Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002528
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01065/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

2nd September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

MUHAMMAD JAVED AKRAM
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Alam, instructed by A-R Law Chambers
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born on 18 July 1987. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cottis (the judge) dated 10 February 2026 dismissing his appeal against the refusal of his human rights claim.
2. The appellant entered the UK as a student in 2016. On 1 February 2022, he made an in-time application for leave to remain on human rights grounds which was refused on 3 May 2023. The appellant married a Nepalese citizen (B) on 30 September 2024. She is lawfully resident in the UK.
3. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the judge found that the appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with B. The judge found that there were no very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan and the appellant’s removal from the UK would not breach Article 8.
Grounds
4. The appellant appealed on the grounds that the judge arguably:
(i) Conflated the assessment under the Immigration Rules with the wider Article 8 proportionality assessment;
(ii) Gave inadequate reasons and/or speculative reasons for relocating to Pakistan and/or Nepal;
(iii) Failed to conduct an adequate cumulative Article 8 assessment;
(iv) Misapplied section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (NIA);
(v) Failed to engage adequately with material academic evidence;
(vi) Failed to distinguish private life from family life in the section 117B assessment;
(vii) Failed to adequately and independently assess the Article 8 rights of the appellant’s wife.
5. Permission was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hobbs on 9 June 2026 for the following reasons:
“The grounds relate to the Judge’s assessment of proportionality under Article 8. Considering the grounds as a whole, I am persuaded that it is arguable that the Judge failed to carry out a cumulative assessment of all the factors under Article 8. I find that ground 1 is arguable, given that the rules considered relate to private life only. I find that ground 2, and the Judge’s consideration of very significant obstacles was arguably not adequately reasoned, given that the consideration of family life has arguably been considered only by reference to the rules relating to private life. This is relevant also to ground 6. I find that ground 3, failure to conduct a cumulative Article 8 assessment is arguable.

It is arguable that insufficient consideration has been given to the appellant’s wife’s position. At 26(i) the Judge states that “some weight” is given to the impact of the decision on B, it is arguably
unclear how this is has been factored into his assessment. I am less persuaded by Grounds 4 and 5, but I do not limit the grant. “
Submissions
6. In summary, Mr Alam submitted the judge conflated the family and private life provisions of section 117B NIA Act 2002 in his assessment of proportionality at [27]. He made no reference to 117B(4) and failed to give weight to the appellant’s family life formed in the UK whilst he was lawfully resident. The judge carried over the little-weight provisions in respect of private life when assessing the weight to be attached to the appellant’s family life. The judge failed to give reasons for why the applicant’s nine years’ lawful residence and his contribution to society was not exceptional.
7. Mr Alam submitted that the judge failed to consider insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK and the Article 8 rights of the appellant’s wife. There was no consideration of her family life and the impact on her if the appellant is removed. The judge failed to demonstrate why it was proportionate for the appellant to go to Pakistan notwithstanding his wife’s private life in the UK. The judge failed to give adequate reasons for why family life could continue outside the UK given the appellant’s family were not in favour of the relationship and would not provide support.
8. Ms Lecointe submitted that the structure and language of the decision demonstrated the judge had fairly assessed the evidence and he considered insurmountable obstacles at [18] to [21], notwithstanding he makes no reference to the test under the Immigration Rules. The factual findings at [18] to [21] were sufficient to show that family life could continue in Pakistan. At [28], the judge took into account all the evidence in the round and correctly assessed proportionality. Significant weight should be attached to the appellant’s failure to satisfy the Immigration Rules. The fact that the appellant had established his family life whilst he was lawfully resident in the UK was not sufficient to outweigh the public interest. There was no misapplication of section 117B of the NIA Act 2002: Dube (ss.117A-117D) [2015] UKUT 90 (IAC) at [26]. Ms Lecointe relied on Volpi and Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and submitted the judge’s reasons were sufficient.
9. In summary, Ms Lecointe submitted that there was no error of law as alleged in the grounds. The judge did not conflate the tests under the Immigration Rules and he gave adequate reasons for his findings. He took into account all relevant matters including the lack of family support in Pakistan. The judge did distinguish between family and private life and any failure to refer to section 117B(4) was not material. The judge set out the circumstances of the appellant's wife at [17] and considered the impact on her at [26]. His conclusion at [28] that there were no unjustifiably harsh consequences was open to him on the evidence before him.
10. In response, Mr Alam submitted that the judge should reflect the different weight to be attached to private and family life in the decision. The judge failed to demonstrate he attached weight to the appellant’s family life, given his lawful residence. This coupled with the appellant’s positive contribution to society in the UK could have tipped the proportionality balance in his favour.
Conclusions and reasons
11. In Volpi at [2], the Court held:
“2. The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
12. There is no dispute on the facts of this case. The appellant came to the UK as a student and he has resided in the UK lawfully since 2016. He is married to a Nepalese national who is also lawfully resident in the UK. They are both well educated and have made a positive contribution to society in the UK. It is not in dispute that the appellant cannot satisfy the requirements of Appendix FM because his wife is not settled in the UK.
13. On the facts of this case taken at their highest, the appellant cannot satisfy the Immigration Rules. There are no very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan. The appellant has been in the UK since 2016 studying and can return to Pakistan to resume his private life. Any lack of family support because of his marriage to B is not capable of demonstrating insurmountable obstacles because the appellant and his wife can continue their family life outside the UK for the reasons given at [19] and [20] of the judge’s decision.
14. The weight to be attached to the public interest is significant because the appellant cannot satisfy the Immigration Rules. There are no unjustifiably harsh consequences capable of outweighing the public interest. The appellant’s family and private life, on the undisputed factual findings made by the judge, does not outweigh the public interest in this case.
15. I am of the view the judge could have expressed himself better, but that in itself does not give rise to an error of law. When the decision is read as a whole, it is apparent that the judge did not conflate his assessment under the Rules with his Article 8 proportionality assessment. The judge took into account the appellant’s and his wife’s background and circumstances at [16] and [17]. It is apparent from [22] that his findings at [18] to [21], in respect of the Immigration Rules, were taken into account in his Article 8 assessment.
16. The judge properly applied section 117B of the NIA Act 2002 and any failure to specifically refer to section 117B(4) was not material. The weight to be attached to appellant’s family life was not, when taken with all the other factors including his inability to satisfy the family life provisions of the Immigration Rules, capable of outweighing the public interest. The failure to specifically state that there were no insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK was not material given the judge’s factual findings.
17. The Article 8 rights of the appellant’s wife were considered and the judge assessed the evidence cumulatively when considering proportionality under Article 8. The judge carried out a balancing exercise at [23] to [27] and his conclusion at [28] was open to him on the evidence before him. Applying Volpi, there was no error of law as alleged in the grounds.
18. I conclude that there is no material error of law in the judge’s decision dated 10 February 2026 and I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed

J Frances
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 August 2026