Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002796
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67959/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

TB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Pullinger, Counsel - Carnegie Law Chambers
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and her son are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or her son. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a 31 year old citizen of Bangladesh from Sylhet. She came to the United Kingdom in February 2023 with her four year old son having been granted a visa to visit for a holiday with her sister. Having arrived in the United Kingdom she made a protection claim. The respondent refused that claim and the appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. Her appeal was heard on 11 March 2026 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Latta (the Judge), who dismissed her appeal in a decision promulgated the following day.

2. The appellant now appeals to this Tribunal, with permission granted by a Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal, against the decision of the Judge. Pursuant to section 12(1) Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 the issue for me is whether the decision of the Judge involved the making of an error of law.

The appellant’s claim and the respondent’s refusal

3. When she first made her protection claim on 22 May 2023, the appellant said she feared persecution in Bangladesh because of her husband’s involvement with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). She said her son had been kidnapped from school and that she feared the Prime Minister, local leaders and Police. The appellant was interviewed about her claim on 17 June 2024. She said in that interview that her husband was the Organisation Secretary of the local BNP and that as a result the family were continually harassed by members of the rival Awami League, who were the party in power. On one occasion their son was taken from school and held by associates of the mayor until they negotiated his return home. The appellant said she feared for herself and her son if she returned to Bangladesh. After the interview the appellant provided a witness statement in which she additionally said that a politically motivated criminal prosecution had been taken out against her husband, together with a witness statement from her husband. She also provided documents which she said demonstrated her husband’s involvement with the BNP, the case against her husband and the kidnap of her son. The appellant said she was suffering from anxiety and depression and had been prescribed medication to help her sleep.

4. The respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim in a decision dated 1 July 2024. The respondent did not believe the appellant’s account, finding it was internally and externally inconsistent and lacked detail. The respondent did not accept that the appellant feared persecution or that she or her child would be at risk on return to Bangladesh. The respondent concluded that return to Bangladesh would be compatible with the appellant’s right to respect for her private and family life. The respondent noted the appellant’s anxiety and depression but concluded that treatment for those conditions would be available in Bangladesh. In a separate decision made the same day, the respondent concluded that return to Bangladesh would be consistent with the best interests of the appellant’s son.

The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and the Judge’s Decision

5. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision on 11 July 2024. On 5 August 2024 following protests, the Awami League was removed from power in Bangladesh. The President of Bangladesh resigned, fled Bangladesh and went into hiding. A new interim government involving members of the BNP and no members of the Awami League was formed.

6. In anticipation of her appeal the appellant served a bundle of evidence which included an updated witness statement, a letter from the Principal of her son’s school in Bangladesh and a psychological report prepared by Consultant Psychologist and Psychotherapist Jum Naxmul Hossain. Mr Hossain found that the appellant was suffering from severe depression and extremely severe anxiety and stress. The respondent served a report that indicated that in February 2026, the BNP had won a landslide majority in Bangladesh’s parliamentary elections.

7. The appeal hearing was conducted remotely by video. The appellant was assisted by a Bengali (Sylheti) interpreter and represented by a barrister. She gave oral evidence during which she was questioned by a Home Office Presenting Officer. The parties representatives made submissions after which the Judge reserved his decision.

8. Having set out the background, the parties submissions and the legal framework, the Judge began explaining his “findings” at [25] of his decision, noting that while he will only be referring to some of the evidence presented, he had considered all of the evidence submitted.

9. At [35] the Judge stated that he does not find the appellant’s account to be credible and at [38] the Judge recorded his conclusion that the appellant does not in fact fear persecution in Bangladesh. He explained that finding in the surrounding paragraphs noting at [30] that he would have expected the appellant to have attempted to leave Bangladesh sooner than she did if her account were true, at [31] that her delay in claiming asylum undermined her credibility, at [32] that the appellant would not have been able leave Bangladesh as she did using her own passport and with a visit visa if she were genuinely of adverse interest to the authorities, at [33] that the documentary evidence adduced by the appellant contained inconsistencies and discrepancies, at [34] that the continued presence of the appellant’s husband was inconsistent with the appellant’s claim and at [36] – [37] that widespread fraud and corruption meant he could give little weight to the documents adduced by the appellant.

10. At [39] the Judge recorded that even if the appellant had given a credible account, she would not be at risk in Bangladesh. He explained this conclusion at [40] and [41] by reference to the change in the political situation in Bangladesh, including the BNP’s landslide victory in elections. At [43] he confirmed his finding that the appellant is not at real risk of serious harm in Bangladesh.

11. At [44] and [45] the Judge noted submissions made about the appellant’s mental health and the evidence of Mr Hossain. The Judge noted that the evidence about the appellant’s mental health was 15 months old and had not been updated. At [46] the Judge noted that Dr Hossain had not seen the appellant’s medical records. At [47] the Judge concluded that the age of the report and the failure to consider the appellant’s medical records meant that he could attach little weight to Mr Hossain’s report. The Judge then found at [48] that even taking the conclusions of Mr Hossain at their highest there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant would be unable to obtain treatment for her depression and anxiety in Bangladesh.

12. In the remaining paragraphs of his decision the Judge considered the appellant’s human rights claim but found that there was nothing to suggest that return to Bangladesh was not in the best interests of the appellant’s son. In the absence of any evidence about a private life established in the United Kingdom or very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh the human rights appeal was dismissed.

The appeal to this Tribunal

13. The appellant was granted permission to appeal on five separate grounds (a sixth ground related to the decision of another First-tier Tribunal Judge not to grant permission to appeal). At the hearing before me however Mr Pullinger sensibly did not pursue ground 5 which concerned the appellant’s human rights claim. In his helpful submissions Mr Pullinger combined grounds one, two and four which he said all challenged the Judge’s finding that the appellant’s account was not credible. Mr Pullinger wisely did not pursue complaints within those grounds about the standard of proof applied by the Judge recognising that, applying section 32 Nationality and Borders Act 2022 the question of whether the appellant in fact feared persecution in Bangladesh fell to be determined applying the balance of probabilities.

14. Instead, in relation to grounds one, two and four, Mr Pullinger submitted that the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility was flawed as it involved no real consideration of the appellant’s case, rubber stamped concerns raised by the respondent in her decision letter, failed to analyse the appellant's explanation for the concerns raised by the respondent and failed to assess the effect of the appellant’s mental health on the evidence she gave. In relation to ground three Mr Pullinger argued that the Judge had failed to engage with the appellant’s evidence that she and her husband remain at risk despite the change in the political situation in Bangladesh.

15. The respondent served a written reply opposing the appellant’s appeal in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. Mr Ojo relied on that reply (which he had drafted) in his helpful submissions. Mr Ojo referred to limitations in the medical evidence adduced by the appellant and the weaknesses of that evidence identified by the Judge. Mr Ojo submitted that the complaint of the appellant was a mere disagreement with the Judge’s finding that the appellant’s account was not credible and argued that the Judge’s finding was one reasonably open to him and did not involve an error of law.

Analysis

Grounds one, two and four

16. These grounds of appeal challenge the Judge’s factual finding that the appellant’s account was not credible and that she does not in fact fear persecution in Bangladesh. As such I remind myself of the need for judicial caution and restraint when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. The Supreme Court made this point at [72] of HA (Iraq) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 stating in particular:

(i) [The tribunal] alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently - see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account - see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out - see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope.

17. Lord Hoffman made a similar point at [45] of Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 a passage quoted by McCombe LJ in an immigration context at [31] of Lowe v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 62:

“the need for appellate caution in reversing the judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance (as Renan said, la verite est dans une nuance), of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation…”

18. As the Judge makes clear at [25] and [26] of his decision, the conclusion that the appellant’s account was not likely to be true and that on balance she does not fear persecution in Bangladesh, was reached after consideration of all the evidence and following assessment of “credibility indicators” such as sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. In the light of this indication I accept Mr Ojo’s submission that the judge’s finding was reached not simply on an assessment of the evidence given directly the appellant but following a holistic evaluation of all the evidence. That was plainly a lawful and appropriate approach for the Judge to take.

19. The Judge’s reasons identify his concern that the appellant’s account of persistent persecution including the kidnap of her son by the local mayor, was inconsistent with the way she came to leave Bangladesh and her husband’s continued presence in the home that she left. I am satisfied that these were factors the Judge was entitled to take into account when assessing whether the events the appellant described were likely to have occurred. I am also satisfied that the Judge’s expression of this concern represents an incomplete statement of the impression the appellant’s evidence made on him and that it is apparent from a fair reading of the decision as a whole that the Judge did not find the appellant’s evidence persuasive.

20. In ground one the appellant complains that the Judge has not “engaged with” the explanation she gave for the delay in her leaving Bangladesh, the way she departed Bangladesh using her own passport two months after having obtained a visit visa, and for her husband continuing to live and work in the same place. Contrary to this complaint and applying the guidance identified above that I should be slow to infer that a relevant point not expressly mentioned has not been taken into account, I am satisfied that the Judge considered all of the appellant’s evidence including her explanation of these factors when assessing the credibility of her account. What is plain however is that notwithstanding the appellant’s explanations, the Judge found the manner and timing of the appellant’s departure from Bangladesh fundamentally at odds with the events she claims to have occurred. That was an evaluative assessment the Judge was entitled to make.

21. It is equally plain from [33], [35], [36] and [37] of his decision, that the Judge found the documents produced by the appellant to be entirely unreliable. That assessment is explained by discrepancies and conflicting evidence within those documents which was identified in the respondent’s decision in July 2024 but not corrected by the time of the hearing in March 2026. These references to the discrepancies and contradictions must be read in the context of the Judge having already identified and detailed them when setting out the respondent’s submissions at [13] and [14] of his decision. The Judge further explains his conclusion by reference to evidence of widespread corruption in the courts and police of Bangladesh and the possibility of genuine documents being fraudulently obtained as part of that process. These were all factors which the Judge was unquestionably entitled to consider when determining the reliability of the evidence before him.

22. As the above indicates, the complaint in ground two that the Judge failed to undertake a “case specific assessment” of the documentary evidence and instead “adopted a blanket and speculative approach” to the evidence, is without merit. The Judge identified specific inconsistencies in the documents provided about when the appellant’s son was said to have stopped attending school as well as specific contradictions in the documents provided about the composition of the local BNP. The Judge’s assessment was therefore plainly case specific, engaging with the documents that were provided and finding that he could not attach weight to the documents when assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account.

23. Mr Pullinger focused much of his submissions on ground four, arguing that the Judge failed to properly consider the medical evidence of Mr Hossain about the appellant’s mental health when assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account. This was the ground that caused particular concern to the Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge who granted permission to appeal. Mr Pullinger submitted that the appellant’s poor mental health was advanced as an explanation for the concerns raised about the credibility of the appellant’s account and that it is not possible from reading the Judge’s decision to understand what the Judge made of that explanation or the effect the appellant’s mental health had on her ability to provide an accurate account of events in Bangladesh.

24. It is correct to note, as Mr Pullinger does, that the Judge does not refer to the evidence of Mr Hossain and the appellant’s mental health in the “findings” section of his decision, until after he has expressed his conclusion that the appellant’s account is not credible and that the appellant does not fear persecution in Bangladesh. I acknowledge that structuring the decision in this way can give the impression that the Judge has not considered the appellant’s mental health until after he has already determined that her account is not credible. I am satisfied however that a fair reading of the Judge’s decision and a proper analysis of Mr Hossain’s evidence demonstrates that this is not in fact how the Judge approached the evidence.

25. Before the Judge begins his analysis of the evidence in the “findings” section of his decision he refers to the medical evidence about the appellant’s mental health at [18] and [21] of the decision. The Judge further confirms that he has considered the evidence that was presented about the appellant’s mental health “carefully” at [44] of his decision. This medical evidence was plainly therefore something that was at the forefront of the Judge’s mind and I am not persuaded that, contrary to his indication that he considered it carefully, the Judge lost sight of the evidence when he assessed the credibility of the appellant’s evidence.

26. The Judge identifies that there were limitations and weaknesses in the evidence that was adduced about the appellant’s mental health. In particular, the evidence was fifteen months old by the time of the hearing. The opinion of Mr Hossain included no reference to the appellant suffering from PTSD (contrary to the appellant’s evidence at [22] of her witness statement) and no indication that the appellant’s ability to recall and recount events in Bangladesh had been adversely affected by her depression and anxiety. The opinion of Mr Hossein was not informed by a review of the appellant’s medical records which had not been provided to the expert.

27. The reality therefore is that, as the Judge said in terms at [47], the evidence that was adduced about the appellant’s mental health was evidence that the Judge could place little weight upon. Despite the Judge structuring his decision so that he addressed the medical evidence after he had expressed his conclusion that the appellant’s account was not credible, there is no reason to infer that he ignored the medical evidence when reaching that conclusion. Instead there is every reason to conclude that for reasons which the Judge adequately explained, he found the evidence about the appellant’s mental health to be unpersuasive and therefore gave it little weight when assessing the credibility of her claim to fear persecution in Bangladesh.

28. Overall therefore, I am satisfied that the Judge has undertaken an analysis of the evidence that was presented before him that was free from legal error and reached a conclusion on the facts that he was reasonably entitled to reach. The complaints made in grounds one, two and four about the Judge’s finding that the appellant had not given a credible account and that she does not in fact fear persecution in Bangladesh, are not made out and those grounds of appeal are dismissed.

Ground three

29. Ground three avers that the Judge erred in his assessment that the appellant would not be at risk on return to Bangladesh even if her account of events were credible. As I have found that the Judge’s primary conclusion that the appellant’s account of events in Bangladesh was not credible and that she would consequently not be at risk in Bangladesh, did not contain an error of law, any error in the Judge’s consideration of this alternative scenario would be immaterial to his decision. On this basis I dismiss the appeal on ground three because it cannot identify a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.

30. In any event I am satisfied that the Judge’s assessment of the risk to the appellant in the alternative scenario was free from error of law. The Judge identified in his decision that the most recent evidence was that the BNP, the party the appellant’s husband supports, had won a landslide victory in Parliamentary elections. The appellant’s witness statement was made in December 2024 and addresses the interim government that existed at that time but not the situation after the elections. The appellant did not give any oral evidence in chief and in the circumstances therefore there was no evidence before the Judge to suggest that the appellant would be at risk despite the fact that the party which her husband supports was now the ruling party in the country.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Latta did not involve an error of law and shall stand.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 September 2026