Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002800
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/58534/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18 September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

Between

GP and DP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
And

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Gherman, Counsel instructed by
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants appeal with permission against the decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”) dated 15 March 2026 dismissing their appeals against a decision of the Secretary of State dated 15 July 2024 refusing the first appellant’s protection and human rights claim. The second applicant DP is a dependent on GP’s claim.
Background
2. GP is a 51 year old citizen of the Philippines and DP is her spouse, aged 52, also a national of the Philippines. GP entered the UK as a student in September 2009 and her husband arrived on 20 December 2009. Their son came to the UK in 2011 and has since been granted leave to remain in March 2025. GP applied for leave to remain on the basis of her human rights on 26 August 2020 which was refused in June 2021. She claimed asylum on 4 April 2023. The appellants asserted that they were at risk in the Philippines due to threats made to the second appellant in the course of his employment. They also asserted that it would be a breach of Article 3 ECHR to return the first appellant to the Philippines because of her ill health. She cannot afford treatment for type 2 diabetes and hypertension. The couple would be destitute in the Philippines.
3. The respondent’s position was that there would be no risk to the appellants. Although it was accepted by the respondent that the second appellant worked as a government official in the field of demolishing illegal buildings and that he had been threatened by squatters, the threats were from non-state agents and the appellants could seek protection from the authorities or relocate. Treatment for the first appellant’s condition is available in the Philippines and she does not meet the high threshold in in AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131. The appellants do not qualify for leave on the basis of their family life. There would not be very significant obstacles to their return. They have been educated to a high level and have knowledge of the language and culture.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appellants and their son gave oral evidence and adopted their statements.
5. The judge found that s8 Immigration and Asylum (Treatment of Claimant’s etc) Act 2004 applies because the appellant did not make an application until 2020 and did not claim asylum until 2023. The judge found that the appellants have not received any threats since 2009 and nor have their families. The threats to the second appellant were directly as a result of his employment at the time, were not related to him personally or anything outside his employment. The judge found that the appellants failed to demonstrate that there would be any remaining threat to them on account of the second appellant’s employment 17 years earlier. The judge found that gang members/squatters would not threaten him as he was no longer a government official and they had no links to the authorities. In the alternative, the judge found that the appellants could safely relocate to a different part of the Philippines and that the authorities in the Philippines are generally able and willing to provide effective protection.
6. The judge turned to the Article 3 health claim. It is accepted that the first appellant has diabetes and hypertension for which she takes medication and that the mediation may not be free at the point of delivery. The judge found that there were private and publicly health care systems in the Philippines from both the background information and the expert report. The appellant’s conditions are not unusual and the mediation is internationally available. She would be able to leave the UK with a supply of medication and a re-integration grant to purchase medication. The appellant and her husband would be able to work on return because they have been able to work and maintain themselves in the UK. They are well educated. The judge found that the first appellant did not meet the AM/Zimbabwe test.
7. The judge found that the appellant does not have family life with their son under the immigration rules and Article 8 ECHR was not engaged in respect of family life. The judge found that there would be no significant obstacles to their integration on return and limited weight can be given to their private life. The appeal was dismissed on humanitarian protection, Article 3 and Article 8 grounds.
The Grounds of Appeal
8. There was no challenge to the judge’s finding that the protection claim was not made out.
Ground 1
The judge made unsustainable findings in respect of Article 3 ECHR and inadequately carried out the assessment.
9. It is accepted that the first appellant has type 2 diabetes, that the family sold everything to come to the UK and that she is unable to afford medication for her health conditions. The expert report addresses the quality of public sector healthcare. The availability of the appellant’s medication is not guaranteed and the cost amounts to 8% of the daily minimum wage. There was also evidence that diabetes care remains a high financial burden. This leads to poorly controlled diabetes and other comorbidities.
10. The judge’s finding that the appellant could rely on a supply of medication from the UK or rely on a reintegration grant is unsustainable because these are temporary and short-term measures which are insufficient to manage a serious long term condition such as diabetes. The judge failed to take into account evidence about their employability and the limited economic opportunities available to them.
Ground 2
The Article 8 ECHR analysis was inadequate
11. The Article 8 ECHR assessment was inadequate, sparse and incomplete regarding what concerned a layered factual matrix of two individuals who have lived in the UK for over 17 years. The judge failed to give any consideration to the appellant’s relationship with their son, the fact that they have resided in the UK for 17 years, their ties to their church, the evidence about the difficulties they would have obtaining employment and how their families would not be able to support them. The judge also failed to take into account how the first appellant’s inability to access healthcare would affect any reintegration or her poor mental health.
The Rule 24 Response
12. The respondent provided a rule 24 response opposing the appeal. It is said that the judge finds that the appellant can access medication and the medical conditions do not meet the high AM/ Zimbabwe test. It was open to the respondent to find that the appellants would be able to work in the Philippines on the basis of work they had carried out in the UK. The judge was not obliged to accept the findings from the expert report. As far as Article 8 ECHR was concerned it was not necessary for the judge to set out every detail or issue. Appellate courts should exercise judicial constraint.
Documentation
13. Both parties had sight of the relevant documentation. This included the grounds of appeal, the grant of permission, the decision of the judge, the rule 24 response, the original respondent’s bundle and appellant’s bundle as well as the skeleton argument.
Submissions
14. Both parties made legal submissions which I will refer to in the discussion of the grounds below.

Applicable principles
15. The Court of Appeal has recognised that the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of its reasoning: In Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055 (‘Ullah’) Green LJ, with whom Lewison and Andrews LJJ agreed, stated at [26]:
“Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT’s jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
i. the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
ii. where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
iii. when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
iv. the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
v. judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
vi. it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”
16. I remind myself of the limited circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the First-tier Judge, who saw and heard the Appellant give her evidence. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48 (‘Volpi’) Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained interference with findings of fact and credibility is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]-[5]:
“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii. The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
Ground 1 – Discussion and analysis
17. In her application the appellant stated that she is unwell with diabetes and high blood pressure. In her asylum interview, she said that she would not be able to afford treatment in the Philippines because it is very expensive. She has relatives in the Philippines including her 78 year old mother and two siblings but she does not think they will be able to assist her. She also believed that it would be difficult for her to find work.
18. In the reasons for refusal letter dated 15 July 2024, the Secretary of State did not accept that the appellant qualified for discretionary leave. The respondent accepted that the appellant has type 2 diabetes and hypertension and that she is depressed. The respondent acknowledged that the appellant takes metformin for diabetes 500mg twice a day, amlodipine 5mg once a day and lozartan 75 mg once a day as well as paracetamol for headaches. The respondent’s position is that appropriate medical treatment is available in the Philippines although it may not be free at the point of entry. The position of the respondent is that this of itself does not make the circumstances exceptional. The respondent did not accept that the first appellant meets the high threshold in AM/Zimbabwe because it was not accepted that the first appellant had established that her reduction in life expectancy would be substantial. The Philippines has a health care system and medical care is widely available and accessible. The earlier 2021 refusal, relied on in the later decision, set out evidence that amlodipine and losartan is available and asserted that the appellant had not produced evidence capable of demonstrating that she would face a real risk of being exposed to a serious rapid and irreversible decline in their date of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy.
19. This position was reiterated in the respondent’s review where it is said that the Article 3 ECHR threshold is very high. The respondent noted that the appellant has not provide medical evidence treatment plans, NHS history, medical prognosis, GP history of letters of support from medical professionals to suggest that these conditions would prevent removal and made no cogent arguments that treatment is unavailable or that they would lack treatment in the Philippines. It is said the burden is on the first appellant to demonstrate how the inability to obtain effective treatment would have on her health. The burden of proof has not been discharged. The first appellant cannot meet the AM/ Zimbabwe test and there is no evidence to suggest that there is a lack of such treatment.
20. The appellant submitted more evidence in support of her appeal including her GP records which confirm her diagnosis of diabetes and her medication, a witness statement from her in which she confirms that she has gained weight and her mental health has deteriorated and a country expert report.
21. The appellant also submitted a skeleton argument in support of her appeal. She submitted that it was accepted that she had sold her home to come to the UK and that she would not be able to afford treatment.
22. The skeleton relied on the contents of the country expert report which highlighted the following:
◦ The public sector has different levels of care but suffers from understaffing, overcrowding and quality.
◦ The country has 1 hospital bed per 1000 individuals and 0.8 doctors. All but one of the medications that the appellant currently takes is sometimes free but availability is not guaranteed and even when paid for they amount to 8% of the daily minimum wage which represents a significant amount in relation to the local economic context. Healthcare is inequitable and inaccessible to the poor and marginalised.
23. The skeleton also referred to a medical paper entitled “Current status of diabetes mellitus care and management in the Philippines Published in 2024 which says:
“In the current state of health financing in the country, with the limited coverage of the national health insurance program plus the high percentage of out-of-pocket expenditure, diabetes care remains a high financial burden, especially for minimum wage earners and middle-class workers. This leads to poorly controlled diabetes and other comorbidities leading to higher disease burden and disability”.
24. The skeleton submits that the appellant would not be able to properly manage her health conditions in the Philippines because treatment would be inaccessible and unaffordable leading to a rapid and irreversible decline in her health resulting in intense suffering. It also submits that the appellant has also outlined the harrowing experiences she and her family have had with the Philippine health care system. It is said that she has discharged the burden to establish a real risk of Article 3 to the high standard required.
25. The judge turned to the issue of Article 3 ECHR at [26]. He said:
“26. The remaining issue is the claim by the first appellant that she would be at risk on return on account of her medical needs under article 3 ECHR. The respondent has accepted that the first appellant is taking medication for diabetes and hypertension, and that medication may not be free at the point of delivery as it is in the UK. The test for an article 3 claim on the grounds of a medical condition, is set out in the case of AM Zimbabwe, which found that in addition to the older tests under the case of N 2008, the test should include cases where there were substantial grounds for believing that the appellant, while not in imminent danger of dying, would face a real risk in the receiving state, of being exposed either to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their health, resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy, which was a demanding threshold.
27. The background information contained in the refusal letter, from Med COI, is similar to that available on the UK government website, which confirms that there is a blend of public and private health care in the Philippines, which provide primary and preventative care. There have been significant improvements and upgrades in healthcare provision in recent years, after the Universal Healthcare Act of 2019 which ensured access to health care for all Filipinos., as well as access via the insurance scheme known as Phil-Health. The appellant relied on a privately funded expert report, which agreed that there were private and publicly funded health systems in the Philippines. The private sector was able to offer world-class healthcare, whereas the public sector was variable. The first appellant was suffering from conditions which were not unusual and was on medications which are internationally available. The first appellant may have to travel outside of her home town due to overcrowding. However the background information indicates that treatment is available. The appellant would be eligible to leave the UK with a supply of medication as well as a significant re-integration grant, which could be used to purchase medication is necessary. The appellant claim that they would be unable to work on return, but this is not consistent with their ability to work and maintain themselves in the UK, where the second appellant does not speak the language and they have no permission to work. The appellants are both well educated in the Philippines. I am satisfied that healthcare is available in the Philippines, the first appellant is taking commonly available medication which is available worldwide, either in the exact form or alternative form. I find that the first appellant’s claim under article 3 on medical grounds does not meet the AM Zimbabwe test” (my emphasis).
26. The reasoning of the judge is tolerably clear. I accept that the reference to the medicine being internationally available is not particularly on point, nevertheless the judge has rationally found in light of the background evidence that most of the medication taken by the appellant is available in the Philippines. The background evidence and the expert evidence are consistent with each other in this respect. The expert confirms that some of the medication is available for free, although this is variable and that the remainder of the medication is available at low cost (not mounjaro) (notwithstanding that this might amount to 8% of the minimum wage). Implicit from this opinion, is that although the cost of medication is a financial burden, even individuals on the minimum wage can afford medication. It was therefore open to the judge to find that mediation and treatment is available.
27. I note here that there was a lacuna in the medical evidence in that the first appellant did not produce a comprehensive medical report detailing the effect on her if she were able to access some but not all of the medication (for instance all the medication bar mounjaro) or what would be the impact on her of having inconsistent treatment. The evidential burden was on her in respect of what would happen to her in this scenario and she needed to provide substantial grounds for believing that she would face a real risk of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy as a result of the absence of appropriate medical treatment or lack of access to such treatment. No such medical evidence was provided.
28. I accept the submission that taking a stock of medication to the Philippines with her and relying on the reintegration grant do not equate to a long term ability to afford this medication., however I infer that the judge’s reasoning is that the first appellant would be able to obtain treatment on arrival for an interim period whilst she and her husband established themselves in the Philippines. I am satisfied that the judge did not take into account immaterial considerations which led the judge to come to a unsustainable conclusion in respect of the availability of medication.
29. The judge made findings about the appellants’ ability to work. Ms Gherman submitted that the judge overlooked the expert evidence in respect of the difficulties that the appellants would have in finding employment in the Philippines and that this impacted on the judge’s assessment of whether the medication and treatment would be accessible. A judge does not need to refer to all of the evidence before them. In this appeal the judge manifestly had regard to the expert evidence because it is referred to at [27] set out above. The evidence of the expert was more nuanced than Ms Gherman suggested. The expert did state that the appellants would face various social and economic hardships if they were returned to the Philippines because they would have difficulty finding employment in light of their lack of educational credentials and social capital, relatively advanced age and in the case of the first appellant gender. The expert explained that ageism and age discrimination is rife. The judge can be taken to be aware of this evidence. However the expert also went on to state that some of the first appellant’s options include “pursuing informal income opportunities, like starting a retail store or a small business, engaging in multi-level marketing or working for family members of friends enterprises”. The expert’s opinion was therefore that some opportunities to earn an income would be available and the judge also can be taken to have considered this evidence.
30. The judge had sight of the appellants’ evidence in respect of their work history both in the Philippines and the UK. The first appellant had a business in the Philippines making shell ornaments. In the UK she has worked as a housekeeper but has also had her own business cooking and selling Philippine food. She has some qualifications from the UK including a course in management studies. Her son gave evidence that she had also worked as a carer and nanny. The second appellant worked with a government demolition team and was later promoted to the role of field inspector. In the UK he has worked in removals and has worked as a kitchen porter. He has a degree in business studies. The couple have managed to survive and support themselves in the UK since 2009. The judge was manifestly entitled to find that the appellants’ work history in the UK where they have lived illegally, have no permission to work and the second appellant does not speak English, suggests that they would be able to support themselves in the Philippines despite their age and the difficulties in finding employment. This finding is not irrational or inadequately reasoned.
31. For these reasons I am not satisfied that ground 1 is made out. The judge’s overall conclusion that the appellant’s medical claim does not meet the high threshold of Article 3 is rational, cogent and grounded in the evidence.
32. I similarly find that the judge’s Article 8 findings despite being brief are adequate and sustainable. A judge does not need to set out lengthy reasons. The judge had made findings throughout the decision in respect of the appellants’ lives in the Philippines and in the UK. In particular, the judge was entitled to take into account that the appellants overstayed their visas from 2011 and did not apply to regularise their leave until 2020 which was because they wanted to wait for their son to finish school and that they went into hiding at one point. The judge had found that they were not at risk of serious harm and that the Article 3 medical claim was not made out. The judge had made findings on the first appellant’s poor health. The judge at [29] was entitled to find that neither appellant met the immigration rules in respect of private and family life, and that they can return to the Philippines where they are both of working age, speak the language and are aware of the culture. The judge correctly applied s117B of the 2002 Act. Ground 2 is not made out.

Notice of Decision
1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law.
2. The appellants’ appeal is dismissed.
3. The original decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge S Taylor dismissing the appeal on Article 3 ECHR grounds and on Article 8 ECHR grounds is upheld.

R J Owens

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 September 2026