Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002668
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65832/2023

Hybrid hearing

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHAPMAN

Between

Mr KS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
v

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S. Rogers, Immigration Advice Centre
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Iraq, born on 4.5.92. He arrived in the UK on 17 April 2022 and claimed asylum. The basis of his claim was that he had an affair with his cousin, S, who was married. On 4 April 2016, he received a phone call saying that S’s husband was armed and looking for him. The Appellant said that he stayed with his cousin for 3 days and was then handed over to the authorities for his own protection and stayed with them for 3 months before relocating to Erbil and making a monetary arrangement with S’s husband.
2. In October 2021, the Appellant said he went to visit his family in Duhok where he saw S’s husband, who was armed, enter into the coffee shop he was in as a consequence of which he fled. His application was refused and he appealed against that decision. His appeal came before FtTJ Caskie KC for hearing on 25 September 2025. On 29 September 2025 the judge promulgated the decision, however, it related to a different Appellant. On 21 January 2026, the decision was re-promulgated dismissing the appeal.
3. An application for permission to appeal was made out of time due to delay in the Appellant’s former representatives being able to take his instructions as no interpreter was available. Permission to appeal was refused by FtTJ Barker on the basis that the application had been made out of time. A renewed application for permission to appeal was made to the Upper Tribunal, supported by a witness statement by Christina Thevathasan, dated 14 May 2026, regarding the difficulty in obtaining a Kurmanci interpreter and the fact that the application was made out of time as a consequence.
4. The grounds asserted:
(i) the FtTJ erred in that multiple parts of the decision suggested that key pieces of evidence had been overlooked or mischaracterised, eg the Appellant’s witness statement and country evidence explaining his non-registration with the Mukhtar; the prevalence of informal/tribunal mechanisms and the practice of temporary detention in honour related cases;
(ii) the FtTJ’s rejection of Ground 2 rests heavily on findings that events were “inherently unlikely” but the plausibility test was wrongly applied by reference to the FtTJ’s own assumptions as to how people behave in Iraq and failed to apply Y v SSHD and HK v SSHD that plausibility assessments must be grounded in country evidence not speculation;
(iii) the treatment of certain propositions such as the financial settlement means S’s husband could not pursue the Appellant and honour based violence patterns make the Appellant’s behaviour was inherently implausible and are in contradiction with country evidence: see CPIN;
(iv) the FtTJ erred in finding the Appellant could live in Erbil without registering with the mukhtar, when the bundle contained evidence showing that many factory workers live on site without registration and this is a known practice;
(v) the FtTJ failed to properly apply Tanveer Ahmed;
(vi) the FtTJ repeatedly assessed aspects of the account in isolation i.e. the relationship plausibility, arrest, settlement, encounter in Duhok, internal relocation). The determination lacks a holistic assessment of risk as required by Karanakaran.
5. In a decision dated 11 June 2026, permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman, having provided detailed reasons for extending time to admit the application in time, in the following terms:
“Permission to appeal

(6) I am satisfied that it is arguable that First-tier Tribunal Judge Caskie KC erred at [18(a)–(b)] in finding it “inherently improbable” that the appellant would have engaged in an affair with his cousin in circumstances where both would have been aware of the serious consequences if discovered in a country where honour-based killings occur. In reaching that conclusion, it is arguable that the judge impermissibly relied on his own subjective assessment and, further, adopted an irrational position that such conduct would never occur in Iraq.

(7) Similarly, it is arguable that the judge erred at [18(i)] in concluding that there was “no serious possibility” that the appellant would encounter his cousin’s husband upon returning to visit his family.

(8) It is also arguable that the judge failed to provide adequate reasons at [18(g)] for finding that the appellant could not have relocated to Erbil without registering with a Mukhtar, and at [18(l)] for the conclusion that the documents relied upon by the appellant could readily be reproduced.

(9) I am less persuaded that it is arguable the judge erred at [18(f)] in finding that it would be unlikely that the cousin’s husband would continue to seek to harm the appellant following the settlement. To do so would appear to be contrary to the honour-based system. Nor does there appear to be much to the contention that the judge failed to consider the evidence in the round.

(10) However, permission to appeal is granted on all grounds.”
6. The Respondent lodged a rule 24 reply on 1 July 2026 opposing the appeal, which asserted as follows:
GROUND 1

a. The FTTJ made expressed reference to the available evidence at [3]).
b. The grounds allege that A's detailed witness statement explained why A’s lack of knowledge of how S’s husband discovered their illicit relationship. With due respect, there were three witness statements that were available to the FTTJ:
i. The witness statement dated 24/10/2023 (please refer to pdf.256 of the HB and p.40 of the Respondent’s bundle ('RB')).
ii. The witness statement dated 01/02/2024 (please refer to pdf.33 of the HB and p.39 of the Appellant’s bundle ('AB')).
iii. The updated witness statement dated 18/092025 (as referred to [3] of the FTT decision). It should be noted that none of these witness statements make any reference to any explanation as to why A did not know how S’s husband discovered their alleged relationship .It should further be noted that none of these witness statements are detailed.
c. With reference to the issues outlined in [3(b)] of this response, it is noted that the grounds have not specifically highlighted where within the relevant background evidence available to the FTTJ he failed to consider:
i. With reference to the issue of non-registration with a local mukhtar in Erbil, it is clear that the FTTJ was reliant upon the IRQ CPIN Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, Version 14, Oct 2023('CPIN IR'), Section 9.5 titled 'Erbil Governorate’. This makes reference to the requirement that someone from outside Erbil wishing to settle there must regularise their stay with the local authorities, including the local Mukhtar. The FTTJ was entitled to question how he managed to stay in Erbil for 5 years (a lengthy period) without registering with the local Mukhtar, even if in hiding. CPIN IR is referred to in R's Reasons for Refusal Letter dated 03/12/2023 ('RFRL') within the section titled 'Internal relocation' (see footnote 4 of the RFRL).
ii. With reference to the issue of the prevalence of informal/tribal resolution mechanisms, the FTTJ never declared that these mechanisms did not exist in Iraq. Indeed, the FTTJ implicitly accepted their existence when taking into account the alleged financial settlement.
iii. Regarding the issue of the practice of temporary detention in honour-related cases, again the FTTJ never challenged that these mechanisms exist in Iraq.

5. It is not understood by R how the grounds are able to allege that the FTTJ failed to consider or engage with the background evidence, especially when the FTTJ expressly made clear that he had assessed A's case against the background evidence (please refer to FTT decision [18]);

6. The grounds assert that the FTTJ erred in how they assessed A's credibility with reference to the cases of HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 (20 July 2006)('HK') and Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 (26 July 2006)('Y'). R submits that the FTTJ had in mind these authorities when assessing the credibility of A's claim:
a. In HK at [28], the Court of Appeal noted that a story by an applicant may seem largely implausible but that did not mean that it could be untrue. But the Court of Appeal further noted that when assessing implausibility, a judge did not have to merely accept what was said by an applicant at face value and further cited that a decision maker can reject plausibility '……on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation' (please refer to [30] of HK).
b. The FTTJ found when assessing the evidence accumulatively, that A's claim was not credible (please refer to FTT decision [18] and [19]). When the FTTJ was assessing A's credibility at [18], most of that assessment variously considered the likelihood of events occurring rather that surmising that aspects of A's account were simply 'incapable of belief' (please refer to Y [26]). Indeed, with further reference to [26] of Y, this authority quotes from [24] of Wani & Ors, Re Application for Judicial Review [2005] ScotCS CSOH_73 (08 June 2005):
'… the tribunal of fact need not necessarily accept an applicant's account simply because it is not contradicted at the relevant hearing. The tribunal of fact is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and may reject evidence if it is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole' (underline R's emphasis).
c. This is exactly what the FTTJ did:
i. At [18(a)], the FTTJ noted that A's account was 'inherently unlikely' (not 'inherently' implausible). When the FTTJ made this observation, he firstly stated that in general, a person would not engage in sexual relations with a near relative who had at least one child then further stated in the next sub-paragraph [18(b)] of the FTT decision that this was 'more unlikely' given the country conditions in Iraq with its prevalence of honour-based violence. [18(a)] - [18(b)] have to be read in conjunction and not singly when assessing likelihood of this occurrence against the cultural tribal background of Iraq. The FTTJ did not engage in making a general observation solely through the lens of their own experience as argued in the grounds.

ii. R further refutes the suggestion that the FTTJ adopted an irrational position as highlighted in the Upper Tribunal’s grant of permission by insinuating that A's conduct in Iraq as described by A could never occur. To emphasise the point: R submits that the FTTJ did not find that conduct as described by A could never occur in Iraq at [18] of the FTT decision. The FTTJ simply did not accept A’s account that these incidents personally happened to him. The background evidence highlights that hundreds of persons have been killed on the basis of honour-related actual and/or suspected transgressions.
iii. The FTTJ was further entitled to note that the consequences of their relationship being discovered would have acted as an ‘enormous disincentive’ for the couple to have got together (please refer to FTT decision [18(b)]). This is a 'reasonably drawn inference' based on common sense as well as an assessment regarding the likelihood of the affair occurring.
iv. The FTTJ was further entitled to point out that S’s husband’s position as an armed military trained member of the Peshmerga alongside the cultural background of Iraqi patriarchal society would have made it '……less likely that the relationship would have developed as described' (underline R's emphasis, see [18(c)] of the FTT decision). Again, this was a probability finding rather than an implausibility finding by the FTTJ.
v. With reference to [18(d)] of the FTT decision, the FTTJ concluded that it was unclear how S’s husband found out about the relationship (and it should be noted, there was no expressed implausibility finding here). R submits that the FTTJ was entitled to find that if A had been detained due to the alleged affair for three months, he would have been able to detail how the affair was discovered. Again, R submits that the FTTJ was utilising common sense with '……reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation' as highlighted in HK. 59
vi. With reference to [18(e)] of the FTT decision, the FTTJ was entitled to observe that S’s sister’s potential prolonged knowledge of the claimed relationship would have placed her at risk if this was known to the male members of the family. The grounds have not countered this point and again the background evidence before the FTTJ supports this observation.
vii. The FTTJ found [18(f)] of the FTT decision that the issue of the financial settlement paid to S’s family restored their honour and that any breach of that settlement by (for example) violent retribution would have been a breach of that honour (please refer to FTT decision [18(f)]). The FTTJ was implicitly referring to [8.3.1] of the Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribal violence, Version 1, July 2024('CPIN') which states 'Tribal law provides remedies for all types of disputes involving harm to person, property or reputation, whether intentional or accidental. Tribal legal processes are built upon the principle that those who have suffered have the right to respond with equal violence, in order to restore the honour of - not the harmed individual - but the group. The group is referred to as khamsa - literally "five" in Arabic - and includes all males descended from a common ancestor five generations back. If one member of the khamsa is the victim of a crime or serious insult, the honour of the entire group is violated. However, to mitigate against this system of revenge descending into frequent violence, tribal law also offers the khamsa an opportunity to restore its honor through a negotiated settlement (sahl) and payment of a tribute (fasel)'. It was A's evidence that his family paid the family of S’s husband $80,000. That (taken in conjunction) with A's claim that: - He had not encountered any problems for five years. - There was no indication that for those five years, S’s husband had sought to try and locate him in Erbil. Indeed, [11.7.6] of the CPIN states that violence can be used against a male partner of an illicit liaison but only in cases where the family of the female partner are influential and powerful enough not to fear any repercussions. [11.10.1] of the CPIN also states that in terms of preserving family honour, there is '……clear evidence that such actors will pursue the person to the proposed area of relocation, including, through tribal, family or other links'. This should further be taken in conjunction with A's argument that internal relocation was not a viable option for him which in itself is inconsistent with his claim that he was able to reside in Erbil and work for 5 years without encountering any problems (please refer to FTT decision [17]). 60 - He saw S’s husband when visiting his home area after the five-year period with no indication that he had actually seen A or was targeting him. The evidence before the FTTJ was that A's sighting of S’s husband was incidental.
viii. With reference to [18(g)] of the FTT decision regarding the FTTJ not accepting that he could have resided in Erbil for a prolonged period without registering with the local Mukhtar, as already outlined in this response, the background evidence was that he must to do this in order to reside there having moved from another part of the KRI Governorate. The grounds have not pointed to any background evidence which counters this objective information (apart from A's subjective assertion).
ix. With reference to [18(h)] of the FTT decision, the FTTJ was entitled to find that as a matter of honour, S’s husband and his family could not pursue him because of the settlement. Again, this is in line with the background evidence: that honour would still be maintained if a settlement had already been reached and accepted by the wronged party. The grounds have not pointed to the background evidence that showed that it would not be dishonourable if that agreement had been breached for no reason. The background evidence in the CPIN emphasises the importance of family honour throughout Iraq.
x. The FTTJ also undertook a calculated assessment when determining the probability of A encountering S’s husband by chance after 5 years (with no indication that he was actually targeting A or even acknowledged him during this incident). Indeed, the FTTJ expressed: 'The Appellant indicates that he saw S’s husband on a visit to the family home area when S’s husband was going into a coffee shop armed. It was that encounter that caused the Appellant to flee. He does not suggest that he was fired upon or indeed that S’s husband acknowledged his presence or indeed saw him. That element of the Appellant’s account strikes me also as inherently improbable. The chances of bumping into this specific individual during a visit to his family after five years are remote at best. I do not believe that occurred as there is no serious possibility it happened' (underline R's emphasis, please refer to [18(i)] of the FTT decision).
xi. With reference to [18(j)] of the FTT decision, the FTTJ further expressed his probability assessment by referring to the sighting as a '……claimed chance encounter' and concluded that A's flight from the country was a '……gross overreaction'.
xii. The FTTJ further referred to Section 8 when assessing A's credibility at [18(k)] of the FTT decision. 61
xiii. The FTTJ was entitled to further question the reliability of the documentation that A produced by providing several reasons why he did not accept them to credibly make out A's case. This was clearly in line with TANVEER AHMED.

7. R submits that the FTTJ's assessment of credibility was in line with the relevant authorities: it was based on internal and external inconsistency against the available background evidence with aspects which were not sufficiently detailed (i.e. how S’s husband was able to find out about the alleged affair).

GROUND 3

8. The grounds assert that the FTTJ had treated certain propositions as fact, including:
a. The issue of whether the financial settlement meant that S’s husband could not pursue A.
b. 'Honour-based violence patterns make the Appellant’s behaviour inherently implausible (para 18(b), (c))'.

9. R refers to the previous submissions in this response. To reiterate the point: the grounds have not pointed to any specific background evidence which makes their argument. There is also further reference to the fact that the FTTJ generally assessed the probability of events occurring not whether these events were implausible.

GROUND 4

10.The grounds refer to the FTTJ's alleged failure to take into account background evidence and A's oral evidence that it was possible for many factory workers to live on site without Mukhtar registration. Again, R repeats that the grounds have not highlighted where within the background evidence available to the FTTJ which demonstrates this point. There is no reference to this claimed information in the appellant’s skeleton argument either.

11.In terms of the FTTJ's alleged failure not to take into account A's evidence, this aspect has no merit: the FTTJ at [18(g)] of the FTT decision made expressed reference to the fact that A '……claims was able to avoid conflict with S’s husband by moving to the capital Iraqi Kurdistan, Erbil. He claims that he lived there for a period of five years without registering with the local Mukhtar. I do not accept that element of the Appellant’s account'. The FTTJ also noted through questions of clarification that A resided at the factory where he worked whilst in Erbil (please refer to FTT decision [14]). The FTTJ simply did not accept his written and oral evidence.

GROUND 5

12.The grounds assert that the FTTJ failed to apply TANVEER AHMED. R submits that there is no merit in this submission either. 62
a. R accepts that the reasoning at [18(l)] of the FTT decision could have been better expressed. However, when the FTTJ found that documents could be easily produced in Iraq, this was based upon the CPIN IR at section 6.6 titled 'Forged identity documents'. As mentioned already in this response, the FTTJ was implicitly referring to footnote 4 of her RFRL (CPIN IR) so this reference to the fraudulent documentation was not based upon speculation as asserted in the grounds.
b. The FTTJ was entitled to question how A obtained his documentation in that it was not credibly explained by A. The provenance of documentation is of importance and there are various authorities which refer to its importance. MA (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 175 (22 March 2016) [27] is one such authority which states that even the involvement of lawyers in the UK and abroad when accessing documentation from abroad did not mean that the said documentation was reliable. In this case, the FTTJ implicitly noted the lack of expert evidence accompanying the documentation A produced.
c. Nor is it incumbent on a judge to make reference to every bit of evidence in order to make a balanced decision (please refer to Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 (05 April 2022), [2(iii) – (v)]).
d. The FTTJ was entitled to include the other credibility elements already highlighted in their decision when assessing the viability of the supporting documentation. Thus, the FTTJ had undertaken a holistic approach to the evidence as a whole.

GROUND 6

13.This ground maintains that the FTTJ had failed to undertake a holistic assessment in line with Karanakaran. R submits that this ground is a mere disagreement with the FTTJ's decision. R submits that the decision was adequately reasoned.”
Hearing
7. At the hearing, Ms Rogers appeared via cvp. She sought to rely upon the grounds of appeal, especially grounds 2 and 3. She submitted that the judge’s credibility findings do not make reference to the evidence upon which they are based. Whilst the Judge sets out the discussion and conclusions he draws, with particular reference made to the finding that generally people do not behave in that way, at [18](a) the judge did not rely on any evidence in support of his contention, despite having had regard to CIPN on honour crimes which makes it clear that committing adultery [3.2.9] is one of the areas where honour crimes arise, also 11.12 and 11.52. She submitted that section 409 of the Penal Code makes provision for the committing of adultery by a female. Consequently, Ms Rogers submitted that clearly there was objective evidence to support the claim and in fact there is legislation.
8. Ms Rogers then proceeded to challenge the judge’s finding at [18(b)] regarding the consequences of actions of individuals “engaging in that kind of behaviour” on the basis that the judge does not point to any evidence in support of that contention. She submitted that the objective evidence referred to above does not support that conclusion.
9. With regard to [18(c)] Ms Rogers drew attention to the fact that there were witness statements included in the bundle including an addendum statement with corrections. She submitted that the Appellant does attempt to comment as to how the relationship with S developed and this was not taken into account by the judge when finding that the Appellant would not have entered into a relationship on this basis.
10. With regard to [18(d)] and how S’s husband found out about the relationship between S and the Appellant, it was clear there had been communications between S’s sister and the family and the Judge does not consider this. Ms Rogers submitted that the Judge should have referred to the evidence given by the Appellant on this matter rather than find that the Appellant would have made enquiries of his own family and it is unclear how the judge felt he could draw that conclusion and he does not give any basis for it.
11. With regard to [18(f)] and the issue of the financial settlement between the Appellant and S’s husband, J and the finding that no-one would breach that settlement as a matter of honour, Ms Rogers submitted that this is not in accordance with the objective material and there was no analysis of the settlement. The Appellant said it was J who entered into that settlement but the family were not happy, however, this was not addressed by the judge, nor did he refer to any objective source. In the Appellant’s supplementary statement at SB 285 he said that J’s tribe disowned J for agreeing to the payment instead of killing him and so he brought shame on his tribe which is why he was still wanting to kill the Appellant and he always will. Ms Rogers submitted that this was a reasonable explanation as to why a person would go against the settlement and referred to the Appellant’s witness statement at SB 286, where he states with regard to paragraph 4 of the refusal: “I don’t believe I have been inconsistent with those who I feared. In my screening interview I was asked to explain briefly who I feared in Iraq so I explained the first reason which was the family of [J] because of the affair the family wanted to kill me including [J]. After the payment agreement and J’s tribe cast him out for taking the money and not killing me for J still wanted to kill me so this was the second reason. But again, I was asked to only explain in brief so when I said in my screening interview that I feared S’s family this would include J.”
12. With regard to the issue of documentation and the relevant test as set out in Tanveer Ahmed Ms Rogers submitted that the Judge does make an assessment but does not assess how the Appellant came to get the documents. There is some facebook information and that speaks to itself as to where it came from: see SB 346 – 350 photos of J from facebook also showing him in military uniform.
13. In his submissions, Mr Tufan, relied upon the detailed rule 24 response [6] above refers. He submitted that the judge heard and considered the evidence and ultimately concluded that the relationship between S and A did not happen and he was entitled to come to that conclusion. Mr Tufan acknowledged that that there were “one or two blips” at [18] where he says people do not behave in that way, given that human beings are capable of all sorts of behaviour but the judge was making a general point, however he queried whether this was a material error.
14. Mr Tufan also acknowledged that the judge may not have had everything fresh in his mind as he promulgated the wrong case and then only considered this Appellant’s case 4 months after the hearing, however, there had to be a causal nexus cf. SS (Sri Lanka) [2018] EWCA Civ 1391 at 29 where Leggatt LJ held:
‘29. It can therefore be confirmed that the approach to the issue of delay adopted by the Upper Tribunal in the case of Arusha and Demushi, applying the decision of this court in RK (Algeria), which requires a nexus to be shown between the delay and the safety of the decision, is the correct approach. The only significance of the fact that delay between hearing and decision has exceeded three months is that on an appeal to the Upper Tribunal this period remains an appropriate marker of when delay is of such length that it requires the FTT judge's findings of fact to be scrutinised with particular care to ensure that the delay has not infected the determination.”
15. Mr Tufan submitted that in relation to [18(f)] that attempts to harm the Appellant following the financial settlement are contrary to the honour based system. This was several years later and he queried why would this person would attempt to harm the Appellant and dishonour himself and consequently, the judge was entitled to reach an adverse finding on this point. Mr Tufan submitted that this makes the other credibility points irrelevant.
16. Mr Tufan also observed that the findings on the section 8 issue had not been challenged at 18(k) and this goes to the Appellant’s negative credibility. He could have applied for asylum in Germany: the Appellant said he was under the control of the agent but this was not accepted.
17. In reply, Ms Rogers submitted that there had been a delay in receiving the determination and there was an inherent risk given the delay that it was conceivable matters were not as fresh in the judge’s mind. She submitted that the grant of permission essentially agreed with the points raised and that the FtTJ should have referred to specific evidence in support of his findings as an Appellant is entitled to know why he won or lost.
18. I reserved my decision which I now give with my reasons.
Decision and reasons
19. I have concluded that there are errors of law in the decision and reasons of FtTJ Caskie KC and that those errors are material. My reasons are as follows:
19.1. The findings of “inherent unlikelihood” at [18](a) as to the behaviour of the Appellant and S and at (i) that it was “inherently improbable” that the Appellant would see S’s husband going into a coffee shop armed I find run contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, where Neuberger LJ (as he then was) held as follows:
“28.      Further, in many asylum cases, some, even most, of the appellant’s story may seem inherently unlikely but that does not mean that it is untrue. The ingredients of the story, and the story as a whole, have to be considered against the available country evidence and reliable expert evidence, and other familiar factors, such as consistency with what the appellant has said before, and with other factual evidence (where there is any).
29.      Inherent probability, which may be helpful in many domestic cases, can be a dangerous, even a wholly inappropriate, factor to rely on in some asylum cases. Much of the evidence will be referable to societies with customs and circumstances which are very different from those of which the members of the fact-finding tribunal have any (even second-hand) experience. Indeed, it is likely that the country which an asylum-seeker has left will be suffering from the sort of problems and dislocations with which the overwhelming majority of residents of this country will be wholly unfamiliar. The point is well made in Hathaway on Law of Refugee Status (1991) at page 81:
“In assessing the general human rights information, decision-makers must constantly be on guard to avoid implicitly recharacterizing the nature of the risk based on their own perceptions of reasonability.”
30.      Inherent improbability in the context of asylum cases was discussed at some length by Lord Brodie in Awala –v- Secretary of State [2005] CSOH 73. At paragraph 22, he pointed out that it was “not proper to reject an applicant’s account merely on the basis that it is not credible or not plausible. To say that an applicant’s account is not credible is to state a conclusion” (emphasis added). At paragraph 24, he said that rejection of a story on grounds of implausibility must be done “on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation”. He went on to emphasise, as did Pill LJ in Ghaisari, the entitlement of the fact-finder to rely “on his common sense and his ability, as a practical and informed person, to identify what is or is not plausible”. However, he accepted that “there will be cases where actions which may appear implausible if judged by…Scottish standards, might be plausible when considered within the context of the applicant’s social and cultural background”.
19.2. The approach of the FtTJ was, I find, exacerbated by the fact that there was evidence before him which was capable of corroborating the Appellant’s claim, but was not taken into account by him in the credibility assessment at [18](a)-(l). In particular:
(i) as highlighted by Ms Rogers, the CIPN on honour crimes which makes it clear that committing adultery [3.2.9] is one of the areas where honour crimes arise, see also 11.12 and 11.52 and that section 409 of the Penal Code makes provision for the committing of adultery by a female;
(ii) the Appellant’s witness statement dated 1.2.24 and addendum statement dated 18.9.25;
(iii) documents seeking the arrest of the Appellant and S following a complaint lodged with the police by S’s husband on 6 April 2016;
(iv) the appointment by the Appellant of an Attorney to represent him dated 12 April 2016, which was signed off by the Duhok Investigation Court;
(v) request for reviews given the expiry of the arrest warrant on 18 April 2016; also 28 April 2016; 2 May 2016; 19 May 2016; 14 June 2016
(vi) an affidavit of complaint made by S’s husband, J, dated 27 April 2016;
(vii) a list of witnesses submitted by the Appellant’s attorney to Duhok investigation court on 17 May 2016;
(viii) witness statements from the proposed witnesses who comprised: the Appellant’s mother [22.5.16]; the Appellant’s father [22.5.16]; his cousin [22.6.16].
(ix) a document dated 21.6.16 addressed to the Court stating that the cases of the Appellant and S had been separated and requesting that the investigation documents shall be submitted for review by the Public Prosecutor;
(x) A request to the Duhok Investigative Judge dated 11.1.22 requesting that the Appellant’s attorney be provided with copies of the documents.
19.3. At 18(l) the FtTJ held that the Appellant’s account “is so riven with incredibility the documents do not make his case.” However, this approach is also incorrect in that, as Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367 makes clear that credibility must be assessed holistically in light of all the evidence.
19.4. It is further clear that there were a number of documents all addressing the arrest warrant and proposed Court proceedings against the Appellant and S, following a complaint lodged by S’s husband and the FtTJ did not provide proper or adequate reasons for disregarding them
20. I have concluded that it may be that theses errors arose due to the unfortunate lapse in time between the hearing on 25 September 2025 and the decision and reasons which was promulgated on 28 January 2026, on due to the fact that the FtTJ mistakenly promulgated another appellant’s case with his reference number. Mr Tufan helpfully drew my attention to the judgment in the Court of Appeal in SS (Sri Lanka) (op cit) at [14]. I find that there is a causal nexus in the delay given that it appears that the FtTJ may have made his findings absent a full contemporaneous consideration of the supporting evidence and this has rendered his decision and reasons unsafe.
21. In light of the fact that the errors are material and go to the core of the claim, I have decided in light of 7(b) of the Practice Direction cf. Begum [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) that the extent of judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
22. There are material errors of law in the decision and reasons of First tier Tribunal Judge Caskie KC. I set that decision aside and remit the appeal for a hearing before the First- tier Tribunal, with no findings preserved.

Rebecca Chapman

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Chapman

6 October 2026