Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002568
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01471/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th of September 2026

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
MHA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the appellant: Mr K Mukherjee, Counsel, instructed by Barnes Harild & Dyer
For the respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Iran and of Kurdish ethnicity, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Grattage (the judge), promulgated on 16 April 2026. By that decision, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims.

2. In simple terms, the appellant’s case was based on claimed involvement in pro-Kurdish political activity in Iran and pro-Kurdish political activities undertaken whilst in the United Kingdom. The appeal was governed by the provisions of NABA 2022.

The judge’s decision
3. The judge recorded the principal controversial issues at [10]. In essence, the appellant’s credibility was disputed, together with the existence of any risk on return. An Article 8 claim was withdrawn at the hearing: [12]. The judge confirmed that he had considered a variety of evidential sources cumulatively, together with relevant country guidance decisions: [13] and [21]. Specific reference was made to the well-known decisions in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC), BA (Demonstrators in Britain-risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) and XX (PJAK-sur place activities-Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC)): [24.

4. For reasons set out at [30]-[33], the judge rejected the appellant’s account of political activities in Iran. As to activities in the United Kingdom, the judge found that:

(a) limited Facebook material was not “widely accessible, prominent, or attributable in a way that would reasonably draw the attention of the Iranian authorities” and that the Facebook account did not have a “significant audience or that it contains material of sufficient profile or content to elevate the appellant beyond a low-level observer”: [34];

(b) the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations was “limited, sporadic, and lacking public prominence”: [36];

(c) the appellant had “not established that he has a genuine or sustained sur place political profile, or that any activity undertaken in the United Kingdom would reasonably be likely to come to the attention of the Iranian authorities”: [37];

(d) the Iranian authorities would not be aware of the appellant, either by virtue of any activities in that country or United Kingdom, and he would not be perceived as holding a political opinion adverse to the government: [38];

(e) the appellant would not be and any list, nor was his profile such as to trigger questioning or adverse treatment on return beyond routine enquiries: [39];

(f) taking the above into account and having regard to the appellant’s ethnicity, his illegal exit, and status as a failed asylum-seeker, the appellant could not be at risk on return for any reason. Specifically, the appellant had not established a “credible or significant sur place political profile in the United Kingdom and he had not established “a genuine or identifiable political profile” in any way. There was “no reliable evidence… that the appellant had a profile, history, or set of characteristics which would reasonably place him at risk of adverse attention on return”: [40]-[56].

The grounds of appeal
5. Three grounds of appeal were put forward. In summary, it was contended that: (1) the judge failed to properly apply the guidance in HB (Kurds) and applied too high a risk threshold; (2) the judge misapplied BA (Demonstrators in Britain) and failed to give proper weight to the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations; and (3) the judge failed to properly consider FCDO travel advice and Iran.

6. The grounds make no reference to any of the underlying evidence before the judge. Nor do they assert that the judge failed to take any specific evidence into account.

7. It is apparent from what I have just said that there was no challenge to the judge’s findings on claimed activities in Iran.

8. Permission was granted on all grounds by the First-tier Tribunal.

Rule 24
9. The respondent provided a rule 24 response opposing the appellant’s appeal on all grounds.

The hearing
10. It became apparent that the appellant’s representatives had failed to serve the error of law bundle on the respondent. I issued an oral direction for the representatives to explain this. An explanation was provided in compliance with that direction and I accept that the omission was a result of human error. No further action will be taken in respect of this particular matter.

11. Mr Mukherjee sought to introduce a new ground of appeal, relying on Article 8. He submitted that this had been advanced as part of the appellant’s case. After a break in which he was able to take instructions, Mr Mukherjee then withdrew his application to amend. He was right to do so. The judge specifically recorded that the Article 8 claim had been withdrawn at the hearing. Presumably, this course of action was undertaken on instructions (there was no evidence to suggest the contrary) and, in any event, the application to amend was made far too late in the day.

12. Mr Mukherjee then sought to add a further ground of appeal, or at least to materially expand ground 1. He submitted that the judge had failed to deal with HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 and the question of whether the appellant held genuine political beliefs which he would wish to express on return to Iran. Ms Everett rightly pointed out that this point was not included in the grounds, but in any event it was clear enough the judge had found that the appellant did not hold such beliefs. I decided to hear what Mr Mukherjee and Ms Everett had to say on the point and to consider whether I should permit the new/extended argument to be advanced as part of my reserved decision.

13. Beyond these preliminary matters, Mr Mukherjee relied on the pleaded grounds. He submitted that the judge had wrongly separated the appellant’s Facebook activity with his attendance at demonstrations. He submitted that it was important for the judge to have made a finding on the genuineness of the appellant’s beliefs, as this was relevant to risk on return.

14. I was not referred to any of the underlying evidence before the judge and nor was it submitted that the judge had failed to take any of that evidence into account. It was the assessment of the evidence in the context of risk which was the sole focus of Mr Mukherjee’s submissions.

15. Ms Everett submitted that, in substance, the judge had conducted a proper risk assessment in light of the relevant country guidance decisions.

16. I reserved my decision.

Conclusions
17. In I remind myself of the need to exercise appropriate judicial caution before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. It is important to look at the substance of the judge’s assessment and not to seek out perfection in his decision. I bear in mind the fact that the judge considered a variety of evidential sources and, as he clearly stated, consideration was given to that evidence on a cumulative basis. Further, the judge expressly referred to the relevant country guidance decisions and in order to establish material errors of law it would need a clear indication on the face the decision that he had subsequently failed to apply the guidance to the appellant’s case.

18. For the following reasons, I conclude that the judge did not materially err in law.

19. There is some merit in the appellant’s assertion that the judge might appear to have placed too high a threshold as to whether the appellant would be at risk on return. I take into account the judge’s use of terms such as “sustained”, “significant” and “prominent”.

20. However, his decision must be read holistically and sensibly and in the context of him having referred to the relevant country guidance decisions. Whilst the risk threshold is low, it is not the case that anyone engaging in any social media and/or demonstrations in United Kingdom will necessarily be at risk: there is still a threshold. Reading the relevant passages of the judge’s decision sensibly and in context, it is sufficiently clear that the terms “significant” and “prominent” were employed in the context of the appropriate threshold required by the country guidance decisions. In other words, the appellant had failed to show that his activities (the Facebook account and the demonstration) had been sufficiently significant or prominent so as to meet the low threshold required to excite the adverse interest of the Iranian authorities. Read in this way, there is no error of approach or misapplication of the country guidance.

21. In any event, those terms were qualified by the use of “or” at [47] and [48]. It was not simply that the appellant had failed to demonstrate a “significant” or “prominent” profile: the judge also found that there was a failure to have established a “credible” and “identifiable” profile which was “attributable in a manner likely to draw the attention of the Iranian authorities”: [47]-[49]. That analysis is sustainable and does not demonstrate the application of an impermissibly high threshold.

22. The judge properly addressed the two important questions of whether the Iranian authorities would already know, or suspect, that the appellant had a sufficiently adverse profile, and whether it was reasonably likely that they would come to perceive him as having such a profile on return: [38]-[39] and [50]-[51].

23. Ground 1 fails.

24. Ground 2 is in a sense linked to ground 1, albeit with a particular focus on the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations. The implication of this aspect of the appellant’s challenge is that any and all attendees will be at risk and that is not what the country guidance says. The judge took account of the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and his very limited participation therein. The judge did not artificially separate the attendances with the Facebook activity: these were clearly considered cumulatively: [48]-[51]. As with ground 1, the judge properly asked himself the question of whether the Iranian authorities would already know about these activities, or would come to know at any stage of the return process: [38]-[39] and [50]-[51].

25. Ground 2 fails.

26. Ground 3 is without merit. The FCDO travel advice related to British nationals travelling to Iran. Clearly, the appellant did not fall into that category and this evidence was relevant to the assessment of risk.

27. Finally, I turn to Mr Mukherjee’s reliance on the HJ (Iran) point. In the first instance, I conclude that it is not open to him to argue this point at this stage. There is no reference to HJ (Iran) or its principles in the grounds of appeal, although I accept that it was referred to in the appellant skeleton argument before the judge. The point raised by Mr Mukherjee at the latest possible stage of proceedings could and should have been identified in the grounds, in line with the guidance set out in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal, Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 150 (IAC). Nor, for the reasons set out below, do I consider it to be a Robinson obvious point.

28. Even if I were to consider the substance of the HJ (Iran) point, there is no material error in the judge’s decision. Reading his decision sensibly and holistically, it is sufficiently clear that he did not accept that the appellant held genuine political beliefs. I say this for the following reasons.

29. The appellant’s account of claimed activities in Iran had been roundly rejected and this was, at least implicitly, relevant to the credibility of the applicant sur place activities.

30. At [47], the judge expressly found that the appellant had failed to establish a “credible” political profile in the United Kingdom and at [49], the judge found that the appellant had not developed a “genuine” profile in this country. It is possible to interpret the terms “credible” and “genuine” in different ways, but the context of the judge’s overall assessment points towards an implicit finding that the appellant did not hold a genuine political beliefs.

31. For the sake of completeness, I note that the appellant’s witness statement did not include clear evidence that the appellant would wish to carry out political activities if he was returned to Iran.

32. In summary, there are no material errors of law in the judge’s decision

Anonymity
33. I maintain the anonymity direction previously made on the basis that this appeal concerns a claim for international protection.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 15 September 2026