Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002421
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/79928/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

NA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME OFFICE
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T. Hill, Counsel instructed by Venire Law LTD
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier judge dated 30 December 2025 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal to grant his protection claim.

2. The appellant is an Afghan national aged 22 who is claiming asylum based on his fear of the Taliban. The appellant’s father ran a clothing business in Afghanistan and gave financial assistance to the Taliban on two occasions but refused further requests to do so. The Taliban threatened his family in 2021 culminating in a bomb attack on their home. Additionally, the Taliban accused the appellant ‘s father, as part of his business, of selling containers to third parties who would the sell them to NATO forces. Subsequently, after the Taliban got into power in 2021, the appellant’s father and brother fled the country. The Taliban then directed their threats towards the family as a whole which caused the appellant to flee the country. Additionally, the appellant claimed that his family was in fear from the Taliban as a result of a long-standing land dispute with his grandfather.

3. The respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim on 25 November 2024 on the basis that she did not accept any of the material facts on which the asylum claim was based and considered that his credibility was further damaged by failing to claim asylum in Austria, Germany or France before arriving in the UK.

4. The judge dismissed the appeal on the basis that that his evidence was not credible and that accordingly if returned that it was not reasonably likely that he would suffer harm or that state protection or internal relocation would be available to him.

5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal on 13 January 2026 which was granted on all grounds by First-tier judge Mills on 11 May 2026.

Submissions

6. Mr Hill relied on his grounds of appeal. The first ground was that the judge had failed to provide adequate reasons for disbelieving the appellant’s account. First the appellant had been consistent in evidence that the family’s business was not selling containers to NATO but to third parties and those third parties had on sold to NATO contrary to the judge’s stated conclusions. Additionally, there was no rational basis for the judge to have concluded that Taliban would not have targeted the appellant because money had been given to them in the past by the appellant’s father when those funds had been given under duress and further sums had been refused. Similarly, the rejection of the appellant’s account not leaving at the same time as his father and brother was based on him being too young when the appellant’s consistent evidence that he believed the threat was directed solely at his father and brother and remained to protect other members of the family. Additionally, the rejection of the photographic evidence and his conclusion that if the Taliban were determined they would have taken the disputed land were not adequately reasoned.

7. Secondly, the judge erred by rejecting the appellant’s account on the basis of inherent plausibility contrary to established case law. In particular the findings that on the lack of Taliban interest in the family because two financial contributions had been made before refusal and the finding that the appellant would have been targeted despite his claim that he avoided mistreatment because he was not a minor and the implausibility of the property dispute were not findings that were reasonably open to the judge.

8. Finally, the judge failed to properly consider the CPIN on Afghanistan particularly paragraph 10.3.1 was an error of law.

9. Mr Tufan submitted that the judge had clearly set out his reasons for his conclusions and in light of the fact that the judge need not refer to every piece of information in his decision he had been entitled to refuse the appeal.

Initial Matter

10. The start of the hearing was delayed as the consolidated bundle had not been available to me through the Upper Tribunal IT system. Mr Tufan, who had received the bundle consisting of 136 pages, helpfully emailed it to me.

11. Prior to the hearing I was able to get access to the key documents presented to the First-tier Tribunal through their system and confirmed I was content to proceed on this basis but asked Mr Hill to identify any particular evidence he was relying on in his submissions by reference to the consolidated bundle page number.

12. I asked that Venire Law write to the Tribunal to explain the reason for the consolidated bundle not being available to me which, as at the date of this decision, had not been received.

Discussion and Decision

13. The issue which I have to determine is whether there is an error of law in the First-tier’s tribunal decision. If I conclude that there is, I then need to consider whether the error requires me to set aside that decision in whole or part. If I set aside the decision, then I must determine whether it should be remade in this Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.

14. In light of the first ground relating to the judge’s view of the credibility of the appellant’s evidence my starting point is the observation made by the Court of Appeal in R(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at paragraph 8 that a tribunal would only “very rarely” be able to overturn a finding of fact based on oral evidence and the assessment of credibility. Additionally, for the failure for a judge to give reasons to amount to an error of law the appellate court must find that it cannot understand the original judge’s thought process when making material findings.

15. I am also guided by the recent Court of Appeal decision in MN Vietnam v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 at paragraph 35 which requires an appellate court in reviewing a First-tier tribunal decision in this chamber to make a “straightforward down to earth reading “ of the decision to identify whether there is room for genuine doubt over what had been decided rather than taking an overly forensic approach and interpreting the decision as if it were a contract or statute.

16. The first ground was that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for a number of his conclusions about the rejection of the appellant’s narrative of events. The essence of the judge’s reasoning is set out in paragraph 23. The first part deals with the appellant ‘s account of threats from the Taliban and his decision to remain with his family after his father and brother had fled:

“First, this is a case where the Appellant was never actually himself threatened or targeted in any way. He states that he came under threat, which escalated with an October 2021 bombing of his family home. Yet, he continued living in Afghanistan for a further 4-months with no reprisals against him. If he was ever at risk he would have left with his father and brother when they did. I do not accept that he did not do so because he was too young. In fact, I do not accept the Appellant’s basic story. I do not accept that as a family, which ran a wholesale clothing business, they were also selling containers to NATO which brought them added risk. I am prepared to accept that the Appellant’s father gave financial help to the Taliban when they needed it but now that they are in power I do not accept that they are interested in targeting the family because the family had after all given such help as they could on two previous occasion.”

17. Mr Hill takes issue with a number of the judge’s conclusions which he submits do not accord with the presented evidence. First, the introductory sentence which suggests that the evidence of the appellant was of indirect threat when he has been consistently clear in his oral evidence and asylum interview that he had personally received a number of threats from the Taliban. Second, that the judge had erred in concluding he did not leave with his father and brother was his age rather than the evidence that he had not, at that stage, received threats and remained to protect his mother and sisters. Finally, that the judge had mistakenly found that the family’s business involved selling containers to Nato when the evidence was that containers were sold to third parties who onward sold them to Nato.

18. On the first point on whether the appellant had personally been subjected to threats from the Taliban, Mr Hill took me to various instances in both the appellant‘s witness statement (paragraphs 6 and 9.6) and his asylum interview (R51, 61 and 62) where the appellant had consistently stated that he had been personally threatened on multiple occasions. However, the judge at paragraph 13 noted in the appellant’s oral evidence that he had stated that he had not personally received any threats although his mother had. Given that no evidence was presented to me that this was not a fair record of the appellant’s evidence I find no error of law by the judge on this point although it is surprisingly that more was not made of this inconsistency in the decision.

19. On the second issue the judge found that if the appellant genuinely believed he was under threat he would have left with his father and brother and did not accept his explanation of his youth for remaining. Mr Hill directed me to the appellant’s witness statement (paragraph 9.6) and responses to the Asylum Interview (R13, 51) where the appellant had consistently said that the reason for him not going with his father and brother was that he had thought the Taliban threats were limited to them as they were the ones running the family business and he stayed behind to protect his mother and sisters. This is supported by the judge’s comments at paragraph 4 of the decision where he expressly stated that the evidence of the appellant was that he stayed behind to look after his family as the oldest male. Clearly, the issue of the appellant’s youth had been raised as a reason for his remaining, as the judge noted in paragraph 18, but equally clearly it was not the only reason for doing so. The judge focussed on the appellant’s youth as the sole basis for rejecting his account and failed to give any explanation for his rejection of his evidence about remaining to protect his family which, on the face of it, seems a more credible basis for his action. Looking at the decision as a whole I consider that there is genuine doubt behind the reasoning of the judge on this issue and accordingly, I do find that the judge made an error of law in his determination.

20. The next issue relates to the credibility of a threat from the Taliban based on the family business. The judge accepted that the family ran a wholesale clothing business but did not accept that business included selling containers to NATO which brought them “added risk”. This comment contains an inconsistency given, as the judge noted at paragraph 4, the appellant’s evidence was that the father’s business involved the selling of containers to people who would in turn sell them to NATO. I consider that nothing turns on this discrepancy as the judge rejected the entirety of the appellant’s “basic story “rather than any particular detail, highlighting the evidence that this was not mentioned in the initial asylum interview and there is no reason to believe that the judge would have come to a different conclusion even if he had correctly noted the intermediary sale.

21. The judge accepted that the appellant’s father gave financial help to the Taliban but concluded that the Taliban would not threaten the family given that they had received money from them in the past. It is not clear to me the basis on which the judge had come to that conclusion. The evidence presented to the judge in the witness statement was that the Taliban were requiring businesses to fund them and the appellant’s family did so under duress and when they stopped paying the threats started. The judge’s conclusions seem to be based on a belief, not supported by the evidence, that these payments were voluntary and that goodwill had resulted from this previous financial support. Accordingly, I find that the judge did make an error of law in rejecting the credibility of Taliban threats based on the fact that previous payments had been made to them by the appellant’s family.

22. Turning to the land dispute, the judge noted that the appellant was not able to give any details about the dispute as it started a long time ago and he was unable to confirm whether his family currently owned the land or the Taliban had taken it. Clearly this was a key point since if the family no longer the land had there would be less reason for the Taliban to continue to threaten or intimidate them. Mr Hill submitted that the judge had not given any reason for his conclusion that “if the Taliban were determined to take the land they would have done so” but the judge’s conclusion on this point was based on the appellant’s own oral evidence as identified at paragraph 17. The judge also gave clear reasons for rejecting the photographic evidence of the damage to the family house in the absence of timestamps to verify the location of where they were taken. Accordingly, I find no error of law in the judge’s treatment of the land dispute.

23. On the second ground, Mr Hill confirmed that the substance of this submission was already covered by the first ground and accordingly I do not need to address it further.

24. The final ground is that the judge ignored background evidence to which he was specifically referred particularly the CPIN Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban Version 5.0 August 2025 (the “CPIN”). Paragraphs 10.3.1 to 10.3.3, Mr Hill submitted, supported the appellant’s account of the land dispute as the CPIN noted the reports of the Taliban settling old scores and personal feuds and that such actions were not necessarily a systematic policy of the Taliban but could arise from ethnic or tribal dynamics or rivalries.

25. The judge expressly referred to CPIN dated November 2022 and that version which he quotes at paragraph 24 specifically states:

“2.4.10 However, not all incidents committed by the Taliban should be considered a systematic campaign of targeting and may be due to Taliban members settling old disputes. Each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they would be at real risk on return.”

26. There is some confusion as to why the judge referred to an earlier version of the CPIN in his decision but both Mr Hill and Mr Tufan agreed that, in essence, the 2025 version was consistent so far as paragraph 2.4.10 in 2022 version was concerned. Accordingly, nothing turns on which CPIN was the relevant one. Since this is the case, the judge expressly took account of the issue which the third ground suggests was overlooked. In any event, the passages quoted by Mr Hill are consistent with the appellant’s claim of the land dispute giving rise to a Taliban threat to settle old scores but they do not address the key issues relating to credibility which the judge had with the appellant’s evidence on that matter. Accordingly, I find that the judge had expressly taken the issue identified in the CPIN of the Taliban’s personal feuds and rivalries into account in his decision and find no error of law.

27. Having found the judge made errors of law I need to address the issue as to whether such errors are material i.e. whether, on the evidence before the first-tier tribunal, any rational tribunal would be bound to reject the appellant’s claim. In my view, given that both errors relate to issues of the appellant’s credibility on key evidential issues my conclusion is that such errors could impact upon the entirety of the decision and applying the rational tribunal test it would not have been bound to reject the appellant’s appeal. Accordingly, I find that the judge made a material error of law.

Disposal

28. I have reflected on the parties’ submissions as to the appropriate disposal.  

29. In determining this issue, I have applied the principles set out in AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 151 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I have also carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal in line with the general principles set out in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. Taking into account the history of the case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made and paragraphs 7.2(a) and (b) of that Practice Statement I consider that it is appropriate to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing with no preserved findings. 

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier judge Juss dated 30 December 2025 involves the making of an error of law and is set aside with no preserved findings.

I remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before any judge other than judge Juss.

Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 July 2026