Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002510
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60268/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

AM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27th August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a national of Algeria, appeals with permission against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lilley-Tams (‘the Judge’), dismissing his appeal against a refusal of his protection and human rights claim by the respondent. The Judge’s decision was sent to the parties on 27th March 2026.

Anonymity
2. An anonymity order was made by the First-tier Tribunal. Neither party addressed me on the issue of anonymity, however in view of the fact this appeal concerns a protection claim, I maintain the order made for the appellant’s anonymity, being satisfied that his interests outweigh the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The appellant’s claim was made to the respondent on 9th February 2023. The claim was advanced on the basis of the appellant’s political opinion. Specifically, the appellant claimed to have taken part in the Hirak demonstrations in Algeria and also claimed that he was employed in a role which facilitated his access to sensitive documents.
4. The respondent accepted the appellant’s identity and Algerian nationality. She did not accept the appellant was arrested or summoned by the Algerian authorities because of his political activity because of a number of credibility issues, and the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum. She conceded however, that if credible there would be no internal relocation or sufficiency of protection available to him. Article 8 ECHR was also considered in the refusal decision.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appeal came before the Judge sitting at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre. The appellant was represented by Counsel at that hearing. The appellant gave evidence with the assistance of an Arabic interpreter. The appellant adopted his witness statement and was cross-examined. The Judge heard submissions from both advocates, and at the end of the hearing reserved his decision.
6. By his reserved decision, the Judge dismissed the appeal. The Judge found, inter alia, that the appellant worked as a security guard in a government building, and that there would have been increased scrutiny in this role. The Judge did not accept the appellant had a detailed knowledge of sensitive information, nor that he attended demonstrations. The Judge further did not find that the appellant had been active on social media after 2019, nor that he had been summoned by the authorities.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The appellant sought permission to appeal on five grounds. First, the Judge had failed to consider a witness statement which had either not been considered by the Tribunal or not filed by the appellant’s representatives. Secondly, the Judge had failed to properly consider background evidence on Algeria. Thirdly, the Judge had made a number of irrational or inadequately reasoned credibility findings. Fourthly, the Judge had failed to consider the appellant’s sur place activity. And finally, that the Judge had failed to consider Algeria’s deprivation of nationality law in the Article 3 ECHR context.
8. The application was refused on all grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge Barker, but the renewed application to this Tribunal was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Wilding on 4th June 2026. It was on this basis that the appeal came before me at Field House. The appellant appeared in person, assisted by an Arabic (Algerian) interpreter, Mr Messaoudi. I did not observe any difficulties in communication between the appellant and interpreter, nor were any issues raised by them.
9. I indicated to the appellant I had considered the detailed grounds seeking permission, and invited Ms Everett to advance the respondent’s permission before enabling the appellant a right of reply. I am grateful to the appellant particularly for the care and time he has obviously spent in preparing for this appeal, and to Ms Everett for her pragmatic and fair submissions.
Analysis and Findings
Ground One
10. This ground is unusual in that there is no criticism made of the Judge and his approach to the appeal, but rather of the appellant’s former representatives. It is said that the appellant provided to his representatives, the day before the hearing, a witness statement of MZ. Upon realising the Judge’s decision made no reference to this evidence, the appellant advanced two alternative scenarios. Either it was not considered by the Judge, or it was not sent to the Tribunal by the representatives.
11. The appellant complained to the representatives, to the Solicitors Regulation Authority and to the Legal Ombudsman. There is lengthy correspondence to all three entities before me, and what can be established is that the appellant did provide the witness statement of MZ to the representatives the day before the hearing. This is accepted in the final response to the appellant’s complaint from the solicitors dated 15th June 2026.
12. There is also a further note of proceedings from Counsel who represented the appellant before the Judge. That note accepts that the statement of MZ was produced in conference before the hearing. Counsel identified a number of issues with its late production, including the fact it had not been served in accordance with directions, MZ himself was not attending to give evidence, there was no accompanying identity document, admittance of the document was likely to be opposed by the respondent, and the contents of MZ’s statement were likely to detract from the appellant’s credibility because of differences in the evidence. Counsel’s note includes a table with ten areas in which MZ’s evidence was inconsistent with or went beyond the evidence given by the appellant.
13. Turning to the respondent’s position, Ms Everett submitted essentially that this was a matter of fairness. Neither Ms Everett nor I could identify any authority which dealt with the issue of a representative not providing evidence the appellant sought to rely on. Having reflected on the evidence provided by the appellant, the issue is whether the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing because of a failure of his representatives to act upon his instructions.
14. Looking at the issue through that lens, it is accepted that the appellant provided the witness statement of MZ to his solicitors the day before the hearing, and again to Counsel on the morning of the hearing. Having reviewed Counsel’s note (which was not disputed as inaccurate by the appellant before me), it is clear Counsel quite properly advised the appellant of the procedural difficulties with seeking to rely on the statement of MZ, especially in the absence of MZ himself, any identity document confirming his authorship, and the differences between the two accounts.
15. What is unclear however, is whether the appellant’s representatives failed to act in accordance with the appellant’s instructions. Clearly, the appellant was provided with the advice one would expect any competent advisor to provide. There is nothing before me to indicate that having received that advice, the appellant persisted in his instruction that the statement still be put before the Tribunal.
16. Counsel’s note specifically records ‘I did not consider it appropriate to seek an adjournment. I had not been instructed to seek one’. The note does not record Counsel being instructed to make an application to adduce the evidence following his advice to the appellant. Further before me, the appellant confirmed at the hearing before the Judge, there was no discussion of the statement of MZ, and clearly, it was not referred to in submissions.
17. It is difficult to see why, in those circumstances, the appellant did not raise at the hearing the issue of MZ’s statement. I say that in view of the fact the appellant has ably corresponded with his former solicitors, the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Legal Ombudsman, and noting his sedulous preparation of the evidence and pleadings before me. The appellant going through the First-tier Tribunal hearing, being aware there was no reference made to MZ’s evidence, but failing to raise it either with the Judge or with Counsel following the hearing, is in my judgment indicative of the fact he did not instruct Counsel to adduce the statement following the advice given.
18. There are two further factors which I have taken into account in making this finding. First, the appellant’s complaint letter to his previous solicitors dated 12th May 2026 refers to a telephone call to the firm raising the issue of MZ’s statement ‘approximately one week before 8 April 2026’. The hearing before the Judge was on 20th March 2026, and I find that had Counsel acted otherwise than in line with the appellant’s instructions, he would have raised the matter prior to the decision being promulgated, already being aware there was no reference to MZ’s evidence at the hearing.
19. Secondly, the appellant has not, despite his complaints against the solicitors, made any complaint about Counsel who represented him to the Bar Standards Board. In view of the fact the appellant has promptly complained about the solicitors, I find the absence of a complaint against Counsel is further indicative of the reality that Counsel did not fail to act in accordance with the appellant’s instructions.
20. Pulling these threads together, I do not find the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing before the Judge. Whilst the appellant clearly sought to rely on the evidence of MZ initially, he was advised of the potential difficulties which might arise. I find that it is more likely than not that the appellant acted on that advice and did not give any instructions for MZ’s witness statement to be adduced before the Judge. I also remind myself that there has been no acceptance of negligence by the solicitors, nor have the Solicitors Regulation Authority or the Legal Ombudsman made any determination.
21. It follows that I do not find there was any procedural unfairness which arose as a result of the evidence of MZ not being before the Judge, and no error of law is established by this ground.
Ground Two
22. This ground submits that the Judge failed to take into account the objective evidence before him about the treatment of individuals who were arrested and detained by the Algerian authorities following their participation in the Hirak demonstrations. At [22], the Judge accepts that
‘the background country information shows that there are a number of people who have been arrested for their involvement in the Hirak protests, and some have been subject to long periods of detention. However, the evidence also refers to the President issuing pardons and clemency for thousands of prisoners and detainees’.
23. The appellant in his grounds identifies a number of people who were arrested following the Hirak protests, and details the sentences imposed on them. It is said that this evidence is contradictory to the Judge’s finding at [22]:
‘The background country evidence does not support the appellant’s account of the authorities continuing to prosecute those involved in those earlier protests after years had gone by’.
24. The grounds give five examples of people arrested in 2023 to 2026 and sentenced subsequently for their Hirak involvement. These names do not appear in the extracts from the background evidence relied on in the Country Information Schedule which was before the Judge. The grounds refer to a ‘comprehensive dossier’ of 32 documented cases of persecution in Algeria, and I note a number of the sources relied on in preparing that dossier were not before the Judge. I do not consider this ground is made out when I look at the evidence the Judge had before him.
25. Even if I am wrong about that, the appellant was not accepted to have been involved in any demonstrations by the Judge, and so any error in the consideration of how participants were treated was immaterial. There is no error established by this ground.
Ground Three
26. This ground is an assortment of criticisms of the Judge’s findings on credibility. Having looked at the four specific points relied on, I do not consider any of these grounds disclose irrationality on the Judge’s part, nor do I consider the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for his findings.
27. Turning to the issue of confidential documents, the Judge was entitled to take into account the appellant’s lack of detail on the issue of what was included in the documents. The appellant had also not clearly explained how, as a security guard, he had access to these confidential documents. Whilst the grounds seek to point to the Judge’s ‘unreasonable expectation’ of what the appellant could safely disclose in open proceedings, it was open to the represented appellant to have sought a hearing in private, however that application was not made and does not appear to have been a factor raised before the Judge.
28. There is no irrationality disclosed by the Judge’s finding at [21] that the summons for the appellant was said to have been issued in 2022, three and a half years after the putative attendance at a demonstration. It was open to the Judge to find, on the basis of the evidence before him, that the delay in the issuance of the summons undermined the credibility of the account. The grounds do not particularise which country evidence before the Judge ‘demonstrated that the Algerian authorities routinely delayed prosecution’.
29. At [23], the Judge considers the appellant’s ability to travel out of Algeria ‘a number of times’ following the start of the claimed interest in him by the authorities in 2018. The Judge also noted the appellant referred to people not being able to travel, those who had been arrested or blacklisted, and was entitled to take into account the fact the appellant’s apparent freedom to travel on more than one occasion was indicative of there being no adverse interest in him.
30. As far as the issue of the summons is concerned, the grounds submit the Judge erred in expecting a date (that the appellant was to appear before the authorities) to appear on the document. The Judge at [26] specifically records the appellant’s explanation for the absence of a date, i.e. that this was common in Algeria, but notes there was no evidence to support that assertion. In circumstances where a phone call was directed but no telephone number given, documents were requested but not identified, the original was not before the Judge and there was no evidence from the appellant’s wife who received the document, it was open to the Judge, and indeed unsurprising that he attached little weight to the document, and no error is disclosed by his approach.
31. I find this ground is nothing more than disagreement with findings which were open to the Judge on the evidence before him.
Ground Four
32. This ground is advanced on the basis of the Judge’s failure to deal with the appellant’s sur place activity. This ground is focused on the evidence of MZ which was not before the Judge. The Judge did not err by failing to consider evidence which was not put before him. No error is made out by this ground.
Ground Five
33. This ground asserts the Judge failed to consider the Nationality Deprivation Act which permitted the Algerian government to deprive individuals in the appellant’s position of their citizenship. It is further said the Judge failed to consider the use of torture by Algerian security services. I remind myself the appellant was not found credible in his claim to be of adverse interest from the Algerian authorities. As a result, he would neither face deprivation of his citizenship, nor would he be subjected to torture. It had been accepted that credibility was the only issue the Judge was required to determine, and so the Judge was not required to determine what treatment the appellant would face had he been accepted as a credible witness, this matter already being conceded by the respondent.
Conclusion
34. I do not find any of the grounds pleaded by the appellant disclose any material error of law. The decision of the Judge is a carefully written one, and the Judge clearly took into account all of the evidence before him and provided adequate reasons for his findings. Whilst I appreciate the outcome is not one the appellant wanted, especially in view of what he may perceive as the failings of his previous representatives, I do not find the decision of the Judge is affected by any error of law.
Notice of Decision
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal, dismissing the appellant’s claim on protection and human rights grounds, shall stand.

CJ Williams

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1st September 2026