Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002722
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/55331/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

JACKSON NYANTUN OFFOR
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Dr Jamiu Adebayo, Syeds Lawcare Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 11 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals against the First-tier Tribunal’s finding that the appellant was entitled to indefinite leave to remain under Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules. The First-tier Tribunal also found that the appellant was entitled to limited leave to remain. The Secretary of State does not seek to challenge this finding. For ease of reference, I refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The brief background of this case is as follows. The appellant is a citizen of Spain and the First-tier Tribunal found that he had entered the UK in October 2018 and had a period of residence in the UK to 19 July 2019. He then left the UK and travelled to Nigeria to be with his father, who was ill. The appellant remained there due to a combination of his father’s illness and Covid restrictions until 28 March 2021. The First-tier Tribunal found that this did not break his continuous qualifying period under Appendix EU.
3. The appellant applied to the respondent for settled status under Appendix EU on 28 June 2021. The respondent refused the application and, at the appellant’s request, carried out an administrative review which did not change the Secretary of State’s position. The appellant then appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.
4. The First-tier Tribunal found that the appellant met the criteria for indefinite leave to remain, with the period from his return to the UK in March 2021 up until the date of the First-tier Tribunal decision in March 2026 counting towards his residence.
5. The respondent appeals to the Upper Tribunal and has leave on one ground, namely that the First-tier Tribunal misdirected itself in law in that it measured the continuous qualifying period for leave under EU11 of the Immigration Rules as ending, not on the date of the application as stated in the Immigration Rules, but on the date of the appeal hearing before the First-tier Tribunal.
6. I have had the benefit of submissions by both parties. The Secretary of State maintains her position as set out in the grounds of appeal and does not seek to introduce any other challenges to the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
7. I remind myself of the need to respect the First-tier Tribunal where the case was heard by a Judge with extensive skills and experience in this specialist jurisdiction. My function is to consider any errors of law, not questions of preference in style or approach.
8. The appellant, reasonably in my view, accepts that there was a material error by the First-tier Tribunal in the approach to EU11, as is set out in the grounds of appeal. The parties agree that it is appropriate for me to remake the decision today on the basis of the First-tier Tribunal findings of fact which are relevant to the applicability of EU14 Condition 1.
9. Having considered the submissions, the grounds of appeal and the First-tier Tribunal determination, along with the wording of Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules, I am satisfied that there is an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s analysis.
10. That error of law lies in calculating the end date of continuous qualifying residence to run to the date of the First-tier Tribunal appeal hearing. It is, in many ways, an understandable error, as often the date the First-tier Tribunal will need to have in mind when assessing an appeal is that of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. However, in this case, the Immigration Rules are such that the continuous qualifying period runs to the date of the application to the Secretary of State.
11. I consider that this error is material because it changes the period of time the appellant can count towards his continuous residence, and changes the outcome of the analysis of the appellant’s ability to meet the rules.
12. I allow the appeal to the extent that it relates to the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on whether EU11 is met and I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 23 March 2026 on that issue.
13. I retain the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on the dates that the appellant was resident in the UK and on his continuous qualifying period not being broken by his absence.
14. I agree with the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant met the requirements of EU14 Condition 1 and therefore the requirements for pre-settled status, also known as limited leave to remain.
15. I remake the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on the issue of whether the appellant meets the requirements of EU11. The relevant condition for this appellant is EU11 Condition 3. I find that the continuous qualifying period that he satisfies amounts to fewer than five years and therefore he does not meet the requirements of EU11.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law in respect of its finding that the appellant met the requirements of EU11.
The appellant does not meet the requirements of EU11 for indefinite leave to remain.
The appellant meets the requirements of EU14 Condition 1 for limited leave to remain.

D Cotton

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 September 2026