Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002524
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01708/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

ALIREZA MALEKPOUR
(Anonymity Order Not Continued)
Appellant before the FTT
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent before the FTT

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Mr Tufman, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission against the decision dated 12 March 2026 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Anzani (the “FTTJ”) allowing the appeal of Mr Malekpour against a refusal dated 6 August 2024 to grant entry clearance.
2. For ease of reference, I will refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
Anonymity
3. The FTTJ in her decision made an anonymity direction for the appellant’s case because the sponsor of the appellant is a recognised refugee in this country and considered the order was important for facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the UK under the Refugee Convention.
4. I have reviewed the grant of anonymity with reference to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. At the hearing before me I heard from the sponsor who asked that the anonymity order continue and from Mr Tufman who submitted it was not justified in the circumstances of this case.
5. I have taken as my starting point the principle that open justice requires the identification of the parties to litigation. However, in some cases, the need to prevent harm to a party may outweigh the need to ensure openness and transparency.
6. A strong need to prevent harm to a party can arise in cases where a person’s entitlement to refugee status is contested and thus there exists a prospect of that person returning to the country where she claims to be in real risk. In that context an anonymity order is justified. The need to prevent harm to a person whose status as a refugee is contested does not exist in this case. The United Kingdom, discharging its obligations under the Refugee Convention, has granted the sponsor refugee status protecting her from return to Iran to face serious harm.
7. I consider the principle of open justice is not outweighed by the particular circumstances of this case. I have decided that there should be no anonymity order.
The appellant’s case history
8. The appellant is a citizen of Iran. He sought entry clearance as the partner of a person with protection applying for family reunion, claiming to have been in a relationship with the sponsor prior to her departure from Iran in 2021.
9. The respondent, while accepting that the appellant might be the partner of the sponsor, refused entry clearance on the basis that under Appendix Family Reunion Protection of the Immigration Rules the appellant did not satisfy the relationship requirement, as an unmarried partner, for him and the sponsor to have been living together in a relationship akin to marriage for at least two years prior to the sponsor’s departure. The respondent also considered there were no compelling or compassionate factors to grant entry clearance outside of the Rules.
10. The FTTJ found the appellant did not succeed under the Immigration Rules as he could not satisfy the relationship requirements. However, she found that there were unjustifiably harsh consequences caused by the refusal making the decision a disproportionate interference with the appellant right to respect for family life under Article 8.
The Grounds of Appeal
11. The respondent has been granted leave to appeal but limited to grounds 1 and 2 of her grounds of appeal.
12. Grounds 1 argues that the FTTJ erred in her assessment that there were unjustifiably consequences rendering the refusal of entry clearance disproportionate under Article 8.
13. Ground 2 submits that the FTTJ has failed to address properly statutory considerations under s.117B(1), (2) and (3) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The error of law hearing
14. In addition to the error of law bundle of documents prepared by respondent, the appellant provided a skeleton argument as well as a Rule 15(2A) application accompanying up-dated evidence of the relationship with the sponsor continuing.
15. The sponsor attended the hearing before me and participated with the help of an interpreter in Farsi.
16. I indicated to the sponsor that at this stage of the appeal, I considered it was appropriate for me to consider only evidence which was before the FTTJ. Therefore at this stage I would not be admitting the new evidence produced.
17. I heard submissions from Mr Tufman. I also went through those submissions, as well as the points made in the skeleton argument, with the sponsor, checking if she wished to comment further on these matters.
18. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision , which I now give below.
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge?
19. Ground 1 and ground 2 complain about the decision making of the FTTJ when considering whether there were exceptional circumstances in the appellant’s case establishing a breach of Article 8. This was after the FTTJ found the appellant could not satisfy the Immigration Rules in order to show a breach of Article 8.
Ground 1
20. Under ground 1 the respondent submits the FTTJ falls into error at paragraphs 37 to 47 of the decision when carrying out the assessment of whether there are the required exceptional circumstances to make the refusal decision of the respondent disproportionate.
21. In the grounds of appeal the respondent helpfully cites the following guidance from the Court of Appeal in Mobeen [2021] EWCA Civ 886 at paragraph 50 on the meaning of exceptional circumstances:
What was meant by "exceptional circumstances" was made clear at [54] to [60] in Agyarko, namely circumstances in which a refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the individual such that the refusal of the application would not be proportionate. This is to be assessed in the context of a proportionality exercise which gives appropriate weight to the policy in the Immigration Rules, considers all factors relevant to the specific case in question, and ultimately assesses whether, giving due weight to the strength of the public interest in the removal of the person in the case before it, the Article 8 claim is sufficiently strong to outweigh it. In general, in cases concerned with precarious family life, a very strong or compelling claim is required to outweigh the public interest in immigration control.
22. It can be noted that the respondent has not challenged that the FTTJ correctly directed herself on the law in such terms at paragraph 22 of her decision. The FTTJ takes note that where the Immigration Rules are not met, the public interest is normally in refusing leave to enter or remain. In this paragraph the FTTJ also reminds herself that she must take into account the factors set out in s.117B of the Nationality.
23. The FTTJ makes findings of fact at paragraphs 24 to 33 of the decision which are also not the subject of challenge in ground 1 (or ground 2).
24. The respondent submits that the FTTJ is inadequate in her reasoning for why there are exceptional circumstances in the appellant’s case capable of outweighing the public interest.
25. The submissions in the grounds of appeal contend that the reasoning given does not explain why the accepted obstacles of cultural restrictions on unmarried partner in Iran and past harassment by the sponsor’s former husband meet the elevated threshold to justify departure from the Rules. It is also submitted that the sponsor’s refugee status cannot of itself establish exceptional circumstances. It is argued that the FTTJ has failed to demonstrate how the facts go beyond normal or expected difficulties for couples unable to meet the Rules and thus fails in her lawful duty to give adequate reasons.
26. Against these submissions of the respondent, I accept that the appellant can point to the FTTJ at the outset of her reasoning in paragraph 37 of the decision reiterating the applicable test is that of unjustifiably harsh consequences. I also accept that the FTTJ did not simply rely on the two obstacle type factors specifically mentioned in the respondent’s grounds of appeal. She identified three further factors at paragraphs 41 to 43 of the decision: the continuity of a genuine relationship over the years, the effect of the sponsor’s refugee status meaning she cannot pursue family life with the appellant in Iran and the efforts made by the appellant and sponsor to maintain a committed relationship.
27. I can accept that the fact of the sponsor being a refugee is not of itself an exceptional circumstance to make the respondent’s refusal decision disproportionate. However, the FTTJ does not find that the status of the sponsor alone establishes the exceptional circumstances. Moreover, I consider proper consideration of the appellant’s case required the FTTJ to take account of the effect of the sponsor’s refugee status meaning the sponsor cannot safely pursue family life in the country where the appellant is currently residing.
28. The reasoning at paragraphs 45 and 46 of the decision addresses how the factors of restriction on cohabitation in Iran and the past harassment provide an explanation for why in the appellant’s particular case the Immigration Rules cannot be met and why this is not for lack of commitment to the relationship which one might normally expect to be the explanation for not satisfying the relationship eligibility requirements of the Rules.
29. By setting out the five factors, I am satisfied the FTTJ was clear in identifying that it was these particular circumstances in accumulation that formed the basis for her finding at paragraph 47 that it is the continuing separation of the appellant and sponsor, despite their committed family relationship, that mean there are unjustifiably harsh consequences for the two of them.
30. In submissions before me Mr Tufman identified that grounds 1 and 2 can be taken together in their challenge to the decision of the FTTJ. I agree. Therefore, before I reach a final conclusion on the merit of ground 1, I consider that I should turn to ground 2. This is because at least one implication of that ground’s argument is that the FTTJ has not provided adequate reasoning in her finding as regards s.117B of the 2002 Act.
Ground 2
31. The complaint of the respondent here is that, when considering proportionality, the FTTJ did not carry out any assessment or analysis with regard to the statutory considerations under s.117B.
32. The applicable considerations relied on before me by Mr Tufman, refined somewhat from the more expansive list present in the grounds of appeal at paragraph 7, are:
• the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest: see s.117B(1);
• fluency in English is in the public interest: see s.117B(2);
• economic independence is in the public interest: see s.117B(3).
33. The grounds, citing Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58, contends that there is an absence of the structured approach which is required to assess proportionality lawfully.
34. It is correct that in paragraphs 37 to 47 of the decisions, as well as the conclusion in paragraph 48 there is no reference by the FTTJ to the s. 117B considerations relied upon by the respondent and how they weigh against the matters found to favour the appellant’s case. Nevertheless, I accept that the appellant is able to draw attention to what the FTTJ said at paragraph 22 about her need to take into account the s.117B factors and balance the public interest considerations against the factors relied upon by the appellant.
35. I also note there was no elaboration arising in the written reasons for refusal or submissions before the FTTJ about the respondent’s reliance on these considerations: see paragraphs 16 and 17 of the decision.
36. I accept that a judge is obliged in law to consider relevant s.117B considerations when assessing proportionality, even if they have not been expressly brought up by the respondent. However, where the case of the respondent is effectively to rely on s.117B considerations without any further elaboration, a judge’s own assessment need not be elaborate so long as it effectively engages with s.117B. Moreover, there was also no claim made by the appellant about being fluent in English or economically independent for the judge to address in express findings in the proportionality assessment.
37. The FTTJ did expressly state in paragraph 22 that she had to take into account the factors set out in s.117B of the 2002 Act. I consider that that is the context for the assessment undertaken at paragraph 37. Accordingly, I consider that when paragraph 22 is read with the later findings in the decision, there is the required structure present for a lawful assessment of proportionality undertaken by the judge. In effect, the FTTJ has properly identified that s.117B factors about the public interest apply in the appellant’s case and it is against these considerations that she weighs the findings she makes about the particular circumstances of the appellant and the sponsor. This is when the FTTJ has directed herself that where the Immigration Rules are not met there should normally be a refusal of leave unless there is the exception of unjustifiably harsh consequences. I am satisfied that in the structure of the proportionality assessment the FTTJ identifies the weight she should attach to the considerations under s.117B.
Conclusion on Grounds 1 and 2
38. I am not satisfied that the reasoning of the FTTJ is inadequate for her finding there to be exceptional circumstances in the appellant’s case. Ground 1 is not made out.
39. I am not satisfied the FTTJ has unlawfully failed to apply or engage with s.117B of the 2002 Act. Ground 2 is not made out.
40. I am not satisfied that there is a material error of law contained in the FTTJ’s decision, as argued by the respondent.
Notice of Decision
There is no material error of law in the decision dated 12 March 2026 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Anzani requiring it to be set aside and remade. The appeal of the Secretary of State is dismissed.

M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 October 2026