Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002533
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61843/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

M. K.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr George Symes, instructed by Sentinel Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Mahdi Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Upper Tribunal’). The Upper Tribunal is an independent decision-making body with powers given to it by an Act of Parliament. This decision is made in the context of the Upper Tribunal’s role in considering statutory appeals from decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the First-tier Tribunal’).
2. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the party that applied to appeal show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (‘TCEA 2007’).
3. If the Upper Tribunal finds that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.
4. The appellant (MK) is a Turkish national of Kurdish ethnicity. He asserts that he would be at risk on return because of race (Kurdish), religion (Alevi Muslim) and political opinion because he took part in political activity for the HDP, and the authorities believe he is a supporter of the PKK. By these proceedings he appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Coll dated 23 March 2026, dismissing his appeal against a decision of the respondent (‘SSHD’) to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
5. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dainty on 18 May 2026.
6. The matter now comes before me to determine whether First-tier Tribunal Judge Coll (‘FTTJ’) erred in law, and, if so, whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
7. The appellant and respondent were ably represented by Mr Symes and Mr Parvar, respectively. I am grateful to them for their very helpful submissions.
8. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity direction and that direction is maintained.
Grounds
9. Permission was granted on grounds 1, 2, & 4 of the grounds of appeal. The permission grant noted that while ground 3 was not arguable, the matters under ground 3, including the issue of medical evidence were arguable under ground 2.
10. Ground 1 submits that the FTTJ adopted an erroneous approach to credibility because there was no consideration of plausibility against the objective country background evidence, in particular, as to the gendarmes’ questioning and the conflation of Kurdish ethnicity and support for the PKK, and short detentions.
11. Ground 2 submits that the FTTJ made factual errors in that contrary to the findings, the appellant was never asked to give details about marches; why the letter from the Muhtar was sent to a relative’s shop rather than to him, and details of the animals sold or the money funding the appellant’s trip.
12. Ground 3 (which matters are now under ground 2) submits that the FTTJ in effect required corroboration.
13. Ground 4 submits there was a failure to have regard to relevant matters, in particular the appellant’s explanation for the authorities not looking for him and that he had used a fake passport.
Findings and reasons
14. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before it, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at this hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but I will refer to any relevant arguments in the decision.
15. I bear in mind that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of a specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.
Ground 1 – Erroneous approach to the assessment of credibility
16. Turning to ground 1, the appellant submits that the FTTJ erred in reaching her findings on credibility in insolation and without any assessment of the country background evidence.
17. In this respect, the appellant challenges the following findings in the determination:
At [35(a)] of the determination the FTTJ stated ‘it was not plausible that the gendarmes would have questioned a shepherd in the mountains about carrying a sizeable amount of bread’.
At [35(c)] of the determination, the FTTJ stated ‘The appellant could not explain why the Gendarmerie needed to question him as a shepherd undertaking his work. The Appellant explained their questioning as being racist. Even on the Appellant’s case, the Gendarmerie’s motivation for questions even if they happened was not political’.
At [36(h)] of the determination, the FTTJ stated in relation to short unofficial detentions ‘The Appellant admitted that he had no evidence that the events on 20 April 2022 and on 24 April 2022 had taken place’.
18. The appellant argues that the FTTJ’s failure to have regard to the relevant country background information renders the above-mentioned findings ‘marred’ by material errors of law.
19. The determination shows at [11] that the FTTJ was referred to three Country and Policy Information Notes (CPIN): Turkey: Peoples’ Democratic Party/Green Left Party (HDP/YSP) – October 2023 Version 5.0 (‘CPIN HDP’); PKK, Turkey – July 2025 Version 6.0 and Kurds, Turkey – July 2025 Version 5.0.
20. At [19] of the determination, the FTTJ refers to her approach when assessing credibility, and at [25] the FTTJ states that in considering the evidence in the round, her credibility findings have been made in the context of the relevant country background evidence.
21. Turning to the relevant country background information, at paragraph 12.9 of CPIN HDP, it states that ‘Kurds are assumed to be PKK members/supporters’ and, at paragraph 12.9.2 (d) it states that ‘Shepherds and ordinary Kurdish people from Kurdish villages are in jail for allegedly supporting the PKK or have given shelter and food to the PKK’.
22. CPIN Kurds July 2025 at paragraph 10.2, confirms that the authorities conflate Kurdish ethnicity with support for the PKK and that ’Kurds are assumed to be PKK members/supporters’. Likewise, at paragraph 9.4.2. of CPIN HDP it states that most people do not draw a distinction between the HDP/PKK.
23. Finally, paragraph 3.1.6 of CPIN HDP states that sources stated that it is difficult to keep track of the exact numbers of HDP members in prison because people get arrested and released additionally stating that HDP members are not being systematically prosecuted but rather arrests may be a tactic of discouraging people from actively working for the HDP.
24. Although the FTTJ states that she has had regard to the relevant CPIN’s, it is clear that paragraph [35(a)] of the determination provides no indication that the FTTJ has had regard to paragraph 12.9 and 12.9.2(d) of CPIN HDP when assessing the evidence in the round. The same can also be said of paragraphs [35(c)] & [36(h)] of the determination.
25. Mr Parvar on behalf of the respondent submits that the CPIN paragraphs referenced do not really cover the findings set out in the grounds of appeal. I respectfully disagree. In my view, the objective background information provides ample support for the appellant’s ground that had the FTTJ had regard to the relevant aspects of the CPINs, it is at least arguable that she would not have concluded that the appellant’s targeting as a Kurdish male was not for political reasons. It follows that I find that ground 1 is fully made out.
26. I reach this decision mindful of the need to exercise judicial restraint relating to findings of fact reached by the First-tier Tribunal. However, this is case where there is no indication on the face of the determination that the FTTJ in reaching her findings on credibility has in fact had regard to the relevant parts of the CPINs and assessed the case against the objective background evidence, despite her general assertion to have done so. This amounts to a material error of law.
27. Accordingly, I find the determination involved the making of a material error of law relating to the applicant’s credibility which arguably have infected the FTTJ’s other findings in the determination. As a result of my findings on ground 1, there is no need for me to go on to determine the remaining grounds. It follows that the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Coll must be set aside.
28. I canvassed the parties in respect of further steps in view of my finding of a material error of law. The parties agreed that if an error of law was found in the credibility assessment that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing. That is my view also. Given the critical nature of the conclusions on credibility no part of the determination can be preserved.

Notice of decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Coll of 23 March 2026 did involve the making of an error of law and is set aside. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before a differently constituted tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.

K. A. Khan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 July 2026