Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002638
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56701/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

G B
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L. Brakaj, Solicitor Advocate instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr M. Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 19 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Riddler) promulgated on 11 March 2026. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 12 February 2025 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above and he is known by the random initials of “ GB”.
Background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant claimed that he was born in Assab, Eritrea in 2000. He fled illegally with his mother in 2002, aged two, after his father was accused of inciting riots and was killed. He lived with his mother in Addis Ababa before moving to live with an Ethiopian family. He lived with this family until 2015. From January 2015 he was living on the streets with his mother until they were arrested and detained because of their Eritrea nationality. States that his mother helped him secure his release and then he lived and worked the taxi driver until he left in 2019 when his wife secured employment in Sudan. He stayed there for two months as the government were deporting Eritreans to Eritrea before moving to Libya where he lived three years before travelling to Europe staying in Italy, France and Belgium before arriving in the UK in June 2023 and making a claim for asylum.
4. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 12 February 2025 refused the claim. The respondent in the decision letter and the review set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim to be a national of Eritrea. The respondent did not accept that the appellant is an Eritrea national.
5. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 11 March 2026, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 17-35. The FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in either his claimed nationality or his background.
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal on 3 grounds. They are summarised as a follows:
(i) The findings fail to give reasons for reaching the decision,
(ii) There is a failure to fully appreciate the appellant’s age at the time from which he is recalling information
(iii) Evidence is classified as inconsistent when this is not inconsistent.
7. Permission to appeal was granted by a FtTJ on 21 May 2026 who stated :
“Ground 1. It is argued that the Judge recognised counsel’s submission that the appellant is criticized if information provided is incorrect but when he is correct the respondent states this does not assist in proving his nationality. The Judge states that this submission carries some weight, but the Appellant’s representatives argue that subsequently no consideration or weight is given to the submission. It is arguable that this is an error of law as it is unclear from the decision what was done with the submission once it was given weight.
Ground 2. It is arguable that the Judge may have confused received information and that which the Appellant recalled and therefore an error of law may have occurred.
Ground 3. This ground is more of a disagreement with the finding than an error of law but given that permission will be given in Grounds 1 and 2 it will be allowed to go forward with those grounds.
6. Permission granted on all grounds.”
8. The written grounds are as follows: Ground 1: Failure to give reasons. Paragraph 20 notes the submission that the appellant is criticized if information is incorrect, but when he is correct the respondent states this does not assist in proving his nationality. It is stated that this carries some weight as a submission but goes on to state that some of his answers were incorrect, unverifiable, or based on what friends told him. It is unclear how this does not assist him. This is the submission, which was made, namely that he has been given all information by others, since he was 2 at the time he left Eritrea and has no personal memory of living there. This means that it is unsafe as a test. The effect of this is carrying out the same process as the respondent of criticizing him for not having sufficient lived knowledge, when it is his case that he has none, and not considering the answers he answered correctly as a result of being given the information by others. There is no consideration of this submission and the weight to it.
9. Ground 2: Age of the appellant. The appellant was 2 years old when he left Eritrea. His age is considered at paragraph 21, but it is considered problematic that he did not know some information and had no memory when he answered other questions with certainty. He is also criticized that some information could not be verified.
10. It is unclear how this is inconsistent with his assertion to have no memories of Eritrea and that he has been told information by others. It cannot be disputed that he will not have any clear memories from a time from birth until 2 years old. It must therefore be common ground that if believed then all of his information will have come from third parties. He is therefore reliant upon the information he has been given for his knowledge. Some information he may remember clearly, some he may remember incorrectly and some may not be verifiable if it is based on local knowledge rather than from an internet search. His evidence is entirely consistent with someone being given information about their country of birth. There is nothing within the findings which suggests his evidence is not consistent with the background claimed.
11. At paragraph 22 it is stated the appellant’s willingness to provide unverifiable information undermines the reliability of the claimed knowledge. This is difficult to understand how this affects the credibility of the appellant when he has clearly stated that he has no memories himself of Eritrea and has been given 100% of his knowledge by others. He has not verified the information he was given and has never suggested he has attempted to therefore does not know what information the respondent can verify or not.
12. Ground 3: Inconsistencies: The appellant is stated to have been inconsistent. It is notable that some inconsistencies may be expected in light of the age of the appellant at the time. Many of the suggested inconsistencies are simply adding further evidence. Paragraphs 32 and 33 note an inconsistency of whether his mum paid a bribe for his release. However, the appellant has stated his mum secured his release and when asked for further details has stated she paid a bribe. However, it is clear from the initial information that she secured his release therefore there is no inconsistency. As a result of the above it is argued the credibility findings are legally flawed.
13. The Secretary of State filed a Rule 24 response which stated ground 1 was a simple re-argument of the point about the appellant’s level of knowledge of Eritrea especially in his alleged home area of Assab. However, as a reasons challenge it was misconceived because it looked at paragraph 20 in isolation. It is clear from reading the determination as a whole, but particularly the two succeeding paragraphs, that the FtTJ attached greater weight to the information volunteered by A which turned out to be unverifiable, i.e. incorrect. There was ample material for A to understand the reason the decision went against him: Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 341 (IAC) at [14].
14. As regards ground 2, the ground failed to identify an error of law as recognised in R (Iran) & ors [2005] EWCA Civ 982. It too is re argument. In respect of ground 3, the grounds failed to identify an error of law and that the FtTJ correctly identified inconsistent evidence and that there was no error in his assessment of finding issues of inconsistency damage depends credibility. Respondent also identified other inconsistencies set out in the findings of fact made by the FtTJ.
15. The hearing took place on 19 August 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was present at the hearing and was represented by Ms Brakaj, Solicitor Advocate who appeared before the FTT. The respondent was represented at the hearing by Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer.
16. Ms Brakaj submitted that she relied upon the grounds of challenge which she supplemented by her oral submissions. It is not necessary to set out those oral submissions which will be considered in the discussion of the grounds. Mr Diwnycz relied upon the Rule 24 response summarise above.
17. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion:
18. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
19. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal's decision in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm AR 535.
20. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
"There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen's summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
'It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see  AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 ;  [2008] AC 678  per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see  MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2010] UKSC 49 ;  [2011] 2 All ER 65  at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see  R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal   (Social Entitlement Chamber)   [2013] UKSC 19 ;  [2013] 2 AC 48  at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.
21. Grounds 1 and 2 can be taken together. The core submission made by Ms Brakaj is the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons when assessing the issue of the appellant’s nationality. Ground 1 seeks to challenge paragraph 20 and ground 2 challenges paragraph 21 – 22. In her oral submissions Ms Brakaj submitted that it was difficult for the FtTJ to assess the issue of nationality when the appellant left Eritrea at the age of two and had no lived memories of that country. Thus, she submitted the information could only be provided by third parties. She pointed to the first interview (Q 49 and 50) when referring to the information told him by his mother and also the second interview. She submits that the FtTJ applied an unsafe test and later described this as the “wrong test” by considering nationality by the appellant’s responses.
22. I have carefully considered the submissions made and have done so in the context of the issues to be resolved and the evidence that was before the FtTJ. Having done so I am satisfied that the grounds are not made out and it is not established that either the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons for his decision or that he failed to consider the issue of nationality in accordance with the evidence.
23. The grounds of challenge include the claim made of the inadequacy of the reasoning of the FtTJ. When addressing this ground, it is also important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view. These are not controversial observations: see Customs and Excise Commissioners v A [2002] EWCA Civ 1039; [2003] 2 WLR 210; Bekoe v Broomes [2005] UKPC 39; Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318; [2006] UKCLR 1135".
24. The scope of the duty to give reasons was set out MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and reiterated in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC) at [43]:
“[The duty to give reasons] does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the Judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. […] It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the Judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision.” (citing English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605)
25. The SPT’s Practice Direction of June 2024 on Written Reasons is also of relevance, particularly paragraph 6 which sets out the following
“6. Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.”
26. This was an appeal where the appellant had entered the UK with no documentation either to demonstrate his identity or crucially his nationality. In those circumstances the respondent was required to assess his claim which the respondent duly did over the course of three interviews before reaching the decision on his claim as set out in the decision letter but which did not accept his claimed nationality.
27. In accordance with the new process for hearings conducted before the FtT the parties were required to identify the “principal controversial issues” (see Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues)[2023] UKUT 163) and this is reflected at paragraph 11 of the decision under the heading “issues in dispute”. The FtTJ recorded that during the preliminary discussions the parties confirmed that this was a single issue appeal – had the appellant established that he is a national of Eritrea? This was also set out in the appellant’s appeal skeleton argument (“ASA”). The decision also records at paragraph 12 the acceptance by the respondent that if he was found to be Eritrea that he would be at risk on return.
28. This was the issue which the FtTJ determined by undertaking an analysis of the evidence. Whilst the grounds (1and 2) seek to challenge paragraphs 20 – 22, as identified by the respondent the factual findings and assessment of the evidence was conducted between paragraphs 18 – 35. Those findings are to be read together and when they are, it is plain in my judgement that the FtTJ gave sustainable, evidence-based reasons for his decision on the issue and by undertaking a full assessment of the evidence determining the appellant’s overall credibility which was not solely confined to the questions he was asked concerning his knowledge of Eritrea. This is of relevance because in her oral submissions Ms Brakaj submitted that the FtTJ applied the wrong test and when asked to explain why, she referred to the FtTJ considering nationality in isolation and by reference to the answers given which she submitted was unsafe as they were not based on any lived experience because he had left Eritrea aged two.
29. I am not satisfied that that is a correct understanding of the FtTJ’s decision. When the FtTJ assessed the evidence he considered the issue of nationality alongside other issues as relevant to the appellant’s credibility which included his visit to the Ethiopian embassy (paragraph 23) his account of his arrival in Ethiopia and the circumstances (see paragraphs 24 – 26), documentary evidence provided (27 – 28), inconsistent evidence given by the appellant ( 29-33) and section 8 issues ( paragraph 34). I accept the submission made of the respondent, that as a reasons challenge, the general thrust of the ground is misconceived as grounds 1 and 2 seek to challenge only part of the FtTJ’s credibility assessment and this should not be seen in isolation. When those findings of fact are considered, it is plain that the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable reasons which were based on the evidence and open to him.
30. Turning to the specific issues raised in the grounds, paragraph 20 was highlighted on the basis that the FtTJ noted the submission made that the appellant had been criticised for providing information relating to Eritrea which was incorrect but when this was correct the respondent viewed it as not assisting the appellant in proving his nationality.
31. The FtTJ did consider that submission at paragraph 20 but was entitled to consider it in the context of the evidence before him and on the analysis of that evidence which he undertook between paragraphs 18 – 22. At paragraphs 18-19, the FtTJ summarised the issues raised in the respondent’s decision as it related to the evidence taken from three interviews but also the appellant’s witness statement. They are summarised as follows; his knowledge of Assab, what is mother told him about the area and the surrounding areas, traditional foods, what the flag represents, the mobile phone provider in Eritrea. The FtTJ set out that the respondent considered that any information the appellant did give was general knowledge answers and would be available online. The FtTJ considered at paragraph 18 that the issue of language was a neutral point given that both Amharic and Tigrinya are spoken in Eritrea.
32. Contrary to ground 2, the FtTJ was plainly aware of the appellant’s claim to have left Eritrea at the age of two. He recorded this not only when setting out the case summary at paragraph 9 but also in the FtTJ’s findings of fact and assessment of the evidence at paragraphs 19 and 21. At paragraph 19 he expressly set out that the appellant stated that he left aged 2 and had “no clear memories” of life in Eritrea, The FtTJ also set out that the appellant stated his mother told him, “A little bit about Eritrea” (paragraph 20 witness statement this).
33. Against that evidential background the FtTJ made his findings of fact. The appellant’s evidence was that his mother and father were both Eritrea nationals and had lived in Assab where he was born and that he had left Eritrea fleeing to Ethiopia with his mother. She spoke Amharic and Tigrinya but her main language was Tigrinya.
34. In the first interview he was asked if his mother, whom he said he was an Eritrea national, had ever talked about life in Eritrea. He confirmed that “yes she told me some” and when asked an open question concerning what kind of things she had spoken about, the appellant volunteered that she had told him where they used to live and the food they used to eat (Q49-50) and see follow-up question at Q54). The answer recorded was “Like the dorowot like spicy chicken sauce and also shiro which is chickpeas powder sauce. Hilber is like powder that they prepare and they made it from that.” Shiro and Hilber are traditional dishes both in Eritrea and Ethiopia however the dish he identified as a traditional Eritrean dish of Dorowat was a traditional dish of Ethiopia. The FtTJ assessed other evidence given by the appellant in the same context as being told by his mother at paragraph 22 of his decision. The appellant’s claim that he was born in Assab ( Q 36) and both parents were Eritrea nationals. When asked an open question about whether his mother told him about his own country (Q36) he volunteered that she had mentioned places within the town and gave his response identifying five locations (see Q37-38). Of these the respondent was only able to verify one neighbourhood and the remainder could not be confirmed. Another example set out by the FtTJ was question 21 (SEF 2 not 1 as stated) and when asked about Assab, which the appellant had identified as a place his mother had talked about, and when asked about the town and villages near Assab, the appellant identified four places according to what his mother said- Edu, Menkeb, Timo and Gelaelo. The FtTJ found that only one could be verified and that it was not near Assab but was 200 miles away.
35. Another issue set out by the FtTJ and taken from the appellant’s evidence referred with knowledge of the flag of Eritrea and its meaning (see paragraph 18 referring to the decision letter at paragraph 7 (h)). The appellant confirmed colours of the flag and what the symbols meant and that he had the information from his friends (see paragraph 25). The inference taken from this is that his friends were Eritrea who had told them of the flag of their nationality therefore he had knowledge of this. However, the answer was correct about the blue and red sections but the part concerning the symbol was not consistent with the external evidence as given.
36. Having considered the answers given in the context of the appellant’s claim including his age and level of knowledge, the FtTJ concluded the appellant was able to describe 2 traditional foods but they were common to both Eritrea and Ethiopia and the other dish was incorrectly identified as Eritrean when it was Ethiopian. When assessing the evidence given the FtTJ reached the conclusion overall that either the answers were incorrect or were unverifiable.
37. There is no error in the FtTJ’s assessment at paragraph 21 that at several points during his interviews the appellant volunteered specific information which the respondent had been unable to verify. That is factually correct. It was open to the FtTJ to consider that in the context of his factual claim that the volunteering of that information which was unverifiable was difficult to reconcile with his assertion that given his young age at the time he left Eritrea he retained no clear recollection of life in Eritrea. What the judge was stating was that there was an inconsistency between the certainty with which he offered some details of information in the interviews and the later assertion given that he had limited memory and that this was problematic when considering his evidence. The FtTJ then set out those examples at paragraph 22.
38. While the grounds assert that his evidence was entirely consistent with someone being given information about their country of birth form third parties who could be making mistakes or giving inaccurate information, the point made by the respondent is well made and that there is no reason why the FtTJ should have treated second-hand information which turned out to be unverifiable any differently from information of which the appellant had first-hand knowledge. On his own account the appellant claimed he had been given specific information from his mother and friends and thus even if from third parties they were from nationals of Eritrea and could be taken to be cognizant of such matters and to be given as accurate information.
39. In summary the reasons given between paragraphs 18 – 22 were adequate reasons and were evidence-based and were open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence that was before him.
40. What is important is that the FtTJ did not base his overall decision on that assessment nor treat it as determinative. That is clear from paragraph 22 and that this formed part of his “holistic assessment of the case”. The FtTJ then went on to consider other aspects of credibility as raised from the evidence.
41. Ground 3 makes a general challenge that while the appellant is stated to have been inconsistent, some of the inconsistencies may be expected in light of the age of the appellant at the time. That is a general assertion made. It is further submitted by reference to paragraph 32 -33 that it was not an inconsistency whether his mum paid for his release but that this was the appellant simply giving further detail.
42. As the respondent submits the grounds seek to challenge paragraphs 32 – 33 but fail to take into account the other credibility findings and inconsistencies identified by the FtTJ at paragraphs 24 – 26 relating to the appellant’s living arrangements in Ethiopia, paragraph 27 – 28 the documentary evidence provided, paragraphs 29 – 31 relating to events in Ethiopia and paragraph 34 relating to section 8 issues.
43. When paragraphs 24 – 34 are read together, the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence based reasons for finding that the appellant had given internal inconsistent evidence on matters that went to the core of his claimed identity and history and to find that those inconsistencies as identified undermined the credibility of his evidence.
44. The FtTJ set out the evidence given by the appellant relating to his living arrangements following he and his mother fleeing Eritrea and entering Ethiopia ( see paragraphs 24 – 26). It has not been submitted that the FtTJ either incorrectly set out the evidence or that it did not reflect the appellant’s accounts as given. Paragraph 24 set out his account from the first interview, paragraph 25 summarised what he had said in the third interview and paragraph 26 set out the witness statement. Despite stating that he had good relations with the family he lived with and that his mother was visiting him, in the third interview he claimed that they were no longer happy with him staying with them and that his mother had stopped visiting (Q34). The FtTJ identified that the claim given by the appellant was internally inconsistent. At paragraph 26 the FtTJ turned his attention to the witness statement, where he found the factual account given was different again and that he claimed to live with his mother at her place of work for the first three years and then he went to live with a lady (G) and her family as his mother’s employer said he could no longer stay at the house. He maintained that he had seen his mother once a month. He was sleeping rough in January 2015 as he left the house as “we were not getting on” and his mother ended up living on the street having been “kicked out of the house where she been working”.
45. Between paragraphs 27 – 28 the FtTJ considered the letter from the Yetim child care centre. The FtTJ referred to the contents of that statement and that he lived in a care facility for six months between February 2002 until 16th of August 2002. The FtTJ was entitled to take into account in assessing that evidence that the witness statement made no reference to staying in any care facility and that the explanation given in cross examination was one that did not stand up to scrutiny. The contents of the letter was the subject of analysis at paragraph 28, and the judge was entitled to attach little weight to that letter given it was produced long after the events described, it provided no information about the author’s identity or position nor provide information on the basis upon which they claimed knowledge of the matters asserted. He was entitled to find the document did little to resolve the inconsistencies in the appellant’s account as identified.
46. Between paragraphs 29 – 33 the FtTJ addressed other inconsistencies in the appellant’s account. Whilst Ms Brakaj that there was no inconsistencies in the evidence ans all the appellant was doing was to provide further evidence, that is not reflected in the assessment of the evidence when it is properly considered.
47. The FtTJ identified inconsistencies in account which related to his fear on returning to Ethiopia. In the screening interview 4.1 he described an incident at the mosque and the fear that he may be arrested and that he might be wanted for an incident which happened at the mosque. He explained that he had thrown rocks but was not arrested (p128). However, the FtTJ identified the account changed in his interview and that he claimed he did not take part in any conflict that he fell into the hands of the police and the police asked him to provide an ID card which he did not have so he asked the lady who was his Guardian to help him. The appellant explains “so she had to pay money in order to get me out of there before any action was taken and before further investigation” and “I was not properly charged with anything, it was before the process started that she could get me out of there”. Pausing there, the FtTJ was entitled on the evidence to find there had been an inconsistency in the accounts given but also that the appellant’s witness statement made no reference to the incident at the mosque and that when cross-examined the appellant changed his account again and that his evidence was now he had in fact been arrested, along with around five others following an “altercation” the mosque when he was attending Friday prayers. The judge records his evidence given for the first time that the police suspected him of being Eritrea because he did not have an ID card.
48. The FtTJ also identified further inconsistent evidence given between paragraphs 31 – 33 relating to the arrest of himself and his mother based on his ethnicity as being Eritrea and being detained for 15 days. The FtTJ was correct to identify that the later account given in the witness statement was inconsistent with the earlier evidence. A period of 15 days detention was not referred to in any of the three interviews and the later account given in the witness statement was not consistent with the evidence given in interview (Q66) and when specifically asked whether, following the incident in the mosque, the police ever had any further interest in the appellant, to which he stated, “I just continued with my low-profile, my life. They didn’t come back anyway”. Therefore, the FtTJ was entitled to find on the evidence that the appellant had given an inconsistent account.
49. At paragraph 30 – 33 the FtTJ considered the assertion made for the first time in the witness statement that following his alleged 15 day detention, that he and his mother were taken to a refugee camp and he remained there for five days before his mother secured his release after which he lived with the taxi driver and assisted him by calling out for fares. The FtTJ was entitled to identify that whilst the appellant had referred to him working as a taxi assistant or driver (see Q29) there was never an account that he lived with the taxi driver.
50. The FtTJ also assessed the claim made in order mother had been present at the camp but that she paid a bribe to facilitate his release. Whilst it is submitted that the appellant had not given inconsistent evidence but was providing more detail in the oral evidence, that does not demonstrate that the findings made by the FtTJ was not open to him. The FtTJ was entitled to find within those findings of fact that the witness statement omitted two significant (if true) details of his account which were given for the first time orally. In other words, the FtTJ’s assessment that the introduction of significant aspects of his claim at a late stage and after three substantive interviews was an attempt to bolster his claim, was a finding entirely open to him to make on the evidence. It is not established that the FtTJ made an error of law in making such a finding.
51. The respondent submitted, at paragraph 34 the FtTJ also made a finding adverse to the appellant that he had failed to take advantage and opportunity to claim asylum in three safe countries namely Italy, Belgium and France and chose to travel onto the UK.
52. Taking into account those matters set out above I conclude that the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons when reaching his overall conclusions. It is clear that he did not take the nationality questions as determinative but undertook a holistic assessment of credibility “in the round” and as demonstrated at paragraph 35. The conclusion reached that that the FtTJ had “ identified significant internal inconsistencies in the appellant’s account on matters ago to the core of his claimed identity and history. These inconsistencies materially undermine the credibility of the appellant’s evidence” was an assessment open to the FtTJ to make on the totality of the evidence and he was entitled find overall that he was not satisfied that the appellant had given a truthful account of his nationality or background.
53. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

20 August 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds