Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case Nos: UI-2026-002726 and UI-2026-002727
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59671/2023, PA/67049/2023
LP/01846/2024, LP/03039/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIPLEY

Between

LF and FN
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Secretary of State: Mr Simpson, Senior Presenting Officer
For the appellant: Mr Khondoker, Counsel, instructed by Lexwin solicitors

Heard at Field House on 27 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant (LF) and her husband (FN) appeal a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Courtney (“the Judge”) dismissing the appellants’ appeals by a decision dated 4 December 2025.
Relevant Facts
2. The appellants arrived in the UK in March 2020 and claimed asylum in March 2021. FN made his claim as the dependent of his wife. Their original claim was based on fear of money lenders.
3. The Secretary of State refused the appellants’ claim in a reasons for refusal letter (RFRL) dated 20 October 2023. The appellants’ claim to have been targeted and threatened by money lenders was accepted. The respondent rejected the claim that the money lenders had influence but conceded that, if it were found that they did have influence, there would not be a sufficiency of protection or internal flight alternative.
4. The appellants appealed and prior to the appeal hearing they raised the additional ground of religious persecution.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
5. The Judge listed the issues for determination, and in relation to the claim of risk on return from money lenders, she identified the relevant issue as:
• Whether the appellants are likely to be at risk on return at the hands of the money lenders, such as to qualify them for a grant of humanitarian protection

6. In relation to the relevant matter for the purpose of this error of law hearing the Judge made the following findings:
• In my view the lenders in this case are small-scale neighbourhood money lenders. Even taking the appellants’ account of Burkhan’s prestige at its highest, he is at most a person of influence in the wholesale markets in Tashkent. There is no evidence that the three money lenders have power or influence of the type that might enable them to gain the assistance of the Uzbek police and/or government officials in pursuing retribution against the appellants for having defaulted on the loans.(44)
• There is no reason to believe that the police are complicit with the money lenders. (45)

Grounds of Appeal
7. The appellants applied for permission to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and relied on 13 grounds of appeal. One ground of appeal, ground 8, was accepted as at least arguable in the decision granting permission of First Tier Judge Hollings – Tennant dated 26 May 2026. The other 12 grounds were rejected. The appellants have not sought to reopen any of those grounds
8. In ground 8 it was argued that the Judge had failed to make findings on sufficiency of protection. The Judge had relied on isolated examples of police attending medical emergencies, had conflated that support with protection against criminal threats and had failed to assess the extensive evidence of police corruption, bribery and unreliability in cases involving alleged extremism.
Permission to appeal and rule 24 response
9. In granting permission to appeal Judge Hollings-Tennant noted the lack of explicit findings on whether there was effective protection to the standard envisaged in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37 and R (Bagdanavicius) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 38, and the lack of reference to relevant country evidence, particularly as it was accepted that the appellants had been targeted and threatened in the past.
10. In a Rule 24 response dated 10 August 2026 the respondent drew attention to the concession in the RFRL set out at paragraph 3 above and argued that the appellant had not challenged that position by arguing that regardless of the level of power and influence, the appellants would not be able to access a sufficiency of protection from the Uzbekistan authorities. It was further argued that the judge’s findings did in any event address this issue. Finally, there was no background evidence filed before the appeal, contrary to the claim in the grounds, save for a report concerning religious freedom. This aspect of the grounds concerned only the claim that the appellants faced persecution on religious grounds and the facts supporting that claim had been rejected in full.
11. The appellant has prepared a composite bundle, which include written submissions addressing the Rule 24 response and has additionally filed a skeleton argument.
Hearing
12. Mr Khondoker and Mr Simpson made submissions at the error of law hearing, which have been recorded. Mr Simpson relied on Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 and argued that the point argued was not an issue for the Judge. The argument adopted by the appellant had been that the moneylenders were powerful and influential. It had not been argued to the contrary in the skeleton. That is, that if they were not powerful and influential, the appellants would still be unable to access a sufficiency of protection.
13. Mr Khondoker addressed the relevant test to establish a sufficiency of protection as set out in Horvath and Bagdanavicius. He further submitted that the Judge should have had regard to headnote six of the country guidance case of LM (returnees – expired exit permit) Uzbekistan CG [2012] UKUT 00390 where it was found that there would be a risk of ill-treatment in detention in Uzbekistan.
Analysis
14. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before reaching a decision. I bear in mind that where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account (MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 49.) Further, an appellate court should not rush to find an error because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently (AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693).
15. The primary argument advanced by Mr Khondoker is that, having found that the money lenders did not have power and influence over the police, the Judge was required to go on to consider whether the appellants would nonetheless be unable to access a sufficiency of protection.
16. Further to Lata and TC (PS compliance - “issues-based” reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC), the issues the Judge was required to consider are limited to those identified by the parties. I am mindful that it was clearly not an issue that the appellants would be unable to access a sufficiency of protection if the money lenders were found to be powerful and influential. Further the appellants did not claim that they had attempted to seek the protection of the authorities, for example, by going to the police. The appellants’ skeleton instead focuses on the argument that the Judge should find the appellants’ claim to be credible and that as the appellants’ aggressors had utilised the assistance of the state, internal relocation and state protection was not an option. The Judge has dealt with that argument squarely at paragraphs 44 and 45 (as set out above) and rejected it. She has found no evidence that the moneylenders had power or influence to gain the assistance of the Uzbek police, no reason to believe the police were complicit with the money lenders and that, at the highest, the main moneylender was considered a person of influence in the wholesale markets in Tashkent.
17. I accept Mr Simpson’s submission that there was a lack of evidence that the alternative argument was presented as an issue for the Judge to address. There is no further argument in the skeleton addressing sufficiency of protection, for example in circumstances where the Judge finds that the money lenders have not utilized the assistance of the state. There is a lack of evidence that any oral submissions were made, or country background evidence relied upon, to that effect.
18. As is set out at headnote 4, 6-7 of Lata:
4. It is a misconception that it is sufficient for a party to be silent upon, or not make an express consideration as to, an issue for a burden to then be placed upon a judge to consider all potential issues that may favourably arise, even if not expressly relied upon. The reformed appeal procedures that now operate in the First-tier Tribunal have been established to ensure that a judge is not required to trawl though the papers to identify what issues are to be addressed. The task of a judge is to deal with the issues that the parties have identified.

6. The application of anxious scrutiny is not an excuse for the failure of a party to identify those issues which are the principal controversial issues in the case.

7. Unless a point was one which was Robinson obvious, a judge's decision cannot be alleged to contain an error of law on the basis that a judge failed to take account of a point that was never raised for their consideration as an issue in an appeal. Such an approach would undermine the principles clearly laid out in the Procedure Rules.

19. Whilst the Judge is required to have regard to any relevant country guidance case, the possible relevance of LM (Uzbekistan) was raised for the first time in oral submissions at this hearing. I am not satisfied that the Judge was required to specifically address a headnote establishing that there would be a risk of ill-treatment in detention. I am not satisfied that this has a clear bearing on the issue of sufficiency of protection. In conclusion, I am not satisfied that it was a Robinson obvious issue that the Judge should expressly deal with a sufficiency of protection against moneylenders whom she has found, at the highest, to be influential in Tashkent markets, when there is a lack of evidence that the issue was further argued in front of her.
20. For these reasons, I do not find the appellants have shown that the Judge has made a material error of law.
Notice of Decision
21. The appellants’ appeal is dismissed.
22. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge does not contain an error on a point of law so the decision stands.

F Ripley
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 September 2026