The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002480
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51897/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

RH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Jorro, counsel instructed by Commonwealth Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal following a hearing which took place on 21 January 2026.
Anonymity
2. I have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal.  I have considered the public interest in open justice but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.  
Factual Background
3. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh who arrived in the United Kingdom during 2011 with leave to enter as a student.
4. His protection claim is based on a risk of return owing to his family’s involvement with the BNP as well as a land dispute with members of an opposition party in his community (namely Mulla Mandal who support the Awami League). In 2019, the appellant’s cousin was killed owing to his political activism. The appellant has attended protests against the Awami League in the United Kingdom and criticised them on social media. The appellant applied for asylum in 2020.
5. That claim was refused by the Secretary of State by way of a decision dated 12 January 2024, principally for want of credibility.
6. In the Respondent’s Review of the appellant’s appeal, the credibility of the appellant’s claim was identified as one of the three issues in contention.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
7. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant maintained that he would not be safe in Bangladesh notwithstanding the change in the regime. He placed particular reliance on documentary evidence in relation to false criminal allegations which had been filed against him. In addition, a witness gave evidence and confirmed much of what the appellant had stated about his circumstances.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
Ground one - a failure to make a clear finding regarding whether the appellant faces outstanding politically motivated criminal cases in Bangladesh;
Ground two – a failure to take account of material evidence including the unchallenged evidence by a witness
Ground three – a failure to take account of material evidence relevant to risk on return owing to outstanding criminal cases.
9. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought.
10. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 1 June 2026, in which the appeal was opposed, with detailed comments being made.

The error of law hearing
11. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
12. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
13. At the end of the hearing, I announced that I was satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained material errors of law and set it aside, with no preserved findings.
Discussion
14. In the light of the guidance given by the Court of Appeal, including at paragraph [77] of KM [2021] EWCA Civ 693, I remind myself that judicial restraint should be exercised when examining the reasons given by a First-tier Tribunal judge for their decision and that it should not be assumed too readily that the judge misdirected themselves.
Ground 1
15. I find that there is some merit in the contention that the judge failed to make a clear finding regarding whether the appellant faces outstanding politically motivated criminal cases in Bangladesh. At [66] the judge made favourable findings in that he accepted that the appellant’s account of a land dispute was plausible in view of the country material and accepted there were political aspects to that dispute, which was ongoing.
16. In relation to the appellant’s claim that false cases had been filed against him, the judge referred to a discrepancy in the appellant’s asylum interview as to the number and nature of the cases. At [70], the judge considered that this “cast doubt” on the appellant’s evidence on this issue. The judge did not expand on this matter and gave no indication of the weight which had been attached to the appellant’s supporting documentary evidence going to this issue. At [71-77] the judge changed their focus to the delay in the appellant making an asylum claim. This aspect of the decision is not saved by the judge’s comments that “even if” the judge accepted that the appellant was at risk in Bangladesh, the situation had changed because the Awami League were no longer in power [86] and the appellant was not in the country when the alleged offences occurred [91]. That is because there is no settled finding that these events did not occur.
17. The credibility of the appellant’s claim that there were false criminal cases brought against him was identified by the parties as the first of the principal important controversial issues. Yet there are no clear unambiguous findings by the judge on this matter. It is insufficient of the judge to merely cast doubt on the appellant’s evidence, applying AM [2026] EWCA Civ 15 at paragraph 20.
Ground 2
18. The grounds contend that the judge failed to take into consideration several pieces of important evidence which provided support for the appellant’s claims.
19. The appellant’s brother, MH, provided a witness statement dated 23 December 2025 in which he stated “(t)he police regularly come home to arrest us. In the circumstances, we cannot live in the local area and hiding here and there.” Yet, at [82] of the decision the judge concludes, “(t)here is no indication of whether any members of the family have been detained as a result of these claimed court cases.” Clearly, there was such an indication in MH’s statement. I note that the judge summarised MH’s statement at [33-36] however the judge did not include what MH said about the police visits and arrests and in this her erred.
20. The grounds rightly contend that there was no indication from the decision and reasons that the judge considered the unchallenged oral evidence of the appellant’s witness, SI. According to SI, he was in Bangladesh, in the appellant’s home area, at the time of the events relied upon by the appellant and was aware of the criminal cases. While the judge sets out the content of SI’s testimony at [30-32], there is no assessment of that evidence in the “Findings” section of the decision [66-103]. The parties agreed that SI’s evidence was not challenged during cross-examination nor during the respondent’s submissions.
21. The appellant relied upon the report of a Bangladeshi lawyer and academic Mr Solaiman Tushar, who commented on the country situation in Bangladesh as well as the appellant’s case papers in a detailed 20-page report. Again, it is not in contention that the judge made no reference to this report. Had the judge considered the evidence of Mr Tushar, the judge might have been entitled to reject it. However, there were no findings at all.
22. It is concerning that the judge made no reference at all to the potentially supporting evidence of the appellant’s witnesses or the expert’s report and instead commented adversely upon a discrepancy in the appellant’s description of the false charges brought against him.
Ground 3
23. I accept that the judge made no reference to any of the voluminous background country evidence which highlighted the misuse of criminal proceedings, the lack of evidence that false charges would be withdrawn notwithstanding the change in the regime or the dire conditions in detention in Bangladesh which breached Article 3 ECHR.
24. This omission is material, as the judge has not demonstrated that all the relevant evidence was considered, prior to the conclusion being reached that the appellant would not be at risk in Bangladesh.
25. Considering the grounds cumulatively, I am satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is vitiated by material errors of law and is therefore unsafe. The decision is set aside with no preserved findings.
26. I canvassed the views of the parties as to the venue of any remaking and both were of the view that the matter ought to be remitted.
27. Applying Majera [2025] EWCA Civ 1597, I carefully considered whether to depart from the normal course of retaining the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principles set out in Statements 3 and 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements, specifically at 3.1, 7.2 and 7.3. I took into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case meant that there was an inadequate consideration of this protection appeal. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different judge.


T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


23 July 2026