Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002665
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/03799/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

MD ABU TAHER TUFAEL
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION LIFTED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S. Akinbolu, instructed by Maliks and Khan Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M. Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order because the appellant’s appeal included a claimed for international protection and it considered that disclosing his identity could “aggravate of give rise to a risk which would not otherwise exist”. The FtT then dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal, however, and there has been no challenge that aspect of its decision. I therefore consider that the reason for the anonymity order has fallen away. I can identify no other justification for an anonymity order on the evidence before me. Taking into account the strong presumption in favour of open justice, I therefore find that the anonymity order previously made should now be set aside.
Introduction
2. The appellant was born in Bangladesh in December 1999. He came the UK with his father in March 2012, when he was 12 years old. His father left the UK without him, and he became an overstayer. The appellant claimed asylum promptly and was eventually granted humanitarian protection in February 2014. He was granted indefinite leave to remain in June 2019.
3. It is not in dispute that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK. After being abandoned by his father, he lived first with a paternal aunt and then with a maternal aunt in the UK. He, his aunts and his cousins all say that they see each other as family, describing their relationship as akin to that of a parent and child or of siblings. Many, if not all, of his UK-based relatives are British citizens. In October 2025, the appellant entered into a religious marriage with a British citizen, although they were not yet living together at the date of the hearing before the FtT. In addition, the appellant completed his secondary education in the UK and engaged in employment.
4. On 31 October 2019, when he was 19 years old, the appellant committed a serious sexual offence against his then-partner. He pleaded not guilty to the offence, but he was convicted by a jury in July 2023, and on 22 September 2023, he was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. On 6 November 2023, the respondent decided to deport him because of his conviction, and he then made a human rights and protection claim. On 12 September 2024, the respondent refused the human rights and protection claims and signed a deportation order against the appellant.
5. The appellant appealed to the FtT against the refusal of his human rights claim. The legal framework that the FtT was required to apply in determining his appeal is set out sections 117B and 117C of Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). The FtT made a series of findings of fact about the appellant, applied that legal framework to those findings and dismissed his appeal.
6. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal against the FtT’s decision.
The FtT’s decision
7. The FtT’s decision begins with a brief outline of the appellant’s immigration history and criminal conviction: [1]-[2]. This is followed by a summary of the respondent’s reasons for deciding to refuse his human rights and protection claims and deport him to Bangladesh: [3]-[4]. At [5], the FtT recorded that the appellant’s relationship with his wife was a “new matter”, because the respondent had not previously considered it. The respondent nonetheless consented to it being considered by the FtT in the appeal.
8. At [6], the FtT identified the matters in dispute between the parties, as discussed at the outset of the hearing. They were:
“i. Whether the Appellant was excluded from the protections of the refugee convention on account of his criminality and the section 72 exclusion – whilst it was accepted that a refugee convention reason was not engaged, the parties agreed that the Tribunal had to deal with the certificate and exclusion point nevertheless;
ii. Whether the Appellant would be at risk of Article 3 contravening treatment on account of his family in Bangladesh;
iii. Whether the Appellant could obtain sufficient state protection or internally relocate to escape any Article 3 risks. As the Appellant’s circumstances were now materially different to when he was initially granted humanitarian protection, his counsel indicate that he adopted a ‘pragmatic approach’ to this issue albeit it was not conceded;
iv. Whether it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant’s partner to relocate with him or to remain in the UK without him;
v. Whilst it was accepted that the private life exception could not be met on account of the Appellant not being lawfully resident in the UK for more than half of his life, it was contended and in issue, whether he was socially and culturally integrated in the UK and whether or not he would face very significant obstacles to reintegration upon return; and
vi. Whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to deportation, including consideration of ‘family life’ with cousins and his aunt’s family.”
9. At [7], the FtT recorded that “The Appellant conceded that he was ineligible for humanitarian protection on account of his conviction of a ‘serious crime’.
10. The FtT set out the legal framework for its decision at [8]-[13]. Although this legal framework is not in dispute, I set it out here in order to make it easier for a lay reader to understand the FtT’s decision.
11. The relevant legal framework is:
(i) Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007, which defines a “foreign criminal” as including a person who is not a British citizen who has been convicted in the UK of an offence and sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment. It stipulates that the deportation of foreign criminals is conducive to the public good and that the respondent must made a deportation order against a foreign criminal, subject to section 33;
(ii) Section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007, which establishes that a person’s deportation is not conducive to the public good and the respondent is not required to make a deportation order against them if their removal would breach a person’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) or the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention;
(iii) Section 72 of the 2002 Act, which states that a person who has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months shall (a) be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime and (b) be presumed to constitute a danger to the community. The presumption of dangerousness is rebuttable, but if it is not rebutted, the person can be removed from the UK even if this would put them at risk of persecution;
(iv) Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits the removal of a person from the UK if this would expose them to a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment; and
(v) Article 8 of the ECHR, which protects the right to a private and family life. Parliament has set out detailed guidance on how article 8 should be applied in immigration appeals. The FtT set out Section 117C of the 2002 Act in full:
“117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.”
12. The sections of the decision that follow set out who gave evidence at the hearing ([14]-[15]), the documents that were before the FtT ([16]) and the parties’ submissions ([18]).
13. The next section of the appeal is headed “Findings”. It contains the FtT’s findings both on the facts and on the application of the law to those facts, organised by the legal issues before the tribunal.
14. The first section is entitled “Asylum and section 72”. Under this heading, the FtT noted that the appellant had not raised a protection claim that was covered by the Refugee Convention. In his successful 2014 appeal, he had said he feared his family in Bangladesh, who had abused him and forced him to work. He had not said that he feared harm for any of the reasons set out in the Refugee Convention (race, religion, nationality, particular social group or political opinion).
15. The FtT nonetheless proceeded to consider whether the appellant was excluded from the protections of the Refugee Convention by section 72 of the 2002 Act. As noted above, the parties had agreed that it should do so. The FtT made the following findings of fact at [21]- [27]:
(i) The appellant had not undertaken any “offending behaviour work” in prison. None of the courses he had taken in prison were directed at offending behaviour;
(ii) His evidence was that “courses were set for him in his OASys report, however, he was told to undertake them in the community. Whilst he expressed his willingness to complete any course required, he has not done so.”;
(iii) He had not reoffended since his release from prison in December 2024, but this had to be seen in the context of his incentives not to reoffend arising from being on license until 21 March 2026 and having this appeal pending;
(iv) The OASys report assessed his risk of reoffending as low, but also noted that he posed a potential risk to a child’s wellbeing;
(v) The offending occurred against an emotionally vulnerable “17 year old girl”;
(vi) The appellant and the victim had been in a relationship, and the appellant had been coercive and controlling. This included taking intimate photographs of the victim and threatening to send them to her brother and father in order to manipulate her;
(vii) The victim had moved away from the UK after the offence “in order to make a fresh start”; this highlighted the seriousness of the offence;
(viii) The appellant had denied the charge but was found guilty after trial;
(ix) The OASys report completed in November 2023 stated that the appellant continued to deny the offence and gave an account of the events that contradicted the sentencing remarks; it was concluded in that report that he minimised his offending and lacked insight into it. When asked at the hearing about the comments “recorded in the OASys report” (from context, it appears that the FtT was referring to his comments denying the offence),
“He claimed that it was now more clear to him what he had done and how it had affected the victim and that he did not ‘really’ rely on the OASys comments now. Again, the Appellant gives a far from
unequivocal acceptance that he committed the crime convicted of, appreciates why it was wrong and that he regrets his conduct.”;
(x) In his witness statement for the appeal, the appellant attributed his offending to his youth and immaturity, apologised for “any wrong actions” and stated that he accepted that his actions “have caused significant distress to many people, including his family”. This fell “a long way short of” an unequivocal acceptance of guilt. “In the same vein as his denials at trial and in the OASys report”, the appellant was minimising his conduct and seeking to “explain it away as immaturity”;
(xi) In his statement, he had noted the distress he had caused to his family, but nowhere did he acknowledge the impact of his offending on his victim; and
(xii) The appellant’s evidence at the hearing about why he had not appealed his conviction did not indicate that he accepted his guilt: “His first reason for this was that he realised it would cost a lot of money. Before adding that as time went by he realised he should not really appeal.”
16. After having made these findings, the FtT concluded at [28]:
“Overall, I am not satisfied on balance that the Appellant has demonstrated that he is rehabilitated. He still struggle [sic] in my view to accept the gravity of his offending and struggles to take responsibility for it. Against this backdrop, I cannot accept that he has rehabilitated. The bare assertions that he has learned lessons and matured are therefore worthy of little weight. I conclude that he has failed to rebut the presumption that he poses a danger to the community in the UK. The refugee convention appeal therefore falls to be dismissed.”
17. At [29], the FtT recorded again that the appellant accepted that his conviction meant he was excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection and it dismissed the appellant’s humanitarian protection appeal for that reason.
18. At [30]-[35], the FtT gave its reasons for dismissing the appellant’s article 3 appeal. It noted that the respondent had found that the appellant had a “well-founded” fear of his father. It then found that there was no evidence that state protection would not be available, given that the appellant was now an adult, and taking into account that he was not a member of a minority and there was no suggestion that his father had any connection to the authorities. Nor was there any evidence that his father would still seek to harm him. Internal relocation would be safe and reasonable, considering the languages the appellant spoke, his level of education and the support he was likely to receive from his UK-based family.
19. The FtT then considered the appellant’s article 8 appeal. Although it did not repeat the legal framework set out at Section 117C, it structured its consideration in accordance with it. Under the heading “Private life exception”, at [36]-[46], the FtT noted that the appellant had not lived in the UK lawfully for more than half his life. It nonetheless went on to consider whether he could meet the other requirements of the private life exception set out at section 117C(4). It gave its reasons for finding that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated at [38]. I set this paragraph out in full, as it is relevant to the appellant’s grounds of appeal:
“The Appellant is 26 years old and has lived in the UK for 14 years. Prior to the index offence he had no previous convictions. The Appellant completed his secondary education here and learnt to speak English after arriving in the UK. The Appellant has grown up through his formative years with his aunt and her UK-based family. He has lived with his cousins as if they were his siblings. I take note of their evidence in this regard which supports his own. He has obtained his driving licence. He has undertaken work in the UK both before and since his sentence. He has formed relationships with partners albeit the first relationship was evidently extremely unhealthy and harmful to his former partner. Overall, I am satisfied on balance that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK, notwithstanding his conviction and offending.”
20. At [39]-[46], the FtT gave its reasons for finding that there would not be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in Bangladesh. In reaching its conclusion, it considered the age at which the appellant had left Bangladesh, his ability to speak Sylheti, his work experience, his good health, his command of English and the support that would be available both from his UK-based family members and Home Office reintegration assistance. There was no evidence that the appellant could not find employment in Bangladesh. He was clearly familiar with Bangladeshi culture, because both the relatives he lived with in the UK and his wife were of Bangladeshi heritage.
21. At [47]-[51], the FtT gave its reasons for finding that the family life exception set out at section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act was not met. It found that the appellant’s relationship with his wife was genuine and subsisting: [47]. However, his wife had known about his offending and the deportation action being taken against him throughout their relationship. This reduced the weight that could be afforded to the relationship, according to Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and undermined the conclusion that it would be unduly harsh for her either to leave the UK with the appellant or remain in the UK without him: [48]-[49]. In addition, as noted at [50], the relationship was relatively new and the couple had never lived together. They had no children.
22. The FtT then identified factors that meant it would not be unduly for the appellant’s wife to relocate to Bangladesh with him: she had been born in Sylhet and lived in Bangladesh until she was 15 or 16 years old. Her immediate family was now settled in the UK, but she had only come to the UK six years before and would not have lost ties to friends and family in Bangladesh. She had lived in Bangladesh longer than in the UK and was more proficient in Bengali than in English. She would be far more socially and culturally integrated in her country of origin than in the UK: [51].
23. Nor would it be unduly harsh for her to remain in the UK without the appellant. She lived with her parents, was in employment and had aspirations to study at university. She and the appellant had never lived together, and she was not financially dependent on him. The FtT accepted that “they see each other daily and talk on the phone and that she loves the Appellant”. However, if he were removed, they could continue to speak on the phone and could visit each other in Bangladesh or third countries. The relationship was “still relatively new”, and she would have her family’s support in the UK: [52]
24. At [53], the FtT set out the established definition of “unduly harsh” as “something severe, or bleak”. At [54], it found that the facts “come a long way short” of meeting that standard.
25. In the next section of the determination, the FtT considered the public interest in deportation. It noted, at [55], that the 30-month sentence the appellant had received was significantly beyond the 12-month threshold for automatic deportation set by Parliament and that “Sexual offences are widely acknowledged to be some of the most serious with lasting consequences for victims as was said to be the case in the sentencing remarks for this case.” At [58], the FtT described the offence and its effect on the victim in similar terms as in its consideration of risk to the community. At [59], it concluded that “there is a significant public interest in the deportation of the appellant.”
26. The final section of the determination considered “very compelling circumstances”, as required by section 117C(6). The FtT began by reminding itself of various relevant principles, although without identifying the cases from which they were taken. It then made the following findings:
(i) It was to the appellant’s credit that he had not reoffended, but there was no positive evidence of rehabilitation: [62]
(ii) The appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK: [64]
(iii) He had “spent his teenage and formative years here”: [64]
(iv) The appellant’s family members here had “effectively replaced his biological nuclear family”, but he and his cousins were all adults, and they were not dependent on each other. They could maintain their links through phone calls, messaging and visits: [64]
(v) The appellant was working and had “held a number of jobs”, but none of the jobs were particularly notable; they reflected “ordinary work opportunities rather than the development of a career”: [64]
(vi) The appellant did not have a child: [65]
(vii) His relationship with his partner was fairly recent and had been developed since being notified of deportation, and it would not be unduly harsh for the partner to relocate with him to Bangladesh or remain in the UK without him: [65]
(viii) The appellant would face difficulties beginning his life in Bangladesh again, but he would not face very significant obstacles, taking into account his gender, age, health, experience of living in Bangladesh as a child, connections with Bangladeshi culture, education and work experience: [66]
(ix) The appellant had a single conviction and had not reoffended since 2019. However, there was no “positive evidence of rehabilitation”. “The Appellant’s acceptance of responsibility for his offending has been equivocal until this appeal and arguably still was in his evidence to the Tribunal”: [67]
(x) “His OASys report reflects that overall he poses a low risk of reoffending. He was said to be a medium risk of sexual offending but this assessment was in 2023 and much time has elapsed since then. The risks posed overall appear to me to be relatively low. However, the risk of harm if he were to offend again are significant. These have to be balanced against each other.”:[67]
(xi) The purposes of deportation are not limited to preventing crime by an individual appellant but included deterrence and “the public concern that there needs to be an immigration system which can robustly deal with those foreign nationals who offend in the UK”: [68]
27. The FtT set out its “Conclusions” at [69]-[73]. The first two paragraphs contained a very brief summary of the findings made above. The FtT found that none of the points raised by the appellant were “individually very compelling”, nor did they outweigh the public interest in deportation when taken together: [71] At [72], the FtT repeated its previous findings about the circumstances that the appellant would face in Bangladesh, referring again to his health, employment skills and support from his UK-based family, as well as the facts that he “grew up in Bangladesh” and could speak the language. At [73], it concluded that the appellant had “not been able to assemble and present powerful evidence to overcome the formidable hurdle of the public interest in his deportation” and there were no “very compelling circumstances.” The appeal was dismissed.
The grounds of appeal
28. The appellant was granted permission to appeal on two grounds:
Ground One: “The finding that the appellant poses a danger to the public is contrary to the evidence”.
29. The appellant submits that the FtT came to a different conclusion on risk to the public than was contained in the OASys report, and it was required by (Mugwagwa (s.72 - applying statutory presumptions) Zimbabwe [2011] UKUT 338 (IAC)) to have “strong reasons” for doing so.
30. The appellant then identifies to two errors in the FtT’s treatment of the evidence. First, it made selective use of the OASys report, pointing to the finding that the appellant was minimising his offence but ignoring the observations that the offence was “of some age”, that the appellant was “willing to engage with programs to addressing [sic] the offending” and that he was “motivated to address his offending behaviour.” Moreover, the author of the OASys report had acknowledged that the appellant was minimising his offending behaviour but had nonetheless assessed him as being at low risk of reoffending. “As such, nothing is identified which suggests that the writer’s conclusion was incorrect.”
31. In addition, the FtT had misquoted the appellant’s statement when it found that he had not acknowledged the impact of the offence on the victim. He had done so at [26], [36] and [44].
Ground Two: Failure to weigh “the length of the Appellant’s lawful residence and the age of his arrival in accordance with the guidance in Maslov v Austria [2008] ECHR 546 and Sanambar [2021] UKSC 30”.
32. The appellant relies on Maslov, Forrester [2018] EWCA Civ 2653, and NA (Pakistan) [2016] EWCA Civ 662 for the principles that a person’s age on arrival is a distinct factor, separate from and additional to their length of residence, and it is capable of attracting significant weight. He further says that Sanambar established the principle that “those arriving as children should be treated differently to those arriving as adult[s] and weight should be apportioned accordingly”.
33. Various submissions are made about the facts of the appellant’s case, including his arrival as a child, his long possession of ILR, his abandonment by his biological parents, the risk his immediate family in Bangladesh still poses to him and his ongoing dependency on family and friends in the UK.
34. The appellant then submits that the FtT failed to note “that age on arrival in the UK was a factor additional to the length of residence”.
35. The respondent filed a detailed Rule 24 response, which I have read and taken into account, where relevant, in reaching my decision.
36. On 10 August 2026, Ms Akinbolu submitted a skeleton argument, which I have also read and taken into account.
The hearing
37. At the hearing before me I had a composite bundle of 426 pages, compiled by the appellant, and Ms Akinbolu’s skeleton argument. I heard submissions from both parties, which I have taken into account in making my submissions.
Discussion
Ground One
38. It is unclear to me why the parties agreed at the hearing before the FtT that the tribunal should consider whether the appellant was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention, given that he had never been granted refugee status and was not raising a refugee claim. The question of whether he was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention was therefore entirely theoretical.
39. In the grounds of appeal and the skeleton argument, Ms Akinbolu has suggested that what the FtT was deciding was not whether the appellant was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention (as expressly stated in the FtT’s determination), but whether he was excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection. The error, it is submitted, was in the way that the FTT applied Para. 339GB of the Immigration Rules. Paragraph 339GB provides that a grant of humanitarian protection must be revoked if a person is excluded from humanitarian protection under Para. 339D. Paragraph 339D, in turn, provides that:
“339D. An asylum applicant is excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection for the purposes of paragraph 339C(iv) where the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are serious reasons for considering that the asylum applicant:
[…]
(iv) having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime (as defined in Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002), constitutes a danger to the community of the UK.”
40. I consider that the appellant cannot pursue this ground in the way it was presented in the grounds of appeal, in the skeleton argument and at the hearing before me. This is because it is recorded twice in the FtT’s determination that the appellant conceded at the hearing that he was excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection by the fact of his conviction alone: [7] and [29]. This is consistent with the two skeleton arguments submitted below. Although there was no express concession in those skeleton arguments that the appellant was excluded from humanitarian protection, the appellant’s case was presented as based exclusively on article 8. At the error of law stage, the appellant cannot raise a ground of appeal that he did not pursue before the FtT. See: AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370, endorsing Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163.
41. Moreover, even if the appellant had not been excluded from humanitarian protection by his conviction, any error in this regard cannot have been material. This is because the FtT gave detailed reasons for finding that the appellant would not be at risk of serious harm in Bangladesh, and those reasons have not been challenged. Moreover, those findings were based on obvious and material changes since the grant of humanitarian protection: he was now an adult and would be able to support himself: [31]-[32]. The grant of humanitarian protection, by contrast, was squarely based on the risk to the appellant as “an unaccompanied minor without family support”, as set out at [16] of the Upper Tribunal’s 2014 decision. Appellant’s counsel had acknowledged in the proceedings below that there been a material change in circumstances: [6](iii).
42. Ms Akinbolu accepted both of these points when I put them to her at the hearing before me. I nonetheless allowed the appellant to pursue his challenge to the FtT’s finding that he was a danger to the community because I considered that the FtT had carried that finding forward into its assessment of whether there were very compelling circumstances as defined at section 117C.
43. As Ms Akinbolu accepted, this was primarily a rationality challenge. The appellant submitted that material aspects of the OASys report had been overlooked and that the conclusion that the appellant remained a danger to the community was not open to the FtT on the evidence before it.
44. I disagree. In the first place, as Mr Parvar rightly pointed out, Mugwagwa did not establish that the FtT needed to have “good reasons” to depart from the assessment of risk contained in an OASys report. The guidance for which Mugwagwa was reported is that, subject to common law principles of fairness, the FtT is required to consider the issue of exclusion under section 72 of its own motion, even if it has not been raised by the respondent. It is right that the Upper Tribunal concluded in that case that the OASys report was sufficient to rebut the presumption of dangerousness. However, it did not articulate any particular principles governing the weight that should normally be given to OASys reports. It did not need to, because the respondent had expressly agreed that the OASys report in that case was sufficient to rebut the presumption of dangerousness: [36]
45. I consider that the FtT’s approach to the OASys report was entirely rational. It is trite law that the FtT was not required to comment on every aspect of the report. It highlighted what it considered to be its most material findings: that the risk of reoffending was assessed as low ([22], [67]) and that the appellant did not accept responsibility for his offending: [24]. It also noted a number of other facts recorded in the report, such as that it had identified the possibility of risk of harm to a child’s wellbeing ([22]), and when the appellant’s license was due to expire: [21]
46. The appellant complains in his grounds that the FtT did not take into account that the author of the OASys report had expressed the opinion that he was “willing to engage with programs to addressing [sic] the offending” and that he was “motivated to address his offending behaviour.” Although the FtT did not specifically mention these findings, it was clearly aware of the courses addressing offending behaviour that had been identified for the appellant in the OASys report, as it heard oral evidence about these: [21]. It was clearly entitled to note that the appellant had not taken any such courses, either in prison or after his release: [21], [27], [62].
47. The appellant further complains that the FtT did not specifically refer to the comment in the OASys report that the offence was of “some age”, but it is obvious that the FtT knew when the offence was committed and that the appellant had not reoffended since. These facts are referred to at multiple points in the decision.
48. With regard to the low risk of reoffending, the FtT accepted this, but also considered that the seriousness of the offence meant that if he did reoffend, the harm would be significant. This was a permissible approach. See: KD v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 349.
49. At the hearing before me, Ms Akinbolu drew my attention to the comments in the OASys report suggesting that the offence may have been linked to the appellant’s immaturity. The FtT was clearly aware of the suggestion that the appellant’s offending was linked to his immaturity; it refers to the submissions about immaturity made by the appellant ([18], [25]-[28]) and his wife: [49]. It gave cogent reasons for rejecting them, including that “the Appellant very much should have known right from wrong at the age of 19” ([49]) and that the appellant’s “assertions that he has learned lessons and matured are […] worthy of little weight” in the context of the other evidence suggesting that he “still struggle[s] to accept the gravity of his offending”: [28]
50. I turn, finally, to the submission that the FtT made a material mistake of fact about the appellant’s witness statement when it found, at [26], that “nowhere does he acknowledge the impact of his offending on his victim”. In the grounds of appeal, the appellant relies on the following paragraphs of the statement:
“14. Since my offence, I can confirm that I have matured and understand the importance of consent. I have reflected upon my actions and I will never commit such a crime again and I understand the impact of my actions on my victims [sic]. […]
36. I reiterate that my actions in having any sexual encounters was due to my youth and desires to have a romantic relationship. I am embarrassed of my behaviour and I accept that my actions have caused significant distress to many people including my own family. […]
44. I feel that my personal circumstances are such that my deportation would not be proportionate or justified. I am aware that my previous criminal act was irresponsible, but I am genuinely remorseful. I have put this behind me and I believe that any risk of reoffending in the future is very minimal for me.”
51. It was clearly rational for the FtT to conclude that these paragraphs contain no acknowledgment of the impact of his offending on his victim. At [14], the victim of this offence is not referred to; indeed, there is a baffling reference to “victims” in the plural. No specific impact on her is identified or acknowledged. At [36], the appellant refers to the impact on “many people”, including his family. This cannot rationally be read as an acknowledgment of the impact on the victim. Nor is there anything at [52] that refers to the impact of his crime. On the contrary, the description of the crime as embarrassing and “irresponsible” is entirely consistent with the FtT’s finding that the appellant did not accept that it was serious.
52. Ground One is not made out.
53. For the sake of completion, I note that the FtT may have erred in referring repeatedly to the appellant’s victim as 17 years old at the time of the offence. According to the sentencing remarks: “You met at college when you were both 17. This offence was committed when you were 19.” Even if 19 refers only to the appellant’s age, his victim cannot have still been 17 at the time of the offence. However, the appellant did not raise this error in his grounds. Putting aside the question of whether the concept of a Robinson obvious error applies in human rights claims, I do not consider that this error could have been material. In deciding that the appellant’s offence was a serious one, the FtT took into account that his victim was emotionally vulnerable, that the appellant had engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour as well as sexual assault, and that “[t]he offence left her feeling controlled and led to a loss of confidence. She moved away from the UK after the offence in order to make a fresh start.”: [58] It also took into account what is generally known about the impact of sexual offences on victims and on society: [55] These findings would have justified treating the crime as a serious one even if the victim were 19 rather than 17.
54. Given these findings, the reasons the FtT gave for finding that neither the private life nor the family life exceptions were met, the finding that appellant had not taken responsibility for his offending and the very high threshold of “very compelling circumstances, I find that the error as to the victim’s age at the date of the offence cannot have been material.
Ground Two
55. The appellant submits that the FtT’s decision was inconsistent with the guidance in Maslov, Forrester, NA (Pakistan) and Sanambar about the weight that must be given to the fact that a “foreign criminal” arrived in the UK as a child.
56. I do not accept Ms Akinbolu’s suggestion that it can be inferred that the FtT was unaware of the principles articulated in these cases because it did not refer to them by name. What matters is whether the substance of the FtT’s reasoning was inconsistent with them. See, e.g.: ECO v BB & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 97 at [56].
57. I therefore begin by setting out what those principles are.
58. In Maslov, the ECtHR concluded at [75] that “very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion. This is all the more so where the person concerned committed the offences underlying the expulsion measure as a juvenile.” It reached this conclusion after making the following observations:
“71. In a case like the present one, where the person to be expelled is a young adult who has not yet founded a family of his own, the relevant criteria are:
– the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;
– the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
– the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant's conduct during that period;
– the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.
72. The Court would also clarify that the age of the person concerned can play a role when applying some of the above criteria. For instance, when assessing the nature and seriousness of the offences committed by an applicant, it has to be taken into account whether he or she committed them as a juvenile or as an adult […].
73. In turn, when assessing the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled and the solidity of the social, cultural and family ties with the host country, it evidently makes a difference whether the person concerned had already come to the country during his or her childhood or youth, or was even born there, or whether he or she only came as an adult. This tendency is also reflected in various Council of Europe instruments […]
74. Although Article 8 provides no absolute protection against expulsion for any category of aliens […], including those who were born in the host country or moved there in their early childhood, the Court has already found that regard is to be had to the special situation of aliens who have spent most, if not all, their childhood in the host country, were brought up there and received their education there […].” [internal citations omitted]
59. There is nothing in Forester that expressly considers the weight to be placed on a person’s arrival in the UK as a child, so I say no more about it.
60. As for NA (Pakistan), the main point of this judgment was that matters that are relevant to whether the exceptions set out at 117C(4) (the private life exception) and 117C(5) (the family life exception) are met may be relevant to the assessment of whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in the two exceptions: [58] NA himself had lived in the UK since infancy, and the Court of Appeal held that the Upper Tribunal had erred by not taking his long residence into account when considering whether there were very compelling circumstances. It found, however, that that error was not material given the weakness of his case under exception 1 and 2: the Upper Tribunal had found there were no significant obstacles to his reintegration in his country of birth ([53]) and that his family “had coped reasonably well with the separation while he was in prison and would be able to do so if he was deported to Pakistan”: [54] The Court of Appeal concluded that:
“and in light of the weakness of NA's case when measured by the yardstick of Exception 1 and Exception 2 and the relative lack of weight in the other factors relied on by him (such as his relationship with his parents), it is in our view clear that even on a proper approach to application of section 117C(6) NA cannot show that there are "very compelling circumstances" indicating that he ought not to be deported. This is so after giving full weight to the guidance of the ECtHR in Maslov v Austria at paras. [68]-[76]. Despite his long residence in the UK, NA is a mature man who committed a particularly serious crime in circumstances in which the public interest in his removal has been made especially clear by the 2014 rules and section 117C. Accordingly, it is clear that there are "very serious reasons" which justify his expulsion, in accordance with the guidance given in Maslov at [75].”
61. The second appellant in NA had entered the UK at the age of eight ([64]), but nothing in the Court of Appeal’s determination in his case turned on this. The third appellant had entered the UK at the age of 22: [84].
62. In Sanambar, finally, and the Supreme Court expressly addressed the issue of he correct approach to article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) in deportation cases consequent upon criminal offending by those who entered and lawfully settled in the United Kingdom as children”: [1] It repeated the excerpt from Maslov set out above and noted that in that case, the offender’s age had been “decisive”. It then summarised the Strasbourg court’s reasoning. This summary highlights that the offender’s young age had affected the assessment of the seriousness of the offending, which had been found to be “acts of juvenile delinquency”. As the offender was still a child, the obligation to take into account the best interests of the child was also relevant: [25] The Strasbourg court further took into account the fact that Mr Maslov had not reoffended. The age at which he came to Austria was also reflected in the findings, summarised by the Supreme Court at [26] that:
“He spent he formative years of his childhood and youth in Austria. He spoke German and all his principal social, cultural and family ties were in Austria. He did not speak Bulgarian and had no close ties with that country.”
63. The Supreme Court then considered a number of other domestic and European cases before concluding that a person’s age on arrival and the age at which they offended were relevant factors to be taken into account in the article 8 assessment: “Unsurprisingly children are treated differently from adults”. However, the weight to be given to these factors depended on the circumstances. There was not a separate test or a higher threshold to be applied when a person had come to the UK as a child: [46].
64. This is directly contrary to the submissions made in the appellant’s skeleton argument that there is a “special” assessment to be carried out when a person has arrived in the UK as a child and that this factor must be treated as distinct from their length of residence and given “additional weight”.
65. I consider that the FtT followed all of this guidance in substance. It treated the appellant’s age on arrival in the UK as relevant to the strength of his private life here, including specifically to his degree of integration and the importance of the familial relationships he had developed with his aunts and cousins: [38]. It also took into account his age on arrival in considering whether there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Bangladesh: [41] and [44]. It took into account the age at which he offended (19) when considering and rejecting the claim that the offence was due to his immaturity, most directly at [49]. It then referred to his age on arrival and the formative years he had spent in the UK again, when considering whether there were very compelling circumstances as defined at section 117C: [64] and [66].
66. For these reasons, I consider that the FtT’s treatment of the age at which the appellant arrived in the UK was in accordance with the principles set out in the leading caselaw. The FtT repeatedly acknowledged the age at which the appellant had arrived in the UK and took it into account where it considered it to be relevant, namely with regard to the appellant’s integration, the strength of his private life here and the obstacles he would face on returning to Bangladesh. No “special” or “additional” consideration of the appellant’s age on arrival was required.
67. Ground Two is not made out.
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 24 March 2026 did not contain any material error of law and is upheld. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 September 2026