Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002555
FTT Appeal No: PA/60952/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

25th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SWANEY

Between

RPZ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Seehra, counsel, instructed by Barnes Harrild & Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewly, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 12 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity order
1. I have considered whether to make an anonymity order and have decided that one is necessary because the need for the United Kingdom to discharge its obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal judge (the judge) promulgated on 21 January 2026, dismissing the appeal against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims.
3. The appellant is an Iranian national who claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of his race and his actual or imputed political opinion. The appellant is Kurdish and claims to be of interest to the Iranian authorities because of his support for the KDPI.
4. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 21 August 2021 and claimed asylum. He claimed to be a minor, which was initially disputed. However, the appellant’s age was subsequently accepted. He was 16 years old when he arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed asylum.
5. The respondent gave reasons for refusing the appellant’s claim in a letter dated 1 November 2023. The appellant appealed the decision, and his appeal was heard on 13 January 2026. The judge dismissed the appeal. The appellant applied to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal, which was refused on 5 May 2026. He renewed his application to the Upper Tribunal and on 11 June 2026 permission to appeal was granted.
6. The appeal is before me for determination of whether the judge’s decision contains a material error of law.
The hearing
7. Permission to appeal was granted on a single ground, which is that it is arguable that the judge’s credibility assessment is flawed, with specific reference to paragraph 26 of the judge’s decision and the core contention by the appellant that his family home was raised by the Iranian authorities.
8. I had a composite bundle before me and heard oral submissions from both parties. There was no rule 24 response from the respondent; however, Ms Clewly confirmed that the appeal was opposed. Ms Clewly set out the respondent’s position in advance of submissions.
9. Ms Clewly confirmed that it was accepted that in paragraph 26 of the decision, the judge made a mistake of fact as to the appellant’s evidence when finding that it was his family who decided that he was at risk. Ms Clewly noted that the appellant stated at his substantive interview that his brother remained behind when he fled; at paragraph 13 of his witness statement, he said that his uncle told him that his brother had been arrested and detained; and it is recorded in the refusal letter that the appellant requested help with tracing his family. Ms Clewly confirmed that she had checked the record of proceedings and found nothing in it to indicate that the appellant contradicted this in his oral evidence. She confirmed that she would make submissions as to the materiality of the error.
The appellant’s submissions
10. Ms Seehra noted that the judge found that the appellant was generally credible. She also noted the positive finding that it was credible that the appellant would want to emulate his brother in what he did, with little enquiry into the meaning of his brother’s activities. It is the appellant’s position that the judge’s assessment of credibility is materially flawed based on two issues arising in paragraph 26 of the decision.
11. The two issues the appellant relies on are:
(i) The fact that the family decided that it was the appellant who was at risk despite his low level of activity. This was the subject of the respondent’s concession as to an error of fact.
(ii) The focus on the lack of evidence that the raid on the family home was due to the appellant’s activities instead of whether the raid took place at all.
12. In relation to the second issue, Ms Seerha submitted that it was not the appellant’s evidence that he was the only reason for the raid on the family home. Ms Seehra submitted that it is the fact of the raid, whether it happened, and the consequences of the raid which are important. Ms Seehra submitted that the judge failed to refer to the appellant’s evidence that his brother remained behind in the house during the raid or that his brother was subsequently arrested and detained. She submitted that this is material to the consideration of risk, relying on the hair trigger approach of the Iranian authorities to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights as identified in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC).
13. Ms Seerha submitted that the judge’s failure to make a clear finding about what the consequences of those present during the raid being arrested would be for the appellant is material to the approach that would be taken to the appellant on return. She submitted that the failure to consider this issue means that there is a lack of reasoning as to why the appellant would not be at risk because of his family associations.
14. She noted paragraph 14 of the decision, which reflects the respondent’s position in the refusal decision, i.e. that it is accepted that if the appellant’s claim is credible, then there would not be sufficiency of protection, and he could not relocate in Iran. She submitted that this goes to the materiality of the judge’s errors.
15. Ms Seerha submitted that in the event I was to find a material error of law, the nature and extent of the findings that would be required in the remaking of the decision mean that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. She submitted that the positive credibility finding in relation to the appellant’s motivation for supporting the KDPI should be preserved.
The respondent’s submissions
16. As stated, the respondent did not file a rule 24 response; however, her position was set out in oral submissions by Ms Clewly.
17. With regard to paragraph 14 of the judge’s decision and the respondent’s position on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation if the appellant is credible, Ms Clewly submitted that the position is contingent upon it being accepted that the authorities are interested in the appellant.
18. Ms Clewly submitted that the judge considered the appellant’s claim at its highest in paragraph 26 of his decision and that even if the judge was mistaken about his family considering the appellant to be most at risk, the judge considered the raid and the motives for it and found that the authorities were not interested in the appellant. Ms Clewly submitted for this reason that the accepted error of fact was not material.
19. Ms Clewly suggested that if the material error is solely about what occurred in Iran, then the appeal could be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking but expressed no strong view on behalf of the respondent.
Consideration
20. I have focused on the second of the two points raised by Ms Seerha in her submissions. At question 35 of the substantive interview the appellant was asked ‘what was the reason for the problem?’ in reference to the problems he faced in Iran. He stated ‘My brother had helped the Kurdistan democratic party KDPI. My brother had helped the democratic party members by giving them food and the Pasdaran found out and they raided our house.’
21. At question 47 of the substantive interview, the appellant was asked about the raid on his house. He was asked several linked questions, including ‘why they raided your house (sic)?’ His answer was as follows:
I was in the house with my mum and brother, we had some peshmergas in the house as well. The sun was setting. When we suddenly heard shooting the peshmergas started exchanging fires with the Pasdaran. My brother told my mum take Ramyar and go to somewhere safe. My brother stayed with them he was also carrying weapon. We ran away from the back door. We went to the village of Gusik gusik. We went to relative of my mother who was called [M]. Then my mum said that I had to go to somewhere else they would continue to look for you. She said that they had no mercy and they will continue to look for you. She set me off to go with [M] to go with someone called [A]. [M] was with me he started to speaking to [A] I could not hear, then they said me to go out of the country and then I ended up here. (Emphasis added)
22. The appellant confirmed that he and his mother fled in his witness statement dated 24 February 2024 (paragraph 6).
23. At question 53 of the substantive interview, the appellant was asked whether he had ever personally received any adverse attention from the Iranian authorities before he left Iran. His answer was ‘no’. When the question was repeated, his response was ‘no, just the raid and how we had to leave.’
24. It is clear from the appellant’s evidence that it was his brother who was the person who was actively involved in helping the KDPI and that he played a supporting role, doing what his brother told him to do. The appellant does not claim that the raid on the family home was because of his own activities. I find that the appellant’s response to question 53 is not an indication that he was the target of the raid on his house. He is clear that he was not targeted personally. I find his reference to the raid in answer to that question is a reference to the reason he fled Iran.
25. I find that the judge’s finding that the appellant had claimed that the raid was because of his own activities was not open to him on the evidence before him. This error is material because it carried weight in the judge’s overall finding that the appellant’s account of needing to leave Iran was not credible (paragraph 28).
26. I find that the judge’s failure to refer to the appellant’s evidence that his brother was arrested and detained in Urmia prison (paragraph 13, witness statement dated 24 February 2024), to make a finding as to whether that evidence was accepted or rejected, or give reasons for such finding is an error of law. It was originally raised in the grounds of appeal as being relevant to the challenge to the judge’s finding that the family decided that the appellant was most at risk. That issue has been resolved, as it is now accepted that the judge made an error of fact on that point. It is, however, also relevant to the question of whether the appellant’s claim that he would be of interest to the authorities on return is credible, with specific reference to paragraph 10 of the guidance in HB (Iran) and is therefore material.
27. Having had regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Directions and what was said by the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022], Civ 1512, I find that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing. Given that the material error of law relates to the assessment of credibility, which must be assessed in the round, having regard to all relevant factors, I do not consider it is appropriate to preserve the single, limited finding Ms Seehra requested be preserved.

Notice of Decision
28. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves the making of an error of law.
29. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside, and no findings are preserved.
30. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing before any judge other than Judge Derrick.

J K Swaney
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
13 August 2026