UI-2026-002700

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 09 Oct 2026
• Promulgation date: 13 Oct 2026
• Publication date: 30 Oct 2026
• Last updated on: 30 Oct 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002700
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57196/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

LK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Hill, Counsel instructed by Mount Azure Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Sheikh, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. In a decision promulgated on 2 September 2026 (“error of law decision”) I set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s dismissal of the appellant’s protection appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her asylum claim and indicated that I would remake the decision concerning that appeal following a further hearing, in accordance with section 12(2)(b)(ii) Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
2. That further hearing took place on 9 October 2026. Although the Tribunal made attempts to arrange the attendance of a Burmese interpreter to assist the appellant to participate in the hearing, no such interpreter was available. In the event however, the appellant confirmed that she has some English ability and she was able to follow proceedings. The parties also agreed that in view of the findings of fact that have already been made, the hearing would proceed by way of submissions only i.e. without any further evidence being called.
3. I have decided to allow the appellant’s appeal on asylum grounds. I explain my reasons for that conclusion in this decision (the “remaking decision”). A copy of my error of law decision is attached as an appendix to this remaking decision and the two decisions should be read together.
The Facts
4. The following facts have either been accepted as true by the respondent or found to be true by the First-tier Tribunal in findings of fact that I preserved in my error of law decision.
5. The appellant was born in 1995 in Kalay, North West Myanmar, where she grew up with her parents and siblings. She is of Chin ethnicity and is a Christian. In 2020 through the use of an agent, she found work in Singapore. Although the appellant thought she was going to work in a factory, the work was in fact as a housemaid to a Singaporean family. The appellant worked for the family for two years in Singapore.
6. On 1 February 2021, while the appellant was living and working in Singapore there was a coup in Myanmar in which the democratically elected government was ousted by a military junta. Following the coup there was violent oppression of peaceful protests against the new military rule. Treatment included arbitrary arrests of protestors and their family members, property raids, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. While she was in Singapore the appellant sent a limited amount of money to her family in Myanmar which was donated by them to organisations who opposed the military junta, relief efforts for civil war victims and towards the restoration of churches destroyed by the military.
7. In July 2022 the appellant’s employers came to the United Kingdom and the appellant was granted a visa to enter the United Kingdom with them as a domestic worker in a private household. They arrived in the United Kingdom on 20 July 2022. On 5 December 2022 the appellant left her employers and claimed asylum in the United Kingdom. She was referred to the Single Competent Authority (SCA) as a potential victim of modern slavery and after enquiries, the SCA concluded that the appellant had been exploited in domestic servitude throughout her time with her employers, both in Singapore and the United Kingdom.
8. Whilst waiting for her asylum claim to be resolved and following the refusal of her claim in February 2024, the appellant has been attending protests and demonstrations against the military junta in Myanmar at which she has not been a leading or prominent voice. Those demonstrations have been held outside the Myanmar embassy and elsewhere in London. She has also continued to send limited financial contributions to support the causes opposed to the military junta in Myanmar. The appellant has also attended church first in London and then, when she was moved to asylum seekers accommodation in the city, in Swansea.
9. The appellant’s family in Myanmar were forced to leave Kalay and to go into hiding by the actions of the military junta, who burned down the family home. The family have suffered no further harm and are now living in a remote village on the Indian-Myanmar border.
10. Despite the appellant’s concerns, it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would be conscripted in to the Myanmar military if she were to return to the country.
11. In these circumstances the appellant has characteristics which could cause her to fear persecution for reasons of her race, religion and political opinion and she does in fact fear persecution in Myanmar as a result of those characteristics.
The competing cases
12. The appellant claims that the military government in Myanmar are aware of her opposition to them, her support for causes opposed to the military junta and her financial donations to those causes. She states that she would continue to support those causes and to oppose the military junta if she were returned to Myanmar. The appellant also claims that Christians are persecuted in Myanmar where they are viewed as a threat to military rule. She argues that these facts in addition to the fact that her family have already been identified as opponents of the Military government and forced out of their home and into hiding, plus the fact her ethnicity and religion are factors which the Military government consider to be destabilising, mean that on return to Myanmar she is likely to be monitored, arrested and detained and that if detained she is likely to face ill-treatment amounting to persecution.
13. The appellant claims therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that, if she were returned to Myanmar, she would be persecuted by the military junta as a result of her race, religion and political opinion. As such she submits that she is a refugee and that her return to Myanmar would be incompatible with the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
14. The respondent submits that the appellant is not genuinely politically motivated and that she would not oppose the Myanmar military government if she returned. The respondent submits that the appellant’s opposition to the Military government while she has been in Singapore and the United Kingdom has been limited and will not have come to the attention of the authorities in Myanmar. The respondent submits that while Christians may be discriminated against in Myanmar, they are not persecuted, and that neither the appellant’s religion or her ethnicity will lead to the authorities in Myanmar taking an interest in her. The respondent submits that although they burned her family home to the ground, the authorities in Myanmar have not been sufficiently interested in the appellant’s family to find them or arrest them. In all the circumstances therefore the respondent submits there is no reasonable likelihood of the appellant being persecuted on her return to Myanmar.
Legal Framework
15. By virtue of section 82(1) Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 a person can appeal against a decision by the Secretary of State to refuse a protection claim. A protection claim is defined in section 82(2) to include a claim that removal of the person from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom ’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
16. The Refugee Convention is the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which defines a refugee at Article 1(A)(2) as a person who: “…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits a contracting state from expelling or returning a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
17. Section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applies for the purposes of determining whether an asylum seeker’s fear of persecution is well-founded in accordance with the Refugee Convention. It prescribes the following approach to answering that question:
(2) The decision-maker must first determine, on the balance of probabilities—
(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic.
(See also section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (asylum claims etc: behaviour damaging to claimant’s credibility).)
(3) Subsection (4) applies if the decision-maker finds that—
(a) the asylum seeker has a characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a) (or has such a characteristic attributed to them), and
(b) the asylum seeker fears persecution as mentioned in subsection (2)(b).
(4) The decision-maker must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence)—
(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and
(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.
(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation).
18. The preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal include affirmative answers to the questions posed in s. 32(2) of the 2022 Act. What is required therefore, is for me to resolve the questions posed in s.34(4) of the 2022 Act above.
The Country Evidence
19. Although it was heard in March 2013 and therefore long before the military coup, the parties agree that TS (political opponents – risk) Burma CG [2013] UKUT 00281 (IAC) continues to provide authoritative country guidance concerning Myanmar. Headnote 1 to that guidance includes that ”Detention in [Myanmar], even for a short period, carries with it a real risk of serious ill-treatment….amounting to persecution / serious harm…” Headnotes 3 - 7 of the guidance are of particular relevance to the present case. They provide as follows:
3. The spectrum of those potentially at risk ranges from those who are (or are perceived to be) actively seeking to overthrow the government to those who are in outspoken and vexing opposition to it. Whether a person is in need of protection will depend upon past and future political behaviour. This assessment has to be made against the background of a recently reforming government that carries a legacy of repression and continues to closely monitor those in opposition. The evidence points to a continuing anxiety over the break up of the state and the loss of its power.
4. The question of risk of ill-treatment will in general turn upon whether a returnee is detained by the authorities at any stage after return.
5. A person who has a profile of voicing opposition to the government in the United Kingdom through participation in demonstrations or attendance at political meetings will not for this reason alone be of sufficient concern to the Burmese authorities to result in detention immediately upon arrival. This is irrespective of whether the UK activity has been driven by opportunistic or genuinely held views and is regardless of the prominence of the profile in this country.
6. A person who has a profile of voicing opposition to the Burmese government in the United Kingdom can expect to be monitored upon return by the Burmese authorities. The intensity of that monitoring will in general depend upon the extent of opposition activity abroad.
7. Whether there is a real risk that monitoring will lead to detention following return will in each case depend on the Burmese authorities’ view of the information it already possesses coupled with what it receives as the result of any post-arrival monitoring. Their view will be shaped by (i) how active the person had been in the United Kingdom, for example by leading demonstrations or becoming a prominent voice in political meetings, (ii) what he/she did before leaving Burma, (iii) what that person does on return, (iv)the profile of the people he or she mixes with and (v) whether a person is of an ethnicity that is seen by the government to be de-stabilising the union, or if the person’s activity is of a kind that has an ethnic, geo-political or economic regional component, which is regarded by the Burmese government as a sensitive issue.
20. The respondent’s Country Policy Information Note: Myanmar (Burma): Critics of the military regime June 2023 (“CPIN”) details an increase in violence against civilians by state forces in Myanmar since the coup, whilst making the assessment that a person simply taking part in a demonstration is not likely to be at risk for this reason alone. The CPIN refers to “violent oppression of peaceful protests, arbitrary arrests of protestors and family members, property raids and seizures…and to a lesser extent enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Threats, harassment, violence and direct attacks occur against those associated with or perceived to support pro-democratic or anti junta groups, and on civilians in areas where there is conflict between the military and armed groups”. The CPIN refers to reports that torture and sexual violence occur in detention, particularly against vulnerable groups such as women, and that detainees can also experience degrading conditions in interrogation centres and prisons. The CPIN goes on to recognise that a person is likely to be at risk where they are of an ethnicity that is seen by the government to be destabilising the country or the person’s activity has an ethnic, geo-political or economic regional component which is regarded by the government as a sensitive issue.
21. Referring to the country guidance provided in TS, the CPIN makes the assessment at 3.1.15 that:
“the spectrum of those potentially at risk of persecution as identified in TS remains. However, since the military coup, the regime is increasingly focused on low level opposition and exhibits a low tolerance for what it considers as open criticism of its rule and a threat to the state (and its control)”
22. The appellant adduced three media articles concerning the persecution of Christians in Myanmar. An article in “Global Christian Relief” describes violence against Christians having “spiked” following the military coup, with over 70 churches in Chin state being firebombed, pastors killed and Christian villages earmarked for bombing. It describes the military junta repressing Christian minorities and trying to impose Buddhism on them by force. A second article in “Firebrand” contains an account given by a pastor from Myanmar studying in the USA. He says that while there was religious freedom prior to the coup, Chin state was targeted following the coup with thousands of homes and churches being burned down resulting in the displacement of approximately 2.5 million people. The third article from “Christianity Today” refers to the targeting of Christians in Chin state, with the military junta regarding Christians as a foreign malign influence. The article says that following the coup, Chin state emerged as a resistance stronghold and that as a result the military junta launched brutal attacks specifically targeting Christian leaders and places of worship. As a result the article refers to UNHCR estimates that 55,000 Chin refugees fleeing across the border to India and a further 47,000 internally displaced within Myanmar.
Analysis of risk on return
23. I have no hesitation in rejecting the respondent’s submission that the appellant is not politically motivated. Whilst it is true that the appellant showed no interest in politics prior to moving to Singapore, it was during her time in Singapore that the democratically elected government in Myanmar was overthrown in the military coup. It is entirely realistic and likely that it was this event that ended the appellants lack of political interest in February 2021.
24. The preserved finding of the previous Judge is that since the coup, the appellant has sent financial contributions to organisations opposing the military junta in Myanmar for five years. The fact that those contributions were found to have been “limited” does not undermine the appellant’s claimed political motivation but reflects the fact that throughout the time she has been sending financial contributions the appellant has been either held in domestic servitude by her employers, or a asylum seeker in the United Kingdom with a restricted income. Much like the biblical account of the “widow’s Mite”, in those circumstances the appellant’s limited but consistent financial contributions from the severely limited means she had, actually demonstrates the strength of her motivation to oppose the military junta.
25. The appellant has also been given every motivation to be strongly opposed to the military junta by the fact that following the coup the military were responsible for displacing her family from their home and sending them into hiding, before burning their home to the ground. Against this background it is highly likely that the appellant is strongly motivated to oppose the military junta.
26. The appellant has also demonstrated her political motivation and her opposition to the military junta through her attendance at demonstrations and protests throughout her four years in the United Kingdom. The evidence demonstrates that far from attending one or two demonstrations in an opportunistic attempt to stay in the United Kingdom, the appellant has attended a significant number of demonstrations and protests from the time she left domestic servitude up to the present. The fact the appellant was not a “leading or prominent voice” at those demonstrations does not reflect on her motivation in attending them. There will be many genuine and motivated protestors who are not leaders or prominent voices at the demonstrations.
27. Likewise the appellant has demonstrated a genuine and sincerely held Christian faith. Not only was she a regular attender at church when living in London and in touch with other Christians of Chin ethnicity, the appellant has also been a regular attender at church (three times each Sunday according to Counsellor Lucy Heude) in Swansea following her dispersal into asylum seeker accommodation away from London.
28. It is quite clear to me therefore that the appellant is a genuine and motivated political opponent of the military junta that is currently in power in Myanmar and also that she has a genuine and committed Christian faith. The appellant’s conduct over the last four years since leaving domestic servitude demonstrates a willingness and a desire to act on both her political and religious motivation. In those circumstances I am satisfied that the appellant is likely to want to express both her political opposition and her faith if she were to return to Myanmar.
29. The country evidence is very clear that a person who has such these political views, and has such a Christian faith will be viewed with concern by the military junta in Myanmar who have increasingly focused on low level opposition and who exhibit a low tolerance for what it considers as open criticism of its rule and a threat to the state (and its control). I am further satisfied from the evidence adduced by the appellant that a person openly expressing their Christian faith in Myanmar would be viewed as a destabilising and malign influence (particularly if returning from a foreign country) and a threat to the military junta. There can be little doubt that the appellant would be at risk of being detained in degrading conditions and at risk of torture and sexual violence if the military junta were to be aware of her political or religious views.
30. The respondent argues that it is not reasonably likely that the military junta in Myanmar is currently aware of the appellant’s opposition and therefore that she would not be at risk on return. The respondent relies on the assessment in the CPIN that information does not suggest a significant change in monitoring ability or interest since TS was decided. The appellant by contrast argues that it is reasonably likely that the authorities in Myanmar will have become aware of her financial support for causes opposed to the regime and her participation in demonstrations in London. The appellant submits that the CPIN assessment is based on an absence of any evidence about the interest in or ability to monitor attendance at demonstrations rather than any positive evidence to suggest it does not take place.
31. Overall, there is a distinct paucity of evidence about what the Myanmar authorities are likely to know about the appellant’s political views and religious practices meaning it is difficult to resolve this conflict between the parties. This absence of evidence is unsurprising. As has previously been recognised by the Court of Appeal in WAS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 894 and MH(Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 it is inherently unlikely that an applicant for asylum will be able to adduce direct evidence of covert surveillance and monitoring by a foreign state. At [38] of his judgment in MH(Bangladesh) Arnold LJ identified that in such circumstances a tribunal can and should take judicial notice of the ease with which persons attending demonstrations can be photographed and filmed and the resulting photographs and films transmitted abroad, and similarly that a tribunal can and should take judicial notice of the fact that publicly-accessible websites and social media postings can readily be monitored by electrical means. I do take judicial notice of these factors from which I discern that it would be relatively easy for the military junta in Myanmar to have see photographs or take photographs of the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations.
32. It is also relevant that the Myanmar diaspora in the United Kingdom is small compared to that in the situation in the cases considered by the Court of Appeal which involved asylum seekers from Pakistan and Bangladesh. The CPIN refers at 14.1.1 to an estimate that there are 8,000 Burmese people in the United Kingdom. It is reasonable to infer that the Myanmar authorities are more likely to be aware of the identity of protestors coming from a relatively small diaspora.
33. It is also relevant that the appellant has been a consistent attender at demonstrations and protests over a period of four years. The number of events she has attended increases the likelihood of her presence being identified by those she has been protesting against. This remains the case notwithstanding the fact she has not been a “leading” or “prominent” voice at those demonstrations. The photographs of the appellant at the demonstrations show her to be clearly identifiable should someone wish to do so. Further, photographs show the appellant with members of the National Unity Government (NUG) which the CPIN describes as a “shadow government” set up in direct opposition to the military junta classified by the military junta as a terrorist organisation. Similarly there are photographs which show the appellant explicitly supporting the Peoples Defence Force (PDF) which is also classified by the military junta as a terrorist organisation. The CPIN records that classification of those organisations as terrorists could result in prosecution and detention for anyone who communicates with the groups’ members (see 9.3.7). It is reasonable to infer therefore that the military junta are likely to pay particular attention to members of the NUG and the PDF as well as those with whom they are shown to associate. This also therefore increases the likelihood of the military junta being aware of the appellant’s political views and activities.
34. Finally, it is apparent from the evidence adduced by the appellant that some of the photographs in which she is clearly visible at demonstrations against the military junta, have been posted on the social media sites of the Myanmar Unity Movement and PDF Zoland. It is again reasonable to infer that these are sites which the military junta would be likely to monitor or at least pay some attention to.
35. Bringing this together I am satisfied that it is reasonably likely that the authorities in Myanmar will already be aware of the appellant’s opposition to their regime. I reach this conclusion notwithstanding the fact she has not been a leading or prominent voice at the demonstrations she has attended. The evidence however is that she has been one of a relatively small number of protestors, attending many events over a prolonged period at which she has been clearly visible. Her involvement has included her being photographed with people the authorities in Myanmar consider to be terrorists. Her involvement has also been published on social media sites connected to those the authorities in Myanmar consider to be terrorists. Given the recognition that the regime is increasingly focused on low level opposition, it is at least reasonably likely that for all the reasons discussed they will have identified and be aware of the appellant’s activities in opposing their regime.
36. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that if the appellant were returned to Myanmar, she would be persecuted by the military junta as a result of her political opinion. Since the persecution would come from the state authorities in Myanmar there is no reasonable likely of the state protecting her from persecution or of the appellant reasonably relocating to avoid persecution.
37. Even if I were wrong and there were no reasonable likelihood that the military junta in Myanmar were currently aware of her opposition, it is clear to me that there is a reasonable likelihood of the appellant facing monitoring on her return to Myanmar of such intensity as to amount to persecution. The appellant is of an ethnicity and religion that the military regime view as being destabilising. She has spent the last four years in the United Kingdom and as a result will be additionally viewed with suspicion due to the military junta’s fear of foreign intervention. The appellant’s passport has expired and her return would involve a process of redocumentation during which it would not take much enquiry to discover the appellant’s home has been burned down by the military and her family displaced. In all these circumstances it is at least reasonably likely that the appellant would be viewed as a threat by a regime exhibiting a low tolerance for opponents and a lack of concern about attracting adverse publicity.
38. Again even if I were wrong and the military junta showed no concern about the appellant on her return, I am satisfied that her genuinely motivated opposition to the military junta is such that she would either, be at risk because she demonstrated that opposition openly on return or that she would be discrete about her political opinion because she fears persecution.
39. Finally, whilst it is clearly correct that not all Christians in Myanmar are persecuted, given the appellant’s other characteristics, including her Chin ethnicity and her connection to a family who has attracted the adverse attention of the military and an area which has been targeted by the military junta, and an area in which churches have been burned down, I am satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would be persecuted as a result of her religious belief. The evidence strongly indicates that the appellant would practice her Christian faith on return to Myanmar as she has done throughout her time in the United Kingdom and that this would lead to her facing persecution.
40. I conclude therefore that the appellant is a refugee and that her return to Myanmar would be incompatible with the United Kingdom obligations under the Refugee Convention. Her appeal therefore succeeds.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal against the respondents refusal of her protection claim is ALLOWED


Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 October 2026




IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002700
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57196/2024


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

LK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Hill, Counsel instructed by Mount Azure Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer


Heard at Field House on 13 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
(1) Introduction
1. The appellant is a thirty year old citizen of Myanmar. She came to the United Kingdom with permission to enter as the domestic worker for a Singaporean family in July 2022. She was subsequently found by the Single Competent Authority to have been the victim of modern slavery when working for the family in Singapore and the United Kingdom. The appellant managed to leave the family on 5 December 2022 and having done so she claimed asylum.
2. The appellant claimed to have a well founded fear of the military government who had taken power in Myanmar while the appellant was living in Singapore and who she feared would persecute her because she was politically opposed to the government and because of her Chin ethnicity and because of her Christian faith. The respondent refused her claim in a decision dated 15 February 2024. The respondent was not satisfied that the appellant had a political opinion that would bring her to the adverse attention of the authorities in Myanmar.
3. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal. In anticipation of the hearing of her appeal the appellant served three bundles of documentary evidence which included media reports of the persecution of Christians in Myanmar, and an appeal skeleton argument (ASA). The ASA argued that the respondent had been wrong to only consider the threat to the appellant arising from her political opinion and also should have considered the threat to her as a result of her religion and ethnicity. It was argued that the appellant’s ethnicity, Christian faith and the fact while outside Myanmar she has supported protests against the government and funded organisations opposed to the government meant the appellant was at risk on return. It was further argued that the appellant was at risk of forced conscription into the Myanmar army if she were to return.
4. The appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge J G Richards (the Judge) on 9 February 2026 and three days later the judge issued his decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal. The appellant has appealed against the Judge’s decision to this Tribunal, having been granted permission to do so by another First-tier Tribunal Judge. Pursuant to section 12(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the issue in this appeal is whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.
(2) The Judge’s decision
5. At [4] of his decision the Judge describes the background to the appeal stating that
The Appellant asserts that she would be at risk on return due to her political opinion, together with her Christian faith and Chin ethnicity; or alternatively, that she is entitled to humanitarian protection
6. At [9] of his decision the Judge identified the disputed issues in the appeal as follows:
(a) whether, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant feared persecution due to her political opinion, Christian faith and Chin ethnicity;
(b) whether it was reasonably likely that she would be persecuted on her return to Myanmar; and
(c) in the alternative, whether substantial grounds had been shown for believing that she would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in Myanmar.
7. Having set out the legal framework, the evidence that was given during the hearing and the parties submissions, the Judge set out his findings and reasons from [31] – [39] of his decision.
8. At [31] the Judge repeats that the first question he must resolve is whether the appellant fears persecution due to her political opinion, Christian faith and Chin ethnicity. The Judge determined that the evidence was consistent about the appellant’s political interest after leaving Myanmar ([32]), that the appellant had sent a limited amount of money to support her family and “other causes” in Myanmar ([33]), that the appellant’s family had been forced to move by the military government and they now reside on the Indian-Myanmar border, noting that apart from the burning of their home the appellant’s family had not suffered any further harm ([34]), and that the appellant has attended protests and demonstrations in the United Kingdom ([35]). Remarking that there is a widely held belief that the protests are photographed by those in the embassy, the Judge found at [36] that the appellant does fear persecution should she return to Myanmar.
9. At [37] and [38] the Judge considered the remaining two issues he had identified at [9] namely whether it was reasonably likely the appellant would be persecuted and faced a real risk on return to Myanmar. Those two paragraphs are brief and it is convenient to set them out in full:
37. The real question in this case however is in my view whether it is reasonably likely or, as regards humanitarian protection, whether substantial grounds have been shown that there is a real risk, that the Appellant will be persecuted on her return. On this, I find that the Appellant has not shown such a risk. I have considered the CPIN and TS, and note that TS was decided before the current regime and that the regime apply a low threshold for what is considered opposition to their rule.
38. Nonetheless, the Appellant has no profile from her time in Myanmar and undertook no political activity there. The amount of her financial contributions to the opposition is low. While she has attended protests, she is far from being a leading or prominent voice. While I accept that her Chin ethnicity could be seen as destabilising the union, she is only one of a significant number of people from that ethnicity. In all the circumstances, whatever the Appellant’s belief, I do not consider that it is reasonably likely, or that there is a real risk, that she will be persecuted on her return to Myanmar.
10. At [39] the Judge found that the appellant would not be at risk of conscription on return to Myanmar “based upon the latest country information from the Respondent, together with the fact that none of the Appellant’s family have themselves been conscripted”.
11. The Judge then gave his decision to dismiss the appellant’s appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds.
(3) The Appeal to this Tribunal
12. The appellant was granted permission to appeal on a single ground which avers that the Judge failed to make findings on or engage with the evidence concerning whether the appellant would be at risk of persecution or ill-treatment as a result of her Christian religion. The ground identifies that the Judge recognised that the appellant had claimed a well-founded fear of persecution because of her religion, but argues that the Judge then failed to consider the appellant’s religion when undertaking his assessment at [37] and [38] of whether the appellant would be at risk on return risk to Myanmar.
13. In a rule 24 response the respondent has sought to maintain the Judge’s decision arguing that the evidence did not establish that the appellant would be at risk as a result of her religion and that the appellant’s Chin ethnicity and religion would be interchangeable in the eyes of the Military government of Myanmar, and therefore the Judge’s assessment of the risk to her as a result of her ethnicity amounted to adequate consideration of the risk to the appellant on return.
14. The appellant served a written reply to the respondent’s arguments in accordance with rule 25 of the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules, and both Mr Hill and Ms Isherwood made helpful oral submissions at the hearing before me. I mean no disrespect by not setting out those submissions in full here, but I will refer to them where necessary to explain my decision.
15. At the end of the hearing I announced my finding that the Judge’s decision did contain an error of law and would need to be set aside. I explain that conclusion in the following paragraphs.
(4) Analysis
16. As identified above the ASA submitted by the appellant made it explicitly clear that the appellant’s claimed fear was that she would be persecuted in Myanmar, not only because of her political opinion and her Chin ethnicity but also for reason of her religion. This reflected the evidence that was served on behalf of the appellant which included not only witness statements from the appellant and two others in which they said Christians are persecuted in Myanmar, but also three media reports of the persecution of Christians by the Myanmar military government. A report from Global Christian Relief referred to Christian minorities including those in Chin state being targeted for firebombing and Christians being “doubly targeted by the authorities” A report in Christianity Today refers to the arbitrary arrest, forced labour and rape of Christians in Chin state as well as the destruction of churches and towns. The ASA also made it clear that the appellant’s claim involved a claim that she had a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of her religion.
17. Contrary to Ms Isherwood’s oral submissions therefore it was very clear that the appellant’s protection claim included the assertion that she was at risk as a result of her Christian faith. It is equally clear that that was the Judge’s understanding of the claim, as he records at {4], {9} and [31] of the decision when identifying the appellant’s claimed fear due to “her political opinion together with her Christian faith and Chin ethnicity” . The complete absence of any reference to the appellant’s religion in the Judge’s very brief assessment of the risk the appellant facers in Myanmar at [38] of his decision is in this context stark and very significant. It strongly indicates that the Judge did not consider the risk to the appellant as a result of her faith.
18. The suggestion in the respondent’s rule 24 reply to the notice of appeal, repeated by Ms Isherwood in her oral submissions, that there is “interchangeability” in the minds of the authorities in Myanmar between Chin ethnicity and Christian faith is not persuasive. As identified, the evidence replied upon by the appellant included evidence that Christians in Chin state are at particular and specific risk because of their religion. This evidence required consideration and assessment by the Judge. The failure to mention the risk arising from the appellant’s faith in the short assessment of risk cannot be explained, as the rule 24 reply suggests, by a desire for brevity. This was a fundamental part of the appellant’s claim that was identified by the appellant and acknowledged by the Judge and not subsequently assessed.
19. This failure to consider a fundamental aspect of the appellant’s claim amounted to an error of law by the Judge such that his decision must be set aside. In addition, however there are further inadequacies in the assessment of risk undertaken by the Judge at [37] and [38].
20. At [37] the Judge says that he has considered the respondent’s Country Policy Information Note: Critics of the military regime, Myanmar (the CPIN) and the Country Guidance case of TS (Political opponents – risk) Burma/Myanmar CG [2013] UKUT 281 (IAC). I agree with Mr Hill’s submission that it is significant that the Judge did not at the same time refer to considering the country evidence that had been adduced by the appellant and that this suggests that evidence was overlooked.
21. The summary of the CPIN and of TS that the Judge helpfully provides at [26] and [27] of his decision makes it clear that an assessment of risk must be forward looking considering not only a person’s past behaviour but also their future behaviour e.g. “Whether a person is likely to be at risk of persecution from the military state will depend on a person’s location in Myanmar, profile, activities and future political behaviour” and “Whether a person needs protection will depend upon past and future behaviour” (my emphasis). Contrary to this the Judge’s assessment of risk refers only to the appellant’s past political activity and her ethnicity. The Judge makes no findings about the appellant’s likely future behaviour and gives no apparent consideration to the risk that might pertain from her future conduct.
22. Further, as I indicated during the hearing, when considering the appellant’s past political behaviour the Judge does not resolve a matter that was clearly in dispute between the parties namely whether the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and protests in the United Kingdom will have come to the attention of the authorities in Myanmar. Instead the Judge recognised “a widely held belief” that the protestors have been photographed by the authorities in the embassy, without making any apparent finding about whether that had in fact happened and if it would have led to the identification of the appellant as someone opposed to the military government. That was especially significant given the Judge accepts at [37] that the current regime “apply a low threshold for what is considered opposition to their rule”.
23. Finally, the Judge’s assessment that “while I accept that her Chin ethnicity could be seen as destabilising the union she is only one of a significant number of people from that community” indicates a failure to undertake an assessment of risk that was specific to the appellant. The facts found by the Judge included not only that the appellant is of Chin ethnicity, but also that her family home had been burned to the ground and her family displaced to live in the borders of India and Myanmar. The appellant’s case was that her family were targeted because of financial donations that her father made to organisations opposed to the military government, including money that the appellant had sent. While the Judge accepted that the appellant had donated money to such organisations (describing the amount of the contributions as low) he did not make any assessment of the particular risk to the appellant arising from the fact her family had been displaced and their home burned down.
24. The decision of the Judge to dismiss the appellant’s appeal must therefore be set aside and a new decision made. There has however been no challenge to the Judge’s findings of fact and those findings can therefore be preserved. For the avoidance of doubt, those findings include:
• At [33] that the appellant has sent a limited amount of money to her family some of which has been donated to organisations opposed to the Military government
• At [34] the appellant’s family have been forced to move by the military government, with their home being burned down by the authorities, so they now live in the borders of India and Myanmar.
• At [35] the appellant has attended protests and demonstrations against the Military government in the United Kingdom and she believes that her attendance at those demonstrations has led to her being identified by government authorities
• At [36] the appellant does in fact fear persecution.
• At [39] the appellant is not at risk of being conscripted in to the Myanmar army
25. What is required when remaking the decision is an assessment of the questions identified at [9(b) and (c)] of the Judge’s decision (see [6] above) which applies those facts, is specific to the appellant’s circumstances, considers her likely future behaviour and has regard to all the reasons she for why she fears persecution including her Christian faith.
26. Mr Hill submitted it would not be fair and just to remake the decision immediately because the appellant would need to give evidence, and a request for arrangements to be made an interpreter for this hearing was refused by the Tribunal. He submitted that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal so that a fresh decision can be made there. Whilst I am persuaded of the need to adjourn the hearing before remaking the decision on this appeal to enable the appellant to effectively participate in that process, I am not persuaded that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for that to be done. In Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) a Presidential panel of this Tribunal identified that the general principle is that a case will be retained within the Upper Tribunal for the remaking of the decision after a conclusion that there has been an error of law. None of the exceptions to that general principle identified in Begum are present here. In particular the extent of the fact-finding necessary when remaking is very limited because, as explained above, findings of fact can be preserved.
27. The appeal will therefore be relisted for a further “re-making” hearing before me. Given Mr Hill’s involvement throughout this case, a date convenient to him would be preferable but as this appeal has been outstanding for a long time the hearing should not be delayed for this purpose.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal J G Richards involved an error of law and is set aside.
The appeal will be retained in the Upper Tribunal to be remade following a further hearing.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 August 2026