Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002698
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/60302/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM

Between

YAHYE ABDELRAHMAN
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: None (the appellant had instructed Jupiter Legal Services and Advisory Centre)
For the Respondent: Mr M Parver, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of judge of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) C Fern (the judge), promulgated on 2 February 2026, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision, dated 7 December 2022, refusing the appellant’s application to enter the UK to join his father, Mr Omar Abdelrahman Mohamed (the sponsor).

Background
2. The appellant, a national of Somalia, claims to have been born on 30 April 2005. He was therefore 17 years old at the date of his application, although 20 years old at the date of the FtT decision. The applicant sought to enter the UK under paragraph 297 of the immigration rules. Under this provision the appellant had to demonstrate, inter alia, that he had a parent who was present and settled in the UK, and either that his other parent was dead or that the parent in the UK had sole responsibility for him. The appellant claimed that his mother died on 14 September 2021. The appellant provided a death certificate in support of his application and his birth certificate that was issued on 24 January 2022. Although he had never met his father in person (the sponsor, now a British citizen, came to the UK in 2000) it was asserted that they maintained a relationship through remote means and that the sponsor financially supported the appellant.
3. The respondent noted that the birth certificate was non-contemporaneous and she was not satisfied the sponsor was the appellant’s father. The respondent acknowledged the death certificate but was not satisfied this demonstrated, because of her concerns about the relationship between the appellant and the sponsor, that the sponsor had sole responsibility for the appellant. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC).
The First-tier Tribunal decision
4. In a respondent’s review the respondent noted, inter alia, that the appellant provided two documents relating to the death of his mother – a letter dated 14 April 2022 purportedly issued by a hospital in Mogadishu and a document purportedly issued by a court dated 8/May 2022. The respondent noted that the document from the hospital stated that the appellant’s mother “… has been died.” At a hearing on 26 January 2026 the judge heard oral evidence from the sponsor.
5. In her written decision the judge found there were “a number of matters that raise serious concerns as to the credibility of the Appellant and Sponsor.” The judge gave several bullet point reasons by way of examples to support her concerns. For the purposes of this ‘error of law’ decision, the judge noted, amongst other matters, that the sponsor worked full time and that his family were in receipt of child tax benefits and child tax credits for his six children in the UK, that she would have expected the sponsor to have met the appellant if his mother died, that the “governmental death certificate” (presumably the one issued by the Somali court) was “in non-standard form” and was not issued contemporaneously, that the lack of a contemporaneous birth certificate for the appellant could not “sensibly be explained by the effects of the civil war in Somalia causing delays to the production of documents and the delivery of services as the appellant was born in 2005”, that although the appellant produced a DNA test indicating there was a 99% probability that the sponsor was the appellant’s father “… there was no evidence of what the probability of paternity would be if compared to a related individual”, and that it was not clear why the sponsor would have travelled to a Refugee Camp where he claimed to have met and impregnated the appellant’s mother.
6. The judge was not satisfied that the evidence established that the appellant’s mother was dead or that the sponsor exercised sole responsibility for the appellant. Although never raised as an issue at any stage of the proceedings, the judge also found that the maintenance requirements were not met under paragraph 297.
The appellant’s challenge
7. The appellant obtained permission to challenge the judge’s decision in respect of several grounds, including the adverse credibility points summarised above.
8. At 16:58 on 11 August 2026, the day prior to the ‘error of law’ hearing, the Upper Tribunal received an email from the appellant’s legal representatives requesting that a solicitor attend by remote video link as the sponsor could not afford to pay a solicitor to attend the hearing. The solicitors are based in Kingsbury, London. They also requested written permission to file written submissions in any event. Given the volume of correspondence received by the Upper Tribunal this was only brought to my attention late in the morning of 12 August 2026. It is contrary to the good administration of justice for such applications to be made so late in the day. The sponsor indicated that he had paid the solicitors for representation and the solicitors were only a short tube journey from the Tribunal. Having already considered the decision under challenge I did not consider it necessary to either adjourn the hearing or the facilitate remote attendance by the legal representatives. Jupiter Legal Services and Advisory Centre Ltd are however cautioned against making late applications such as the one made on 11 August 2026.
9. At the hearing to determine whether the judge’s decision contained material legal errors I was assisted by the Home Office Presenting Officer, Mr Parver. As the hearing progressed, I went through with Mr Parver each of the reasons identified above that were advanced by the judge for doubting the credibility of the appellant and sponsor, and, having considered the corresponding grounds of appeal, Mr Parver helpfully indicated that he was able to concede that the decision contained errors of law that were material to the integrity of the decision.
Discussion
10. The issue I must decide is whether the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge made a legal mistake in his decision. It is not the role of the Upper Tribunal judge to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge merely because the Upper Tribunal judge may have reached a different conclusion.
11. The judge gave 12 bullet points in total for doubting the credibility of the evidence of the appellant and the sponsor. The judge was entitled to the adverse inferences drawn in respect of the bullet points not identified above. I am however satisfied that, in respect of the factors identified at paragraph 8 of this decision, that the judge erred in law.
12. The judge appeared to draw an adverse inference from the fact that the sponsor was working and was in receipt of child benefit and child tax credits in respect of his children in the UK. It is not however clear why or how this undermines the credibility of the appellant and sponsor. No explanation is provided by the judge, and it is not apparent why the fact that the sponsor was in receipt of certain benefits to which he was lawfully entitled went to the issue of credibility.
13. The judge held against the appellant and the sponsor her view that she would have expected the sponsor to have met the appellant if his mother died and if he had any parental role. It does not however appear that the sponsor was ever asked why he had not travelled to Kenya to meet the appellant in person. Mr Parver could not identify any such question from the Home Office record of the FtT hearing, and the decision itself does not indicate any such question being asked. It is procedurally unfair for an adverse inference to be drawn in circumstances where the basis of the adverse inference was never put to the sponsor and he had no opportunity of providing an explanation. The same procedural unfairness arises in respect of the judge’s concern as to why the circumstances in which the sponsor met and impregnated the appellant’s mother. If the sponsor was not asked about this the judge is not entitled to hold the lack of any explanation against him.
14. The judge referred to the governmental death certificate as being in “non-standard form” and not having been issued contemporaneously to the claimed death of the appellant’s mother. It is not however clear on what basis the judge concluded that the death certificate, which was actually purportedly issued by a District Court in Mogadishu, was in a “non-standard form”. The respondent ‘s review raised a concern with the hospital issued death certificate, but the only issued raised in respect of the District Court death certificate was that it was not contemporaneous. No reference was made by the respondent or the Presenting Officer at the hearing in the FtT(a point confirmed by Mr Parver) to the District Court document being in a “non-standard form”. To the extent that the judge has relied on this reason in finding that the document was not reliable, her reasoning was not supported by any cogent evidence before her.
15. The judge held against the appellant and the sponsor the claim that the appellant’s birth certificate was issued 17 years after his birth as she was not satisfied the civil war in Somalia would have caused such a delay. In his statement the sponsor claimed that they birth certificate was not issued earlier “because of the way things were in Mogadishu and most of the country. At the time the [appellant] was born there was not much of a government because at one time Somalia was controlled by Islamic courts. At another time it was controlled by Al-Shabaab. There was no possibility of getting a government issued document. Since then people have been able to get them if they register and provide such information such as evidence of relationship.” The explanation provided by the sponsor in his statement was not inherently implausible and was supported by publicly available Home Office documents such as the Country Background Note, Somalia, December 2020, which noted, at 7.2, that, according UNICEF date from 2010 to 2015 authorities registered 3% of births in the country, and that according to UNHCR there was no official birth registration system and may babies were born at home. Although it is not apparent that the Country Background Note was brought to the judge’s attention judges are expected to familiarise themselves with Home Office background document if they are considering drawing an adverse inference based on the issue of documents that is specifically covered by the Home Office report.
16. No issue was raised by the Home Office with the DNA documents produced by the appellant and it is not apparent from the decision that the judge raised her concerns as identified at paragraph 8 above with the DNA report. This constitutes a procedural impropriety.
17. In determining whether it is appropriate to set the judge’s decision aside I have considered whether the errors of law identified above were material in light of the judge’s other unchallenged adverse credibility findings. Having considered with care the errors of law made by the judge I cannot say that her decision would inevitably have been the same even if the errors were not made. The decision is therefore unsafe and must be set aside.
Remittal to First-Tier Tribunal
18. Under Part 3 paragraph 7.2(b) of the Upper Tribunal Practice Statement of the 18 June 2018 a case may be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal if the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party's case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.
19. Given that the legal errors relate to the judge’s credibility findings, I consider that, in these circumstances, there will need to be a full re-assessment of all the evidence rendering it appropriate to remit the matter back to the First-tier Tribunal for a full fresh (de novo) hearing. I note in passing that the respondent and the sponsor were in agreement with this approach.

Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains a material error of law and the ‘error of law’ appeal is allowed.
The matter will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) to be determined afresh by a judge other than judge C Fern.

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
13 August 2026