Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002706
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66430/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

1st August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANTHONY

Between

DL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Eaton, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the names or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wilsher (“the Judge”) who dismissed the appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds (“the decision”).
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Albania who applied for asylum on 10 October 2022. The Secretary of State (“the respondent”) refused her protection claim on 11 December 2023. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal and the appeal was heard on 3 February 2026 by the Judge. The Judge dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 11 February 2026.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
3. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted on 22 May 2026 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dieu.
4. In a rule 24 response dated 22 June 2026, the respondent conceded that the Judge erred in not providing adequate reasoning in respect of the risk from traffickers. The respondent stated that the matter should be retained in the Upper Tribunal and reheard on the points raised by the appellant.
Upper Tribunal Hearing
5. At the outset of the hearing, I discussed with both advocates the respondent’s rule 24 response. Ms McKenzie confirmed that the respondent still maintained the view that there was a material error of law with the Judge’s decision in respect of ground 1 of the grounds for permission to appeal. Ground 1 relates to the Judge’s assessment of the ongoing risk from the traffickers.
6. I informed both advocates that I was satisfied that there was an error of law in respect of the Judge’s assessment of risk on return from the traffickers and that it was indeed material. Given the Judge’s findings of fact at paragraph 9 of the decision, I am satisfied that those findings were not subsequently fed into the assessment of risk on return at paragraph 15 of the Judge’s decision. This failure in my view renders the Judge’s conclusions on risk on return from the traffickers unsustainable.
7. It was agreed by both advocates that the decision could be remade today. Mr Eaton proposed that the matter be dealt with on submissions only given there is already an unchallenged factual matrix before the Upper Tribunal. Ms McKenzie did not oppose that course of action but requested additional time to prepare. I permitted Ms McKenzie an additional 30 minutes to prepare. On commencement of the hearing, I heard from Ms McKenzie followed by Mr Eaton. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision. I do not propose to rehearse the oral submissions made but will consider and address these as part of my analysis set out below.
Analysis and Conclusions
Error of Law
8. As stated above, I am satisfied that there was an error of law in respect of the Judge’s assessment of risk on return from the traffickers and that it was indeed material for the following reasons.
9. At paragraph 9 of the Judge’s decision, the Judge found that the appellant received harsh treatment from the traffickers in Belgium who gave her little food and were verbally abusive, saying that her husband, EML, owed them £10,000. When she was brought to the UK, the Judge found that the appellant was told by the traffickers that EML owed them a debt and she would have to pay it. However, the Judge’s finding at paragraph 15 that “there is no evidence that the appellant owes anything”, is internally inconsistent with paragraph 9 of the Judge’s decision that the appellant was told by the traffickers that she was responsible for the debt. I also accept the respondent’s concession that there was a failure by the Judge to give adequate reasons for why the Judge was rejecting at paragraph 15 the appellant’s account that she was responsible for the debt when this was a matter which the Judge had accepted and found at paragraph 9 of the decision. I find the Judge failed to explain how those two positions could be reconciled.
10. I accept the respondent’s concession that the Judge’s conclusion that the sums involved was “not particularly large in the context of such gangs” is evidentially unsupported. I find the Judge does not refer to any background material to support the finding that these sums were not large nor to explain why the Judge considered that such sums were not large. I accept and find that there was a failure to give reasons and that failure was material to the Judge’s assessment of risk on return from the traffickers.
11. I accept the respondent’s concession that the judge’s reliance on the appellant’s voluntary departure from Albania was an immaterial matter to whether the traffickers would still be interested in her. I accept and find that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for why these matters undermine risk in circumstances where the Judge acknowledged at paragraph 3 of the decision the positive conclusive grounds decision of July 2023 that the appellant is an accepted victim of trafficking and at paragraph 9 that she is responsible for the debt owed to the traffickers.
12. I accept the respondent’s concession that the Judge’s findings at paragraph 15 that there was an absence of recent contact from the traffickers which could only mean she was of little interest to them was internally inconsistent with the Judge’s earlier findings at paragraph 9 where the Judge accepted that the traffickers phoned her 10 days after her escape, threatened her and told her they had EML and that following this contact, she destroyed her phone. I accept that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons as to why the appellant’s accepted evidence that they did contact her and that she destroyed her phone was insufficient evidence that she was still of interest to the traffickers.
13. Taken cumulatively, I accept and find that the assessment of future risk from the traffickers is inadequately reasoned and amount to errors on a point of law. I find that these errors are material for the reasons given above.
Remake – Risk on Return
14. The unchallenged factual matrix is set out at paragraph 9 to 11 of the Judge’s decision. There is also no dispute regarding the Judge’s assessment of risk on return from the criminal gangs who extorted money from the appellant’s family at paragraph 14 of the decision. The sole issue before the Upper Tribunal is confined to risk on return from the traffickers.
15. The relevant country guidance is TD and AD (trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC). There is a requirement to apply the country guidance unless there are “very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence” to justify not doing so (SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940). Neither advocate argued that the country conditions have changed or that the country guidance is no longer applicable and in fact, Mr Eaton made his submissions following the framework set out in TD and AD. Therefore, I have applied the relevant risk factors in TD and AD when remaking the assessment of risk on return. I take them in turn.

Social status and economic standing
16. The unchallenged factual matrix from the Judge’s decision is that the appellant’s parents ran a small shop and was in financial difficulties in 2011 due to extortion from the criminal gangs. Her father had to take bank loans and her mother had to sell their home to pay the criminal gangs. I accept and find the appellant is not from a wealthy family.
Level of education
17. The appellant’s unchallenged evidence is that she left school at the age of 13 due to her parents’ financial difficulties. I find she only has school education.
Mental Health
18. I have the unchallenged medical report of Professor Katona. Professor Katona diagnosed the appellant with mild depression and moderate anxiety. Professor Katona found that the appellant fulfilled several of the criteria for PTSD but did not meet the diagnosis of PTSD at the time of the assessment. Professor Katona considered the appellant is likely to have had full-blown PTSD in the past but her PTSD symptoms were currently in partial remission. Professor Katona recommended treatment including EMDR and trauma focused CBT. Professor Katona expressed his clinical view that forced removal would likely result in a relapse into PTSD and aggravate the appellant’s anxiety and depression which would affect her ability to re-integrate, impair her ability to work to support herself and her children, or to secure their basic needs such as accommodation and food. It would also affect her ability to form and sustain friendships. Professor Katona said the appellant had a strong subjective fear of return and this would, regardless of its well-foundedness, trigger such a reaction.
19. Given the appellant’s experiences, I accept and find a return to Albania would trigger in the appellant a deterioration in her mental health, a relapse of her PTSD symptoms and aggravate the appellant’s anxiety and depression which would affect her ability to sustain employment to support herself and her children and to secure their basic needs such as accommodation and food.
Illegitimate child
20. The presence of an illegitimate child is also a factor which heightens risk of being persecuted on return. The appellant’s children are not illegitimate.
The area of origin
21. The appellant’s home area is in the north of Albania. I accept that the code of honour would be applied more strictly in the north.
Age
22. The appellant is presently aged 31. I find that her age does not exclude her from being re trafficked. I find that on return, she will still be seen as a commodity by traffickers.
Support Network
23. I have considered whether the appellant can access a support network. Ms McKenzie referred to the appellant’s witness statement at paragraph 16. The thrust of Ms McKenzie’s submissions is that the appellant has a network of support in Albania which includes her mother and two brothers.
24. Mr Eaton’s submissions centred around the appellant’s witness statement, the evidence she gave in her substantive asylum interview and the evidence she gave the Judge at the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal.
25. Having considered all of that evidence, I observe that the evidence the appellant gave was unchallenged and the Judge found her to be a credible witness. I therefore find from her written and oral account before the First-tier Tribunal that although she is still in contact with her mother, this is only to enable her mother to have telephone contact with her children. I accept and find from her written evidence that her mother does not leave the home she shares with the appellant’s grandparents because of fear and stigma. Given her mother is unable to leave her own home, I accept Mr Eaton’s submission that it is wholly unlikely that the appellant’s mother would be able to provide any support to the appellant.
26. Having considered the above factors set out in the country guidance, I find that the appellant is at significant risk of being re trafficked on return to Albania.
Sufficiency of Protection
27. I find from TD and AD that corruption is widespread in Albania. I have also considered the up-to-date background material from the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note Albania: Human trafficking Version 16.0 July 2024 (“CPIN”). Whilst there have been improved efforts made by the Albanian authorities to tackle human trafficking, I find that protection is not effective for a number of reasons namely the gap between a strong legislative framework with practice in reality; issues with victim identification; a lack of training and expertise; corruption; weak institutions; a lack of witness protection and legal aid; and distrust of the protection system which prevents victims from coming forward. Corruption and in particular direct links between officials in Albanian government and police and traffickers hinder the state’s ability to provide effective protection.
Shelter
28. In relation to shelters, I find from the CPIN that there is one government shelter and three NGO run shelters. I accept and find from the CPIN that the European Commission in its Albania Report 2022 held that “NGO-run shelters remained underfunded”. Even if the appellant could access one of these shelters on return, I accept the submission made by Mr Eaton that this support would be time limited in any event. The question then is what support would be available to victims of trafficking such as the appellant upon leaving a shelter.
29. According to the CPIN, the appellant as a victim of trafficking may be able to access social housing and rent subsidy post shelter stay but the support was time limit and the bureaucracy prevent many victims from being able to access such state aid. I find from the CPIN that the amount of subsidy was often insufficient and left victims of trafficking with insufficient funds to meet their cost of living. I also find from the CPIN that the lack of family support is a major barrier to successful reintegration following a victim leaving a shelter.
Internal Relocation
30. I have considered whether the appellant can internally relocate. The question I have to ask myself is “can the appellant find effective protection in another part of her home country to which she may reasonably be expected to move and would it be unduly harsh to expect the appellant to move to another less hostile part of the country?” (see Robinson v Secretary of State for the Home Department and IAT [1997] EWCA Civ 3090 at [29]; Januzi and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5 and Secretary of State for the Home Department v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49).
31. In order to consider whether the place of relocation is viable, I would have to assess all of the circumstances of the appellant’s claim holistically. Whilst I accept the appellant has contact with her mother, I find she could not rely on family support networks on return for the reasons I have given above. I find that the appellant on return to Albania would be without any viable family support networks. I find that she would have significant difficulties in relocating and integrating because she would be a vulnerable single mother with two young children and with no support network. Even if she spent a period of time in a shelter, I find from the CPIN that the lack of a family support network is a major barrier to successful reintegration.
32. I have to consider whether the appellant has the capacity to undertake non exploitative work. I find that her background (poor and of limited education) has led her to consider leaving the country. This in turn led her into debt and sexual exploitation with the traffickers to whom she still owes a debt. I find from the CPIN that key challenges for survivors of trafficking in entering and sustaining new employment include a lack of job opportunities in Albania, lack of education, lack of affordable childcare, ongoing trauma and stigma. I find there is a strong possibility that the appellant may once again be deceived by trafficker and/or be lured into exploitation.
33. According to the CPIN, Albania is a small country. I accept Mr Eaton’s submission that one can easily be found in Albania. I find that submission is corroborated by the background information within the CPIN which held that it is impossible to live anonymously in Albania for cultural reasons; that traffickers move within the same network and that one can easily be traced.
34. In BF (Tirana - gay men) Albania (CG) [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal held at [181]:
“181. We accept Ms Young's evidence that a person's whereabouts may become known in Tirana by word of mouth. Albania is a relatively small country and we accept as entirely plausible that a person might be traced via family or other connections being made on enquiry in Tirana. Whether that would occur would depend on the family being motivated to make such enquiries (which motivation would probably depend on an awareness that the person may be living there) and the extent of its hostility. That is a question for determination on the evidence in each case.”
35. Furthermore, I find from the Upper Tribunal’s country guidance in EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 348 (IAC) that the need to register a civil registration in a new area in Albania may well enable the traffickers to track the appellant due to the direct links between officials in Albanian government and police and traffickers. I find there would be a public record of the appellant’s presence anywhere in Albania. I find the appellant would need to register to be able to access any health care and social support in Albania.
36. In conclusion, I find that the lack of effective protection from the state; the stigma against women who have been trafficked; the lack of assistance for victims of trafficking; the appellant’s particular vulnerabilities as a lone female with two children; her profile as a victim of trafficking; her current mental state; not having any viable family support networks, all of which would make it unreasonable and unduly harsh for her to relocate anywhere within Albania.
37. In light of my findings of fact above, it means that the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Albania and therefore she is a refugee. As she is a refugee, she cannot be a person in need of humanitarian protection (which is a subsidiary level of protection). Her claim under article 3 of the human rights convention are by analogy also proven to the lower standard of proof that applies. But that finding is immaterial as the appellant is a refugee.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error on a point of law and as such it is set aside.
The decision is remade as follows.
The appeal is allowed on protection and human rights grounds.

Farin Anthony

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 July 2026