foundation “and strayed into advocacy” and thus failed to give adequate reasons, that submission is addressed by the matters set out above and by reference to the extended family.
52. Where the FtTJ referred to the assessment of risk in relation to it being based on an unstable foundation, it was that issue that the FtTJ was referring to and the underlying factual assessment which relied on evidence given by the appellant as to the position and the extent of their Royal and influential status. I do not consider that the reference to “strayed into advocacy” was meant to imply that the expert was not independent. In this respect I accept the submission made by Mr Wain that the FtTJ was in essence assessing the weight he could attach to the reasoning in the report and thus that which underpinned her overall conclusions on the issue of internal relocation but also in the context of the factual evidence. The FtTJ was required to consider that evidence which he did between paragraphs 28 – 29. The advantage that the FtTJ had on this issue was that unlike the expert he was able to survey the whole evidential canvas including the oral evidence given by the appellant on this factual issue and as underpinning the assessment of risk. In addition, the FtTJ set out the appellant’s evidence at paragraph 24 and the lack of evidence from the expert in this regard at paragraph 25. At paragraph 28 the judge assessed the appellant’s oral evidence and was entitled to find that her inability when pressed on the issue of specific means and motivation that the family would have to locate her elsewhere Nigeria, the appellant was unable to provide any evidence other than to assure that it could be done.
53. I also refer to the findings made at paragraph 29 which concerned evidence that the expert did not consider and that in the light of the appellant’s evidence that there were countless loyal families in Nigeria and that there were multiple Royal families in X state alone that by reference to the population and the sheer number of royal families as described by the appellant it was unlikely that any one family would command national reach.
54. In addition, the FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant’s evidence was discrepant in important respects. The ASA and set out that the appellant’s evidence was that the family had links to the government and the police. However, that was not consistent with her account at interview where she stated that they had no such links. Other relevant findings of facts were made at paragraph 15 where the judge made a finding that the letters from Nigeria which reportedly came from the family were not reliable documents upon which he could place weight. The FtTJ was entitled to proceed on the basis that it was not established of the family had any links with the police or the authorities despite the claim made that they were wealthy bankers with royal status -it had not been shown they had such influence. The FtTJ was entitled to reject that factual premise.
55. In relation to the challenge to the expert report, neither the original grounds nor the amended grounds are accompanied by a copy of the Record of Proceedings or any summary of the submissions made at the hearing by Counsel then instructed. In those circumstances, it has not been established on what basis Counsel advanced submissions concerning the expert evidence, or how any criticisms made by the respondent as to the weight to be attached to particular aspects of the report were addressed. It is, however, apparent from the decision itself that these matters were explored during the hearing and as raised in the review. In my view the FtTJ’s reasoning in the decision either at paragraph 25 or when reading the decision as whole demonstrates that he was not challenging the objectivity of the expert but that he was addressing particular challenges made to the expert evidence and considered them in the context of the evidence as a whole and reached conclusions as to the weight properly to be attached to the report in that context.
56. The relevant principles of fairness as set out in Abdi v ECO (see paragraphs 29 – 30) demonstrate that what fairness requires is essentially an intuitive judgement which depends on the context. Such principles cannot be applied by rote and an overall judgement must be made in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.
57. In conclusion I am satisfied that the respondent did not seek to assert that the expert did not have the requisite experience or knowledge to be such an expert but what was in issue was the factual account of the appellant viewed in the context of the report and thus the weight that the judge could attach to various areas of the report. The parties were on notice of those general issues from the respondent’s review. It was not suggested by the respondent that there was any issue of a lack of independence on the part of the expert nor do I find that the reference at paragraph 25 could properly be viewed as a suggestion that the expert was not independent. The words “strayed into advocacy” may have been an infelicitous use of phrase but when read in the context of the sentence as a whole and importantly in the context where the FtTJ was referencing the assessment being based on an “unstable foundation”, I am satisfied that the judge was addressing the issue of the weight to be attached to the reasoning in the report and by reference to the profile, influence and social standing of the extended family. The expert’s task is to assist the judge in matters outside the judges experience but it is for the judge to decide the quality of the expert’s reasoning.
58. I reject the submission that the judge was in any way impugning the independence of the expert. He did not do so. When reading the contents of the decision as a whole, the undertook an assessment of the report giving weight to parts of the report that the FtTJ merited such weight and identified the parts where he did not accept the reasoning. That was consistent with his duty to take account of all the evidence “in the round” and being able to survey the whole evidential canvas which was available to him at the hearing. It follows in my judgement that it has not been demonstrated that there was any unfairness on the part of the FtTJ.
59. I now turn to the grounds which seek to challenge the adequacy of the reasons given when assessing the issue of internal relocation.
60. The original grounds differ somewhat to the amended grounds. Paragraphs 9 to 12 of the original grounds assert that the FtTJ erred in law by focusing on the issue of persecution in other areas rather than considering the relevant threshold of whether it was reasonable to relocate. Whilst the grounds referred to AAH (Iraq) I can see no relevance in the citation of that case which was made in a wholly different evidential context and in a different country context. Nor is there any merit in the suggestion the judge failed to consider the correct test of reasonableness or undue harshness. The FtTJ’s conclusions on internal relocation were based on the individual personal characteristics of the family concerned and the FtTJ referred in his decision to being able to relocate “without undue hardship” (see paragraph 31).
61. Dealing with the points raised in the amended grounds, Mr Greer characterised the challenge as a “reasons challenge” and that there was an adequacy of reasoning on the part of the FtTJ.
62. When assessing internal relocation, the FtTJ properly set out that both the expert report and the CPIN identified that this would entail consideration of relevant personal factors such as gender, marital status, ethnicity, religion, education and employment prospects. This is consistent with the legal authorities and the individual assessment required for determining whether relocation would be unduly harsh or unreasonable.
63. The grounds and the submissions focus upon paragraph 30 of the decision and contend that the judge failed properly to identify a place of relocation. It is argued that the reference to a wide range of relocation options amounted to a material omission because the question of relocation had to be assessed through the lens of the appellant's cultural, linguistic and tribal circumstances.
64. I am not persuaded that the decision discloses an error of law on that basis. The respondent's decision letter, which pre-dated the commissioning of the expert report, addressed the issue of internal relocation and, by reference to section 35 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, concluded that there was freedom of movement within Nigeria and that the appellant and her family could relocate to Abuja or another area of their choosing.
65. In my judgment, the grounds mischaracterise the FtTJ's reasoning at paragraph 30. The FtTJ was not there identifying every potential destination to which the appellant might relocate. Rather, he was addressing the appellant's evidence that she and her husband could not realistically live elsewhere because they had established a life in their current location and that she would be unable to work or integrate in another area. The FtTJ rejected that aspect of the evidence by reference to the appellant's own immigration history and chronology. He found it difficult to reconcile those assertions with her evidence that she had previously lived in Lagos, Okeagbe, Abuja, Bauchi, Ado Ekiti and Osogbo and had successfully sustained herself in each of those locations. The significance of those findings was that they undermined the claim that relocation, of itself, would be unduly harsh or unreasonable.
66. Furthermore, paragraph 30 cannot be read in isolation. Earlier in the decision the FtTJ had considered the country evidence, including the July 2024 CPIN, which identified large urban centres such as Lagos and Abuja as potential relocation areas. The judge's conclusion that the appellant had a range of relocation options was reached against that particular evidential background.
67. More importantly, the FtTJ did not overlook the cultural, ethnic and linguistic factors relied upon by the appellant and the expert. On the contrary, those matters formed part of his analysis. The FtTJ considered the appellant's Yoruba ethnicity, the fact that both she and her husband were Yoruba, and the availability of support from members of her family, including her mother and sister, none of whom supported the practice of FGM. The appellant's evidence was that her mother regarded the practice as no longer occurring in her own state ( see interview response). Those were all matters bearing on both risk and the availability of support.
68. Equally, the FtTJ was aware of the expert's opinion that relocation to an area where the family lacked linguistic and cultural connections could result in social isolation and practical difficulties. Those matters were addressed at paragraphs 26 -31. The FtTJ considered the objective evidence and was entitled to conclude that any adverse consequences arising from opposition to FGM were more likely to involve familial disapproval, withdrawal of support, or social consequences rather than retributive violence. That finding was also relevant to the question of whether the family would have access to alternative support networks elsewhere.
69. Read fairly and as a whole, the decision demonstrates that the judge resolved the central issue identified by the parties. He accepted that there would be consequences arising from relocation and that those consequences might become more acute if the family were required to move away from Yoruba-majority areas. However, he did not accept that relocation would necessarily involve such a move. The FtTJ found that there were substantial areas of Nigeria with significant Yoruba populations and that the appellant had previously lived successfully in locations such as Lagos and Abuja. He further noted that Yoruba-majority populations existed across several states and that the Yoruba language was spoken widely over a substantial geographical area.
70. Those findings were directly relevant to the concerns identified in the expert report, particularly the view that successful relocation depended upon cultural and linguistic compatibility and the avoidance of social isolation. The FtTJ's reasoning was that the appellant would not be required to relocate to an area wholly disconnected from her ethnic, cultural and linguistic background. Rather, relocation could occur within areas where Yoruba communities were established and where the appellant had previously demonstrated an ability to live and support herself.
71. Viewed in that context, the judge gave adequate reasons for concluding that internal relocation would be reasonable and not unduly harsh. His reasoning addressed the factors identified in the expert report, including ethnicity, language, cultural integration and support networks. The reasons were concise, but they were sufficiently clear to explain why he concluded that the appellant could relocate to another part of Nigeria with a significant Yoruba population, and why he rejected the contention that cultural and linguistic barriers rendered relocation unreasonable.
72. The grounds raise the issue of civil registration as set out in the expert report (paragraphs 15-16) and the submission made that the assessment made by the judge was legally flawed. The issue of civil registration as raised at paragraph 58 was expressly considered in the context of the obligation to register leading to an increased risk of being located. However, the expert also stated that Nigerian officials and institutions including police were corrupt (also see paragraphs 46 – 50) and that those determined to find a person’s whereabouts could bribe an officer to access the system. This was further referenced at paragraph 65 in terms of social destitution and that the family would have to relocate to a place where the paternal family would find it difficult to locate them and to decrease the risk of being located they would have to avoid registration. In short, without being able to register in a place of relocation, that would severely increase the family’s risk of social destitution.
73. It is not demonstrated that the judge fell into error between paragraphs 24 – 25 or at paragraph 28 or by reference to the level of influence held by the family and its relevance to the issues. In this context the judge was entitled to take into account the evidence given by the appellant as to the profile of the family themselves and her inability to provide relevant factual detail as to the specific means of motivation they would have to locate the family. Whilst the civil registration system alongside corrupt officials provided a theoretical way of locating the family, the FtTJ was entitled to consider the evidence to demonstrate the link between those issues and the circumstances of the appellant. Notwithstanding the account that they were wealthy; the evidence of the appellant was inconsistent as to their social status. First, the evidence was that there were countless royal families in Nigeria, and multiple royal families in the state in which the family lived. The FtTJ addressed this at paragraph 29 and was entitled to find that it was unlikely that the family could command a national reach. I do not consider that the FtTJ failed to make any firm finding on the influence of family. The decision read as a whole makes it clear that the judge did not find that the appellant had given consistent evidence upon the level of their influence and social standing. Nor did he accept that the expert had been able to do so view of what had been set out in section “d” and the lack of evidence in support of the family save by reference to its “royal” name.
74. The evidence given by the appellant was that the family were wealthy and thus influential was not supported by the evidence that she gave and as recorded. When pressed when she was not able to link their social status and wealth to having any links with the police or the authorities therefore it did not support the claim that they would be in a position to influence corrupt officers. Further as to the specific risk from family the consideration of the evidence of the threatening letters by the FtTJ (see paragraph 15) was also relevant to the issue of current risk. The evidence before the FtTJ was that there had been no contact with the appellant’s husband’s family since May 2023 and the appellant did not leave until September 2023 and this underscored the finding made by the FtTJ that the appellant would be able to relocate as it had not been demonstrated that the family would be able to locate or wish to do so and had not done so during that period.
75. When the decision is read as a whole the FtTJ was entitled to proceed on the basis that it had not been demonstrated that the family had the motivation or the influence as claimed to locate the appellant in a different area outside of the home area taking into account the evidence before him.
76. The grounds also assert that the judge erred in law by failing to give reasons by reference to the social economic circumstances and/or social exclusion.
77. To some extent that has been addressed in the paragraphs above. The FtTJ was entitled to find on the evidence that the appellant and the family members would be able to locate to a Yoruba majority population area and that she had lived previously in such areas. As set out her mother and sister were Yoruba and neither they or she or her husband agreed with the practice of FGM. The appellant’s ability to relocate live in the majority Yoruba area addressed the issue of language and social exclusion as identified by the expert.
78. As to the other issues raised as to social destitution in the context of socio-economic circumstances, the expert refer to the importance of support or having a social network (see paragraph 63). The FtTJ addressed this with reasons between paragraphs 30 and 31. At paragraph 30 took into account the appellant’s previous ability to live in a number of different areas of Nigeria where she was both able to work but also able to integrate. He was entitled to find that the appellant’s evidence as to the stated difficulties of relocation was “at odds” which I take to mean to be inconsistent with the personal characteristics that she had already displayed, which he had described as “considerable initiative, resilience and resourcefulness required of the appellant to relocate her family UK at short notice, whilst eight months pregnant, her level of education, her previous employment, her husband’s previous employment and a continuing relationship with her family who could reasonably be expected to offer a degree of support even if that were remotely.” Those were personal characteristics that the FtTJ was entitled to identify as relevant to the issue of reasonableness of relocation. In particular, the level of education was that she had a BSE in Finance from a University in Nigeria and she had entered the UK as a student studying international business management and the FtTJ was entitled to place weight on that. He was also entitled to place weight that she had had previous employment as had her husband who was described as being employed as a firefighter. Importantly, the FtTJ addressed the issue of family support and was entitled to find that she had maintained a continuing relationship with her own family members including her mother and sister, neither of whom supported FGM and as such were reasonably to be expected to provide support for the family even if it were remotely. As submitted by Mr Wain on behalf of the respondent, it is of relevance that none of those issues had been considered in the expert report when assessing internal relocation in the context of social destitution, network of support or the economic conditions in Nigeria. It is not the case either that the appellant would be returning as alone with children but that she would be relocating with her spouse and upon whom the FtTJ found would also provide her with the necessary support.
79. In conclusion those were findings that were reasonably open to the FtTJ on the evidence and whilst his reasoning on internal relocation were given albeit briefly they were adequate, sustainable and evidence based.
80. The grounds also challenge the decision on the basis that the judge made internally contradictory findings on the issue of sufficiency of protection. Reference is made to the FtTJ having found that she would be at risk in X State and that the State would not provide an effective deterrent the FtTJ failed to explain why those deficiencies were insufficient when reaching his conclusion on State protection at paragraph 35 in the context of internal relocation.
81. Having considered the decision in its evidential context, I accept the submission made by Mr Wain that there is no contradictory finding on the issue of sufficiency of protection. Whilst the FtTJ reached the conclusion at paragraph 21 in favour of the appellant and that the family would be at risk of harm in the home area of X State, and there would not be an effective criminal sanction for FGM that was specific to X State as indicated by the final line of paragraph 21 and based on the appellant’s husband’s family originating from that area. That finding did not preclude the finding made that in a different place of relocation they would be a similar insufficiency of protection and the FtTJ was also entitled to consider the appellant’s own evidence on this issue at paragraph 35 and the more recent evidence that the appellant’s sister had sought police protection unlike previously, and that the appellant’s fear of persecution stemmed from a single group of nonstate actors, which he had also identified as not likely to locate the appellant and her family members in a place of relocation. It has therefore not been demonstrated that there was any contradictory finding.
82. In any event, the FtTJ found that it would not be unduly harsh or unreasonable for the family to relocate to a Yoruba majority populated city, where they would be able to reside in accordance with their culture and linguistic background, in circumstances where the family members had a level of education and previous work history and where they retained the family support of other members in Nigeria and where the FtTJ found that the family members, who did not have the profile, status and influence as asserted would either have the means or motivation to locate the family. Given those findings of fact made as to internal relocation, there was no need to go on to consider sufficiency of protection.
83. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.
20 October 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds