Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2026-002599
FtT No: HU/00708/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

VINOD KUMAR RAMACHANDRAN
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Khan, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms B Jones, Counsel, instructed by SABZ Solicitors LLP

Heard at Field House on 28 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
A. Introduction
1. In this decision the parties are referred to as they were before the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Ramachandran is ‘the appellant’ and the Secretary of State is ‘the respondent’.
2. The respondent appeals a decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 12 December 2025 by which the appellant’s appeal was allowed on human rights (article 8 ECHR) grounds.
3. The respondent seeks to deport the appellant to India.
B. Anonymity Direction
4. The First-tier Tribunal did not make an anonymity direction. No party sought a direction before me. I do not make one. The appellant’s conviction is a matter of public record and so I consider the right of the public to know the identity of the parties to these proceedings, a right protected under article 10 ECHR, outweighs the private life rights of the appellant and his family.
C. Relevant facts
5. The appellant is an Indian national. He is married with three children, the youngest of whom is a British citizen. Both the appellant’s wife and the other siblings enjoy settled status. He entered the United Kingdom lawfully some years ago and was granted indefinite leave to remain in 2022.
6. On 15 August 2024 he was sentenced to a total of 24 months’ imprisonment following his conviction on four counts. He was released from prison on 13 August 2025 and placed in immigration detention from which he was released on 13 September 2025. Since his release, he has been required to reside away from the family home and contact with his children remains under professional supervision. He is permitted to visit the family home when the children are away from the property. He returns home every day and provides care for his wife. This was the position at the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing in November 2025, and I understand from Ms Jones that it remained the position at the date of the hearing before the Upper Tribunal.
7. On 16 September 2024, the respondent served a notice of decision to deport on the appellant. In turn, he submitted human rights representations. On 19 March 2025, the respondent signed a deportation order. The following day, the respondent decided to refuse the appellant’s human rights claim. When considering the appellant’s protected article 8 rights, the respondent accepted that it would be unduly harsh for the children to live in India, and that it would not be in their interest to do so. However, it was not accepted that it would be unduly harsh for the children to remain in the United Kingdom and for the appellant to be deported. The decision letter observed, inter alia:
‘This is because once you were separated from your family whilst under investigation and during your incarceration, their mother has been their primary carer. Although she has stated that she has struggled, due to her ongoing medical concerns, there is nothing before us to suggest that the children have not been cared for adequately during this time. To the contrary, social services have stated that they have seen the children every 20 working days and that they have always appeared to be well cared for.’
8. The refusal letter also observed that whilst the wife considered the help she was receiving from the local church community to be a temporary measure, as both herself and the three children enjoy either settled status or are British citizens, ‘they would be entitled to all the benefits and support associated with their status, should this be needed moving forward.’
9. The respondent concluded that although there would be an emotional impact upon the children should the appellant be deported, there was no evidence to demonstrate that the consequences of this would be unduly harsh.
D. First-tier Tribunal decision
10. The appeal was heard by a First-tier Tribunal Judge sitting at Harmondsworth. The appellant attended with his wife, and both gave evidence. The respondent did not challenge their credibility. The Judge read letters from the children and considered a report from a clinical psychologist. She correctly noted that the burden of proof fell upon the appellant and that there was no dispute that he could not meet the requirements of section 117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
11. The appellant relied upon section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act, which establishes an exception to the public interest requiring deportation. He contended that he has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, his wife, and also a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, namely his three children. He asserted that the effect of his deportation on his wife and children would be unduly harsh. I note that the three children meet the requirements of ‘qualifying child’ under section 117D(1) by either being a British citizen or having lived in this country for a continuous period of seven years or more.
12. The Judge accepted the wife’s evidence that she had been very unwell from January 2022 onwards and so for a time before his arrest and imprisonment the appellant had been the children’s primary carer. The Judge noted at [20] of her decision that for some time the wife was confirmed to be medically unfit to work by her GP. The wife had resumed her career by the time of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, but only to the extent that she worked at home and not at her workplace.
13. Additionally, the Judge found the wife to be unable to carry out domestic chores and, consequently, the burden of caring for her two younger children had fallen upon the elder daughter, who was aged twelve. The Judge further found that there were no other family members in the United Kingdom who could help the family, though members of the church tried to do their best to assist. When the wife was hospitalised for four days in 2025, the children were required to stay with church members, which they found scary and upsetting.
14. Before the appellant’s release from prison, the elder daughter would cook frozen meals for her mother and siblings. She would also try to look after the house. The Judge observed that the elder daughter continues to be responsible for taking the younger children to primary school before she heads to secondary school.
15. The Judge found a loving bond between father and the children. She concluded as to the children’s best interests:
‘25. I am satisfied, that despite the nature of the appellant’s offending, it is in his children’s best interest that he remains in the UK. In the current circumstances, I find that this at least enables him to help their mother, which significantly reduces the caring burden that currently rests on their 12-year-old daughter, and also reassures the children so far as they know that he is ‘safe’. They are able to have physical face to face contact with him. The hope is that very soon the appellant will be allowed to return to the family, which, I am satisfied, will further be in the children’s best interest.’
16. Turning to the Exception 2 ‘stay’ scenario, the respondent having explicitly conceded the alternative ‘go’ scenario, the Judge reminded herself of the requirements of the unduly harsh test. Adopting an assessment grounded on the facts as found, she concluded that it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s children to remain in the United Kingdom without their father, specifically the appellant’s elder daughter. She was satisfied that, in her father’s absence, the elder daughter had taken on the role of a young carer to both her mother and her younger siblings, and observed, ‘this is not a role that a 12-year-old should have, and carrying this responsibility leaves her, in my view, with a bleak future.’
17. The Judge found that these responsibilities would, as a matter of common sense, require the elder daughter to grow up too soon, would adversely impact upon her studies and her development, as well as her ability to develop her own social life. The Judge further found that the family could not rely upon the goodwill of their church indefinitely. Consequently, any reduction in the assistance provided by the appellant would place a further burden upon the elder daughter. The Judge was satisfied that there was no sign that the wife’s health would improve significantly in the immediate future and concluded:
‘33. Were the appellant’s wife healthy I might have reached a different conclusion regarding undue harshness. However, I find that given the level of caring responsibilities that has fallen to his eldest daughter since his term of imprisonment and the way that this has impacted and will continue to impact her life, that it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the UK without the appellant.’
18. In the circumstances, the Judge concluded that the appellant met the requirements of Exception 2 in respect of the public interest and allowed the appeal.
E. Grounds of Appeal
19. The respondent appealed to this Tribunal, contending that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law by its assessment of Exception 2 and the application of the unduly harsh test.
20. In granting permission to appeal by a decision dated 1 July 2026, Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Froom reasoned, inter alia:
‘The unduly harsh test sets an elevated threshold. It is arguable the FTTJ did not carry out a rounded evaluation of the impact on the children, as explained in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22.’
F. Analysis
21. I am mindful that I should properly exercise judicial caution and restraint when I consider whether to set aside a decision of a specialist Tribunal. As Baroness Hale said in AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678, at [30], appellate courts should not rush to find misdirection simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.
22. I am also mindful of the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in its consideration of a deportation appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Ojaleye [2026] EWCA Civ 950.
23. The substance of the unduly harsh test was considered by a Presidential panel in MK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKUT 00223 (IAC), [2015] INLR 563, at [46]:
‘”Unduly harsh" does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. "Harsh" in this context denotes something severe or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb "unduly" raises an already elevated standard even higher.’
24. I am very grateful to Ms Jones for her helpful submissions. They were as eloquent as they were tenacious. However, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law. It is what is missing from the judicial assessment that causes true concern. There is no express engagement with the fact that the State has intervened with this family; the children are not permitted to see their father in anything other than a professionally supervised manner. This is so because there was, at the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing, a concern as to whether he was a risk to their safety. I acknowledge that he appellant disputes that he is a risk, as does the wife. By the State intervening through the local authority, it considers that the children’s best interests are to be in the father’s presence only when professionally supervised consequent to existing risk. This approach acknowledges that a form of contact with the children is beneficial but only through professional supervision and not by residence. It was for the First-tier Tribunal to consider whether such contact could be suitably conducted by modern means of communication.
25. Whilst the judge concentrates upon the burden placed upon the elder daughter in her caring role, that alone is not determinative of the unduly harsh test. It may be open to conclude that it has some or significant weight. However, when undertaking an unduly harsh assessment it is not sufficient for it to be inferred, and no more, from the reasons that the Judge considered the prohibition upon the father having nothing other than professionally supervised contact with the children. The prohibition must properly be expressly considered and placed into the assessment because the nature and substance of the State’s intervention in this matter is undoubtedly relevant. What weight the prohibition has in the assessment is one to be left to a judge reasonably directing themself. I am satisfied that the decision can only properly be found to be materially erroneous in law.
26. In any event, I also consider there to be further material errors. It is not challenged that the children were subject to a Child in Need Plan at the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing. The phrase ‘child in need’ under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 is a composite one and is not a limiting condition stated in wholly objective terms. For the purposes of section 17 a child will be taken to be in need if:
‘(a) he is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or to have the opportunity of achieving or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without the provision for him of services by a local authority under this Part;
(b) his health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further impaired, without the provision for him of such services; or
(c) he is disabled.’
27. The Child in Need Plan resulted in regular visits by social workers who observed the children to be well cared for. Ms Jones sought to elaborate upon what was meant by the reference to ‘well cared for’. She may be correct in her observation, but this was not addressed before the Judge. There is no express consideration in the Judge’s decision to the fact that social services were visiting the children and were not concerned as to circumstances in the home which may be expected to include the elder daughter adopting a carer’s role. It would be perfectly open to the First-tier Tribunal to prefer the evidence of the wife as to circumstances in the family home, but a reasoned decision has to engage with the position adopted by social services in circumstances where the children were subject to a Child in Need Plan.
28. A further concern is that the wife has, on her own evidence, returned to work in April 2024, some nineteen months before the First-tier Tribunal hearing. It may well be that she continues to struggle from what was clearly a serious illness. However, there is insufficient identification in the Judge’s reasoning as to the extent and nature of the wife’s ability to work, in circumstances where it is said that she is unable to provide sufficient care for her children. Again, it may be that ultimately the wife’s evidence may be accepted, but in the challenged decision there is a lack of adequate, if any, reasoning on this relevant matter. Additionally, a core element of the respondent’s case is that the mother and children could secure support through social services, and there is no engagement with this contention in the Judge’s reasoning.
29. I have sympathy for the Judge, who had a factually complex case before her. However, there was a requirement that there be adequate engagement in her reasons as to the appellant only enjoying supervised contact with his children because of his historic acts consequent to a professional assessment of his risk to them. There was also a requirement to assess the wife’s evidence in conjunction with the position adopted by social services who were engaged with the children through the Child in Need Plan. Additionally, the respondent’s case as to the availability of social services support was to be expressly addressed.
30. I make one further observation. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, appellant’s counsel, who was not Ms Jones, applied for an adjournment seeking, amongst other things, to secure the final social worker’s report regarding the appellant’s contact with his children. I can understand why counsel sought a document that was to be completed in the near future, because it was highly likely that it would illuminate both the family’s current circumstances and the continuing requirement for a Child in Need Plan. The report is not a document that the respondent would have access to, being produced on behalf of the local authority. The application for an adjournment was refused. I consider that preliminary decision was unfortunate, because this document may have thrown much light upon the circumstances in which the children found themselves. It may have aided the appellant. Alternatively, it may have aided the respondent. However, I am satisfied that it would in all likelihood have greatly aided the First-tier Tribunal in understanding the complex factual matrix of the appeal before it.
31. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the only proper course is to conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision is subject to material error of law and to set it aside in its entirety.
G. Resumed hearing
32. The presumption is that the resumed hearing will take place in the Upper Tribunal. However, this is a matter where the appellant’s wife remains ill. It is likely that two people will give evidence, and there may well be longer than usual submissions in respect of article 8 and its application to a father who continues to only enjoy supervised contact with his children. I am informed the Child in Need Plan has now been closed in respect of all three children and the supervised contact requirement remains in place. Such matters will have to be evidenced. In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate that the appeal be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. The evidence which was not permitted to be obtained when the adjournment request was refused can now be secured and relied upon.
H. Directions
33. Whilst this Tribunal does not normally give directions to the First-tier Tribunal, it may do in circumstances where it is considered helpful. In this matter, time is properly to be granted for the appellant to secure relevant social worker evidence, as well as evidence from church members as to the present circumstances relating to his family. Updated statements can also properly be expected to be filed. In those circumstances, I make the following directions that were agreed with the parties at the conclusion of the hearing:
i. The remitted hearing is to be listed on the first available date on or after eight weeks from the sending of this decision.
ii. The appellant is to file and serve, if so advised, any further evidence that he wishes to rely upon no later than three weeks before the listed hearing.
iii. The appellant is to file a skeleton argument no later than two weeks before the hearing.
iv. The respondent is to file a hearing review no later than three days before the hearing.
34. I consider that a half-day hearing is suitable to be held at Taylor House, which the appellant considers to be the most convenient hearing centre to them.
I. Notice of Decision
35. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 12 December 2025 is set aside for material error of law.
36. No findings of fact are preserved.
37. The reconsideration hearing will take place in the First-tier Tribunal at Taylor House.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
23 September 2026