Tribunal decisions

The decision

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27th August 2026

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

LP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr B. Lams, Counsel instructed by Oaks Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Peer, promulgated on 16 March 2026, which dismissed his appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
Background
2. The Appellant is a national of Albania. He entered the United Kingdom on 25 January 2021 and claimed asylum on 23 March 2021. That claim was refused on 24 March 2023 without a right of appeal. On 6 January 2024, the Appellant made further submissions, which although refused by the Respondent on 23 February 2024, were accepted as a fresh claim. That refusal therefore generated the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
3. The Appellant claimed that, before travelling to the United Kingdom in January 2021, he was deceived by persons who promised him lawful employment here. On arrival, he was taken to a house where cannabis was being cultivated and was forced to clean. He escaped after a short period. He claimed that the persons who brought him to the United Kingdom subsequently demanded £20,000, threatened him and threatened his parents in Albania. In his written evidence for the appeal he identified the group as the “Ervis Martinaj Boys”. He maintained that the group had sufficient influence and connections to locate him on return and that the Albanian authorities would not provide effective protection.
4. The Appellant also relied upon his private life and his relationship with his partner, an Albanian national with permission to remain in the United Kingdom as a skilled worker.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appeal was heard before the First-tier Tribunal at Manchester by Cloud Video Platform on 2 March 2026. The Appellant was represented by Mr Lams and the Respondent by Mr Delacruz, Home Office Presenting Officer. The Appellant and his partner attended the hearing and gave oral evidence.
6. The Judge recorded that the issues were whether the Appellant had a well-founded fear of re-trafficking or faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, and whether his removal would breach Article 8 ECHR.
7. The Judge did not accept that the Appellant had given a credible account. At paragraphs 31 to 35, the Judge relied upon what he considered to be the vague and insufficiently detailed nature of his account, the ease with which he had left the persons said to have trafficked him, his failure to seek assistance or accept referral to the National Referral Mechanism, the later identification of the group, the absence of any real harm to his family, the lack of evidence that the persons feared had influence or connections, and his lack of contact with them after changing his telephone number. The Judge concluded that the Appellant had advanced an asylum claim to improve his prospects of remaining in the United Kingdom and had come here as an economic migrant.
8. The Judge gave the country expert report of Dr Antonia Young “some but limited weight”. At paragraph 22, the Judge considered that the expert’s views concerning the Appellant were based upon acceptance of his account and upon his being a vulnerable person without family in Albania.
9. At paragraph 36, the Judge found that the Appellant would not face a real risk of killing, serious harm or trafficking on return. At paragraph 37, the Judge found, in the alternative, that there was a sufficiency of protection and that internal relocation, including to Tirana, was available and reasonable.
10. The Judge found that the Appellant had not demonstrated very significant obstacles to integration in Albania. The Judge further found that his partner did not have settled status, that family life could continue in Albania and that the Respondent’s decision was proportionate.
11. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
Grounds of appeal
12. The Appellant sought permission to appeal on eight grounds, which can be summarised as follows:
(i) Ground 1 contended that the finding that the Appellant’s account was vague was inadequately reasoned or irrational. The Judge relied upon his failure to name the group or gang he feared in oral evidence, notwithstanding that he had adopted written statements naming the gang and explaining why he had not named it during his asylum interview.
(ii) Ground 2 contended that the Judge failed to consider the Appellant’s evidence that his parents continued to receive threats, most recently on 10 February 2026.
(iii) Ground 3 contended that the Judge failed to consider two news articles concerning Ervis Martinaj when finding that there was no real evidence that the persons feared had influence, power or connections.
(iv) Ground 4 contended that the Judge misunderstood or failed to engage with the evidence concerning the civil registration system and the possibility that an organised criminal group with official connections could use it to trace the Appellant.
(v) Ground 5 contended that the finding on sufficiency of protection was inadequately reasoned and failed to engage with the objective evidence concerning trafficking, low conviction rates, corruption, organised criminal infiltration and the limited support available to male victims.
(vi) Ground 6 contended that the finding on internal relocation was inadequately reasoned and failed to engage with the evidence concerning Albania’s size, the ability of trafficking networks to trace individuals and the civil registration system.
(vii) Ground 7 contended that the Judge erred in relying upon assistance available through the Voluntary Returns Scheme when there was no basis for finding that the Appellant would return voluntarily.
(viii) Ground 8 contended that the Judge’s treatment of the expert report was irrational or failed to take relevant matters into account.
13. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dhanji on 20 May 2026. Judge Dhanji considered Grounds 1, 3, 5 and 6 to be arguable. Although seeing less merit in Grounds 2, 4, 7 and 8, the Judge did not limit the grant of permission.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal
14. The matter came before me at Field House on 25 August 2026. The Appellant was represented by Mr Lams, Counsel instructed by Oaks Solicitors. The Respondent was represented by Mr Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
15. I had before me a composite bundle of 886 pages and a skeleton argument filed on behalf of the Appellant shortly before the hearing. There was no agreement between the parties as to any ground.
16. Mr Lams relied upon the grounds and his skeleton argument. In relation to Ground 1, he submitted that the Judge made a global finding of vagueness but failed to recognise that the Appellant had adopted three witness statements, two of which named the group he feared. The Appellant had explained that he had been afraid to identify the group at interview because of its notoriety. The Judge neither accepted nor rejected that explanation. The news articles relating to the same organised crime group were consistent with the Appellant’s account and were also relevant to the plausibility of his claimed fear of naming the group.
17. In relation to Ground 2, Mr Lams relied upon the Appellant’s statement dated 25 February 2026, which said that his parents continued to receive threats and had most recently been threatened on 10 February 2026. He submitted that the Judge referred only to the visit in October 2024 and failed to determine whether the later evidence was accepted.
18. In relation to Ground 3, Mr Lams submitted that the Judge’s finding that there was no real evidence of the group’s influence or connections could not stand when the two articles concerning Ervis Martinaj had not been mentioned or evaluated. Ground 4 was connected to that error. The Appellant’s case about tracing was supported by country evidence and by the discussion of civil registration in EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 00348 (IAC), and was not merely general or speculative.
19. In relation to Grounds 5 and 6, Mr Lams submitted that paragraph 37 did no more than state conclusions on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The Judge did not engage with the substantial objective evidence identified in the amended skeleton argument. The inadequate treatment of that evidence also undermined the assessment of the expert report (Ground 8). He maintained that there was no evidential basis for reliance upon the Voluntary Returns Scheme (Ground 7).
20. Mr Nappey relied upon the rule 24 response. He accepted that the Appellant had adopted his written statements and that he had named the group in them, but submitted that the Judge was entitled to draw an adverse inference from his failure to use the name when cross-examined during the hearing. In relation to the alleged recent threats, he submitted that the Judge referred at paragraph 32 to the parents having received threats.
21. Mr Nappey accepted that the Judge did not refer to the two news articles. He submitted, however, that the omission was not material. The first article recorded that Ervis Martinaj had been missing since 2022 and the second concerned charges brought in Albania. Neither established that the group had the extensive reach claimed by the Appellant or that the Appellant was of interest to it.
22. Mr Nappey submitted that the Appellant’s concern about the registration system remained general and speculative. Neither the expert evidence nor EH established that this particular group could obtain the Appellant’s information.
23. In relation to Grounds 5 and 6, he accepted that paragraph 37 was short but submitted that the findings on protection and relocation were alternative findings which did not need to be made once the Judge had rejected the underlying account.
24. Mr Nappey submitted that the Judge was entitled to take account of the availability of the Voluntary Returns Scheme and had given adequate reasons for attaching limited weight to the expert report.
25. In reply, Mr Lams submitted that the Judge had not undertaken the necessary assessment of what the articles established and their relevance to credibility, sufficiency of protection and relocation. He invited me to set aside the decision in its entirety and remit the appeal without preserved findings.
26. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Decision and reasons
27. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before it, the grounds of appeal, the updated skeleton argument and the submissions made at the hearing before reaching my decision.
28. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint are required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19. I have kept these considerations in mind when coming to my decision.
29. I deal first with Grounds 1 to 3 because they concern the central credibility assessment and are closely connected. The Appellant’s challenge is not simply that the Judge failed to repeat every aspect of his evidence. It concerns evidence bearing directly upon the identity, continuing interest and claimed influence of the group he said he feared.
30. At paragraph 32, the Judge expressly recognised that the Appellant had provided a name for the group in his written evidence. I therefore do not accept the submission, in its broadest form, that the Judge overlooked the fact that he had named the group. Nor was the Judge precluded from taking account of the answers he gave when questioned orally merely because he had adopted his witness statements as his evidence-in-chief. The written statements did not immunise his oral answers from assessment, and it was open to the Judge to consider the development and consistency of the account.
31. The difficulty is that the Appellant had given an express explanation for not identifying the group during his asylum interview. He said that he had been afraid to disclose its name because its members were well-known criminals in Albania. That explanation was material because the timing of his identification of the group was used adversely against him. The Judge did not evaluate or reject the explanation. The omission is more significant when considered alongside the Judge’s failure to address the articles concerning Ervis Martinaj, which the Appellant relied upon both as evidence of the group’s existence and influence and as context for his asserted fear of naming it. The omission is relevant to both Ground 1, concerning the assessment of the explanation for the delayed identification, and Ground 3, concerning the claimed influence and connections of the group.
32. I accept Mr Nappey’s submission that the articles did not establish that the Appellant had any personal connection with the group or that the group had threatened him. Nor were they necessarily capable, without more, of establishing the national reach attributed to the group. They were nevertheless directly relevant to matters relied upon by the Appellant. One article described Ervis Martinaj as having acquired a reputation as the “lord of crime” and referred to strong connections with the police, justice system and politics. The other referred to allegations of murder and weapons offences and to criminal charges concerning participation in a structured criminal group. The articles were therefore relevant both to the claimed influence and connections of the group and to the plausibility of the Appellant’s explanation that he had initially been afraid to identify it. The weight to be attached to that evidence was a matter for the fact-finding Judge, but no assessment of it occurred.
33. The omission cannot be treated as immaterial on the basis that the Judge had already rejected the Appellant’s claimed connection to the group. The identity and characteristics of the group formed part of the Judge’s reasoning for rejecting the account. The Judge relied upon the asserted absence of evidence of influence or connections when finding the claim general and speculative. It would therefore be circular to hold that the articles became immaterial only because the account had been rejected on reasoning which itself failed to consider them.
34. Ground 2 is less compelling as a freestanding challenge. At paragraph 32, the Judge referred to the Appellant’s evidence that his family had been “receiving threats” and to the alleged visit in October 2024. A judge is not required to identify every date appearing in the evidence. It cannot safely be inferred merely from the absence of an express reference to 10 February 2026 that the Judge overlooked the entirety of the evidence of continuing threats.
35. Nevertheless, the evidence of a threat as recently as February 2026 was relevant to whether the group retained a continuing interest in the Appellant. The Judge placed weight at paragraph 33 upon the absence of direct contact with the Appellant after he changed his telephone number, without clearly resolving his distinct case that the group continued to contact and threaten his parents. Although I would not set aside the decision on Ground 2 alone, the treatment of that evidence adds to the difficulty in understanding how the Judge resolved the central issue of continuing interest.
36. I am therefore satisfied that Grounds 1 and 3 are made out. Ground 2 reinforces those errors, although it would not independently have justified setting the decision aside.
37. Ground 4 concerns the Judge’s treatment of the Appellant’s claim that he could be traced through civil registration. At paragraph 32, the Judge described the relevant system as a “public database” accessed if the Appellant “registered for work”. That did not accurately reflect the case advanced in the amended skeleton argument. The Appellant relied upon the obligation to transfer civil registration when moving to a new area and upon the possibility that an organised criminal group with official connections could obtain or exploit that information.
38. The evidence did not establish that every criminal group could access civil registration information. The relevance of EH depended upon establishing that the particular aggressor had sufficient geographical or political reach or governmental connections. The Judge would have been entitled, after evaluating the evidence, to conclude that the Appellant had not established those matters. However, the apparent misunderstanding of the nature of the registration system, taken together with the failure to consider the evidence concerning the named group, meant that the tracing claim was not determined on the basis upon which it had been advanced. Ground 4 is accordingly made out, although its materiality is principally to the assessment of future risk and internal relocation.
39. I turn to Grounds 5 and 6. The finding at paragraph 37 that there was a sufficiency of protection to the standard in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37, and that relocation to Tirana was available and reasonable, was expressed in brief terms. Brevity is not itself an error. Reasons need only enable the parties to understand why they have won or lost on the principal controversial issues. In this appeal, however, the amended skeleton argument identified a substantial body of evidence concerning police and judicial corruption, connections between organised criminal groups and officials, trafficking conviction rates, the limited support available to male victims of trafficking, Albania’s size, the ability of trafficking networks to trace individuals and the civil registration system. The Judge was not required to reproduce that material at length. He was nevertheless required to resolve its essential implications for this Appellant if his account, or the material parts of it, were accepted.
40. Paragraph 37 does no more than record that the Judge had considered the available country evidence and state his conclusions. The findings at paragraph 34 concerning the Appellant’s age, health, work history and resilience were relevant to whether it would be unduly harsh or unreasonable for him to relocate. They did not determine whether relocation would be safe or whether effective protection would be available against the group he claimed to fear.
41. Had the primary credibility findings been legally sustainable, any deficiency in the alternative findings might not have been material. However, for the reasons given above, the rejection of the account is affected by errors of law. The alternative conclusions at paragraph 37 do not contain sufficient reasoning to preserve the outcome if the credibility assessment falls to be undertaken again. Grounds 5 and 6 are therefore made out.
42. I do not find Ground 7 established. The availability of assistance through the Voluntary Returns Scheme was recorded at paragraph 21(e) as one of the Respondent’s criticisms of the expert report. The Judge did not find that the Appellant would return voluntarily or make acceptance of such assistance a necessary part of his ultimate conclusions. Any error concerning whether the Appellant would choose to use the scheme was not material to the dismissal of the appeal.
43. Ground 8 must be considered with some care. The weight to attach to expert evidence was primarily a matter for the Judge. The Judge was entitled to take account of the fact that Dr Young had not seen the screening and substantive asylum interview records and that her Appellant-specific conclusions depended upon factual assumptions which were disputed. I do not accept that the decision to give those conclusions limited weight was irrational.
44. The expert report, however, also contained general country evidence concerning corruption, the strength and reach of organised criminal groups, the effectiveness of the police and other institutions, and internal relocation. The limitations identified in relation to the expert’s knowledge of the Appellant did not dispose of that general evidence. The decision does not demonstrate that this distinct aspect of the report was considered when the Judge reached the conclusions at paragraph 37. Ground 8 therefore succeeds only to that limited extent and in conjunction with Grounds 5 and 6.
45. Standing back, I am satisfied that the decision involved material errors of law. The errors were not confined to peripheral matters. They affected the assessment of the identity, continuing interest and influence of the group said to be feared, as well as the related questions of tracing, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The other credibility reasons given by the Judge do not enable me to conclude that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the relevant evidence been considered and the material issues adequately resolved.
46. Although there was no distinct ground challenging the Article 8 assessment, the Judge’s conclusion that there were no very significant obstacles to integration relied in part upon the protection findings. The proportionality assessment also proceeded upon the premise that the Appellant could safely and reasonably return to Albania. In those circumstances, the Article 8 decision cannot sensibly be severed from the protection decision and must also be set aside.
47. The Judge also found at paragraph 29 that the Appellant was not a member of a particular social group and that there was therefore no applicable Refugee Convention reason. That conclusion was not expressly challenged in the grounds of appeal. Since the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, however, the Upper Tribunal has promulgated LR (Male VOTs) Albania CG [2026] UKUT 00315 (IAC). The country guidance establishes that Albanian male victims of trafficking constitute a particular social group both before and after the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, although a person must still demonstrate the necessary causal connection between his well-founded fear of persecution and his membership of that group. LR was not raised by either party at the hearing before me. I do not rely upon LR as establishing any additional error of law in the decision of Judge Peer. It is however relevant to the legal framework which will apply when the appeal is remade. I do not make any finding as to whether the Appellant is a victim of trafficking or whether the required causal connection is established. Those matters depend upon the factual assessment which must now be undertaken afresh. In circumstances where the Judge’s findings concerning whether the Appellant was trafficked and remains at risk cannot stand, the conclusion at paragraph 29 cannot sensibly be preserved as a dispositive finding. The First-tier Tribunal will determine the Refugee Convention reason issue afresh by reference to the evidence and the applicable country guidance.
Disposal
48. The credibility assessment and the related issues of future risk, protection and internal relocation must be determined afresh. The nature and extent of the fact-finding required are such that, having regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements and the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), the appropriate course is to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Peer. No findings are preserved.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety, with no findings preserved.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Peer.

S. Anzani

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 August 2026