Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002576
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58075/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

A CARER
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr R Rai, counsel, instructed by NA Law Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 24 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Respondent or the child referred to as ‘T’ in these proceedings. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals against the determination of FTTJ Meyler (‘the Judge’), promulgated on 8 March 2026. In that determination the Judge found that the impact of the Respondent’s removal would pose a disproportionate interference with the private life enjoyed by T, a nine-year-old child for whom she has cared as a professional carer for seven years (since 2022, she has done so in the UK). Permission to appeal was granted by FTTJ Karbani on 20 May 2026, noting “this decision is thorough and has addressed all the issues holistically” but granted permission to appeal “with hesitation”.
2. The Secretary of State was represented by Ms Keerthy and the Respondent by Mr Rai. I thank them both for their helpful and clear submissions.
Grounds of appeal
3. The Secretary of State’s grounds of appeal are not clearly identified as required by Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 150 (IAC), §11. However, with the assistance of Ms Keerty’s clarification, I can summarise them as follows:
a. The Judge’s conclusions involve outcome irrationality because:
i. The Respondent’s private life could continue with her employers in Malaysia;
ii. The Judge asked the wrong question, namely whether private life could be enjoyed by T in the UK, not whether the Respondent’s removal would be disproportionate.
iii. The Judge did not apply the public interest properly and elevated the family’s preferred care arrangements into a determinative factor.
Discussion
4. I bear in mind that this is an unusual case. I am unaware of (and have not been directed to) any authority which establishes that it is a disproportionate interference with the private life of a child to remove their carer from the country (indeed, the Judge notes that she was not referred to any Strasbourg case law on the point despite inviting submissions on the point, see §20). That said, the fact that a claim is novel or unusual does not mean that it cannot succeed. I am mindful of the fact that this case is not one which falls within the Immigration Rules, nor one which is closely analogous to the circumstances recognised in the Rules.
5. The Secretary of State solely frames her argument by way of outcome irrationality alone. Although there were references to failures to take matters into account or give adequate reasons both in the grounds and orally, Ms Keerty expressly disavowed reliance upon any other error of law, including any process challenges. Outcome irrationality is a high threshold. That threshold was summarised succinctly by Chamberlain J in R (KP) v SSFCDA [2025] EWHC 370 (Admin) at §57. I accept, applying Chamberlain J’s analysis at §78 of the same judgment, while the range of reasonable outcomes may be narrowed by the importance of the individual rights at stake, “[t]he nature and importance of the public interests on the other side of the balance may also be important”.
6. Turning to the decision, I agree with FTTJ Karbani that this is a thorough decision which addresses all the issues holistically. It is a model of clear, structured, and balanced decision-making. It is clear that the Judge took into account all relevant consideration. The factual findings are made incrementally and cautiously, with close cross-reference to the evidence before the Judge. The law is accurately set out and conscientiously applied.
7. The Secretary of State’s submission that the Judge’s decision is rendered unlawful by a failure to consider the question of what the human rights impact would have been in the event the family went to Malaysia with the Respondent cannot succeed because this is not an issue which she raised in the refusal letter or at first instance. The parties are expected to identify the principal controversial issues (Lata [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC)). The Secretary of State did not rely upon the possibility of the family returning to Malaysia at any stage. The Secretary of State filed two reviews and a skeleton argument in the First-tier Tribunal. This point was never taken, despite ample opportunity to do so. This is not a matter which is Robinson obvious, especially as there was not substantial evidence on the point. I agree with Mr Rai that, as a matter of procedural rigour, the Secretary of State cannot now criticise the Judge for failing to consider a point which she herself never raised. Even if there were not these procedural obstacles to such an argument succeeding, I do not accept that the Judge’s reasoning was perverse simply because there was a theoretical option of the family returning to Malaysia. On the material before the Judge, no party was advocating for this as a viable option. It is also not obvious that the Respondent could necessarily return to Malaysia, as she is a citizen of the Philippines. In the absence of any clear evidence and argument that this was a viable option, I do not accept that the Judge’s decision on the point was outside the range of outcomes reasonably open to her.
8. I do not accept that the Judge failed to identify and apply the question of the impact of the Respondent’s removal; this was her express self-direction at §§52 and 72. There is nothing perverse about the Judge’s reasoning on this point. She correctly assessed the appeal by reference to the question of whether the Respondent’s removal from the UK would pose a disproportionate interference with her Article 8 rights (which was answered in the negative) or those of T.
9. I consider that the Judge’s decision was not outside the range of decisions open to a reasonable decision-maker. The Judge clearly and expressly identified the public interest considerations in play and the weight to be given to the public interest (§§23, 52, 55, 69, 73). The submission in the grounds of appeal that the Judge failed to give adequate weight to immigration control is a matter of mere disagreement and cannot discharge the heavy burden of showing that the Judge’s decision was irrational. I do not accept that the family’s preferred care arrangements were treated as determinative. This was a holistic assessment of proportionality, which carefully balanced the very specific needs and risks with which T presents against the public interest in the Respondent’s removal from the UK. The Judge spent considerable time addressing the alternative care arrangements which were realistically available to meet T’s undisputed, severe needs (see §§51, 59-69). No submission was made to suggest that any of that analysis was perverse and I consider it is well-reasoned.
10. Outcome irrationality is a high threshold, even in the context of immigration control. The Secretary of State’s submissions, at their heart, amount to a mere disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions. Another judges may, acting reasonably, have reached a different conclusion in this case but I am not persuaded that the Judge’s decision is outside the range of reasonable decisions open to her.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 July 2026