Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-002825, UI-2026-002842
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/67843/2023
PA/67851/2023
LP/01900/2024
LP/01901/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

5th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

AC
SP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E. Fripp, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr A. Sheikh, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The first appellant, AC, born in 1967, is the mother of the second appellant, SP, a woman born in 2000. They are both Albanian citizens.

2. The appellants seek to appeal against the decision (“the decision”) of First-tier Tribunal Judge O’Garro (“the judge”) dated 7 December 2025. That decision dismissed the appellants’ linked appeals on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.

3. The essential background is that the appellants left Albania in February 2019 and travelled to Cyprus, where they were imprisoned for using false documents for three months. They were returned to Albania; and in September 2019 left again, travelling to Poland and Belgium, arriving in the United Kingdom sometime around the end of September or start of October. They have lived in the United Kingdom ever since; and the second appellant has given birth to two children in 2020 and 2023. The second appellant had applied for leave to marry in November 2019, which was refused in January 2020. Following this, both appellants claimed asylum: the first appellant in May 2020 and the second appellant in March 2021, which claims were refused in December 2023.

4. The appellants’ case is that both fear the same individual: he is the husband (now former husband) of the first appellant, and the father of the second appellant. I shall refer to him herein as the former husband. The former husband was, until 2016 when he was dismissed to accepting bribes, a traffic police officer. He divorced the first appellant in 2018. Both claim that he was abusive towards them; that he would kill them on their return; and that, by virtue of his former position, he would be able to do so without consequences. The first appellant additionally fears her brother-in-law, whom she says threatened her. The first appellant separately raises health grounds, relying on medical evidence diagnosing her with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and moderate Depressive Disorder. The second appellant fears that the former husband will kill her because her two children were born out of wedlock, which is against the law of Kanun: a code of customary law observed in the part of Albania she is from.

5. In the reasons for refusal letter dated 5 December 2023, the respondent accepted that the second respondent feared her mother’s former husband. The respondent also accepts that the first respondent feared him. However, the respondent did not accept that the appellants were at a real risk on return to Albania, as the former husband “…is deemed to be a rogue state agent who is a former traffic police officer…in Albania with no power or influence to [sic] the Albanian State”. Whether the former husband does have influence as claimed by the appellants has been the focus of the submissions I have heard today.

6. The appellants’ grounds of appeal (“the grounds”) are dated 18 December 2025 and set out both grounds:

a. Ground 1: failure to give adequate reasons on material matters (specifically, that the judge failed to provide adequate reasons for finding the appellants would not face a real risk of harm on return, having failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the country expert report); and
b. Ground 2: inadequately reasoned conclusions in relation to Article 8 ECHR (specifically, in failing to give adequate reasons as to finding it would be in the children’s best interests to return to Albania).

7. Permission to appeal on both grounds was granted by First-tier Judge Robinson on 1 June 2026.

8. Mr Fripp, for the appellants, has in respect of ground 2 adopted the grounds as drafted in his submissions today. His position is that if I am with him that ground 1 discloses a material error of law, then I will inevitably be with him on ground 2 as well: as the reasons that the judge relies upon in coming to her decision are the essentially the same as those for ground 1; and if the appellants are at a real risk then that will undermine the judge’s assessment of the children’s best interests.

9. The thrust of ground 1 is that the judge did not apply the correct standard when considering sufficiency of protection. Mr Fripp refers me to Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37; 1 AC 489 at 500H:

“The standard to be applied is therefore not that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of protection in the home state. Rather it is a practical standard, which takes proper account of the duty which the state owes to all its own nationals…“

10. As I have already said, the respondent accepts that the appellants genuinely feared the former husband and continue to have a subjective fear of him. In assessing whether the appellants would in fact face a real risk of serious harm on return to Albania, the judge explained at [44]:

“In determining this issue, I have considered the Country Expert report of Mr Erjon Fejzulla. I accept that Mr Fejzulla is adequately qualified to undertake his report. I find his report is valuable in giving some background on domestic violence in Albania. However, on the core issue of risks on return and serious maltreatment and whether such risks would rise to the level of being real as opposed to remote, Mr Fejzulla’s report is merely part of the totality of the evidence I have to take into account in my assessment.”

11. There is no further reference to that country expert report (“the report”). This lack of further consideration, argues Mr Fripp, demonstrates not just that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the report, but failed to consider it at all. This is all the more of a failure, it is said, in the context of the judge having relied heavily at [40], [41] and [50] upon the relatively old decision of DM (Sufficiency of protection-PSG-Women-Domestic violence) Albania CG [2004] UKIAT 00059. Mr Fripp took me through Mr Fejzulla’s report in detail; and following some clarification sought by me, submitted that paragraph 47 therein encapsulates his argument.

“The widespread issue of domestic violence in Albania, as highlighted by the increasing number of cases and the systemic inadequacies in addressing these incidents, directly correlates with [the appellants’] experiences. The data showing a consistent rise in reported domestic violence cases and the known challenges in obtaining effective protection underscore the dangerous environment they fled. Their accounts of severe physical abuse at the hands of [the former husband] fits within the documented context of pervasive and often unreported domestic violence in Albania. Despite recent legal reforms, the enforcement of domestic violence laws remains inconsistent, and victims like [the appellants] frequently find themselves without adequate protection. The societal stigma and the judicial system's tendency to dismiss domestic violence as a private matter further exacerbate the situation, leaving many women vulnerable.”

12. The significance of this is as follows. The first appellant sets out in her statement dated 22 August 2024 episodes of threats and physical abuse taking place against both appellants over a number of years. This culminated, she says, in her finally applying for a restraining order against the former husband. It was shortly before its expiry that the appellants left Albania in February 2019; and the first appellant describes attempting to enter the United Kingdom through Belgium in December 2018. Their reason for leaving was that restraining order did not provide that the former husband was prohibited from entering the home he shared with the first appellant. When the first appellant returned to her home after the restraining order was made, having nowhere else to live, she says the former husband assaulted her again. The second appellant’s statement dated 23 August 2024 essentially echoes her mother’s statement. The second appellant particularly asserts that the former husband assaulted her while she was pregnant in 2019.

13. Mr Fripp argues that the report supports the broad contention of the appellants that the Albanian state does not protect women against domestic violence, despite there apparently being mechanisms in place for doing so; and more specifically will not do so where the perpetrator is a person with influence. The first appellant describes at paragraph 34 of her statement an episode in February 2019 when she was engaging with the Prosecutor’s Office, during the currency of the restraining order, and following her allegedly having been beaten and threatened again:

“Both me and my ex-husband were invited to come for interviews, but only my daughter and I came to an interview. [We were told] that we will have a court hearing between my husband and myself about violence I experienced from my ex-husband. We never received any invitation for a hearing date; my brother also told me he never received anything. I believe that this was just again to show that [the Prosecutor’s Office is] doing something, but I do not think that hearing would ever happen but even if it did, I do not think my ex-husband would be prosecuted; he was never prosecuted for his long criminal history after he was dismissed from his work after he bribed people at court.”

14. The report has this to say at paragraphs 48 and 49:

“Women who return to Albania after being victims of domestic violence often face significant risks of encountering violence again, particularly from their ex-husbands or other family members. The pervasive influence of patriarchal norms in Albanian society, especially in rural and conservative areas, often leaves women vulnerable. These norms include the belief that women should remain submissive and tolerate abusive behaviour, making it challenging for victims to escape the cycle of violence. Additionally, perpetrators, who are often well-connected within local communities or the police, can easily track down and re-victimize these women, especially in smaller towns where anonymity is difficult.

“Although Albania has laws in place aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence, their enforcement is often weak. The legal system can be biased, and there are numerous reports of corruption within the police and judiciary. This corruption can result in perpetrators avoiding prosecution or continuing their harassment of victims without fear of legal repercussions. Even when restraining orders are issued, they are frequently disregarded, and law enforcement may be reluctant or unable to provide adequate protection.”

15. While it is accepted that the former husband has not been a police officer for a decade, he still, says Mr Fripp, plainly falls within the category of “well-connected citizen”, rendering an already weak enforcement system even less likely to protect these appellants. The system, says Mr Fripp, is merely performative: the restraining order did not in fact restrain the former husband; and enforcement – always patchy – is particularly unlikely to aid these appellants.

16. As to the second appellant’s circumstances, the report concurs at paragraph 18 with the appellants’ fears that her children, born out of wedlock, place the second appellant at particular risk:

“In traditional communities where the Kanun's influence remains strong, women who bear children out of wedlock may be at risk of violence, including honour-based violence (discussed under Q3), as a means of restoring the family’s reputation. This can include pressure to marry the father of the child, even if the relationship is abusive, or, in extreme cases, the woman may be disowned or physically harmed by her own family.”

17. Mr Fripp further argues that the report supports the appellants’ position that internal relocation is unavailable. Again, it is the former husband’s status that is key. While Albania’s relatively small size potentially presents a problem for any relocation, the former husband is in any event well-placed to track down and victimise the appellants. I quote paragraph 17 of the report in full.

“In conclusion, the risk of discovery for [the first and second appellant], and the latter’s children, should they return to Albania, remains significantly high due to the accessibility of personal data and the country's small, interconnected community. The readily available civil registry information, combined with a public electoral database that includes detailed personal data, makes it alarmingly for abusers to locate individuals like [the appellants]. Moreover, the endemic easy corruption within local civil registries and other state agencies exacerbates this risk, as sensitive information can be disclosed for minimal bribes. These structural vulnerabilities, coupled with the cultural and societal networks that facilitate the tracking of individuals across the country, render internal relocation ineffective and potentially dangerous. This scenario underscores the profound challenges and risks associated with their potential return to Albania, where safety and anonymity are compromised by systemic deficiencies and corruption.”

18. In sum, Mr Fripp submits that the judge’s finding that the appellants would not face a real risk of harm on return is unsafe; and as ground 1 discloses a fatal error of law, the decision cannot stand.

19. Mr Sheikh, for the respondent, argues that the judge stated at [44] that correctly stated that the report is “merely part of the totality of the evidence I have to take into account in my assessment”; and that is exactly the light in which she approached it. The judge correctly cited Horvath at [52]; and went on correctly to apply it. The “totality of the evidence” includes the first appellant’s mental health, which the judge took into account at [59] and [64] to [68]. The judge’s separate analysis of the report dated 28 August 2024 of Dr Nuwan Galappathie, psychiatrist, is careful and rigorous. She clearly explained why she was not satisfied that the first appellant was a seriously ill person, nor that treatment would be unavailable for her diagnosed conditions in Albania, nor that she would be without family support.

20. While her reasoning is not set out in exhaustive detail, it is easy to see, says Mr Sheikh, why the judge did not give the report greater weight. By way of example, Mr Sheikh takes me to paragraph 116 of the report, which relies on “an investigative TV programme ‘Fiks Fare’” to demonstrate that threats from the police and the alleged victim’s family were enough to make the victim, a girl, withdraw her case. In the same paragraph, Mr Fejzulla states that the appellants’ fears “resonate” with such cases. The matter reported by the TV programme was, says Mr Sheikh, factually so dissimilar to the appellants’ circumstances as to be irrelevant and, if the methodology underpinning the report is so diffuse, its opinions and conclusions must be called into question. Nor should the report’s considerable length – at 92 close-typed pages – itself imply thoroughness: it in fact betrays a lack of focus.

21. In any event, says Mr Sheikh, the appellants’ own version of events does not support their being at risk on return. The first appellant was able to obtain a restraining order, notwithstanding the former husband having been a police officer. It is accepted by the appellants that enforcement proceedings are available as a legal procedure. The appellants acknowledge that they left Albania before formally seeking enforcement of the restraining order. The appellants cannot claim that enforcement would not have worked without having even tried it as a remedy; and it is difficult to see why the first appellant would fear to enforce the restraining order where she had already been sufficiently bold to seek it knowing that the former husband would be – and indeed was – served with it.

22. Turning to those submissions, I say from the outset that the age of DM does not in itself count against its cogency. But the appellants’ not meeting the refugee convention criteria as a member of a Personal Social Group does not mean that they do not face a real risk of serious harm on return, nor that sufficiency of protection or internal relocation are reasonable on the specific facts of the case. DM does not specifically address a situation where the alleged abuser is a police officer, former police officer, or in a position of similar supposed influence.

23. The issue that the report grasps, and the decision does not, is the difference between an order being made, and an order being both effective and enforceable. The judge says at [45] that the restraining order “is good evidence that the abuser did not have power and influence because if he had such power, the Albanian authorities would not have issued a Restraining Order against him when the matter was brought to their attention”. It is evident that the existence of the restraining order was an important plank in the judge’s reasoning. The judge goes on to say at [46] and [47], which I quote in full:

“The 1st appellant’s evidence is that she would make complaints but then she would withdraw the complaint. However, once she allowed the complaint to go through without withdrawing it, the Albanian authorities acted on the complaint.

“I have taken into account that the abuser breached the restraining order but I noted at paragraph 38 of the 1st appellant’s statement dated 29 June 2020, found in the respondent’s bundle, that the Albanian Authorities considered taking the abuser to court again with the possibility of convicting him to prison but, sadly, due to her fear of the abuser, which is understandable, the 1st appellant decided to leave Albania then.”

24. I have already quoted from paragraph 34 of the first appellant’s 2024 statement, which is compatible with the first appellant having said that she considered taking her former husband to court again, but emphatic that the first appellant did not expect it to make any difference. The second appellant made the same point in her asylum interview dated 2 May 2023:

“Q88: What happened with your father that you and your mother had to go there?
A88: After the order of protection, we understood that the country could not help us and our father was not stopping the violence so we were forced to go to my uncle.”

25. That visit to the uncle could only be, so the first appellant describes in her 2024 statement at paragraph 30, a short one. The enforceability of the restraining order remained the issue. As the first appellant claims at paragraph 37 of her statement, after the expiry of the restraining order:

“…We called the police and…the police officer responsible for the area, came to the house. My ex-husband grabbed me and my dress, pushing me to the floor in front of the policeman, who did nothing. Them they left together for a coffee.”

26. Mr Fejzulla, as I have already said, considered that the appellants’ account resonated with documented cases of women in comparable situations to the appellants’ being at risk. Specifically, the report supports the distinction made by the appellants as to the making and enforcing of an order. I cannot find at [44] or elsewhere in the decision, any point at which the judge has addressed this distinction. I cannot see from any of the several quotes the judge makes from the CPIN that she has made use of the CPIN to address that issue. The natural reading of [47], made explicit at [51], is that she regarded the restraining order as adequate protection, or as a preliminary to obtaining available adequate protection. Accordingly, at [48], she concluded that there was no evidence the former husband was in a position to “prevent criminal charges being brought against him”. But the appellants, supported by the report, argue the restraining order was ineffective; and that a charge brought is not a conviction.

27. I now turn to [49] as, if the judge is right that there is no evidence that the former husband would pursue the appellants in any event, the respondent may answer that the above is immaterial: if the former husband no longer poses a risk, his status in Albania is irrelevant. I quote [49] in full.

“I am also not persuaded that the abuser is still interested in the appellants now some 6 years after the appellants left Albania. No reason has been given why he would be, particularly as the 1st first appellant and the abuser are divorced and the 2nd appellant is now a grown adult and on return to Albania, they will be living independent of the abuser and would be in a stronger position to alert the authorities and get the support on offer to victims of domestic abuse as noted in the objective evidence.”

28. It is plain that [49] is not freestanding: the finding that the former husband would not now be interested in the appellants is founded not just on the passage of time, but also what the judge took to be the improved position of the appellants. The finding that “they will be living independent of the abuser and would be in a stronger position to alert the authorities and get the support on offer to victims of domestic abuse as noted in the objective evidence” underlines that [49] relies upon the findings at [45] to [48] that the appellant is not in a position to influence the Albanian authorities and, specifically at [46], that “the Albanian authorities acted on the complaint”. As the judge’s reasons at [49] merge the question of whether the former husband would still be interested in pursuing the appellants with the question of whether he is in a position to do so, the finding at [49] that he is not interested stands or falls with the findings at [45] to [48] that he lacks the power to do so.

29. On that last point, I am then left with [44], where the judge describes the report as being “valuable on giving some background on domestic violence in Albania”. The reporter is described as “adequately qualified”. The final sentence of the report is abundantly clear:

“The lack of effective state protection, coupled with deep-seated cultural norms and systemic corruption, creates a profoundly hostile environment that would endanger their lives and well-being.”

30. I repeat that I cannot see an adequate account, in [44] or elsewhere in the decision, of why the report’s conclusion was rejected. The report, weighing the appellants’ accounts, states in its conclusion that these particular appellants would on return “confront a complex array of severe risks”. The reasons given at [45] to [54] do not grapple, as the report does, with the appellants’ case that neither further restraining orders nor internal relocation would meet the practical standard set out in Horvath, because, amongst other matters, of the status of the former husband. The judge is right to quote at [52] that Horvath does not require the elimination of all risk. But the practical standard set out in Horvath is to be considered in the light of the individual circumstances of the appellants. The report considered those circumstances. The decision at [44] does not explain where the report’s assistance begins and ends, nor what “the totality of the evidence” comprises. It is for the judge and not the expert to decide the case; but it is also for the judge in reaching their decision to explain why they reject a relevant report’s conclusions.

31. For the above reasons, I conclude that the judge has not given adequate reasons for rejecting the report and finding that the appellants would not face a real risk of serious harm on return to Albania. This amounts to a material error of law.

32. I concur with Mr Fripp that it is not necessary for me to go on to consider ground 2, beyond observing that the judge’s best interests assessment is undermined by the error of law I have found. Mr Sheikh is right to observe that [71] to [73] provide reasons for the judge concluding as she did that there was no arguable case under article 8 that do not directly flow from her findings I have considered under ground 1; but they remain to be in the context of the judge finding that there was not a real risk of harm on return.

33. I have considered whether to preserve any findings and whether the matter may be retained in the Upper Tribunal. I have already said that the respondent has accepted that the appellants fear the former husband. However, as the error identified goes to the heart of the appellants’ case as I have set out above, I have decided that the matter demands a hearing de novo in the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

1. The judge’s decision involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
2. I do not preserve any findings of the decision.
3. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 September 2026