Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002621
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03263/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

MA
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In Person (unrepresented)
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Egypt, born on 27 July 1969. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.

2. The appellant arrived in the UK on 10 February 2023 and claimed asylum on 27 March 2023. He attended a screening interview on 25 April 2023 and a full asylum interview on 15 July 2024. His claim was refused on 26 July 2024. He appealed against that decision and his appeal is the subject of these proceedings.

3. The basis of the appellant’s asylum claim is that he fears being arrested and imprisoned by the authorities in Egypt as he had been accused of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. The appellant claims to have helped raise money for charity at his local mosque in Egypt and that the mosque was targeted by the authorities when they found out about members associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. He claims that he was informed, after his arrival in the UK, of an arrest warrant which had been issued against him and that his family had been approached about his whereabouts.

4. The respondent, in her refusal decision, did not accept any of the appellant’s claim other than his nationality. The respondent noted inconsistencies in the appellant’s claim in regard to his account of who informed him about the arrest warrant and considered that his ability to successfully bypass security measures in place in Egypt was inconsistent with his claimed fear and that the delay in making his claim undermined his credibility. The respondent did not accept the material facts of the appellant’s claim and concluded that he would be at no risk on return to Egypt. It was considered that his removal to Egypt would not breach his human rights.

5. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision. He produced an appeal bundle containing a witness statement, a skeleton argument, an Egyptian Court judgment, two ‘request to summons’, a travel ban, a declaration from an Egyptian lawyer and confirmation of receipt of the documents by the Home Office. The respondent filed and served two respondent’s reviews, asking in the latter that little weight be given to the documents.

6. The appellant’s appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal on 9 April 2026. The appellant was legally represented before the Tribunal and gave oral evidence in support of his appeal. The judge did not find the appellant to be a credible witness and found his evidence to be implausible and “replete with lies and inconsistencies”. She found the documentary evidence to be inconsistent. She concluded that the appellant did not fear persecution in Egypt and that he would not be at risk on return, and she accordingly dismissed the appeal on all grounds in a decision promulgated on 17 April 2026.

7. The appellant sought permission to appeal against the judge’s decision on five grounds. Firstly, that the judge had failed to apply the correct legal framework under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA) and JCK (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC). Secondly, that the judge had failed to give adequate reasons for her adverse credibility findings, contrary to the requirements of KB & AH (Pakistan) [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC). Thirdly, that the judge had failed to consider relevant objective country guidance (CPIN Egypt, March 2026) on imputed political opinion and risk on return. Fourthly, that the judge had failed to properly assess internal relocation and state protection in light of the CPIN. Fifthly, that the judge had failed to give anxious scrutiny to the appellant’s evidence, including the effect of his vulnerabilities and delays in seeking asylum.

8. Permission was granted in the First-tier Tribunal on the second ground only, on the basis that the judge had arguably erred in law in relation to her consideration of the documentary evidence regarding the claimed sentence in absentia to 12 years’ imprisonment for support of the Muslim Brotherhood. The salient part of the permission grant states as follows:

“4……However, there is a significant issue which raises considerable concern. The appellant provided documentary evidence regarding the claimed sentence in absentia to 12 years’ imprisonment for support of the Muslim Brotherhood.

5. The Judge refers to these documents at [37]. The Judge states that the documents are irreconcilable with the letter from the Egyptian lawyer which suggests that “one or both are not reliable.” There is no conclusive finding about the reliability of the key documents as the Judge leaves open the possibility that only one set of documents are not reliable.

6. The Judge also refers to these documents at [38]. The Judge states that the documents are irreconcilable with the appellant’s evidence. However, there is again no conclusive finding on the reliability of the key documents as the Judge leaves open the possibility that the documents (produced after the appellant left Egypt) are reliable unlike the appellant.

7. The documentary evidence regarding the claimed sentence in absentia to 12 years’ imprisonment for support of the Muslim Brotherhood is highly material. It is arguable that the Judge failed to make findings (or adequately reasoned findings) in relation to these key documents.”

9. The respondent did not provide a rule 24 response.

10. The matter came before me for a hearing. The appellant appeared without any legal representation. An email had been received from his former legal representatives on 24 August 2026 stating as follows: “We forward all the emails to the client, as the client is currently representing himself and has filed a request with the upper tribunal in personal; the office does not represent him. and he confirm today he will attend the hearing in personal on 03/09/2026.”

11. A court-appointed interpreter in the Arabic language was available to interpret for the appellant. The appellant confirmed to me that he was representing himself and was content for the appeal to proceed on that basis. In the circumstances it seemed appropriate for the Home Office Presenting Officer to make her submissions first and to then provide the appellant with an opportunity to respond to her submissions. The submissions were interpreted for the appellant.

12. Ms Nolan relied on the decision in MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 at [35], that:

“… the decision, in this case the FtTIAC determination, must be read as a whole and in context. Part of that context is that examining the determination’s reasons should be approached and undertaken purposefully, with the object of obtaining an understanding of the decision and its basis. It should not be read or construed in a manner more appropriate to a contract or statute. It requires what Lord Bingham MR described as a “straightforward down to earth reading” of the determination which seeks to identify whether there is “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt” as to what has been decided and why…”

13. She submitted that read as a whole, the judge’s findings on the documents were adequate. She submitted that the judge made a number of adverse credibility findings from [23] to [40] and made findings on the documents as part of that holistic assessment. Ms Nolan set out the adverse credibility findings made by the judge at [27], [29], [32], [33] and [34] and then referred to the findings made by the judge at [37] and [38] about the documents. The judge found that the documents were not reconcilable with each other and with the appellant’s evidence. When her findings were read as a whole and in context it was clear that the findings were adequate and that the judge did not accept any of the appellant’s claim. As for the other aspects of ground two, Ms Nolan submitted that there was no medical evidence before the judge to show that the appellant’s medical condition impacted upon his credibility, and that the judge considered the reasons given by the appellant for the delay in claiming asylum but was not required to accept his explanation.

14. In response, the appellant wished to rely upon what his solicitor had written in the grounds of appeal and did not have anything further to add.

Analysis

15. Permission was granted in this case on the second ground only, and only in regard to that part of the ground relating to the judge’s findings on the documentary evidence.

16. I find no merit in that ground.

17. As Ms Nolan pointed out, the judge made numerous adverse findings about the appellant’s claim, from [24] to [40] of her decision. At [24] and [25] the judge found that the appellant’s delay in making his asylum claim and his failure to mention alleged police and court action against him in his screening interview to be damaging to his credibility, pursuant to section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, albeit making clear that that was not in itself determinative of the claim. At [27] she made a finding that the appellant was not credible and that his evidence was implausible, and she went on to give proper reasons for so concluding. At [29] she found that his evidence was “replete with lies and inconsistencies”, and again she explained why she had concluded as such, with specific reference to the appellant’s evidence. At [32] the judge referred to the various different and inconsistent accounts given by the appellant as to how he learned of the police interest in him, and at [33] she noted again that none of the police matters were mentioned by the appellant at his screening interview. At [34] the judge found that the appellant’s evidence as to when he felt fear and why he left Egypt was contradictory, explaining by reference to the evidence why that was so, and at [35] the judge found that the fact that the appellant’s family in Egypt had not been troubled by the authorities was contrary to the background country evidence (as cited previously at [18] in the summary of submissions).

18. The judge specifically dealt with the documentary evidence at [37] and [38], having previously explained the documents at [12] when noting the contents of the appellant’s appeal bundle, and pointed out inconsistencies within the documents and as compared to the appellant’s own evidence. Whilst it is the case that the judge did not make a specific finding on each individual piece of documentary evidence it is clear to any reader of her decision that she did not find any of it to be reliable. The fact that the judge found some documents to be irreconcilable with each other and with the appellant’s evidence cannot possibly be taken to mean that there was a possibility that she found other documents reliable. The judge was essentially pointing out inconsistencies in the documentary evidence as a whole which, when taken together with the various concerns about the credibility of the appellant’s account, showed that the evidence in totality was unreliable and the appellant’s claim not genuine.

19. Accordingly, when read as a whole, it is clear why the judge made the adverse findings that she did and why she reached the conclusions that she did. Ms Nolan quite properly relied upon [35] of MN Vietnam in that respect. The judge gave adequate reasons for finding the documentary evidence to be unreliable and there is no merit in the assertion in the grounds to the contrary.

20. The other parts of ground 2, namely a failure to apply R v Lucas (1981) QB 720 correctly, a failure to account for the appellant’s explanation for delayed asylum claim, and a failure to consider the appellant’s vulnerabilities, did not form part of the grant of permission. Indeed the judge granting permission specifically, and quite properly, rejected the first part. In any event the judge clearly had regard to the appellant’s explanation for the delay in claiming asylum and did not accept it, finding at [24], [30] and [31] that he had not credibly explained the delay. As regards any failure to consider the appellant’s vulnerabilities, Ms Nolan quite properly pointed out that there was no medical evidence before the judge to suggest that he suffered from any vulnerabilities or medical conditions that could have impacted upon his credibility. Accordingly nothing of merit arises on those grounds.

21. For all these reasons I do not accept that the grounds identify any errors of law in the judge’s decision. The judge took account of all the evidence before her and provided clear and cogent reasons for according it the weight that she did and for making the adverse credibility findings that she did. The appeal was dismissed for reasons which were fully and properly explained in the judge’s decision and which were entirely open to the judge on the evidence before her. The judge’s decision is accordingly upheld.

Notice of Decision

22. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve an error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Anonymity Order

The Anonymity Order previously made is continued.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 September 2026