Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002412
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01823/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 September 2026

Before

The Hon. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

HANJARINA PIRETH OLIVEIRA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D. Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr G. Lee, Counsel instructed by Direct Access

Heard at Field House on 16 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

(1) Summary
1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“the Upper Tribunal”). The Upper Tribunal is an independent tribunal established by Parliament with powers set out in law. This decision is made as part of the Upper Tribunal’s role in deciding appeals against decisions of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“the First-tier Tribunal”).
2. For the sake of continuity, we will refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal, although technically the Secretary of State for the Home Department is the party who has appealed to the Upper Tribunal.
3. The appellant, Ms Oliveira, appealed against the respondent’s decision to refuse a human rights claim in the context of deportation proceedings which resulted from the appellant’s criminal convictions. The appellant lodged an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the NIAA 2002”). The appeal could be brought on the ground that removal from the United Kingdom would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA 1998”).
4. First-tier Tribunal Judge Cary (“the judge”) allowed the appellant’s appeal in a decision sent on 12 February 2026. The judge found that the appellant met the exception to deportation contained in section 117C(5) of the NIAA 2002, which provides, insofar as material, as follows:
“Exception 2 applies where C [i.e. the appellant] has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, …, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner … would be unduly harsh.”
5. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the party making the appeal show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
6. If the Upper Tribunal finds that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, then the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law, then the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal. In this decision, the Upper Tribunal is only deciding whether the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law.
7. We find that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law. Accordingly, that decision shall stand.
(2) Background
(2)(a) The First-tier Tribunal’s Decision
8. The appellant was unrepresented in the hearing before the judge. The judge heard from the appellant and her husband and was best placed to assess their evidence. The judge began his findings, at [18]-[22], by considering the evidence before him relating to the appellant’s offending history. He concluded, at [33] and [39]-[43], that the appellant was a “persistent offender” and therefore a “foreign criminal”, as that term is defined in section 117D(2)(c)(iii) of the NIAA 2002. Section 117C(1) provides that the deportation of a foreign criminal is in the public interest and section 117C(2) provides that, in the case of a foreign criminal such as the appellant, who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires their deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
9. Exception 1 did not apply. The judge then directed himself, at [44]-[47], to Exception 2, contained in section 117C(5), which we have set out above.
10. The appellant’s husband, Mr Weighon Cardoso de Melo, (“the husband”) is a “qualifying partner” as that term is defined in section 117D(1), because he is a naturalised British citizen. He was born in Brazil in 1977 and came to the United Kingdom in 2005. He and the appellant, who entered the United Kingdom in 2007, have two adult daughters who are resident in the United Kingdom.
11. At [48]-[53] the judge evaluated the evidence relating to the husband. The judge considered the documentary evidence, which showed that the husband was hit by a car in 2021, and accepted that there was evidence to show that the husband suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident. The judge accepted the husband’s oral evidence that he still required “extensive therapy to help him overcome his injuries”. The judge outlined, at [50]-[51], the evidence given by the husband at the hearing. The judge considered what assistance the husband might receive from his adult daughters, but concluded that they were busy with their own lives. There was insufficient evidence to show that they would be willing to assist with his care on a long term basis. Although the judge accepted that the husband might receive some support from the local authority, there was no evidence to suggest that such help was likely to be at the level provided by the appellant “if there are budget constraints either in the care provided by the state or any insurers of those responsible for his injuries”.
12. The judge said, at [52], that he could not see how the husband could be expected to return to Brazil. He found that there was evidence to show that the husband had been under the care of the Trauma Orthopaedic Service. He concluded that returning to Brazil would “significantly disrupt his care regime”. The judge took into account evidence referred to by the respondent relating to the health services in Brazil, but found that the respondent
“did not specifically address what help … might be available to him. He told me he has undergone 5 operations in the UK and would be understandably reluctant to switch to medical treatment in Brazil assuming it was available.”
13. The judge also noted, at [52], that the husband had not been back to Brazil since his accident, even though he has family there. At [53], the judge’s conclusion was:
“On a very narrow balance I am prepared to accept that [the] effect of the Appellant’s deportation on her husband would be unduly harsh in the context of the strong public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. He is not well and his current capacity to work is extremely limited. He has no experience of life without his wife since his accident apart from when she was in prison for some months in 2021. Simply because he was able to manage then does not mean that he would be able to manage long term if his wife was removed. Prison was temporary and short lived…. If a person can bring himself within an exception, he wins his human rights appeal against deportation, without more ado. It follows that I allow this appeal but decline to make a fee award as I have allowed this appeal principally but not exclusively on the evidence given at the hearing.”
(2)(b) Grounds of Appeal
14. The respondent’s grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal are not clearly particularised in accordance with the guidance given in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC). At the hearing, the grounds were formulated into two broad points:
(1) The First-tier Tribunal finding that deportation would be “unduly harsh” on the husband was based on a mistake of fact which was likely to have affected the reliability of the evidence given by the appellant. Information contained in the Police National Computer (“the PNC”), which was said to be attached to the grounds, indicated that the appellant was not truthful in saying that she had not committed any further offences since the index offence. In fact, she had a further conviction for common assault in 2024. The respondent relied in relation to this ground on MM (unfairness; E & R) Sudan [2014] UKUT 00105 (IAC), the headnote to which states as follows:
“(1) Where there is a defect or impropriety of a procedural nature in the proceedings at first instance, this may amount to a material error of law requiring the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (the “FtT”) to be set aside.
(2) A successful appeal is not dependent on the demonstration of some failing on the part of the FtT. Thus an error of law may be found to have occurred in circumstances where some material evidence, through no fault of the FtT, was not considered, with resulting unfairness (E & R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49).”
(2) The First-tier Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for its conclusions relating to the “unduly harsh” test. This ground of appeal had three aspects:
(a) The First-tier Tribunal failed to take into account the fact that there was little up to date documentary evidence relating to the husband’s healthcare needs. The respondent submitted that the husband had been able to return to work at a stone mason’s, which would involve manual labour. The lack of evidence, taken with the misleading evidence given by the appellant as to the absence of further offending on her part, materially damaged the credibility of the evidence given by both witnesses.
(b) The First-tier Tribunal reversed the burden of proof in the appeal when considering the question of the availability of healthcare in Brazil by stating that the respondent had not addressed what help the appellant’s husband would require. The respondent had established a prima facie case that Brazil has a functioning healthcare system which the appellant and the husband would be able to access on return. The appellant had failed to establish what treatment or care the husband required at the date of the hearing. It was reasonable to infer that his needs would have decreased in the five years since the accident.
(c) The First-tier Tribunal failed to explain why the appellant’s deportation could be said to be either “bleak” or “severe” for the husband. The First-tier Tribunal failed to consider the potential support available to the appellant or the husband from family members in Brazil or the support which might be available to him if he remained in the UK.
(2)(c) Application to Cross-Appeal
15. The appellant was unrepresented before the First-tier Tribunal. Counsel, Mr Lee, was instructed by direct access at a late stage on the day before the hearing in the Upper Tribunal. In his skeleton argument filed on the morning of the hearing, Mr Lee sought to make an application to cross-appeal in order to protect the appellant’s position in light of the Supreme Court’s recent grant of permission to appeal in the case of Molnar v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 31; [2026] WLR (D) 82.
16. During the discussion on this point, it became clear that there is some uncertainty as to whether any appeal was brought under the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020. Mr Lee pointed out that the Stage 1 deportation decision dated 1 August 2021 might not have been issued correctly because it did not outline a right of appeal under the relevant regulations even though the appellant was granted settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme in 2020. Mr Lee argued that the issue of EU law proportionality might still be relevant to the assessment of Article 8 under the European Convention. However, he accepted that if the Upper Tribunal found no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal decision the issue was likely to be immaterial.

(3) Decision and Reasons
17. We have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation which was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal and the submissions made at the hearing before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions, because they are a matter of record, but we will refer to any relevant arguments in this decision. First, however, we remind ourselves of the principles applicable to an appeal of this nature.
(3)(a) Relevant Appellate Principles
18. We bear in mind that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal, such as the First-tier Tribunal. In particular, judges of a specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22; [2022] INLR 425. The Upper Tribunal should not characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of the facts. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65. When it comes to the reasons given by the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the First-tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see Jones v FtT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48. Appellate courts or tribunals should not rush to find misdirections simply because they themselves might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] 1 AC 678, MM (Lebanon) v SSHD [2017] UKSC 10; [2017] 1 WLR 771 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693; [2021] Imm AR 1361.
(3)(b) Ground 1: Material Mistake of Fact leading to Flawed Credibility Findings
19. The respondent’s grounds of appeal set out information which is said to be taken from the PNC. It is said that the appellant was convicted of a further offence on 22 October 2024, for which she received a community order with a rehabilitation activity requirement, and a fine. The grounds state that the offence was “common assault; destroy or damage property (value of damage £5000 or less) & using threatening abusive insulting words/behaviour or disorderly behaviour to cause harassment/alarm/distress”. Beyond this bare statement, no further details of the offence are provided. The PNC is said to record that there were failures to comply with the requirements of the community order on 11 March 2025 and 16 September 2025.
20. No copy of the PNC print out was produced with the grounds or at the hearing before the Upper Tribunal. Although the appellant did not dispute the information, the respondent failed to provide an evidential foundation to underpin the first ground of appeal.
21. Mr Simpson argued that the appellant’s failure to bring this information to the attention of the First-tier Tribunal caused unfairness to the respondent. The appellant was under a duty not to mislead the judge when she was asked about her offending history. Mr Simpson argued that the information contained in the PNC was relevant to the reliability of the evidence given by the appellant at the hearing.
22. We can see nothing in the summary of the evidence contained in the First-tier Tribunal decision to suggest that the appellant was asked whether she had been convicted of any further offences since the index offence. The respondent has not produced the Presenting Officer’s note of the hearing to show whether or not the appellant was asked any direct questions in relation to this issue. The only reference appears to be at [11] of the decision, in which the judge recorded that he asked the appellant about her offending history and that she said that “she could remember very little about it.” The judge went on to refer to what she said about her convictions in 2013 and 2018, but there is no reference to the appellant being asked about more recent offences.
23. The further conviction in 2024 pre-dated the First-tier Tribunal hearing on 30 January 2026. The respondent would have had access to the PNC records at the time and could and should have produced a print-out for the First-tier Tribunal hearing if it was a relevant matter on which the respondent wished to rely. The purpose of adversarial proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal is to provide an opportunity for the parties to put their case. The respondent was represented at the hearing and had the opportunity to cross-examine the appellant on any additional matters which were raised by the information contained in the PNC records or on any false evidence given by the appellant in relation thereto. She did not do so. No explanation has been provided as to why the issue was raised for the first time in the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
24. In the recent decision of SSHD v OSB [2026] EWCA Civ 647; [2026] WLR (D) 289, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal brought by the Secretary of State from a decision of the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal had found that there was no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision allowing that appeal on human rights grounds. The Upper Tribunal had noted that the only ground of appeal argued by the Secretary of State at that stage was a failure to give adequate reasons. In the application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal it was argued that the First-tier Tribunal judge failed to address all aspects of the relevant legal test relating to Article 3 medical cases.
25. The Court of Appeal referred to the following passage in R (Talpada) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 841 at [67]-[69]:
“67. I turn finally to the question of procedural rigour in public law litigation. In my view, it cannot be emphasised enough that public law litigation must be conducted with an appropriate degree of procedural rigour. I recognise that public law litigation cannot necessarily be regarded in the same way as ordinary civil litigation between private parties. This is because it is not only the private interests of the parties which are involved. There is clearly an important public interest which must not be overlooked or undermined. In particular procedure must not become the master of substance where, for example, an abuse of power needs to be corrected by the court. However, both fairness and the orderly management of litigation require that there must be an appropriate degree of formality and predictability in the conduct of public law litigation as in other forms of civil litigation.
68. In the context of an appeal such as this it is important that the grounds of appeal should be clearly and succinctly set out. It is also important that only those grounds of appeal for which permission has been granted by this Court are then pursued at an appeal. The Courts frequently observe, as did appear to happen in the present case, that grounds of challenge have a habit of "evolving" during the course of proceedings, for example when a final skeleton argument comes to be drafted. This will in practice be many months after the formal close of pleadings and after evidence has been filed.
69. These unfortunate trends must be resisted and should be discouraged by the courts, using whatever powers they have to impose procedural rigour in public law proceedings. Courts should be prepared to take robust decisions and not permit grounds to be advanced if they have not been properly pleaded or where permission has not been granted to raise them. Otherwise there is a risk that there will be unfairness, not only to the other party to the case, but potentially to the wider public interest, which is an important facet of public law litigation.”
26. The Court of Appeal also considered what was said by the Upper Tribunal in Lata (FTT principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAT) at [34]:
“We consider that there exists a duty upon the parties to identify relevant issues of their own motion. There is no place for hiding a jewel of a submission in the hope that it will purchase favour on appeal. A party that fails to identify an issue before the FtT that it subsequently asserts to have been essential for a judge to consider is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before UTIAC. None of this is to say that a FtT judge is to entirely lack curiosity in relation to an aspect of a case that the judge requires further assistance with or which the judge considers should be examined as part of the evaluation of the case. Where, as here, a point has not been identified by the parties, and nor is it one which has independently drawn the attention of the judge, it is not an issue which can be appropriately raised for the first time in the context of an appeal to UTIAC.”
27. Finally, the Court of Appeal considered what was said in Singh v Dass [2019] EWCA Civ 360 at [15]-[18]:
“15. The following legal principles apply where a party seeks to raise a new point on appeal which was not raised below.
16. First, an appellate court will be cautious about allowing a new point to be raised on appeal that was not raised before the first instance court.
17. Second, an appellate court will not, generally, permit a new point to be raised on appeal if that point is such that either (a) it would necessitate new evidence or (b), had it been run below, it would have resulted in the trial being conducted differently with regards to the evidence at the trial (Mullarkey v Broad [2009] EWCA Civ 2 at [30] and [49]).
18. Third, even where the point might be considered a 'pure point of law', the appellate court will only allow it to be raised if three criteria are satisfied: (a) the other party has had adequate time to deal with the point; (b) the other party has not acted to his detriment on the faith of the earlier omission to raise it; and (c) the other party can be adequately protected in costs. (R (on the application of Humphreys) v Parking and Traffic Appeals Service [2017] EWCA Civ 24; [2017] RTR 22 at [29]).”
28. In OSB the Court of Appeal found that it was not open to the Secretary of State to seek to go behind the First-tier Tribunal judge’s findings of fact, but she was permitted to argue, even on the First-tier Tribunal’s findings of fact, that a point of law arose in relation to the Article 3 test in medical claims.
29. Having set out the background, and the relevant legal principles, it becomes apparent why the first ground fails to disclose an error of law.
30. First, the respondent had a fair opportunity to produce the PNC, to cross-examine the appellant about it and to make submissions to the judge about it at the First-tier Tribunal hearing. No adequate explanation has been provided for her failure to do so. It is no answer to the respondent’s own failure to say that there was a duty on the appellant to disclose a further conviction to the First-tier Tribunal of her own motion. The appellant was unrepresented and was unlikely to have relevant expertise in the law or procedure. The judge cannot be criticised for failing to consider evidence which was not before him. Nor was he obliged to search out this information on behalf of a represented party.
31. Secondly, the first ground fails to show how or why information about the further conviction might have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal. The conviction attracted a non-custodial sentence, which would not have changed the level of the appellant’s offending for the purpose of the statutory scheme contained in Part 5A of the NIAA 2002. The judge allowed the appeal with reference to the exception to deportation contained in section 117C(5). The judge considered whether deportation would have an “unduly harsh” effect on the appellant’s partner. The Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria) & Ors v SSHD [2018] UKSC 53; [2016] 1 WLR 5273 made clear that similar wording contained in the Immigration Rules at that time did not import a balancing exercise with reference to the relative seriousness of the offence. The fact that the appellant had been convicted of a further offence, which may or may not have been linked to her continued use of alcohol, was not likely to be material to the assessment under section 117C(5).
32. Although Mr Simpson sought to argue that the credibility of the appellant’s evidence about the level of care which she provides to her husband might have been affected by her failure to disclose a further conviction, this was a matter which could and should have been argued at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. It is not clear that this would have made any material difference to the outcome of the judge’s findings, given that the judge also heard evidence from the husband. The fact that the respondent failed to produce evidence which she later decided that she would like to rely on is an evidential error on her part and does not disclose an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
33. For these reasons, we conclude that the first ground fails to show that the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law.
(3)(c) Ground 2: Failure to give Adequate Reasons
34. It is important to note that, as we observed in the hearing without contradiction by Mr Simpson, the second ground does not argue that the judge’s decision relating to the “unduly harsh” test was irrational or otherwise outside the range of reasonable responses to the evidence. The argument was put squarely as a failure to give adequate reasons.
35. The appellant is said to be a Brazilian and Italian dual national with long residence and settled status in the UK. The husband is a British citizen who has lived in the UK for many years. Their now adult children are also long settled in the UK. There was evidence to show that the appellant’s husband had suffered serious and ongoing injuries after being hit by a car in 2021.
36. The appellant’s post-EU exit conviction relied upon by the respondent involved a serious traffic offence for which the appellant was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment. The judge found that the appellant had a series of convictions for offending relating to alcohol abuse which were sufficient to show that she was a “persistent offender” for the purpose of the statutory scheme. The appellant’s abuse of alcohol was said to be her way of coping with the effects of a serious past trauma. We note that her pre-EU exit offences were not considered sufficiently serious at the time to trigger EU deportation or to act as a bar to the appellant being granted settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme. However, the conviction in 2021 was the first time when the appellant was sentenced to serve a period of imprisonment.
37. It was a matter for the judge to consider, having heard from the appellant and the husband, whether she came within Exception 2. As we have said, the “unduly harsh” test did not import an exercise in balancing the effects of the appellant’s deportation on the husband against the relative seriousness of the appellant’s offences.
38. The respondent’s second ground makes a series of generalised submissions on the evidence. In our assessment, they amount to no more than disagreements with the judge’s assessment of the evidence and they do not disclose an error of law.
39. We have summarised the judge’s findings at [10]-[13] above. It is clear that the judge properly directed himself as to the relevant legal framework and understood that the test of “unduly harsh” was a stringent one. He went on to consider whether the appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on the husband in the light of the ongoing rehabilitation therapy which the husband receives in the UK. The judge considered both the situation if the appellant’s husband were to return to Brazil with his wife (“the go scenario”) or if he were to stay in the UK without his wife (“the stay scenario”). The initial hospital records from 2021 showed that he was seriously injured in a road traffic accident. Some evidence was produced from 2023 to show that the appellant’s husband was in receipt of PIP payments due to ongoing disability. Given that the appellant was unrepresented, little up to date evidence had been prepared for the hearing. Nevertheless, it was open to the judge to accept the oral evidence of the appellant and the husband relating to the up to date situation. The judge accepted the evidence given by the husband to say that he had returned to work on a limited basis, but was still not able to work full-time. He was still in receipt of ongoing weekly rehabilitation therapy.
40. The judge was also aware that the appellant and the husband continued to have some family connections in Brazil. He also considered the fact that medical treatment might be available there. The respondent’s argument that the judge reversed the burden of proof is without foundation, since the judge's reasoning did not rest on a finding that adequate treatment was unavailable in Brazil. Rather, it rested on the evidence that relocation would disrupt a long-established programme of treatment and rehabilitation in the United Kingdom. The judge also considered the possibility of additional support from their adult daughters or social services if the husband remained in the UK without the appellant. It is clear from his concluding paragraph that the judge considered it to be a borderline decision, given that the couple do still have some connections in Brazil.
41. We bear in mind that an appellate court will be slow to interfere with factual findings made by a specialist tribunal. Because the appellant was unrepresented, it seems that most of the evidence was given by the witnesses during the course of the First-tier Tribunal hearing. The judge was in the best position to hear and to evaluate that evidence.
42. We also take into account the fact that an appellate court or tribunal should not substitute its own view of the evidence simply because it might have come to a different conclusion. The Supreme Court gave the following guidance in AH (Sudan) at [30]:
“This is an expert Tribunal charged with administering a complex area of law in challenging circumstances….[T]he ordinary courts should approach appeals from them with an appropriate degree of caution; it is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the Tribunal will have got it right….They and they alone are judges of the facts…Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.”
43. The Court of Appeal in MM (Lebanon) cited with approval what was said in Mukarkar v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1045 at [40]:
“Factual judgments of this kind are often not easy, but they are not made easier or better by excessive legal or linguistic analysis. It is of the nature of such judgments that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case … The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law … Nor does it create any precedent, so as to limit the Secretary of State’s right to argue for a more restrictive approach on a similar case in the future. However, on the facts of the particular case, the decision of the specialist tribunal should be respected.”
44. We consider that the First-tier Tribunal decision is generous, given the stringent nature of the legal test and the fact that little up to date documentary evidence was produced by the appellant for the hearing. The judge himself indicated that it was a borderline decision. However, given that the appellant was unrepresented, it was open to the judge to evaluate and to give weight to the oral evidence given by the witnesses. It cannot be said that the case was devoid of any compelling or compassionate factors, given the serious and lasting nature of the injuries suffered by the appellant’s husband in 2021 and his long-standing connections and ongoing treatment in the UK. The respondent had the opportunity to test the oral evidence given by the appellant and her husband. The second ground simply reiterates submissions which were likely to have been made by the respondent at the hearing. We are satisfied that the judge’s reasons for finding that deportation would have an “unduly harsh” effect on the appellant’s husband are adequate to understand the basis of his decision. The second ground fails to identify any error of law which would have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal.
45. For the reasons given above, we conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.
(4) Notice of decision
46. The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
47. The decision shall stand.

The Hon. Mr Justice Lavender
President of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 September 2026