Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002527
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/74330/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

AO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M McGarvey, instructed by Seren Legal Practice
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 18 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or children. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a Nigerian national, appeals a determination of FtT C J Judge Woolley dated 24th March 2026 dismissing the appellant’s appeal.
2. The appellant entered the UK in 2022, heavily pregnant, and claimed asylum. She asserted she feared persecution on return owing to the risk from her ex-partner and her father.
3. The Secretary of State’s refusal letter dated 9th October 2024 accepted that she was a victim of domestic violence but did not accept that she had an objectively well-founded risk of persecution on return and concluded that she could avail herself of sufficiency of protection. At the hearing the Home Office Presenting Officer gave permission for the ‘new matter’ in the form of the child daughter being at risk of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) on return.
Findings
4. In his key findings the judge recorded this at [29]:
29. The respondent has accepted that the appellant was the subject of abuse and threats from her ex-partner and father in Nigeria. I find that it has not been established that the appellant is still at risk of abuse from either person. I have not accepted that the messages produced can be relied on to show any ongoing threat. In respect of the father I can accept that he may have been upset about the appellant getting pregnant out of wedlock. I find however that he has no inclination to pursue any threats against the appellant. She has said that he never calls her or has anything to do with her, and that this state of affairs I find will appertain to Nigeria just as much as to the UK. She has a mother and a brother in Ogun state who live apart from the father and there is no evidence that her mother bears any animosity towards her (in fact she was supportive when she told her of the pregnancy). I have not accepted that as a pastor of a church that he will have any connection with the bad gangs in Nigeria. In respect of the ex-partner I have found that the message from him cannot be relied on as evidence of any ongoing threats. He is an airport worker at Lagos State airport and has not been shown to work in anything other than a menial capacity. I find that he has not been shown to have any power or influence across the country. The ex-partner has a friend who works at Ikeja airport and I find likewise that he has not been shown to have any power or influence across Nigeria. Given the contradictions in her account I find that the appellant is not a credible witness. I take notice that she is a vulnerable appellant but I find that these inconsistencies are fundamental to her account and cannot be explained by her vulnerability. I find that it has not been established that her twin daughter is at risk of FGM in Nigeria, and by the same token find that the appellant is not at risk as the mother of a child being forced to undergo FGM. The appellant has claimed that her daughter would be kidnapped for FGM if she returned, and pointed to the country information produced as to kidnappings. As Ms Lewis pointed out this information does not provide any reasons for the kidnappings it describes and I find it cannot be linked to FGM. The appellant’s family background; her education and social status are all protective factors. I find that no FGM could be performed without her consent, which would not be forthcoming. I find that she is not credible in her assertions that she cannot receive assistance from the Nigerian State – the mere fact she has not sought assistance does not mean it is not available. I find that she is not credible in her assertions that she cannot relocate within Nigeria to avoid risk. It has not been shown that her father or ex-partner (or his friend at the airport) have any power or influence within Nigeria so as to be able to trace her if she returns.
Grounds of appeal
5. The grounds of challenge set out that the judge:
(i) failed to apply the correct legal test when assessing humanitarian protection
(ii) failed to consider the appellant’s dependant’s protection claim
(iii) looked behind a factual concession
(iv) looked for corroboration contrary to caselaw
(v) misunderstood the subjective evidence and showed a significant issue in understanding the appellant’s accent and thus her oral evidence and mis-recorded the evidence
(vi) speculated as to lack of continuous interest from the father as the appellant had changed her telephone number and further that the FGM would not be carried out without the appellant’s consent but there was no objective evidence on this point
(vii) failed to have regard to Immigration Rule 339K (past persecution) and erred in his assessment of the same.
(viii) failed to consider the objective evidence
(ix) (a) failed to provide adequate reasons as to state protection and internal relocation as the judge found the appellant not credible as to lack of state protection and not credible in her inability to internally relocate and (b) failed to consider the subjective evidence particularly in relation to the support of the mother and brother.
(x) failed to consider all convention reasons including an honour killing
(xi) made contradictory findings of fact in holding the father and ex partner had no power nor influence over the state but were of relatively ‘high status’ when assessing risk of harm as mother objecting to FGM.
(xii) Failed to consider relevant caselaw and Country Policy and Information Notes when addressing internal relocation.
Grant of permission
6. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Dainty but she observed that ground (i) did not appear to be material but that ‘all of the grounds are either in their totality arguable or arguable as to parts for the reasons set out’. Judge Dainty stated she took at what the advocate in the grounds had stated in ground (v) ‘face value’ as no transcript had been provided.
7. Prior to the commencement of the hearing various applications for adjournments were made (in part on the availability of Ms Carrington-Wolf who had represented in the FtT but refused. The appellant’s representatives were reminded of BW (witness statements by advocates) [2014] UKUT 568 (IAC) (an advocate must never assume the role of a witness), as Ms Carrington-Wolf who had represented the appellant in the FtT had made a witness statement and moreover was in attendance elsewhere in court. In the event counsel was located for the appellant in the form of Mr McGarvey.
8. Although no transcript was requested or provided, prior to the hearing in the Upper Tribunal I provided the parties with the ability to listen to the record of the audio proceedings in the matter. There was no further request for adjournment.
Submissions
9. Mr McGarvey was surprised that an interpreter had been provided to the FtT, but the appellant chose not to use their services. He submitted that ground (ii) was the strongest ground as the judge failed to make findings on the child. The appellant was a single woman who would be returning to Nigeria with two young children, and she had undergone previous persecution. At ground (iii) the judge was going behind the respondent’s concession of domestic violence. Ground (iv) was withdrawn.
10. As to ground (v) Mr McGarvey considered there were misunderstandings between the appellant and others in the hearing, but he would leave the assessment of evidence to the judge (me). On ground (vi) there was a contradiction and on ground (vii) a reference to the past persecution regarding the children. Ground (viii) was withdrawn. At ground (ix)(a) inadequate reasons in relation to the female child being at risk of FGM were given and at (ix)(b) the judge had failed to note all the subjective evidence and that the appellant had no contact with the mother or brother since November 2024, [29]. In relation to (x) the fear of an honour killing was not considered. As to ground (xi) there was a distinction between finding that the ex-partner and father had no power nor influence but had relatively high status and at ground (xii) the judge had not considered the extracts from CPINS set out in the grounds. Mr McGarvey confirmed the appellant had worked as a nurse whilst in Nigeria.
11. Ms Rushforth submitted there was no error and nothing which was material bearing in mind the credibility findings, and the findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The humanitarian protection claim would stand or fall with the asylum claim which was rejected. The judge addressed the position of FGM and the child and I was referred to [29]. In relation to s8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc. ) Act 2004, there was an accurate direction at [17] and [28]. The respondent had made no observation on s8.
12. At [20] the judge’s finding was not adverse. The respondent had accepted the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence but did not accept that she had a well-founded fear of persecution. That was clear in the refusal decision and the finding open to the judge. The judge had not gone behind a concession. As to ground (v) the judge had correctly recorded what was said in the oral evidence and there was no misunderstanding. The words as to social capital were those of the appellant’s representative. The appellant did not say that her father would pay for gangs, and the judge had made reasonable inferences.
13. On ground (vii) the judge gave adequate reasoning why past persecution was not to be repeated. The appellant had not been threatened for a long time. The judge clearly gave adequate reasoning on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. There was no suggestion that the mother or brother were anything other than supportive.
14. In terms of ground (x) honour killing was not argued at the hearing. Ground (xi) was not contradictory because there was clearly a distinction between high status in the community and being able to seek someone out throughout Nigeria. Ground (xii) was not made out merely because the judge had not considered those specific extracts of the CPINs. The appellant had worked as a nurse previously and the judge looked at the relevant facts.
Conclusions
15. I take the grounds in turn.
16. Ground (i) has no merit. As the judge stated the claim under humanitarian protection was ‘exactly the same as under the Refugee Convention’ [35] and as submitted by Ms Rushforth stood or fell with the asylum claim. Moreover, there was no material misdirection from the judge.
17. On ground (ii) the judge clearly made findings on the child. The judge acknowledged the ‘new matter’ (reference to the risk to the female child of FGM) at [8] and at [29] specifically stated ‘I find that it has not been established that her twin daughter is at risk of FGM in Nigeria’. On credibility the judge was entitled to find that the messages produced could not be relied upon to show any ongoing threat. Indeed, the judge, having noted the appellant was to be treated as a vulnerable witness, still found the contrast between the appellant’s oral evidence (that she had received no threats from the father since entering the UK) and her written statement, were contradictory and undermined her evidence.
18. In terms of the father the judge recorded accurately that the appellant stated, ‘he never calls her or has anything to do with her, and that this state of affairs I find will appertain to Nigeria just as much as to the UK’. It was also open to the judge to conclude that as the father was a pastor of the church, he would not have any connection with the ‘bad gangs’ in Nigeria.
19. The ex-partner was an airport worker, thus a limited position and as the judge stated, ‘has not been shown to have any power or influence across the country’. I would note at this point that the representative at the FtT mis-recorded in her transcript that the appellant had stated he was ‘police’. The audio recording clearly demonstrates that the appellant stated he was an airport worker as the judge notes. It was thus open to the judge to find that neither of these men had been shown to have any power or influence ‘across the country’. Thus, sufficiency of protection was available. Horvath [2000] UKHL 37 on considering sufficiency of protection was lawfully applied. Further, the judge cited the contradictions – which were fundamental- in the appellant’s evidence (not least the contradiction in the messaging) when finding the appellant not credible.
20. The judge found the appellant’s education and her background protective factors at [29]. The judge observed that without her consent FGM on the child would not be forthcoming and moreover she could receive assistance from the Nigerian state. That was properly reasoned by the judge at [29] and open to the judge so to find.
21. As to ground (iii) the judge did not ‘look behind a concession’. The Secretary of State’s reasons for refusal accepted that the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence but went on to set out that she was not considered to have a well-founded fear of persecution on return. That was not a concession that the appellant had been persecuted previously, not lest owing to the availability of sufficiency of protection. The judge also factored in that the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence but clearly considered, on the facts, that she could avail herself of protection from the Nigerian state as seen above in relation to ground (ii).
22. Ground (iv) in relation to corroboration was withdrawn by Mr McGarvey and rightly so.
23. The assertion at ground (v) by the FtT representative in the grounds that the judge failed to understand the evidence was simply incorrect. I have already referred above to the error in the transcript by the FtT representative. The judge was patient in his conduct of the hearing and did not repeatedly ask for clarification. He clearly understood the appellant and who was provided with a Yoruba interpreter, in the presence of her representative and chose not to use their services. At no point did Ms Carrington-Wolf interject to object that the appellant was not being understood and indeed the judge correctly recorded at [22] the exchange as to the ex-partner’s and his family’s views on circumcision and the response of the appellant and the judge’s deduction was open to him. The judge also recorded that her family were opposed to circumcision. Additionally, the judge correctly recorded that the appellant had merely stated ‘she knew who she was into’ when being asked about why she would still be at risk from the ex-partner. The transcript of the appellant’s representative was not as full, understandably, as the actual recording of the audio proceedings and thus was at variance with the proceedings record; on my listening the judge’s record and deductions therefrom were sound.
24. At [28] the judge identified that the Secretary of State did not use s8 and therefore determined credibility without reference to that provision. The appellant, however, in her answers specifically stated that she came to the UK ‘for protection’ and thus the judge was entitled to find that is what she did whilst at the same time accepting that s8 was not enlisted by the Secretary of State in her decision. That approach cannot be impugned.
25. As to ground (vi) the judge had clearly consulted the background material and the appellant’s own individual views on circumcision and was plainly entitled to make the findings that he did on FGM. The judge gave cogent reasoning for his findings on credibility. The grounds make assertions that were not presented during the appellant’s oral evidence. There was no arguable speculation on the part of the judge as opposed to reasoned analysis. The appellant’s views on FGM were clearly relevant to the risk to the daughter (particularly as she was no longer with the ex-partner). The grounds themselves at 6.6 as to the contact between the appellant and her mother and brother identify there was contact last year with the brother (Bapatope).
26. Ground (vii) Here I consider there is a lack of appreciation of the text of Paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules which in fact states:
‘339K. The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.’
27. The judge gave sound reasons for considering, even if he found previous persecution, which he did not, that such harm would not be repeated; not least the judge found sufficiency of protection.
28. Ground (viii) was withdrawn. Thus it was accepted that the judge did consider the objective evidence.
29. Ground (ix) (a) on reading the decision as a whole the judge gave sound reasoning on credibility and unarguably sound reasoning in relation to sufficiency of protection. The judge cited the Country Policy and Information Note on FGM at [30] and the CPINs themselves cite the VAPP [Violence Against Persons (Prohibition)] Act in Nigeria and see section 2.5.1 of the specific CPIN on FGM. The judge at [18] specifically identified the CPINs consulted and applied and there is no indication that he did not. At [38] the judge identified the CPINs explained the sufficiency of protection in Nigerian. As to the risk of housing and poverty the judge specifically recognised that the appellant had worked in a skilled profession, that of nurse before arriving in the UK on a skilled worker visa. The decision also records the appellant has family in Nigeria who have been supportive.
30. As to ground (ix)(b) there was no evidence that the appellant had a poor relationship with the mother or brother and indeed the judge found the mother was supportive before and did not accept she would not continue to be supportive [43]. The mother is not required to be local.
31. In terms ground (x) of the claim as to honour killing this in fact was the risk from the father. This was indeed considered by the judge who found, on cogent reasoning, that neither the father nor the ex-partner had power or influence over the state.
32. At ground (xi) the findings by the judge were not arguably contradictory. As pointed out an individual such as a pastor can have high status locally but no general influence or power over the wider state in terms of sufficiency or protection.
33. In answer to ground (xii) and the consideration of internal relocation, the judge addressed this fully at [39]. Not only did the judge consider the CPINs but also the particular circumstances of the appellant noting Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5 which was also unarguably lawfully considered and applied. The judge reasoned that there were very many large cities in Nigeria away from her home area, she had lived in Ogun state with her mother and there was no indication that she was at risk there and further the judge reasoned ‘the appellant is an educated woman who has worked as a nurse in Nigeria’ [40].
34. The grounds are not sustainable. There is no material error of law disclosed.

Notice of Decision
The determination of the judge contained no material error of law and will stand. The appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25th August 2026