Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No:
UI-2026-002702 & UI-2026-002704
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55054/2024
LH/00798/2025
& HU/55051/2024
LH/00799/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

NANK DEVI (FIRST APPELLANT)
SUNDER SINGH (SECOND APPELLANT)
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr S Khan, Counsel, instructed by Legal Justice Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellants appeal with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Smyth (“the judge”), who dismissed their appeals against the respondent’s refusal of their human rights claims.

2. The appellants are both nationals of India. The first appellant is the wife of the second. They both came to the United Kingdom in February 2022 in possession of entry clearance as visitors. Instead of leaving this country in accordance with the grant of entry clearance, they made an application for leave to remain based on private and family life. That application was treated by the respondent as a human rights claim.

3. The claim was essentially based on the fact that the appellants suffered from a number of seemingly pre-existing medical conditions which were getting worse over the course of time. The appellants wished to be cared for by the sponsor (their son) who resides in the United Kingdom. They asserted that they would not be able to receive suitable medical care in India and that they had no other family members in that country to turn to for help.

4. The human rights claims were refused by a decision dated 18 April 2024.

The judge’s decision
5. The judge identified the core issues in the linked appeals as being:

a. whether the appellants would face very significant obstacles to reintegrating into Indian society; and

b. whether there were in any event exceptional circumstances in their case which would render removal from the United Kingdom a breach of Article 8.

6. The judge accepted that both appellants were in need of long-term personal care. The judge listed the various health conditions suffered by each appellant (I have seen no evidence to indicate that these post-dated arrival in United Kingdom). The judge accepted that the appellants did not have a family support network in India and that family support emanated from the sponsor and a daughter of the appellants who also lives in this country.

7. The judge found that the appellants had significant assets to their name in the form of three properties: two in India and another in Afghanistan. The judge seemingly accepted that the value of the properties was approximately £400,000 (or that that figure came in the form of savings in addition to the properties) either way, the judge found the appellants to be “financially secure”.

8. Counsel who represented the appellants before the judge (not Mr Khan) had narrowed down the focus of the appellants’ case by accepting that appropriate care would be available and accessible in India, but that it would not be suitable as regards their psychological and/or emotional needs.

9. The judge found that:

a. the appellants had resided in India for more than 30 years before arriving in the United Kingdom;

b. their financial security meant that they could readily meet their essential needs in terms of food and medication;

c. there was a preference by all concerned that the appellants should be cared for by the sponsor;

d. the psychological and emotional needs of the appellants was a relevant consideration;

e. Article 8 did not confer a right to choose the place of residence;

f. the appellants’ health was deteriorating as they aged;

g. the sponsor and his wife could make visits to India;

h. the other daughter living in this country could also make visits;

i. the country information demonstrated that care would be available;

j. taken cumulatively with the appellants’ emotional needs and all other circumstances, neither appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration.

Accordingly, the judge concluded that the relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules were not satisfied.

10. Turning to Article 8 outside of the Rules, the judge adopted a balance-sheet approach and, weighing against the appellants, took account of:

a. the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control;

b. the inability to satisfy the Rules - which carried with it significant weight;

c. and the appellants’ inability to speak English.

11. In the appellants’ favour, the judge took account of:

a. their dependency on the sponsor and his wife and that there was family life;

b. that the sponsor and his wife could maintain and accommodate the appellants (this should in fact have been a neutral consideration);

c. there was, "a common wish for the appellants to be cared for by the sponsor [and his wife] in the final years of their lives. This would also alleviate the loneliness felt by the appellants. However, the fact that the appellants would prefer care from close family did not establish that care in India was unsuitable or unreasonable to access."

12. The judge went on to note that if an application had been made from overseas the adult dependent relative route under the Rules could not have been satisfied.

13. Ultimately, the judge concluded that the factors relied on by the appellants did not outweigh the public interest and that the respondent’s decision did not give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellants or members of their family.

14. The two appeals were accordingly dismissed.

The grounds of appeal
15. The grounds of appeal upon which permission was granted can fairy be summarised as follows. They contend that the judge: failed to apply the right test for very significant obstacles to integration; failed to have regard to the need to consider psychological and/or emotional needs; treated the inability to satisfy the Rules on adult dependent relatives as being determinative of Article 8; failed to undertake a freestanding proportionality assessment; erred by assuming there was a viable support network in India; and erred by making a fundamentally inadequate "proportionality assessment".

The parties’ submissions
16. At the hearing before me, Mr Khan sought to argue that the grounds included a reasons challenge in respect of the judge’s assessment of the claims within and without the Rules. I permitted him to make some submissions on the point, although I made it very clear that I would only decide on whether these arguments were open to him in this appeal after reflecting on matters after the conclusion of the hearing.

17. Mr Khan relied on the grounds as pleaded and made additional submissions thereon.

18. Ms Ahmed relied on the respondent’s rule 24 response and submitted that there were no errors in the judge’s decision.

Conclusions
19. I conclude that there are no material errors of law in the judge’s decision.

20. Having reflected on Mr Khan’s reasons argument, I conclude that, as properly understood, the grounds do not include a reasons challenge and Mr Khan was in effect introducing a new ground of challenge going beyond the grant of permission. There is no clear reference to an inadequacy of reasons within the grounds. What there is are references to alleged misdirections in law and a failure to have applied the appropriate test and/or carry out an adequate proportionality assessment. Thus, my primary conclusion is that the purported reasons challenge is not to be entertained.

21. However, adopting a belt-and-braces approach, I address the reasoned argument for the sake of completeness. Before I do so, I set out other aspects of my reasoning for why the judge did not commit any material errors of law.

22. First, the judge specifically referred to the submission made on behalf of the appellants that any care in India had to be suitable: [19]. That is an indication that the judge took account of this particular line of argument.

23. Second, the judge expressly confirmed that the psychological and emotional needs of the appellants was a relevant factor: [21]. This is a strong indication that the judge in fact had regard to this factor when reaching his conclusions. It significantly undermines the appellants’ primary ground of appeal.

24. Third, the judge specifically referred to the suitability of care and not simply its availability and accessibility: [25(iii)]. Again, this represents an indication that the judge had in mind the interlinked considerations of psychological/emotional needs and the suitability of care.

25. Fourth, in reaching the clear conclusion that there were no very significant obstacles to integration, the judge properly took into account matters relating to the appellants’ care, the fact that they had resided in India for a very lengthy period of time before coming to this country in February 2022, that they were financially secure, and that a preference to be cared for by the sponsor could never act as a form of trump card: [20]-[22].

26. Fifth, the judge directed himself to the well-known test in Kamara: [20]. The applicants have come nowhere near persuading me that, notwithstanding the self-direction, the judge then went on to simply ignore or misapply it.

27. Sixth, Mr Khan was unable to point me to any underlying evidence as to why, having regard to all aspects of the appellants’ needs, suitable care, could not exist in India. With respect, all he could do was point me to the appellants’ assertion that they were lonely in India, yet that particular point was expressly addressed by the judge at [25(iii)]. I was not referred to any independent evidence about particular psychological and/or emotional needs which would have provided a cogent basis as to why no form of care would have been appropriate in India itself.

28. Seventh, it is readily apparent that when considering Article 8 outside the Rules the judge approached the assessment of proportionality in a sustainable way. He adopted a balance-sheet approach and took account of relevant factors both for and against the appellants. He ultimately applied the unjustifiably harsh consequences test, both in respect of the appellants and the sponsor: [27].

29. Eighth, it is simply wrong to suggest that the judge regarded the failure of the appellants to meet ADR 5.2 as decisive of the Article 8 claim. What the judge did do was place significant weight upon an inability to satisfy the Rules (whether Appendix Private life or ADR), and that was an entirely lawful self-direction.

30. Ninth, the judge rightly placed weight on the appellants’ inability to speak English.

31. Tenth, the judge took proper account of the desire of all parties concerned to live together in this country. It was, however, clearly open to the judge to reach an overall conclusion that the factors resting on the respondent’s side of the balance outweighed those favouring the appellants.

32. In my view, the judge was entirely justified in observing that in essence this appeared to be a case more about preference and choice rather than needs. On the grounds as pleaded, the appellants’ appeals fail.

33. I return to Mr Khan’s purported reasons challenge. Reasons need not be extensive. There is no obligation to give reasons for reasons. What is required are tolerably intelligible reasons which enable the losing party to understand why they have lost.

34. In the present case, the reasons given by the judge are undoubtedly adequate. It is clear why the judge decided that the appellants were financially secure and could access necessary treatment in India. The judge explained that whilst psychological and emotional needs had been taken into account, these were not determinative and were outweighed by the ability to afford appropriate care, the ability of family members to visit and the fact that the appellants had lived in India without the sponsor for a long period of time prior to their arrival in the UK. The judge explained that relevant factors had been considered cumulatively, including the appellants’ emotional needs and the desire to live with family members in this country.

35. In summary, there is no merit to the purported reasons challenge.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.
The appellants’ appeals to the Upper Tribunal are accordingly dismissed.

Judge H. Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 August 2026