Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002558
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54250/2024
LP/12213/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

AD
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Iqbal Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr N. Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 26 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 13 March 2026. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 12 February 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim. The appellant’s wife and child are dependants on the claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant and his wife are nationals of Albania. He was a physical education teacher and his wife was a nurse.
4. His claim was that he could not return to Albania because his life and his wife’s life would be at risk as they were subject to pressure from influential people who were forcing them to do work he did not want to be involved in for the advancement of the political agenda for the Socialist Party in Albania during local elections.
5. He claimed that his problems originated in or about April or May 2022 when he encountered between 1 to 10 unknown individuals. He claimed that he suspected them to be working undercover for the mayor. In the alternative his problems started 2 ½ years before 2022 when AM was elected mayor, or the problems he had started a year prior to 2022. The appellant could not give the date but he stated that after an encounter with unknown individuals, he was asked to undertake political promotional and networking activities in and outside the school and to attend assemblies and post on behalf of the Socialist party on social media. He stated he did not influence the children or post on social media but he attended 2 to 3 assemblies. He experienced verbal abuse and threats from these individuals when he refused to do the work. He was physically attacked on one occasion. As a result, he and his wife were both dismissed from their employment were not given any papers or reasons. He claimed that he had been asked to carry work for AM by the people working for him. They were part of his team, and they came from different cities in Albania.
6. They left Albania in or about September 2022 and travelled via France before arrival in the UK on 30 September 2022 when he made a claim for asylum with his wife as a dependant on that claim.
7. Since being in the UK, he said in interview that no attempts have been made to contact him or his wife but his brother and father had been harassed by them a year prior to the interview.
8. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 12 February 2024 refused the claim. The respondent in the decision letter and the reviews undertaken set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim to be at risk of harm in Albania.
9. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 13 March 2026, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence on the core of the appellant’s claim between paragraphs 17-26 and at paragraph 27 considered the claim in the alternative. The FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had given a credible and internally consistent account of events in Albania and that he and his wife would not be at real risk of serious harm or persecution on return.
10. The appellant sought permission to appeal on 2 grounds.
11. Permission to appeal was granted by a FtTJ on 20 May 2026 on those 2 grounds.
12. The hearing took place on 26 August 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant and his wife were present at the hearing and were represented by Counsel Mr Iqbal who appeared before the FTT. The respondent was represented at the hearing by Mr Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer.
13. Mr Iqbal submitted that he relied upon the grounds of challenge and the skeleton argument which he had provided which he supplemented by his oral submissions. Whilst he indicated he had not seen a Rule 25 response filed by his instructing solicitor’s on behalf of the appellant, a copy was provided to him and time was given for him to read that. The solicitors for the appellant had filed and served on the Tribunal and the other party a consolidated bundle of documents. Mr Parvar relied upon the Rule 24 response filed on behalf of the respondent dated 10 July 2026.
14. It is not necessary to set out those oral submissions which will be considered in the discussion of the 2 grounds advanced on behalf of the appellant.
15. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give and by reference to the decision of the FtTJ, the material before him and in the context of the submissions made, both oral and in documentary form as advanced by both advocates.
Discussion:
16. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
17. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal's decision in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm AR 535.
18. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
"There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen's summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
'It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see  AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 ;  [2008] AC 678  per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see  MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2010] UKSC 49 ;  [2011] 2 All ER 65  at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see  R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal   (Social Entitlement Chamber)   [2013] UKSC 19 ;  [2013] 2 AC 48  at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.
19. There are 2 grounds of challenge. I begin by considering ground 2.
Ground 2:
20. This ground seeks to challenge paragraph 19 of the findings of fact and credibility assessment undertaken by the FtTJ.
21. That paragraph reads as follows:
“In truth, the Appellant appears to be an economic migrant. His initial interaction during his screening interview at 3.1 for both him and his wife seem to demonstrate this. They both in turn (being interviewed separately) state in response to the question of “Why have you come to the UK?” as follows: “I have for better opportunities for my family” [sic] and “better prospects.” There is no mention of any claimed problems in Albania by either of them which is highly surprising. Whilst I acknowledge that the screening interview is not the main forum for identifying the reasons for claiming asylum it is I consider significant that they both when asked, broadly identified better economic prospects as their reason for travelling to the UK. When asked about this at hearing the Appellant (and his wife also) stated somewhat unconvincingly that ‘better opportunities for his family’ did not mean for economic reasons. The Tribunal does not find this to be convincing evidence especially as he failed to mention in his screening any of the claimed political issues which he now advances (see for example the summary at q236 of main interview)”.
22. Mr Iqbal submits that the finding made at paragraph 19 was not a finding that was open to the FtTJ to make ( I refer to the grounds, skeleton argument and rule 25 response at paragraph 18). He submits that the appellant did not state that they travelled to the UK for better “economic “prospects and that when they were asked questions by the respondent there were no follow-up questions.
23. In his oral submissions, Mr Iqbal submitted that there was a difference between “better prospects” and “better economic prospects” and that the former had a wider ambit whereas “better economic prospects” was more specific. What the appellants were saying was that they sought a safe life away from persecution and state actors. He further submitted that when reading the answers and when motivated by a desire to reach a fair decision, the respondent rushed to give the importance to that answer without clarifying further. The FtTJ agreed with the respondent and it was a finding that was not open to the FtTJ to make.
24. Having had the opportunity to hear the submissions and consider them in the context of the documentary material and the issues raised, I am satisfied there is no error of law on the basis advanced in ground 2. My reasons are as follows.
25. At paragraph 19, the FtTJ recorded the evidence given by the appellant and his wife from their respective screening interviews given on 1 October 2022. The screening interview at paragraph 3.1 as it related to the first appellant was asked “ why have you come to the UK?” The answer stated is, “I have for better opportunities for my family.” The appellant’s wife was asked the same open question at paragraph 3.1 and the answer recorded is, “for better prospects.”
26. The FtTJ did not misread or misquote the evidence and was entitled to consider those responses in accordance with the evidence. It was plainly open to the FtTJ to take into account that they were separate answers, which were given independently of each other, and were answers given to open questions and were such when taken together to mean that they had come to the UK for economic reasons, in other words not due to a fear of persecution. This was the point that the FtTJ made at paragraph 19 and that it was in the context of neither appellant having made any reference or mention of claimed problems in Albania when asked the open question “why have you come to the UK?”
27. The issue of whether it was for economic reasons was not the real focus of the finding made at paragraph 19- the FtTJ’s focus was on the failure of either appellant to make any reference or mention of the fact that they were coming to the UK because they feared harm in Albania.
28. The FtTJ rightly acknowledged that the screening interview was not the main forum for identifying their reasons for claiming asylum. However, it was open to the FtTJ to take into account that both had independently of the other broadly identified the same reason but also that neither made any reference nor mention of problems in Albania. I reject the submission made by Mr Iqbal that neither the respondent nor the FtTJ asked any follow-up questions or otherwise. The appellant was asked in screening interview why he had not mentioned problems in Albania in his screening interview (see Q235), and the appellant claimed it was because “I have been very heavily mentally. As I was in depression. That’s why.” It is also clear that the appellant and his wife were both asked during the hearing questions (independently of the other )about what they had initially said in the screening interview and the FtTJ recorded his assessment of their evidence that the” appellant (and his wife also) stated somewhat unconvincingly that “better opportunities for the his family” did not mean for economic reasons.” The FtTJ rejected that explanation with reasons stating, the tribunal does not find this to be convincing evidence especially as he failed to mention in screening any of the claim political issues which are now advances (see question 236 of the interview). It is also of note that the appellant stated by reference to the screening interview that he had told his story regarding “the economic issue and side” (see question 14 of the interview) and thus the appellant appeared to be agreeing that he was referring to economic issues in the screening interview. Contrary to the submissions made, the appellant was asked questions in his interview but also at the hearing and the FtTJ was entitled to consider the evidence and make his findings on that evidence.
29. In his submissions Mr Iqbal relied upon paragraph 14 of MM (DRC, plausibility) [2005] UKIAT 00019, which stated that: “The Adjudicator had also failed to assess the Appellant as a witness. It was if she had assessed the case wholly on paper. There was no reference to oral evidence as such or to cross examination. There was nothing about the way in which he had given his evidence, such as whether he had been detailed and elaborate, whether he had been evasive or forthcoming when answering challenging questions, hesitant when he should have been ready and confident. This was all necessary for the making of proper credibility findings.” It is submitted that the FtTJ did not follow the above required approach in reaching his credibility findings.
30. When considering the reliance placed on paragraph 14 of the above decision, it is important to note that the grounds only challenge paragraph 19. There is no challenge to paragraphs 17 -18 and 20- 26-where the FtTJ assessed the evidence relating to the core part of the appellant’s claim. Insofar as paragraph 14 above refers to the assessment of credibility, it could not properly be said that the FtTJ failed to assess the oral evidence of the witnesses. He plainly did ( see paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21) and in respect of paragraph 19 expressly referred to the oral evidence given by both appellants. In the circumstances and overall, I am satisfied that the findings made at paragraph 19 were reasoned and plainly open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence.
31. Whilst ground 1 challenges paragraph 19; there is no challenge made to the findings of fact and the analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 17 – 26 (save for that one paragraph).
32. As submitted on behalf of the respondent those paragraphs assessed the evidence that went to the core of the appellant’s claim and they remain unchallenged findings of fact. The FtTJ had the advantage of hearing the evidence and for the oral testimony of the witnesses to be tested during cross examination alongside the documentary evidence. In his finding at paragraph 18 the FtTJ found that with the exception of the appellant’s nationality, age and identity, he found “the appellant be a very unconvincing witness before me and incredible in his increasingly vague account of past events and also regarding stated fears upon return. This was reflected both in his asylum process interviews and in oral evidence before me.” At paragraph 19, he made the finding the subject of ground 2, which was a finding that was entirely open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence for the reasons set out above.
33. At paragraph 20 the FtTJ set out the appellant’s claim to have been pressured to attend events and that when he did not do so he was threatened. The FtTJ identified that the appellant’s wife’s evidence contrasted with that she confirmed that she had never seen any threats made against her husband. At paragraph 21 the FtTJ stated that for all the supposed pressure he (the appellant) was put under he was threatened on 2 to 3 occasions and was just once physically assaulted. In this respect his evidence in interview was that the claimed to have been wounded (Q185). The judge found that there was no medical records. He did refer to the wife’s oral evidence who confirmed injuries to his face on one occasion but could not say the date.
34. The FtTJ also considered the factual claim made as to why he had been targeted but rejected this as lacking in credibility having identified that his claim it was because he was a teacher but the FtTJ found that he did not happen to any of his colleagues (see Q157) and that in light of the unwillingness of him to be involved and his lack of influence, it was not credibly explained why these people would spend so much time as claimed trying to get the appellant to support the party.
35. At paragraph 22 the FtTJ addressed the evidence given in the appellant’s interview which he assessed as being a series of what appear to be “deliberately vague answers” and gave examples of these by reference to the evidence as it related to the core of the claim - dealing with the inability to identify those who threatened him, the influence the people had, and after being further questioned only then eventually identifying AM but being unable to be more specific.
36. At paragraph 23 the FtTJ identified the lack of consistency regarding the timeline as to the claimed problems he had in Albania and did so by reference the answers given by the appellant in evidence. At paragraph 24, the FtTJ addressed the claim made that both he and his wife were fired from their jobs as teacher and a nurse because of the failure to obey those intimidating him. The FtTJ rejected his evidence and that it was “highly implausible” that employees such as a nurse and a teacher would be summarily sacked with no given reason and without any paperwork (which is what the appellant claimed see Q224). The FtTJ also found that if those he feared were related to those of influence, it was of some significance that the appellant and his wife were able to leave the country using their own passports.
37. At paragraph 25, the FtTJ found that the appellant had not sought to contact the police at any stage contrasting his claimed account that “he didn’t have any evidence or facts” but that he accepted that if he had problems in the future he could report it to them. The FtTJ rejected his claim that his brother and father had received threats when they has provided no evidence in support of this and that neither of them had sought to report any threats to the police. Pargarph 26 was an adverse credibility findings made in relation to the failure to claim asylum in France, a safe country, and the FtTJ made a finding that the failure to claim asylum was indicative of someone who was not really in fear of persecution.
38. Thus, in summary the FtTJ not only made a finding that was open to him on the evidence at paragraph 19 of his decision which was plainly based on the evidence, but also the between paragraphs 17 – 26. In those paragraphs the FtTJ also made findings of fact having assessed the evidence that went to the core of his fear in Albania and the factual claim which the FtTJ rejected with reasoning and which is not the subject of challenge in the grounds.
39. Taking into account those matters set out above I conclude that the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons when reaching his overall conclusions. This is also relevant to ground 1.
Ground 1:
40. Turning to ground 1 it is submitted that the claim was that the appellant feared unnamed individuals and AM and that the respondent’s case was that AM was no longer a mayor and had resigned and therefore no longer held an influential position.
41. The grounds and submissions refer to the appellant’s witness statement filed after the respondent had submitted a document which was uploaded to the electronic file on 2 June 2025. In the witness statement as recorded in the grounds at paragraph 3, the appellant claimed that he had seen the article referring to AM’s resignation but that he “strongly believes that he is very influential and powerful man…” and that he would instruct others to search for him and therefore their lives will continue to be in danger. It also made reference to the resignation is not “merely a routine political act, but a calculated step directly linked to his ambitions to rise to a higher level that the member of Parliament.”
42. The grounds go on to state that at the hearing and during closing submissions and in support of this Counsel made an oral application for the FtTJ to view and take account of what was described by Counsel as “ evidence available in the public domain“ in the form of a web link to an article ( see paragraph 4 of the grounds). Counsel’s attendance note states that during his submissions he sent the judge an online link to an article which confirms that AM has now become a member of Parliament. It states that the judge refused to look at it because he said that the evidence has been closed and it is not in the bundles. The note also records that counsel’s argument was that it was information in the public domain and he could take it into account by “judicial notice” however the judge refused to do so. It records that this was an error of law by the judge because the judge could take it into account because “it is an undisputed factual evidence which is in the public domain.”
43. Reference is made in the grounds of the contents of that article and that it confirmed that the mayor had resigned from the position and had contested the election to be a member of Parliament in May 2025, he has managed to be among the most voted in Albania in Parliament election and was now a member of Parliament. The grounds state that the FtTJ refused to grant permission and that the FtTJ’s decision does not mention that application.
44. Against that background the grounds seek to challenge paragraph 27 on the basis that the FtTJ made a finding that was wrong, that is, that there was no objective evidence and that the appellant attempted to rely on it, the judge was made aware of it and that the judge refused to look at it. It was stated that it was relevant evidence that went to the heart of the asylum claim and that “at the very least the judge should have mentioned it in his determination and in any event he was wrong in refusing permission to rely on it. It is therefore a material error of law.”
45. As Mr Parvar submitted the grounds of challenge evolved after the original grounds had been submitted and following the rule 24 response which was filed on 1 June 2026 (see paragraphs 7-9 of that document). The appellant’s solicitors sought to rely on rule 25 response where at paragraph 25 it was asserted that the refusal to consider the material was “procedurally unfair”.
46. Mr Iqbal on behalf the appellant submitted that there was no dispute that AM was powerful and had influence and that the article corroborated the appellant’s account. The appellant’s case involves state actors. He submitted that the judge had been asked to take judicial notice of objective evidence in the public domain which was the same as a CPIN and if the respondent wanted more time to investigate the information, they could have asked for more time. He therefore submits that this taints the finding of fact made at paragraph 27 and by implication the other findings made.
47. Mr Parvar on behalf of the respondent relied on the Rule 24 response filed on 1 June 2026. In his oral submissions he identified that if Ground 2 was not made out, Ground 1 is not material to the outcome because paragraph 27 was an alternative finding. The finding of facts made on the core of his account were those made between paragraph 17 – 26.
48. As to the points made in the grounds, the rule 25 response and the skeleton argument, Mr Parvar submitted that the position taken by the FtTJ was open to him and it was not demonstrated that it was unfair in the particular circumstances as they were . As to the material sought to be admitted, he argued that it could not be described as “objective material” when this was a web link to one article and one which the respondent had no opportunity to consider.
49. I have therefore considered the circumstances and the submissions made by the advocates alongside the written documentation.
50. Mr Iqbal and Mr Parvar agree that whilst the FtTJ did not make any reference to the oral application made during closing submissions, there was no dispute on the facts as to what occurred at the hearing in the sense of what was said by the FtTJ and the stage of the proceedings.
51. The respondent had set out in the rule 24 response an extract from the PO note. “J” refers to the FtTJ and “Rep” refers to Counsel. It states as follows:
“Rep: information in public domain this article confirms please find the link
J: you can’t adduce extra evidence once close
Rep: judicial note
J: evidence in bundle in papers or its not – completely unfair to allow objective evidence and she didn’t have opportunity to examine and I won’t have look at the link
Rep: ok understand
J: ok we can move on then”
52. There is no dispute between the advocates that Counsel sought to adduce the web link during his closing submissions. There is also no dispute that after having refused to look at the link Mr Iqbal accepted the ruling. The fact that he did so accept the ruling is not of any relevance to the issue as Mr Iqbal properly pointed out.
53. I therefore considered the ground of challenge as advanced. Having done so I am not satisfied that either the FtTJ failed to apply his discretion or acted unfairly in refusing to admit the evidence. I set out my reasoning below.
54. Both parties have cited in their respective documents reference to the decision of Dawrani (Judicial discretion - late evidence - sanction) [2026] UKUT 151 (IAC) which is a decision of the Presidential Panel which draws upon the earlier decision of Maleci (Non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 28 (IAC), and as supplemented by the later SPT's Practice Direction of November 2024. The facts of the appeal are entirely different to the facts of the present appeal. In Dawrani the issue related to the admission of a large number of documents which had not been previously served in accordance with the Practice Direction. Nonetheless the relevance of the case to the present appeal lies in the summary of the way in which evidence is to be provided during proceedings before the FtTJ.
55. The headnote reads: It must no longer be thought that the mere presence of available and relevant evidence will invariably result in its admission, irrespective of whether it has been provided in compliance with case management directions. Judges have a range of available procedural sanctions, such as adjourning the hearing and going on to consider wasted or unreasonably incurred costs or allowing only the truly essential parts of a belatedly served bundle to be admitted. The SPT's Practice Direction countenances such alternative measures. However, it is plainly open to a judge, in their discretion and as a matter of judgment, to sanction the defaulting party by excluding the evidence if it is just and fair to do so.
56. In brief summary, the FtTJ Rules 2014 and Practice Statement No. 1 of 2022 set out that material provided outside the relevant time limits must not be admitted without permission of the FtT. This is in the context of material being provided after five working days prior to the date of the hearing. Admissibility of material must be dealt with as a preliminary issue and reference is made to the permission of the Tribunal being sought and granted. The decision also refers to the importance of procedural rigour and sanctions available for non-compliance such as the exclusion of evidence if the tribunal considers it just and it is necessary to ensure the proceedings are conducted in accordance with the overriding objective. Other sanctions such as costs or adjournments are also referred to. The Rules and Practice Statements refer to the effect of non-compliance and the impact on the ability of the other party to participate fully in the proceedings and also that it is disrespectful of the judicial process and the rule of law. Importantly what is “just” will depend on the circumstances. Further procedural guidance as noted in that decision was provided in the SPT’s Practice Direction and by reference to paragraphs 5.1-5.4 and 7.14.
57. Having considered the decision in the light of the submissions and the issue raised in ground 1 I reach the following assessment.
58. First, this was not a case of late service of material but that there had been no service or filing of the material either in accordance with the time limits or in accordance with the Practice Direction. Criticism is raised of the FtTJ’s failure to record the reasons in the decision. I would agree that it is good practice to set out any procedural issues that occur in a hearing. However, here the FtTJ did not act contrary to the Practice Direction. He did not address the issue of late evidence as a preliminary issue at the outset of the proceedings, which is the stage identified in the Practice Directions, because no application was made before him to adduce any evidence and therefore no ruling could be made.
59. If evidence that has not previously been filed and served is sought to be admitted or is provided late, the stage to seek its admission is before the evidence begins. At the hearing before the FtTJ the stage which it was sought to adduced the evidence was not prior to the evidence being given and cross examination but at the stage when the evidence had closed. This is reflected in the FtTJ’s response ( see above) “ you can’t adduce expert evidence once closed.” At that stage of the proceedings the evidence had been completed and the submissions stage is where the evidence given and considered by the parties is the subject of analysis and argument.
60. Second, it is also not the case that this was material that related to any new issue being raised. The respondent had uploaded to the electronic file the document on 2 May 2025 and the appellant had filed his witness statement in response dated 4/6/2025 by reference to that material. The date of the article subsequently relied upon is dated May 2025. As Mr Parvar submits there was no explanation why the evidence, if it was of such evidential importance, was not provided from May 2025 until the hearing which took place on 20 February 2026. As the FtTJ also stated its admission had not been sought by filing the document within the bundle.
61. When considering procedural fairness, it has to be viewed in the context of both parties and as indicated the FtTJ’ s response “evidence in bundle in papers or its not – completely unfair to allow objective evidence and she didn’t have opportunity to examine it “. What the FtTJ meant was that where these are adversarial proceedings and there is a reasonable expectation that the other party will have a fair opportunity to consider the evidence.
62. Whilst Mr Iqbal submitted that other sanctions could have been invoked such as adjourning the case or giving the respondent the opportunity to read the document, this has to be considered in the light of the position the FtTJ had reached in the appeal. It was sought to be admitted after the evidence had been given and after the presenting officer had given her submissions. It would have meant that the parties may have to have been recalled, further cross-examination to be undertaken, the giving of further submissions and thus lead to further delay.
63. As to the material itself, it has been referred to as “objective evidence in the public domain” and Mr Iqbal sought to draw the comparison with reports such as the country information policy unit reports ( CPIN’s) provided by the Home Office and in the circumstances the FtTJ could take judicial notice of it. However, I accept the submission made by Mr Parvar that this was not objective evidence either akin to a CPIN, which is a sourced document provided by a government department, but a web link to a news article.
64. It is for the individual judge to determine by applying their discretion the admission of evidence in a hearing which they are seized of and are conducting. They are best placed to consider the issue in the light of the revised practice of the FtT and the overriding objective.
65. Having set out the matters above, I am not persuaded that the FtTJ was in error as the grounds and submissions assert.
66. However, even if the FtTJ was in error in not admitting the article, I am satisfied that it is immaterial to the outcome.
67. The finding that is challenged is that set out at paragraph 27. However, a careful reading of the decision demonstrates that the FtTJ considered the core of the appellant’s account between paragraphs 17 – 26 where he gave his evidence based reasons for rejecting the core account of the appellant’s factual claim to be at risk on return to Albania. They are summarised earlier in this decision. As those findings of fact make plain, the FtTJ did not accept that the appellant had established that the unnamed people the appellant claimed had issued threats and had sought him to engage with the political party were linked or otherwise associated with AM. In other words, and contrary to the submission made on behalf of the appellant, the FtTJ rejected any link between the threats made by unnamed and unknown men and the mayor, whatever position he now had.
68. Whilst it is argued that the respondent’s case was that AM was no longer a mayor and had resigned and therefore no longer hold an influential position thus the threat no longer existed, that does not reflect the overall way in which the case was advanced on behalf of the respondent. The respondent’s case as reflected in the decision letter and supported in the 2 respondent’s reviews was that the appellant’s factual claim was rejected having set out the credibility issues raised (see paragraph 13 of the decision letter). The review of the respondent in June 2025 set out the respondent’s case that the appellant was an economic migrant having never had a political profile now or at all in Albania. It records, “His alleged fear is from non-state agents. Fear from people he does not know and cannot name. Notwithstanding his alleged fear from a mayor who has recently resigned his family continue to reside in Albania today without issues. Accordingly, this appellants story is not accepted now or at all.” The assessment made of the evidence by the FtTJ and as reflected in his findings of fact between paragraphs 17 -26 addressed the issues of credibility, implausibility and inconsistency of the factual account given by the appellant.
69. I have not been provided with the full note of the presenting officer, but I do have Counsel’s note which sets out that the PO’s submissions did reflect the respondent’s case that related to issues of credibility and consistency of his evidence where it is stated that the appellant had been inconsistent about the timeline when his fear first arose, and issues raised about the screening interview. The point made about AM having resigned from the position was an additional submission. It did not mean that the respondent had abandoned the previous issues raised nor that it bound the FtTJ in his assessment of the evidence and the issues. It is often the case that an advocate will provide submissions on what is their primary case and also provide an alternative to that.
70. Having assessed the material I am satisfied that paragraph 27 of the FtTJ’s decision was the assessment in the alternative. It did not reflect his primary findings of fact on the core factual issues as already found between paragraphs 17 – 26 . This is demonstrated by what was said by the FtTJ at the beginning of paragraph 27 “in any event even if the tribunal was to accept the appellant’s account of what he said had happened ( which it does not)… and the FtTJ considered in the claim in the alternative.
71. In summary, the findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 17 – 26 were adequate and sustainable evidence-based findings of fact which were open to him to make for the reasons set out above . In those circumstances even if the FtTJ was in error by not admitting the material, any error could not be material to the outcome when the FtTJ had rejected the appellant’s factual claim that he had been threatened by unknown individuals but also that the FtTJ had rejected that they were in some way related to the mayor. The findings of fact between paragraphs 17-18 and 20-26 are not challenged in the grounds and those findings are not reliant upon whether AM is an MP or not.
72. For those reasons ground 1 is not established.
73. It is necessary to make an observation of a matter raised by the FtTJ who granted permission. Reference was made to the FtTJ having “wrongly identified the case number and initials and Counsel which suggests a lack of accuracy…” This had not been raised in the grounds of permission however the FtTJ was correct in stating that the judge had made no reference to the late evidence sought to be adduced at the hearing which was a matter that had been raised in the grounds. There is no dispute that the FtTJ typed the wrong case number on the first page although pages 2-10 did reflect the correct case number. The judge also gave the wrong initials and the name of Counsel. This is unfortunate and reflects the lack of proofreading. However, it is not established that it was an error of materiality given that the substantive aspects of the claim were correctly considered by the FtTJ.
74. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

1 September 2026

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds