Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002677
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01034/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

LHNT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No appearance
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant either directly or indirectly. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 23 February 2026, dismissing his appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
2. For the reasons set out below, I have decided that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision contained a material error of law and should be set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before a different judge.
Background
3. The Appellant is a Vietnamese national. He first arrived in the UK on 5 September 2022 as a student. He returned to Vietnam on 20 March 2023 and returned to the UK on 18 April 2023. He claimed asylum on 25 July 2023, then aged 16, and was interviewed in relation to his claim on 7 January 2025 (then aged 17). The basis of his asylum claim was fear of persecution as a follower of Pure Hao Hoa Buddhism.
4. The Appellant’s claim was refused on 21 February 2025. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant was a Pure Hao Hoa Buddhist or that he had engaged in demonstrations in Vietnam or come to the adverse attention of the Vietnamese authorities as a result of his religious beliefs or political activity.
5. The Appellant’s appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal on 11 February 2026, at which time the Appellant was aged 18. The First-tier Tribunal found that there were inconsistencies in the account given of his detention between the Appellant’s asylum interview and his later witness statement, and that his lack of detailed knowledge of aspects of Pure Hao Hoa Buddhism meant that he was not a follower of the religion.
6. The Appellant sought permission to appeal, which was granted out of time by the First-tier Tribunal on 21 May 2026. The grant of permission noted that it was arguable that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to consider the Appellant’s young age when making adverse credibility findings, and that the judge had in particular not directed himself by reference to the guidance in KS (benefit of the doubt) [2014] UKUT 00552 (IAC).
The Upper Tribunal hearing
7. The Appellant did not appear at the hearing and was not represented; he had not contacted the Tribunal prior to the hearing nor requested an adjournment. I was satisfied that the notice of hearing was sent to the Appellant by post on 27 August 2026. I considered whether to adjourn the hearing to a later date but it was not clear that the Appellant would attend a future hearing. Bearing in mind in particular that this was an error of law hearing and that the Appellant was not legally represented, and having carefully reviewed the First-tier Tribunal decision, I was satisfied that no unfairness resulted to the Appellant from proceeding in his absence. I therefore heard submissions from Mr Ojo for the Respondent and reserved my decision.
Discussion and decision
8. On reviewing the First-tier Tribunal decision, it was apparent that the First-tier Tribunal judge had misdirected himself in relation to the correct standard of proof applicable to the claim. As the Appellant claimed asylum after 28 June 2022, s32 Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applied to his claim and the First-tier Tribunal was therefore required to apply the structured approach set out in JCK (Botswana) v SSHD [2024] UKUT 100 (IAC). In particular, the First-tier Tribunal was required by s32 NABA 2022 and JCK to apply the civil standard of proof to the question of whether the Appellant had a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for a Convention reason, and to the question of whether he did in fact fear such persecution.
9. The First-tier Tribunal did not apply that approach, and the judge’s statement at paragraph 2 of the decision that the standard of proof which applied to the entirety of the claim was “a reasonable degree of likelihood” was therefore an error of law. However, as Mr Ojo submitted, that error was not material to the outcome of the appeal given that the First-tier Tribunal had rejected the Appellant’s case applying the lower standard of proof.
10. I am however satisfied that there was a material error in the judge’s failure to take account of the Appellant’s age when assessing the credibility of his account.
11. In KS (benefit of the doubt) [2014] UKUT 00552 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal considered the guidance set out in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (‘the Handbook’) on applying the ‘benefit of the doubt’ in refugee claims, particularly when assessing the evidence of minors. The Upper Tribunal held that the proposition in the Handbook that when assessing the evidence of minors there may need to be a “liberal application of the benefit of the doubt” was not to be regarded as a rule of law or even a statement of universal application. However, the Tribunal noted (§24) that paragraph 351 of the Immigration Rules required that account should be taken of an asylum applicant’s maturity and that “in assessing the claim of a child more weight should be given to objective indications of risk than to the child’s state of mind and understanding of his situation…”. Further, as the Upper Tribunal noted at §25, the notion of a liberal application of the benefit of the doubt to claims by unaccompanied children was endorsed in the Adjudicator Guidance Note No 8 of 2004 of the former Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, cited by the Court of Appeal in ZJ (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 799.
12. The Adjudicator Guidance Note no 8 referred to in KS remains relevant guidance for First-tier Tribunal judges and paragraph 351 of the Immigration Rules is in materially the same terms as it was at the time of KS.
13. The Appellant was 16 when he claimed asylum and 17 when he was interviewed; he was 18 at the time of the appeal hearing and was unrepresented before the First-tier Tribunal. The Appellant’s young age at the point of his asylum claim and interview, and his relatively young age at the hearing, was a factor which was obviously of potential relevance when assessing the credibility of his account. In particular, his age was potentially relevant to both (i) the apparent inconsistencies between his asylum interview and his later witness statement, and (ii) the lack of detail he was able to give about Pure Hao Hoa religious principles, doctrine or practice.
14. I note in passing that the question for the First-tier Tribunal was not simply whether the Appellant was himself a follower of Pure Hao Hoa Buddhism, but whether he was likely to be viewed as such by the Vietnamese authorities on return. Lack of detailed knowledge of the religion, whilst obviously relevant to that question, was not necessarily determinative of the appeal. However, the Appellant’s lack of knowledge was, together with the inconsistencies in his account of his detention, a material factor which led the judge to reject the Appellant’s case (§§12 and 16 of the decision).
15. To state the obvious, the First-tier Tribunal judge was not required to accept the Appellant’s evidence wholesale simply because he was a minor when he claimed asylum. However, the judge was required to take the Appellant’s age into account when considering the credibility of his claim, and to give reasons which demonstrated that he had done so. The First-tier Tribunal decision contains only one reference to the Appellant’s age (at §13) as part of a reference to the local authority’s care plan. The decision does not either expressly or in substance identify the Appellant’s age as potentially relevant to the credibility of his account, nor explain how the judge took it into account in determining the appeal. The judge’s failure to have regard to the Appellant’s age when evaluating the evidence was a material error of law.
16. I therefore set the decision of the First-tier Tribunal aside. Having regard to paragraph 7 of the Practice Statement and the guidance in AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, I consider that it is appropriate for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before a different judge with no findings preserved.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law and is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before a different judge with no findings preserved.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 September 2026