The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002532
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58234/2024
 LP/02512/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

30th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

SHS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M West of Counsel, instructed by Liberty Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 7 February 2026 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 23 February 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claims.
2. The appellant’s protection claim was predicated on support for the BNP. After his screening interview on 18 January 2023, the appellant was asked to complete a statement of additional grounds under s120 of the Nationality, Immigration and Aylum Act 2002, which he did together with covering letter, on 10 February 2023. In that letter, the appellant claimed to have established a family and private life in the United Kingdom.
3. The respondent refused the claim on all grounds, finding amongst other things that the appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom would not be contrary to Article 8 ECHR.
The Parties’ Respective Cases
4. The FtT’s dismissal of the appellant’s appeal on protection grounds is not challenged. The only challenge is to the FtT’s dismissal of the appeal on Article 8 grounds. The sole ground of appeal for which permission was given, by Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt in a decision dated 11 June 2026, is set out in paragraphs 10 to 15.
5. Summarised at paragraph 10, the allegation is that the FtT ‘failed to provide a distinct and detailed assessment of the Appellant’s private and family life under Appendix Private Life and Article 8 ECHR’. Judge Bulpitt considered it arguable that the judge failed to give adequate explanation for why the human rights claim was dismissed and failed to resolve a disputed issue.
6. Representatives each made oral submissions. Whilst I refer below only to such matters as necessary to understand my decision, I took the grounds of appeal the party's submissions and the material to which they referred into account in their entirety.
7. I indicated at the outset that I intended, if I found there to be a material error of law, to remake the decision myself, in accordance with the standard directions of the Upper Tribunal. Mr West submitted that I should not do so, as his client was not in attendance. However, he was unable to offer any explanation for why the appellant had failed to attend, given the standard directions. As it was, I reserved my decision on the error of law, and so heard the party's submissions on remaking the decision only in case I were to find in the appellant’s favour. I did not, however, take those submissions into account at all when deciding whether the FtT had erred in law. Given that I have not found any error of law, I summarise below only the submissions made on that point.
8. Mr. West submitted that FtT’s consideration of the appellant’s Article 8 claim left the reader in genuine doubt as to what had been taken into account: the refusal letter; the review; the presenting officer’s submissions; or a combination of those matters. That was a problematic approach, in particular because the decision contained no record of the presenting officer’s submissions. It was, in any event, necessary for the FtT to make its own findings on the issue. There were factors not challenged by the respondent which could give rise to very significant obstacles to reintegration, such as the appellant’s family’s land dispute. Furthermore, the appellant lived with his grandmother which was a strong indicator of family life. The FtT had failed to take into account the statutory considerations in s117B of the 2002 Act.
9. Mr Sheikh that accepted that the decision was poorly structured but submitted that the FtT had done enough-. The FtT had referred to the family and private life claim at [13]. All of the points raised in the ASA had been dealt with in detail in the review. There was nothing to suggest that the FtT had overlooked any of the factors specifically relied upon. The land dispute had not been raised in the ASA or the grounds of appeal as a matter which should have been taken into account. Nothing raised by the appellant in his evidence established a family life or any significant private life. Consequently, the Article 8 claim was one which was doomed to fail.
10. In reply, Mr West submitted that the FtT was obligated to make an express finding on whether it agreed with the respondent regarding the claimed family life. The reasons do not show that the ASA was taken adequately into account. In particular, the ASA referred to section 117B; However, that issue was not addressed at all. The FtT should have grappled with certain factors such as the appellant’s relationship with his grandmother and the effect on reintegration of the extant land dispute. He submitted that, if I agreed the FtT had given inadequate reasons, then the appellant had not had a fair hearing and so the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Consideration
11. In order to decide whether the FtT has given adequate reasons for dismissing the appellant’s case under Article 8, or alternatively failing to decide material issues falling under that umbrella, it is necessary first to consider how the case was put.
12. In the appellant’s section 120 submission, the following is said:
‘Our client has family and private life in the UK. He has his maternal grandmother, aunts, uncles, and many cousins in the UK who he has very close relationship with. His family members all are British nationals. He is currently living with his grandmother.
He also has considerable friends and relatives in the UK, and they are British citizens or otherwise settled in the UK and have known our client as social and friendly person. They will provide letters of support in favor [sic] of our client. They have also acknowledged that our client is a very good-natured character. friendly and devoted. They have also praised his sense of responsibility towards the welfare of his local community.
You will note the extent of our client's claimed relationship with his close people in the UK. Our client's claimed circumstances suggest that he has formed a close bond with his extended family and friends in the UK and it should therefore be noted what was held at paragraph 18 of Huang [2007] UKHL 11:
“Human beings are social animals. They depend on others. Their family, or extended family, is the group on which many people most heavily depend, socially, emotionally and often financially. There comes a point at which, for some, prolonged and unavoidable separation from this group seriously inhibits their ability to live full and fulfilling lives. Matters such as the age, health and vulnerability of the applicant, the closeness and previous history of the family, the applicant's dependence on the financial and emotional support of the family, the prevailing cultural tradition and conditions in the country of origin and many other factors may all be relevan [sic]’
13. The respondent concluded that the appellant’s removal would not be contrary to Article 8 because he did not satisfy the requirements of Appendix FM or Appendix PL, and there were no exceptional compassionate circumstances to the case. The FTT summarised the respondent’s conclusions under the Immigration Rules at [13].
14. The appellant's witness statement said the following on the issue of Article 8:
‘17. Apart from the reason of asylum claim I would like to mention that I have an established private and family life in the UK. I have grandmother, uncles and aunts and cousins in this country. Although my time in the UK is not long by, but I like the British way of life. People have freedom of expression in the country. I have integrated into the British customs and cultures. I have also gained work experience during my stay in the UK. If I am allowed to stay in the UK, I can confirm that I will not be a burden on the economy of this country.
18. I am law abiding person. I have never committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, or any other serious crime or instigated or otherwise participated in such crimes. I never constituted a danger to the community or to the security of the United Kingdom, or prior to my entry to the United Kingdom.’
15. In his ASA, under the heading ‘Ground 3- WHETHER THE APPEAL SHOULD BE ALLOWED ON ARTICLE 8 GROUNDS’, the appellant submitted that:
‘40. As for Article 8 outside of the rules, the five-stage Razgar, R (on the Application of) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27. The Appellant enjoys a strong private life. More than little weight can be given, the provision is flexible, see [58] of Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 58 (14 November 2018).
41. The appellant has been living in the UK for over 2 years. The Appellant has established a private life in the time he has been here. He has strong political connections and activities. The appellant has maternal grandmother, uncles and aunts in the UK. He has formed a family life with his relatives in the UK.
42. Given the circumstances if he is removed from the UK, it would be an interference of such gravity that it would engage the United Kingdom's obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention to respect his private and family life in the United Kingdom. There is no suggestion or reasons to believe that any interference would be otherwise than in accordance with the law and for the legitimate public end necessary in a democratic society of the interests of the economic well-being of the country referred to in Article 8(2) which includes the maintenance of proper immigration control (Shahzad (Article 8: legitimate aim) [2014] UKUT 00085 (IAC))
43. The following elements need to be borne in mind.
i) The appellant has an independent private life.
ii) He will face very significant obstacles to reintegration.
iii) He has been here lawfully initially.
iv) He cannot continue his political activities in Bangladesh.
v) There are not significantly detracting/aggravating features in this
case [especially under 117B of the 2002 Act] such as deception.
44. The above factors, together with previous factors/arguments are also relevant in showing that there would be very significant obstacles to reintegration and/or removal would be unjustifiably harsh and a breach of Article 8 ECHR, especially as the Appellant is likely to be arrested on return. Even if there is a trial process, it cannot be said with certainty that it would be fair and there is every risk that the Appellant would be at risk of ill-treatment/harm during any period in custody.’
16. The respondent’s review addressed the appellant Article 8 case thus:
‘i) The grounds of the RFRL are maintained. (RB, RFRL, Pages 3-14)
ii) The A has provided no evidence to suggest that they are not still familiar with the language and culture of Bangladesh which would cause them to be unable to reintegrate into society, it is not accepted that they would be unable to locate and reunite with family members, and no persuasive arguments have been made to support the suggestion that they would be unable to find employment to support themselves there, or that they have made any real and proper enquiries into their return to prove they would be unable to establish themselves or gain employment as per MA Jamaica [2005] UKIAT 0013.
iii) Further with it being for the A to identify factors that go beyond hardship, inconvenience, or upheaval as per Treebhawon 2017 UKUT 13 (IAC), and Parveen 2018 EWCA Civ932, it will be maintained that no very significant obstacles have been sufficiently demonstrated within the ASA or AB on these grounds either.
iv) The R submits that as the A has been able to acclimate to the UK, with no prior knowledge of the culture or customs, that it is axiomatic that he would be able to integrate to a culture which is familiar to them, without very significant obstacles.
v) The R acknowledges the ASA’s submission that the A has family members in Britain (grandmother, uncles and aunts) (ASA – Page 11, Paragraph 41) but does not accept that he has demonstrated he shares more than normal emotional ties with them. As such, the R does not accept refusal is in breach of Article 8.
vi) The R also prescribes that little weight is to be given to a private life which is established at a time when the person is unlawfully in the UK or at a time when the applicant’s immigration status is “precarious” – which, as decided in Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 58, means at a time when they do not enjoy ILR.
vii) The onus is on the Appellant to demonstrate that removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences (Agyarko 2017 UKSC) and go beyond mere difficulties inconvenience or even being harsh, this being a high threshold that on the evidence submitted has not been reached.’
17. It is not suggested in the decision that the appellant gave any relevant evidence or made any relevant submissions on the Article 8 issue materially beyond that which was in his witness statement and ASA. Mr West accepts that he was not present at the FtT hearing. No challenge was made to the FtT’s comprehensive review of the evidence, and no application has been made for a transcript or recording of the hearing. Consequently, I am satisfied that the appellant’s case before the FtT was set out completely in his witness statement and ASA, nor indeed that the respondent made submissions on Article 8 materially beyond what was said in the refusal letter and review.
18. Dealing first with the claimed family life, the appellant adduced no evidence from which the FtT could be satisfied that there were ‘additional elements of dependency’ involving ‘more than the normal emotional ties’ necessary for family life to exist between adult relatives (see IA & ors v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 at [113]). Mr West submitted that the appellant’s cohabitation with his grandmother was a strong indicator of family life. With respect, that fact alone falls far short of establishing such ties. The appellant had come to the United Kingdom to study and work so far as permitted. The fact that accommodation was provided by relatives in no way shows in itself that additional elements of dependency or indeed more than normal emotional ties. The appellant could have described such dependency and ties in his witness statement, or could have adduced evidence from his grandmother on the point, but did not.
19. Consequently, rejection of the appellant’s claimed family life would have been inevitable even if the FtT’s reasons were objectively inadequately expressed. As it was, the family life claim failed for exactly the reasons given by the respondent in her refusal letter and review. In such circumstances, it was unnecessary for the FtT to say any more than it did at [42]:
‘Insofar as the appellant's human rights claim is concerned, in my judgement this has been adequately dealt with by the respondent. There is no prospect of the appellant’s appeal succeeding.’
20. Turning to the claimed private life, whilst the ASA alleged that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to reintegration, no detail was given. The appellant’s specific evidence on the issue of private life was limited to his having a grandmother, uncles and aunts and cousins in the country, liking like the British way of life, having integrated into the British customs and cultures, and having gained work experience during his stay in the country. He says nothing of obstacles to reintegration. He can hardly complain now that the FtT agreed with the respondent on that specific issue.
21. Similarly, nothing said by the appellant could have led the FtT to disagree with the respondent and find that any significant weight could be placed on his claimed private life. In short, the FtT was entitled to and expressly did reject the private life claim for the same reasons and expressed by the respondent in the refusal letter and review, and again was entitled to say no more than it did at [42].
22. The FtT is obligated only to give such reasons as necessary for the appellant to understand why his case as advanced before the FtT failed. He was in possession of both the refusal letter and review. In referring at [42] to the respondent’s reasons for rejecting the Article 8 claim, with which it agreed, the FtT discharged its legal obligation to provide sufficient reasons.
23. In the alternative, even accepting that the FtT had been invited (obliquely) to take into account the elements making up his protection claim, the only accepted element now relied upon was the existence of a land dispute with Tofur Miah. Of course, the appellant’s case was predicated not only on the existence of that land dispute but also on the fact that Mr Miah had made a false police complaint against the appellant which would lead because of Mr Miah’s political connections to his unjustified prosecution, detention and torture. The existence of a police case against the appellant was rejected at [40] with the appellant’s evidence having been found to be unreliable at [30].
24. There is no indication that the FtT was ever invited to treat the land dispute per se as a significant obstacle (let alone a very significant obstacle) to reintegration. The FtT cannot be criticised for failing to deal with a matter not placed in issue before it (see for instance Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC)).
Materiality
25. As it is, given the FtT’s unchallenged rejection of the appellant’s claim to be at real risk of serious harm from Tofur Miah as well as his remaining grounds for claiming asylum, and given the appellant’s other unchallenged personal circumstances, it is inconceivable that the FtT could properly have found on the evidence there to be any very significant obstacles to reintegration. In short, even if the FtT had failed to consider whether the mere existence of a land dispute (without real risk of consequential serious harm) led in all the circumstances to very significant obstacles, that would have been an immaterial error.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law and stands undisturbed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


22 October 2026