Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002423
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01957/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

YASSER KUBI
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms R Rashmi, Counsel, instructed by ALC solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms K Khan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Syria. His date of birth is 13th February 1974. He has been granted permission to appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (F-tT) to dismiss his appeal against the decision of the respondent on 27th September 2024 to refuse his application as an adult dependent relative. The sponsor is the appellant’s son, AA. AA has been granted refugee status.
2. The appellant developed mental health issues as a result of having been detained and tortured in Syria. He was detained in August 2020 and held in a prison. He was released on 10th September 2023.
3. Since his release from prison, the appellant has been looked after by his neighbour, Youseff. However, Youssef has informed the appellant that he plans to move to Lebanon and will therefore be unable to care for him. The appellant's case is that he has been financially supported by AA and his other son MSA, who is also a refugee in the UK. They both arrived in the UK on 30th November 2020. The money they send to him is used for medical and living expenses. His evidence is that he is depressed and misses his children. He has daughters who are living unlawfully in Lebanon. They cannot come to Syria to live with the appellant because they have families of their own to look after
4. The sponsor and MSA attended the hearing and gave evidence. It was accepted by the appellant's representative that the appellant did not meet the financial requirements of Appendix ADR at the time of the application; however, it was the appellant's case that he met the requirements at the date of the hearing.
5. The judge had a medical letter from Dr Aswad dated 5th July 2024 who diagnosed the appellant as suffering from “diseases and psychological symptoms” as well as epilepsy. Dr Aswad said that the appellant was admitted to hospital because of his mental health difficulties between 22nd March 2024 and 1st April 2024. He said that the appellant's condition was monitored more than once as it was getting worse and he been treated with carbamazepine, the dose being 600 milligrams daily. He said that the appellant was placed on beta blockers although this did not help improve his recurrent seizures. He said that the appellant has had an electrocardiogram as well as clinical and radiological examinations which reveal the presence of “fragments”. Dr Aswad said that the appellant suffers from severe pain in his feet with tingling in his lower extremities. The judge had an update letter from the same hospital in which it was confirmed that the appellant is under the care of two doctors; one for his physical health and the other for his mental health problems.
6. The judge noted that the update stated that the arrangement had been in place since the appellant suffered a major seizure on 10th November 2024 at his home which caused him to fall down the stairs and damage his spine. The judge noted that the update said that the appellant requires assistance to perform his daily tasks and that he was still suffering from severe pain in his feet and tingling in his lower extremities. The judge noted that the update stated that due to the appellant's experience of torture he was unable to communicate with strangers and remains in bed most of the time. The appellant has missed a few of his appointments because of his agitation and fear of leaving the house and his mental health problems have deteriorated. The author of the update stated that deterioration in the appellant’s health was as a result of past experiences, separation from his family and a lack of medication.
7. The judge had a report dated 20th April 2025 which indicated that the appellant had had two MRI scans on 21st November 2024. There was what was described by the judge as a brief report dated 29th May 2025 from the Ibn Rushd Hospital for Psychiatric Illness which stated that the appellant requested admission to the hospital, but the request was rejected due to a lack of vacancies and medications. The judge referred to a different report of the same date from another hospital which stated that the appellant made a request to be admitted as a result of psychological issues, but the request was rejected due to a lack of available treatment. The appellant was, however, given some sedatives.
8. The judge recorded the sponsor's oral evidence that the appellant likes to stay in a dark room and is frightened of certain noises. He is encouraged to eat and given his medication by his neighbour Youseff and Youseff’s wife. The sponsor said that on occasions the appellant would not go to medical appointments but that he and his brother would then speak to the doctor who would travel to the appellant's home to treat him. The sponsor’s evidence was that sometimes medication is not available and Youssef would inform them of this and whether alternatives could be found. The sponsor stated that his sisters were living illegally in Lebanon and would not be able to re-enter Syria. The sponsor said that he did not know why Youssef wanted to go to Lebanon.
9. The judge had a letter from Youseff dated 3rd May 2025 in which he said that the sponsor and MSA have been sending money to Syria initially via friends and then via Western Union after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. Youseff's evidence was that the current situation was unsafe and unstable and therefore he has decided to leave Syria and go to Lebanon with his family and he will not be able to continue to care for the appellant. He said that he is waiting for the outcome of the appellant's appeal so that he can leave Syria.
The Immigration Rules
ADR 5.1. The applicant, or if the applicant is applying as a parent or grandparent, the applicant’s partner, must as a result of age, illness or disability require long term personal care to perform everyday tasks.
ADR 5.2. Where the application is for entry clearance, the applicant, or if the applicant is applying as a parent or grandparent, the applicant’s partner, must be unable to obtain the required level of care in the country where they are living, even with the financial help of the sponsor because either:
(a) the care is not available and there is no person in that country who can reasonably provide it: or
(b) the care is not affordable.
10. ADR 6 sets out the financial requirements. It is not necessary for me to set these out. The requirements are not in dispute.
The findings of the FtT
11. The judge made the following findings:
1) The appellant requires long term personal care to perform everyday tasks taking into account that there was no particular challenge to the documentary medical evidence. The appellant suffers with mental health problems as well as epilepsy.
2) The overall evidence does not establish that the appellant is currently unable to obtain the required level of care in Syria or that this is unreasonable. The appellant’s evidence and Youseff’s evidence is “extremely light in detail as to the actual day-to-day arrangements made for the appellant's care”. The specifics of how Youseff assists the appellant is lacking even taking into account the oral evidence of the sponsor.
3) Healthcare services in Syria have been significantly impacted by the past 14 years of conflict and there are millions of people in need of primary and secondary care. There have been significant restrictions at time caused by sanctions and in respect of the availability of electricity and medications.
4) The specific medical evidence provided to the tribunal shows that the appellant's mental and physical health have been routinely treated in his home area. For instance, the first medical letter at the end of the respondent’s bundle states expressly that the appellant's mental health has been monitored on more than one occasion. The medical evidence shows that the appellant has had MRI scans and an electrocardiogram as well as clinical and radiological examinations.
5) While part of the medical evidence indicates that there is a lack of medication available, the evidence does not specify which medications the appellant has failed to receive, for how long and so on. The medical evidence generally indicates that the appellant has received carbamazepine, beta blockers and sedatives. While there is one example of the two local hospitals not being able to admit the appellant in May 2025 there is no other evidence to suggest that the appellant has been refused admission or required treatment. One of the two letters from the period indicates that although the appellant was not admitted to hospital, he was nonetheless given sedatives because of his mental health problems.
6) It was open to the appellant to explain in his witness statement what specific medications he needs and or which have become unavailable temporarily or permanently. It was open to Youseff to explain any difficulties he had in obtaining medication, but he has not done so.
7) While the appellant has missed some appointments the sponsor's evidence was that doctors had travelled to him to treat him when he had refused to leave his room.
8) The medical letters are sufficient evidence on balance to establish the appellant's medical conditions, but they are insufficient in respect of the precise nature of the appellant's medical needs/treatment regime at the date of the hearing.
9) The appellant has some daily care needs. The evidence indicates that his mental health has deteriorated and that this has been caused by his previous experience of mistreatment, conditions in Syria and missing his family in the United Kingdom. However, there is insufficient clinical description of the nature of the appellant's deterioration.
10) Bearing in mind the closeness of the bond between the appellant and Youssef as well as the absence of any evidence that they face specific security problems, the appellant has not established, on balance, that his friend would simply desert him to relocate to Lebanon in the absence of any other specific, appropriate care arrangements despite what Yousef has stated in his letter. The current care arrangements in place between the appellant and his friend are reasonable both from the perspective of the appellant and Youseff.
11) The sponsor’s monthly income from benefits is £868.34 less housing costs (which were identified by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) as amounting to £1225). This leaves a negative deficit of £356.66. The monthly income support allowance of £477.20 per month was not met or exceeded in this case.
12) It is clear that the appellant does not meet the requirements of appendix ADR at the date of the application/decision or the hearing; however, this is not determinative of the assessment of proportionality under Article 8 (2).
13) The sponsor’s employment significantly post-dates the date of application and cannot meet the temporal requirement in ADR 6. 2. (a).
14) The letter from the sponsor's employer does not comply with the requirements of the rules because it does not confirm the gross annual salary or annual salary after income tax and National Insurance and does not confirm the type of employment. In any event, the sponsor has only provided one wage slip and one bank statement to confirm payment in July 2025 and does not cover a six-month period prior to the date of application or even prior to the date of the hearing. The bank statements do not cover the six-month period either before the application or before the date of the hearing. The sponsor failed without good reason to provide such documentary evidence. The employment letter does not even confirm that employment is permanent.
15) The financial requirements in Appendix ADR expressly do not allow for consideration of third-party support. The rules are not determinative of the assessment of exceptional circumstances. None of the third-party sponsors who have been named by the sponsor or his brother has provided the evidence required.
16) No submissions were made relating to MSA’s ability to provide third party support. His evidence is that he receives Universal Credit of £2,418, Personal Independence Payments (PIP) of £116.56 and Carer's Allowance of £354.90 per month. It is not appropriate to take into account the carer's allowance as MSA is paying this to his brother, the sponsor and it is therefore not available to him.
17) Overall MSA's own income is just under the cost of its own housing. MSA has not provided any documentary evidence clarifying how long he will be in receipt of the health component of Universal Credit, and the PIP documents show that those awards end on 13 December 2026 and therefore before the end of any hypothetical grant of permission to enter the appellant would receive under ADR. 6. 2.
18) The appellant has failed to establish to what extent his own hypothetical entry to the UK would impact upon the benefits available to the sponsor. He has not made out the assertion that he can be maintained adequately either at the date of the application or the date of the hearing.
19) The appellant cannot speak English. He has not established that he or his family are financially independent. These factors weigh in favour of the public interest side of the balance.
20) The appellant has not established that he has been subject to any security issues or targeting since his release from prison in 2023. He continues to live in his own home and is supported by his childhood friend.
21) The appellant is generally receiving sufficient support and medication/ treatment for his mental health issues and his epilepsy.
22) The appellant's friend and carer would not simply abandon him if the appeal was to be dismissed. There is no suggestion that the sponsor and his family in the United Kingdom will not continue to send money to the appellant which is plainly being used by him to access the treatment he needs.
23) The appellant’s proposed entry to the United Kingdom will inevitably lead to further recourse to public funds which is a materially significant issue in this case.
24) The public interest outweighs the sponsors Article 8 ECHR rights, and the consequences are not unjustifiably harsh.
25) In the alternative if ADR. 5.1 and 5.2 were met, the public interest would nonetheless outweigh the family rights of the sponsor.
26) It is highly undesirable that there be further recourse to public funds. The refusal of entry clearance is not unjustifiably harsh albeit there are significant consequences.
The Grounds of Appeal
12. The judge erred because at [37]–[44] he embarked on an assessment of medical care available generally. ADR 5.2 requires an assessment of whether the required level of care identified when considering ADR 5.1, is available. The judge had to assess whether the required level of care that the appellant required was available and if so whether that could be reasonably provided by Youseff. Issues of affordability did not arise.
13. The judge failed to identify what he means by Youseff not deserting his friend noting the “closeness of the bond” between them. That they had known each other since childhood and remain neighbours does not denote a close bond such as an adult man would sacrifice the future and well-being of his wife and children for a neighbour who they have known since childhood. The finding was unreasonable and unreasoned.
14. The judge is unclear as to the motivation why Youseff wants to leave Syria. Youseff made it quite clear in his letter that apart from instability it was unsafe for him and his family to remain in Syria. Irrespective of Youseff identifying any specific security problems the widespread dangers to civilians in Syria is well documented. It is unreasonable for the judge not to accept Youseff’s evidence that he wished to leave due to it being unsafe. Even if the judge was correct to find Youseff would not leave Syria, he failed to make lawful findings on whether the care that the appellant was required was in fact being provided by Youseff or capable of being provided by him.
15. The required care that the appellant needs to prevent the deterioration of his mental health includes not being separated from his family. The care provided by Youseff is not the required level of care since the care he provides cannot and has not prevented a deterioration in the appellant's mental health.
16. The grounds refer to Britcits v SSHD [ 2017] EWCA Civ 368 where the Court of Appeal noted at paragraph 59 the following:
“……the provision of care in the home country must be reasonable both from the perspective of the provider and the perspective of the applicant, and the standard of such care must be what is required for that particular applicant. It is possible that insufficient attention has been paid in the past to these considerations, which focus on what care is both necessary and reasonable for the applicant to receive in their home country. Those considerations include issues as to the accessibility and geographical location of the provision of care and the standard of care. They are capable of embracing emotional and psychological requirements verified by expert medical evidence….”
17. Bearing in mind the accepted medical evidence that the appellant's mental health was deteriorating because he was separated from his family, who would look after him, it is difficult to see how it could be said that from the perspective of the appellant continued care from Youseff could be said to be reasonable.
18. The judge's figures are incorrect in respect of the sponsor’s and MSA’s income.
19. Since the judge's approach in respect of ADR 5.2 was flawed the conclusion and respect of Article 8 is fatally flawed.
Conclusions
20. I heard oral submission from the representatives with which I engage in my conclusions.
21. Since the hearing before the F-tT and the drafting of the grounds of appeal on which permission was granted, the appellant has instructed new solicitors. Ms Rashmi attended the hearing on behalf of the appellant. She was not the author of the grounds of appeal who represented the appellant before the F-tT. She did not specifically engage with the ground relating to ADR 5.2. She addressed me on the basis of the wider Article 8 assessment. The thrust of her submissions was that the judge was wrong to conclude that the decision was proportionate and that he had not taken into account material evidence. She relied on the grounds in so far as she said that the judge had erred in respect of the calculations of the sponsor and MSA’s income.
22. I asked Ms Rashmi to take me through the judge’s calculations to explain how it is said that he erred. She took me to a document from the DWP. At p40,41 and 45 of the bundle there are documents relating to the sponsor’s benefit payments. She said that the documents support that the sponsor receives £868.34 plus carers allowance of £354.90 less rent of £1225. She said that the judge did not factor carer’s allowance into the assessment. I observe that the evidence before the judge concerning the income of the sponsor was lacking. In his witness statement of 3 July 2025, his evidence was that he receives carer’s allowance for his brother and he received universal credit. No further details are given. In his statement of 15 July 2025, his evidence is that he pays rent to his brother of £800. He also says that he is his brother’s main carer and receives attendance allowance and universal credit. In the appellant’s skeleton argument before the FtT at paragraph 28 it is stated that the appellant’s income is £1,269 and his housing costs are £800. There is no explanation of the figures.
23. It appears on the face of it that the judge may not have taken into account the carer’s allowance received by the sponsor. I accept that there are documents relating to the payment of benefits to the sponsor which are capable of supporting that the figure representing carer’s allowance is deducted from the overall figure as it is a benefit that the sponsor is already receiving and should have been included in his overall income.
24. If the judge erred, taking into account that the sponsor pays rent of £1225 (which appears from the documents), this would leave a monthly income deficit of £1.76. On the basis that the sponsor pays rent to his brother of £800 which was his evidence, he would have a monthly income of £423.24. There is no challenge to the figure used by the judge of £477.20 per month that represents the monthly income support allowance. If the judge did err it is not material to whether he met this threshold.
25. Ms Rashmi contended that the judge did not take into account the sponsor’s earnings; however, this is not the case. The judge did not find that it was properly evidenced. The judge at [72] took into account the letter from ROOT- Wheel repair dated 19 June 2025. The judge said that the sponsor has provided one wage slip dated 30 June 2025 (the hearing was on 17 December 2025) and the bank statement. The judge said that the evidence does not comply with the rules at the date of the decision. There is no challenge to this. There were a number of reasons given at [73] and [74]. The evidence fell significantly short of complying with the rules. At paragraph 75 the judge found that the financial evidence does not comply with the rules even if they allowed for an assessment at the date of the hearing. The judge found that the sponsor had failed without good reason to provide documentary evidence.
26. Concerning MSA the judge took into account the documentary evidence and the figures contained therein. He said that he received around £95 per month in PIP and a standard allowance for a married couple of £489.23 and £416.19 as a result of his work incapacity. He took into account the sponsor pays him £800 towards the rent and that he (MSA) receives £1,225 in housing benefit per month. I can see that the figures are supported by the documents at pp 86 and 98 of the bundle. The sponsor in his evidence included child support in the figure that he gave. Moreover, the married couple allowance is for MSA and his wife. My calculation is that the overall figure is of his income is £235.80. The judge was entirely correct to say this figure is less that his housing costs of £1650. It would be even if all the married couples’ allowance was attributed to MSA’s income.
27. The presentation of the evidence concerning both the finances of the sponsor and MSA was wanting. It is not acceptable for the judge to be expected to trawl though a bundle of papers from the DWP. I note that there were no submissions relating to MSA’s support. What was said about a forward appeal is not material to the outcome.
28. The grounds fail to acknowledge that the financial requirements of Appendix ADR expressly do not allow for the consideration of third-party support. The judge acknowledged the rules are not determinative of the assessment of exceptional circumstances; however, found that the third-party sponsors (including MSA) have not produced the evidence required under the rules. He also went on to consider the reliability of the evidence for himself (see [85]) and concluded that it was insufficient. He said that none of the third parties attended the hearing. The judge was entitled to conclude that the financial requirements were not met at any time.
29. Ms Rashmi concentrated her submissions on the Article 8 assessment and proportionality. She said that the judge focused too much on financial considerations. She asked me to consider [50]– [60] and [71]-[74] of Britcits v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 368. However, most of these paragraphs relate to the main argument in that case which was whether the Rules are ultra vires.
30. In respect of ADR 5.2. the judge directed himself at [31] setting out [59] of Britcits which was relevant to the case before him;
"… The focus in on whether the care required by the ADR applicant can be 'reasonably' provided and to 'the required level' in their home country. As Mr Sheldon [counsel for the Secretary of State] confirmed in his oral submissions, the provision of care in the home country must be reasonable both from the perspective of the provider and the perspective of the applicant, and the standard of such care must be what is required for that particular applicant. It is possible that insufficient attention has been paid in the past to these considerations, which focus on what care is both necessary and reasonable for the applicant to receive in their home country. Those considerations include issues as to the accessibility and geographical location of the provision of care and the standard of care. They are capable of embracing emotional and psychological requirements verified by expert medical evidence. What is reasonable is, of course, to be objectively assessed."
31. The judge was not satisfied that the appellant was unable to obtain the required level of support in Syria and therefore he was unable to satisfy ADR 5. 2. (a). Contrary to the grounds the judge did assess the required level of care but found the evidence wanting. The grounds of appeal ignore that the primary reason for the judge’s decision was that the evidence was “extremely light on any detail as to the actual day-to day arrangements made for the appellant’s care”. Ms Rashmi did not acknowledge this. The judge accepted that whilst the appellant’s friend Youseff provided some daily care the specifics of how he assists him was lacking even taking into account the oral evidence of the sponsor. The judge said that at best Youseff and his wife assist the appellant by arranging appointments and assisting him with those appointments when he is able to travel, prompting him to take medication, to clean himself as well as helping to prepare his meals. This was the required level of care as found by the judge.
32. It was open to the judge to conclude that the appellant’s mental and physical health have routinely been treated in his home area and that the appellant’s mental health had been monitored on more than one occasion (these findings are not challenged). The judge was entitled to attach weight to the evidence that the appellant has had MRI scans and an electrocardiogram as well as clinical and radiological examinations. The judge acknowledged that the evidence supported that the appellant was admitted to hospital for about a month due to his mental health problems in 2024. The judge took into account that part of the evidence indicated that there was a lack of medication available; however, the evidence did not specify which medications the appellant had failed to receive for how long and so on ([41]). The judge also attached weight to the medical evidence which he said generally indicates that the appellant has received carbamazepine, beta blockers and sedatives ([42]). The judge took into account that there was evidence that two of the local hospitals were unable to admit the appellant in May 2025 (Ms Rashmi drew my attention to this evidence: however, the judge found that there was no other evidence to suggest that the appellant had been refused admission or required treatment ([43])). The judge noted the lack of evidence of precisely what specific medications the appellant needs and or which have become unavailable temporarily or permanently. This evidence was not forthcoming in the appellant's witness statement. Moreover, the evidence was not provided by Youseff. The judge was entitled to conclude that “a single comment in one of the medical letters that medication is generally not available is insufficient to establish, on balance, what the appellant's specific medication/ treatment needs and/ or that he has not received sufficient medical treatment for his mental health problems, epilepsy and his fall down the stairs at the end of 2024” ([45]). The judge was also entitled to attach weight to the evidence that while the appellant had missed medical appointments, the sponsor's evidence was that doctors had in fact travelled to the appellant's house to treat him on occasions when he had refused to leave his room ([46]). The judge concluded at ([47]) that whilst the evidence was sufficient to establish the appellant's medical conditions, they were insufficient in respect to the precise nature of the appellant's medical needs/ treatment regime at the date of the hearing and that there was insufficient clinical description of the nature of the appellant's deterioration.
33. The judge properly directed himself in relation to the test which is set out in Britcits; namely, whether the care required level of care can be reasonably provided both from the prospective the applicant and Youseff. In assessing this the judge took into account the evidence of Youseff that due to the instability in Syria he wished to relocate to Lebanon. The evidence was that Youseff and the appellant had known each other since childhood and they had remained neighbours. The judge was entitled to take into account that the evidence concerning Youseff’s desire to relocate to Lebanon was not supported. In respect of the evidence of Youseff the judge said that the sponsor's evidence was that he did not know why Youssef wanted to leave Syria and that whilst there was instability in Syria despite the fall of the Assad regime, there was no suggestion that the appellant or Youseff or the appellant has had any direct difficulties. This finding was open to the judge.
34. Contrary to the grounds, the judge took into account the appellant’s desire to be with his sons in the UK; however, while the grounds contend that that the judge failed to make findings on whether the care that the appellant required was being met by Youseff, this fails to take into account that the judge found that the evidence was “extremely light on any detail as to the actual day-to day arrangements made for the appellant’s care”. The grounds misunderstand the decision in contending that the accepted medical evidence was that the appellant's mental health was deteriorating because he was separated from his family. However, the judge found that there was insufficient clinical description of the nature of the appellant’s deterioration ([47]). This was a finding open to the judge on the evidence.
35. The judge was bound to consider issues such as accessibility and geographical location of the provision of care and the standard of care. In so doing he made sustainable findings. Whilst these can embrace emotional and psychological requirements which is verified by medical evidence, the judge did not accept that there was sufficient evidence of deterioration and that the evidence was lacking in respect of the actual day to day care. Whilst emotional and psychological requirements are factors that can be taken into consideration, the assessment is fact specific and objective. Moreover, they are not factors of such weight that it can override others.
36. In respect of the wider Article 8 assessment Ms Rashmi submitted that the judge did not have regard to the consequences of decision to refuse entry clearance. She said that there was no structured assessment. This is not the case. Having found that there was family life, the judge considered whether there were unjustifiably harsh circumstances and directed himself on MM (Lebanon) & Ors at [70]. He made findings about the financial circumstances of the sponsor and his brother and third-party support generally which are sound. Any error in respect of the income of the sponsor is not material. The income is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the rules at any time. He applied s.117B of the 2002 Act. He made sustainable findings that the appellant has not been subject to security issues or targeting since his release from prison in 2023 and that he continues to live in his own home and be supported by his childhood friend. The judge found that the family in the UK would continue to support him. He rightly said that the respondent's position in the immigration rules as well as parliament's socioeconomic provisions in s.117B are to be given significant weight in the balancing exercise. The judge was entitled to attach weight to the insufficiently evidenced third party support and that the appellant’s proposed entry to the UK will inevitably lead to further recourse to public funds. The judge acknowledged in the decision that the appellant would like to travel to the United Kingdom to be with his son. The judge had focused on what care is both necessary and reasonable for the applicant to receive in Syria. It is wrong to suggest that the judge dismissed the appeal under Article 8 focusing on the economic circumstances only. The judge was not satisfied with the evidence of of the appellant’s state of health which he said was insufficiently particularised. In the light of the findings generally any error that judge may have made in respect of the financial circumstances of the sponsor is not material. The decision is in accordance with what the Court of Appeal said in IA v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 (see [166] and [167]).
37. I also note what the judge says at [102] that in the alternative, should he be wrong to conclude that ADR 5.1 and 5.2 are not met he would have nonetheless concluded that the public interest outweighs family life in this case. Bearing in mind the findings in relation to the balancing exercise and the proper application of s.117B of the 2002 Act the judge was entitled to find that the public interest would outweigh family life.
38. The judge properly weighed the family’s circumstances against the SSHD’s policies as reflected in the rules, to which considerable weight had to be attached. Very compelling or exceptional circumstances had to be shown for entry clearance to be granted outside of the rules. He reached conclusions that were open to him on the evidence. He engaged with the evidence and made necessary findings in order to resolve the relevant issues.
39. There is no error of law in the decision of the F-tT. The decision is maintained.

Joanna McWilliam

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 August 2026