Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002414
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67261/2024
LP/10815/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8 September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Appellant
and

AJ
(anonymity direction made)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Khan, Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms K Soroya, Counsel Instructed by Turpin Miller LLP

Heard at Field House on 30 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I shall refer to the respondent as the appellant, as he was before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT).
2. This case concerns the application of Article 3 of the ECHR (“Article 3”). Article 3 states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. There is no dispute between the parties about the proper application of the law. Unlike protection under Article 8 (private and family life) which involves a proportionality assessment, Article 3 is an absolute non-derogable right. There is no balancing of competing interests. Protection against treatment protected under Article 3 is absolute. Properly applying the law an appellant’s criminality or character has no part to play in determining whether an appeal should be allowed on Article 3 grounds. For the purposes of Article 3 the appellant’s criminality and the risk he poses to the public is not material.
3. The appellant is a citizen of Morocco. His date of birth is 1 December 1994. He is a foreign criminal whom the SSHD wants to deport. He has been granted permission to appeal against the decision of the FTT (Judge Ripley) to allow his appeal on Article 3 ECHR grounds against the decision of the SSHD on 13 June 2024 refusing his human rights claim.
4. The issue before me is whether the FTT erred in law. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact-finding tribunal. I must not rush to find misdirections simply because I might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed myself differently. I must in accordance with established case law exercise judicial restraint (see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22 AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2008] AC 678; MN (Vietnam) v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 485).
5. I have concluded for the reasons that I will go on to explain that the grounds do not identify an error of law. I note that the author of the SSHD’s grounds of appeal is not the representative who attended the FTT hearing. The grounds raise issues that could have been but were not raised by the SSHD in her two reviews or at the hearing before the FTT. The SSHD is in her grounds seeking to advance the case on a different basis to how it was advanced before the FTT. Having considered the grounds in detail and Ms Khan’s submissions, I conclude that they amount to a disagreement with the findings of the FTT.
6. The appellant is subject to a deportation order made on 12 June 2024. He arrived in the UK in 2010 and was granted leave to remain when he was a minor. He is a foreign criminal. On 11 March 2021 he was convicted of wounding with intent contrary to s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of four years and three months. The appellant stabbed a fellow asylum seeker three times. He hit him with a frying pan several times in what was described by the sentencing judge as an attack without provocation or warning which left the victim with serious injuries. The sentencing judge rejected any suggestion that the victim had done anything to offend or intimidate the appellant. The judge commented that the appellant had conceded that he had been heavily using cannabis and that any psychosis and paranoia was drug inflicted.
7. The FTT found that the appellant was excluded from protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention by virtue of Article 33 (2). The judge found that he was excluded pursuant to s.72 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 on account of the danger he poses to the community. The appellant did not appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds.
The grounds of appeal
Ground 1
8. The decision of the judge that the appellant is seriously ill is irrational and or inadequately reasoned and or there is an error of fact. It is the SSHD’s position, at the time of the second review was that the appellant is not or was not seriously ill either at the date of the decision on 13 June 2024 or the date of the hearing.
Ground 2
9. The judge gave inadequate reasons or made a mistake of fact in finding that there is a real risk of the appellant being exposed to serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy.
10. There was no evidence recorded or finding made that the appellant was at the date of the hearing intent on ending his life on return to Morocco. The appellant did not give evidence. Based on his current presentation there is no clear and sustainable finding when or why the appellant might suffer from psychosis on return. The appellant is also without family in the UK and has no current treatment plan or medication regime. It begs the question why the same situation would cause the appellant a problem in the country of his birth other than the suggestion that he might be triggered on return due to an alleged sexual abuse as a minor. In any event, the reasoning in regard to the alleged sexual abuse at §64 of the determination is inherently speculative and relies entirely upon Dr Prangnell's assessment of the appellant's future presentation in Morocco. Dr Prangnell reached conclusions after a single interview in a solicitor's office in Oxford.
11. Dr Prangnell stated that although the appellant can manage his own personal care and access public transport, he requires support with daily living skills such as cooking at §66. The is unsustainable as there is no evidence that the appellant is being supervised by an adult social services care team.
Article 3 (health cases)
12. There is a two-stage test in Article 3 health cases endorsed by in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17:
(1) Has the person (P) discharged the burden of establishing that he or she is “a seriously ill person”?
(2) Has the applicant adduced evidence “capable of demonstrating” that “substantial grounds have been shown for believing” that as “a seriously ill person”, he or she “would face a real risk”:
[i] on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment,
[ii] of being exposed
[a] to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
[b] to a significant reduction in life expectancy”?
The decision of the FTT
13. The judge specifically engaged with whether the appellant is a seriously ill person at § 43-51. The paragraphs read as follows:
43. In the decision appealed against the respondent did not specifically dispute that the appellant was seriously ill. What was disputed was the absence of appropriate treatment. As pointed out in the respondent’s second review and argued by Mr White, the appellant has managed in the community since March 2023 without engagement with mental health services and it is not now accepted that he is seriously ill.
44.As set out above, since the appellant last gave evidence in 2023, he has spent long periods homeless and begging in the UK and in Europe. After being hosted by a family, he then suffered a psychotic breakdown and was sectioned and diagnosed with schizophrenia. He was subsequently accommodated by the respondent, committed the index event and spent 29 months in prison, taking antipsychotic medication for some of the time he was imprisoned.
45. Whilst the appellant has neither taken antipsychotic medication and nor suffered from a reported psychotic episode since April 2023, he has a diagnosis of schizophrenia, dissociative disorder with temporary amnesia, complex PTSD and a cognitive impairment. It is noted that at page 104 Dr Chisholm states that the appellant’s psychosis may be a psychotic disorder as a consequence of a TBI, rather than schizophrenia. I have stated above that I am satisfied that there is sufficient evidence in the form of regular references to a substantial scar on his head to conclude that the appellant has suffered from a TBI.
46. The appellant relies on the letter dated 21 January 2025 from a caseworker at Refugees Asylum seeker and Migrant Action (RAMA) (page 635–636) setting out the support they have provided the appellant. This includes spending time listening and talking with him, helping him to liaise with professionals and attend activities. They monitor his mental health so that they can obtain intervention if necessary. At page 11 of Dr Prangnell report (December 2025), the appellant stated that he was hearing voices but could not describe how often and also had paranoid thoughts that others would harm him and others could read his thoughts. The appellant is thus clearly continuing to have symptoms of paranoia.
47. The appellant’s medical history shows that he has not sought to access support when his mental health has deteriorated. He has been sectioned in the past. Additionally, before he committed the index offence those supporting him were very concerned that his mental health was deteriorating. He has self-harmed in the past including cutting himself and was sectioned after he set fire to his jacket and strangled himself in a dissociative state.
48. It is noted that in the sentencing remarks it is recorded that the appellant’s psychosis at the time of the index offence was cannabis induced. This followed from the appellant’s admission that he had been taking cannabis. I have not been provided with the pre-sentencing medical evidence. However, as pointed out by Dr Chisholm (page 39) none of the extensive medical evidence refers to cannabis use as a cause for the appellant’s psychosis. In any event, even if the appellant’s psychosis has in part been caused by cannabis use, there is a lack of evidence that this is no longer a risk factor. There is no evidence of any treatment for substance abuse.
49. In his original medical report, in October 2020, Dr Chisolm concurred with the available medical records that, if the appellant did not receive monitoring and support his life was at risk through misadventure or suicide and that he was at much higher risk of relapse to an acute psychotic episode (page 579).
50. In his second report (in January 2025) Dr Chisholm stated that the appellant is at risk of suffering further psychotic episodes and at significantly increased risk of suicide (p104). Without care his prognosis is very poor with the risk of death by suicide or harming others high (p104). In his latest report, dated 23 May 2025, and having considered the full medical records to-date, Dr Chisholm’s opinions remained the same.
51. Overall, I am satisfied that the appellant has established that he is seriously ill person.
14. Having found that the appellant had established that he is a serious ill, the judge addressed the second part of the test at §62-71 as follows:
62. Dr Chisolm has advised (page 104) that if the appellant failed to re-engage with psychiatry, he would experience acute psychotic episodes resulting in hospitalisation more frequently and for longer duration. In experiencing an acute psychotic episode, he would be unable to care for himself and have a significantly increase the risk of suicide (page 104). The appellant’s prognosis was very poor with a risk of death by suicide or harming others high. If removed to a place where there was not the support recommended his life would be in grave danger from self-harm, exploitation and death by misadventure (page 105). Dr Chisolm records that those with a TBI have a higher risk of suicide and that risk is further elevated because the appellant also has a psychotic disorder. He concludes that the appellant is statistically at very high risk of suicide (page 105).
63. On page 109 Dr Chisolm records that if the appellant is acutely psychotic, he will not be able to seek help in Morocco. Further, as the appellant needs were complex, Dr Chisolm thought it unlikely he would be able to seek help in Morocco even if he was not acutely unwell.
64. On page 18 Dr Prangnell states:
It is likely that a return to Morocco would precipitate an acute deterioration in AJ’s mental health and functioning. There is a high probability this would lead to attempts at self-harm and suicide (AJ had previously stated he would rather die than go back to Morocco). AJ previously stated that returning to Morocco would trigger memories of his past trauma and he has no effective coping strategies in place to manage this.
65. I am mindful that there is a lack of evidence that the appellant would be provided with accommodation or the means to meet his essential living needs in Morocco. In the statement prepared for this appeal the appellant has not provided any information about his elder sister Fatima or his brother Mohammed, who got drunk and set light to the house. The appellant has consistently stated that he had a very difficult upbringing in Morocco and was not provided for, and needed to work from a young age. He was not protected from abuse by either of these older siblings, or indeed his father.
66. I am satisfied that there is a real risk that none of these relatives would be willing to provide the support that this appellant requires, particularly to protect him from exploitation as a vulnerable individual (page 14 of Dr Prangnall’s report) and to encourage him to engage with mental health services when he shows signs of an acute episode of psychosis. Dr Prangnell summarises on page 16 that he finds the appellant to be vulnerable because of his impairment in problem-solving, memory, comprehension and mood regulation. He states that although the appellant can manage his own personal care and access public transport, he requires support with daily living skills such as cooking. His ability to manage even basic self-care would be impaired when he was acutely unwell (page 78) Dr Prangnell also notes that the appellant has a lack of insight into his illness (page 13) which would impede him seeking treatment himself.
67. In J v SSHD 2005 EWCA Civ 629 the Court of Appeal set out the test in Article 3 cases as follows. (i) the feared ill treatment must be of a minimum level of severity; (ii) a causal link must be shown between the act of removal and the inhuman treatment relied on; (iii) in a foreign case the Article 3 threshold will be particularly high; (iv) in principle it was possible for an Article 3 case to succeed on the basis of a risk of suicide and (v) in a foreign case of suicide risk it would be relevant to consider whether the fear of ill treatment in the receiving state was objectively well founded; if not, this would weigh against there being a real risk of there being a breach; and (vi) it would also be relevant to consider whether the removing and/or the receiving state had effective mechanisms to reduce the risk; if there were, this would also weigh against there being a real risk of a breach.
68. The Court of Appeal went on to say that the Tribunal was correct to consider separately the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in the UK, in transit and the country of arrival. In relation to the risk in the UK it would be open to the Tribunal to conclude that the risk of suicide in the UK would be adequately managed by the UK authorities. In relation to the risk of suicide on route the Tribunal was entitled to infer that the Secretary of State would take all reasonable steps to discharge her obligations under section 6 of the Human Rights Act and take judicial notice of the arrangements that the Secretary of State made to escort vulnerable persons on return. In relation to the risk of suicide in the country removed to, the Tribunal was entitled to take into account the evidence that there would be family support on return, in that case, and that the claimant would have access to medical treatment, and that any fears of persecution were not objectively justified.
69. In considering the relevant principles as set in J v. SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 629 the medical evidence shows that there is a causal link between removal and the increased risk of suicide. Whilst it is not argued that the appellant has a subjective fear of return, it is accepted that returned to Morocco would be return to a place where he suffered prior abuse, and that association would significantly exacerbate his poor mental health and also adversely affect his ability to seek treatment. I am not satisfied that this appellant would have access to family or other support in Morocco to monitor his health or encourage him to access services in the event of a psychotic episode developing or increased suicidal ideation. I am mindful that both experts were of the view that there was a real risk of a significant deterioration in the appellant’s mental health and Dr Chisholm was of the view there was a statistically high risk of suicide.
70. I am satisfied that the appellant has shown that there is a real risk that he would suffer a serious rapid and irreversible decline in his health. Both Dr Chisolm and Dr Prangnell what of the view that the appellant’s health with deteriorate rapidly if returned to Morocco. As set out above, Dr Chisholm has stated that the appellant will experience acute psychotic episodes that will occur more frequently and last longer. Such episodes involve flashbacks, entering a dissociative state, and wondering aimlessly and that the appellant is in grave danger of self- harm, exploitation of death. I am satisfied that the medical evidence overall establishes that there is a real risk that the appellant would suffer a serious rapid and irreversible decline in his health. I am not satisfied that it has been shown that a decline in the appellant’s health would be reversible because there is a lack of evidence that there would be any effective intervention.
71. In the alternative, I am satisfied the appellant has established that there is a real risk of a significant reduction in life as the risk of suicide is high and there is a lack of support to avert that risk in Morocco. I am satisfied that the appellant has shown that the risks set out in the AM Zimbabwe test apply.
72. I have already considered above the information relied on by the respondent and I am not satisfied that the respondent has shown that there are grounds to rebut the case established by the appellant that his return to Morocco would involve a breach of Article 3 and would expose him to the risk of inhumane and degrading treatment.
Conclusions
15. I heard submissions from the representatives with which I will engage in my conclusions. In addition, Ms Soroya relied on her Rule 24 response.
Conclusions: Ground 1
16. The judge noted at § 43 that at the time of the decision the SSHD did not dispute that the appellant was seriously ill. Her position had changed by the time of the hearing on the basis that the SSHD contended that the appellant had managed in the community since March 2023 without engagement with mental health services.
17. The judge had before her the appellant’s medical records from 2010 up until April 2025. There were reports from two medical experts. There were three medico-legal reports from Dr Chisholm, a Consultant Clinical Psychologist; dated 30 October 2020, 6 March 2025 and 23 May 2025. There was a report from Dr Prangnell, a consultant clinical neuropsychologist dated 12 December 2025. Their evidence was not challenged by the SSHD. Ms Khan in her submissions drew my attention to neither expert being a psychiatrist and that Dr Prangnell at§ 73 of his report deferred to the opinion of a psychiatrist. However, this concerned the correct medication to prescribe to the appellant. I do not agree that this undermines Dr Prangnell’s medical opinion. In any event, it was not a matter that was argued by the SSHD before the FTT. Similarly, that neither expert’s evidence was that they had referred the appellant to a community mental health team (or psychiatrist or other emergency mental health provider or arranged for an MRI imaging) undermines the findings of the judge, is not a submission that was advanced before the FTT and in any event, amounts to a disagreement with the findings of the judge. The judge was cognisant of the background.
18. Dr Chisholm said that the appellant reported repeated self-harm by cutting his arm. Dr Chisholm concurred with the diagnosis in the medical records of complex PTSD and schizophrenia. He was also of the view that the appellant was suffering from dissociative disorder that caused temporary amnesia and that there was a possibility of cognitive impairment. In Dr Chisholm’s report dated 6 March 2025 he opined that the appellant may have suffered traumatic head injury (TBI) because of the cognitive difficulty he had observed. He said that he may have a psychotic disorder because of a TBI rather than schizophrenia. He said the appellant probably has a learning disability. Dr Chisholm set out overlapping features of TBI, complex PTSD and psychosis. Dr Chisholm in his report in January 2025 opined that the appellant is at risk of suffering further psychotic episodes and at significantly increased risk of suicide. He said that without care his prognosis is very poor with the risk of death by suicide or harming others high. In his report dated 23 May 2025 his opinions remained the same.
19. Dr Prangnell diagnosed the appellant with complex PTSD, schizophrenia, dissociative depression disorder with fugue states, depression with a history of attempted suicide and self-harm by cutting and setting on fire, cognitive impairment, impairments consistent with the traumatic brain injury, impairments consistent with a diagnosis of neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism and unusual presentation of psychotic symptoms.
20. The SSHD accepted the expertise of Dr Chisholm and accepted the medical diagnosis of complex PTSD, schizophrenia and dissociative disorder. The SSHD did not advance any case that sought to challenge the expertise of Dr Prangnell. The SSHD’s representative accepted his expertise and conclusions (see §19 of the judge’s decision) although the presenting officer noted a lack of evidence of any cognitive impairment.
21. The judge throughout the decision noted that the appellant has not taken antipsychotic medication and nor has he suffered from a reported psychotic episode since April 2023. The judge was cognisant that the appellant was living independently and was not being supervised by the social services.
22. Despite the SSHD having accepted the medical evidence, the grounds of appeal contend that the medical experts did not consider whether the appellant was malingering or otherwise exaggerating his claimed disability. This is not the case. While Dr Prangnell did not consider in his report whether the appellant was feigning, Dr Chisholm did. This is mentioned twice by the judge (at §18 in respect of the first report and §21 in respect of his most recent report). While the grounds contend that the medical reports are written by psychologists (as opposed to psychiatrists) who are not and have not been responsible for the appellant's treatment, the main diagnoses were not challenged. Moreover, this was not an issue raised by the SSHD before the FTT.
23. The sentencing judge in 2022 was of the view that the applicant’s psychosis was as a result of drug use, with reference to the evidence of Dr Singh. The grounds contend that Dr Chisholm was therefore wrong to state that none of the extensive medical evidence refers to cannabis use as a cause for the appellant’s psychosis (§ 48 of Judge Ripley's decision). However, Dr Singh’s report was not before Dr Chisholm or Judge Ripley. Dr Chisholm was entitled to disagree with the conclusions in that report (which can be inferred from the sentencing comments). Dr Chisholm was talking about the medical evidence that was before him and not that before the sentencing judge, when he said that none of the extensive medical evidence refers to cannabis use as a cause for the appellant psychosis. This accurately reflected the medical evidence that he had seen. If the SSHD wanted to rely on the evidence of Dr Singh at the hearing before Judge Ripley, this could have been produced. In any event, this was not an issue raised in either of the SSHD’s reviews (11 March 2025 and 31 March 2025). The SSHD’s case was not advanced on the basis that the appellant was concealing drug use. This is an issue introduced in the grounds of appeal. While the OASYS report did not support that the appellant had in 2022 been diagnosed as psychotic or claimed to be intent on taking his own life, there was up to date evidence before the FTT that supported the appellant’s case.
24. The judge at§ 28 said that she was making an initial observation on the appellant's credibility in the light of the available medical evidence. She took into account that the appellant claimed to be Palestinian when he first claimed asylum and that she was satisfied that he was aware that this was not the case. However, there were aspects of the appellant’s account which the judge found to be consistent and credible. The judge was entitled to conclude that the observation about the appellant's credibility was not “directly pertinent to relevant findings for the purposes of Article 3”. The grounds say that this is “problematic”. The judge was not making a general statement about Article 3 and credibility; however, in this case she had before her powerful and cogent independent medical evidence which was not challenged and that supported the appellant's claimed mental health problems and was entitled to accept the medical diagnoses notwithstanding that the appellant had not been entirely truthful about his circumstances. The credibility findings were open to the judge on the evidence.
25. The judge was entitled to attach weight to the recent medical evidence. It is not the case that she did not deal directly with the SSHD’s argument that the appellant has not been seriously ill since 2020 or 2023. There was up to date which supported a finding that the appellant was seriously ill. Moreover, the judge was entitled to take into account that the appellant had been detained under s.2 MHA 1983. At §17 the judge recorded that the appellant was sectioned from 28 January 2020 until 27 February 2020. I do not agree with the grounds of appeal that the judge laboured under a misapprehension that he had been sectioned under s.3 of MHA. The judge was entitled to attach weight to the evidence of Dr Prangnell that the appellant had struggled to engage with treatment for his mental health problems which is “reflective of lack of insight into his illness, a symptom that is characteristic of schizophrenia”.
26. Moreover, the judge was entitled to take into account a letter from a caseworker at Refugee Asylum Seeker and Migrant Action (RAMA) dated 21 January 2025 which set out the support that they had provided the appellant which included spending time listening and talking to him, helping him to liaise with professionals and attend activities. They also monitored his mental health so that they can obtain intervention if necessary.
27. In the light of the diagnoses and the unchallenged medical evidence, the judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant was seriously ill. AM does not define seriously ill. It does not say that there must be an engagement with ongoing treatment. In any event, at the time of the hearing the appellant was getting some support and all the medical experts agreed that there was a risk of relapse. I accept Ms Soroya’s submission that the decision is adequately reasoned, and the judge considered all strands of the evidence: see §43-51.
28. The decision that the appellant is seriously ill was open to the judge on the evidence.
Conclusions: Ground 2
29. The judge found that there was insufficient psychiatric care available in Morocco. She found that there is a lack of evidence that there are community mental health services available to monitor the appellant's health and to step in should he begin to exhibit signs of an episode of acute psychosis. She found that should the appellant's health deteriorate to an extent that he needs to be hospitalised, the up to date evidence is that hospitals are already running at capacity and there is insufficient psychiatric care available.
30. The judge found that the appellant’s mental health is likely to deteriorate if he is removed and he is then likely to need to access treatment. She found that in those circumstances there is a real risk that the appellant would not be able to access the treatment he requires in Morocco.
31. While there was no direct evidence from the appellant that he was at the date of the hearing intent on ending his life on return to Morocco, the medical evidence supported the findings of the judge. The appellant did not give evidence. The judge noted that he had been diagnosed with cognitive impairment which Dr Prangnell said is likely to have arisen from long term learning difficulties but may also have been caused by a head injury. The judge noted at §26 that the presenting officer, Mr White, did not dispute that he has a cognitive impairment. The judge said that she was satisfied that the impairment may have had an impact on his ability to give a consistent, clear and chronological account throughout his asylum claim and appeal with reference to his earlier appeal in 2013 and the application of Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 702.
32. It was agreed by the experts that without treatment the appellant would have a psychotic episode. The judge was mindful that there was no evidence that the appellant had had a psychotic episode since he had stopped taking medication or receiving treatment. This was an issue raised by the presenting officer. However, the experts were aware of this. Having accepted the medical prognosis, the judge was entitled to consider that it will happen and to consider risk on that basis. I understand the point made in the grounds and by Miss Khan, that bearing in mind the appellant is not receiving any treatment in the UK, and he does not have family in the UK, his situation will not be any different in Morocco than it is in the UK should he have a psychotic episode. However, the appellant does have support in the UK. It was accepted that he receives support from RAMA which includes helping the appellant liaise with professionals and the monitoring of his mental health so that they can obtain intervention if necessary. Moreover, medical treatment is accessible and available to the appellant. The appellant does not have family in the UK, but he has stable accommodation and friends here. The judge found that he would not have relatives who would be willing to provide the appellant with the support that he needs in Morocco or to encourage him to engage with mental health services when he shows signs of an acute episode of psychosis. The judge’s credibility findings about the family in Morocco were open to her, including her acceptance of the appellant having been sexually abused. It was open to the judge to accept as credible the account that the appellant gave to Dr Prangnell.
33. The judge reasonably concluded that when the appellant has a psychotic episode, there would not be medical support available and accessible to the appellant. Moreover, the judge was entitled to consider that the appellant had been found to be vulnerable by Dr Prangnell because of his impairment in problem solving, memory, comprehension and mood regulation.
34. The judge attached weight to the evidence of Dr Prangnell that although the appellant can manage his own personal care and access public transport, he requires support with daily living skills such as cooking. The grounds make the point that this is unsustainable since there was no evidence that the appellant is being supervised by an adult social services team and that Dr Prangnell says in his report that he can prepare simple meals such as cooking eggs or pasta. That the appellant requires support is not necessarily undermined by him not actually being supported. In any event, the appellant does receive support from RAMA. Nothing turns on whether the appellant requires support for living skills such as cooking and or whether he can prepare simple meals. I note that Dr Prangnell also stated that the appellant appeared otherwise reliant on friends to cook for him.
35. The evidence that was not challenged supported that the appellant's health will deteriorate rapidly should he return to Morocco. The judge in light of the evidence was entitled to conclude that the appellant would face a real risk of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering.
36. In the alternative the judge found that there would be a real risk of a significant reduction in the appellant’s life having attached weight to the risk of suicide and the lack of support to avert the risk in Morocco. The findings were supported by the evidence. The judge found that there is a risk of suicide once the appellant is returned to Morocco when he has a psychotic episode. The judge reached her conclusions with specific reference to the medical evidence which was emphatic on this point. She correctly noted that both experts were of the view that there was a real risk of significant deterioration in the appellant's mental health and she rationally relied on the view of Dr Chisholm that there was a statistically high risk of suicide with which Dr Prangnell concurred. The judge properly directed himself in relation to J v SSHD 2005 EWCA Civ 692.
37. There is no properly identified error of law and the decision of the FTT is maintained.

Joanna McWilliam
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
7 September 2026