Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002836
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64658/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

HP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Papasotiriou of Counsel, instructed by BHT Sussex
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Spicer (“the judge”), promulgated on 16 February 2026, dismissing his asylum and protection appeal.
Anonymity
2. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in respect of the appellant. There has been no application to set aside that order. While I recognise the strong factors in favour of open justice, in the present case I am satisfied that it is appropriate to continue the anonymity order given that the appellant seeks international protection.
Background
3. The appellant is a citizen of Albania, born in 2008. He entered the United Kingdom by small boat on 7 August 2022 and claimed asylum the following day. During his screening interview, the appellant stated that he had left Albania because of arguments between his parents, bullying at school, and his involvement in selling “black rubbish bags”. He also claimed that his father wanted to get rid of him because “he wasn’t secure because I was there”.
4. The appellant subsequently provided a witness statement in support of his asylum claim. In it, he stated that he had been bullied at school and that his father had physically abused both him and his mother. He further claimed that, while in Year 7, he had been approached by a group of older youths, aged approximately 16 to 17, who instructed him to deliver packages wrapped in black bags on behalf of their gang, which he understood to contain drugs. The appellant stated that, out of fear, he complied and was paid for doing so. He later decided that he needed to leave the gang because he feared being arrested. According to the appellant, he informed his father, who arranged for him to leave Albania and travel through a number of countries before reaching the United Kingdom. During that journey, he spent approximately two months at the home of his father’s cousin in Belgium. The appellant further claimed that, after arriving in the United Kingdom on 7 August 2022, he was taken by Albanian traffickers to a cannabis house, where he was told that he would have to work to repay a debt owed to them. He stated that he escaped the following morning and subsequently claimed asylum that day.
5. On 17 October 2023, the appellant was referred to the Competent Authority as a potential victim of human trafficking. However, on 2 September 2024, the Competent Authority made a negative conclusive grounds decision rejecting his trafficking claim.
6. The respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim on 27 November 2023. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had provided a credible account of his claimed fear of persecution, relying on numerous inconsistencies in his evidence. The respondent also considered that the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in any of the safe European countries through which he had travelled undermined his credibility. In any event, the respondent concluded that, even taking the appellant’s account at its highest, he could either obtain a sufficiency of protection from the Albanian authorities or internally relocate to another part of Albania in order to avoid any risk from the criminal gang he claimed to have worked for.
7. The appellant exercised his right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
8. The appellant’s appeal was heard on 13 February 2026. In a decision promulgated on 16 February 2026, the judge concluded that the appellant, as a potential victim of trafficking, did not fall within a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. The judge also rejected the appellant’s claim to have a genuine subjective fear of persecution from gang members in Albania. In common with the respondent, the judge found that the appellant had been inconsistent in important aspects of his account. She further concluded that the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in any of the safe countries through which he had travelled, including Belgium, where he remained for approximately two months, damaged his credibility.
9. The judge also considered the psychiatric report of Dr Hina Rauf, which recorded the appellant’s reports of low mood, anxiety and nervousness, and which diagnosed him as suffering from PTSD and severe depression. However, the judge found that Dr Rauf’s conclusions were substantially predicated on the truth of the appellant’s account of persecution. Having rejected the core of that account and found that the appellant did not have a genuine subjective fear of return, the judge nevertheless went on to consider, in the alternative, whether the appellant would be able to obtain a sufficiency of protection from the Albanian authorities or internally relocate if his claim were true. She concluded that both options were reasonably available to the appellant. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. On 28 May 2026, the appellant was granted permission to appeal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Jepson on two out of three grounds. In fact, the appellant had raised four grounds, although Grounds 3 and 4 are similar, and Mr Simpson accepted that the appellant could pursue all grounds other than Ground 1, in respect of which Judge Jepson had expressly refused permission. The grounds of appeal before me are, therefore, as follows:
(2) The judge erred by failing to take into account relevant evidence, namely Dr Rauf’s psychiatric report, when assessing the appellant’s credibility.
(3) The judge failed to follow the country guidance case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) when considering sufficiency of protection and risk of re-trafficking.
(4) The judge failed to follow the country guidance cases of AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC) and BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania CG [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC) when considering the appellant’s ability to internally relocate.
The hearing
11. The parties made the following submissions at the error of law hearing.
12. Mr Papasotiriou, for the appellant, submitted that the First-tier Tribunal had fallen into an error described in Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367, at [24], by assessing the appellant’s credibility before properly integrating the psychiatric evidence, which addressed the impact of trauma, dissociation and mental health difficulties on the appellant’s memory and ability to give consistent evidence. He argued that the judge reached adverse credibility findings based on discrepancies and only thereafter considered the psychiatric report, contrary to the requirement that such evidence form an integral part of the credibility assessment. He further submitted that the error was material because the credibility findings infected the subsequent risk assessment, including findings regarding family support, the significance of the appellant’s mental health, and the risk of re-trafficking. In relation to Grounds 3 and 4, he argued that the judge failed adequately to consider relevant trafficking risk factors identified in the country materials and authorities, including the appellant’s lack of family support, history of abuse, mental health difficulties and vulnerability to re-trafficking, with the result that the risk analysis, sufficiency of protection assessment and internal relocation findings were flawed.
13. Mr Simpson, for the respondent, submitted that the judge had not committed a Mibanga error, having considered the psychiatric evidence at length before reaching her ultimate credibility findings. He argued that the appellant had failed to identify any aspect of the psychiatric report demonstrating that the diagnosed conditions explained the particular inconsistencies relied upon by the judge. Mr Simpson contended that the medical evidence was incapable of resolving the credibility issues identified and that the judge was entitled to reject the appellant’s account. As to Grounds 3 and 4, he submitted that the judge considered the appellant’s case at its highest when assessing risk and took into account the relevant factors, including family support, his education and his mental health. He argued that no directly applicable country guidance had been advanced before the First-tier Tribunal, that the appellant’s skeleton argument had not squarely raised the points now relied upon, and that the judge could not be criticised for failing expressly to engage with authorities or risk factors which had not been properly raised before her.
14. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Discussion
Ground 2
15. There are two elements to this ground. First, it is said that, in rejecting the appellant’s account at [36]-[39] because of inconsistencies in his evidence, the judge failed to consider whether those inconsistencies might be explained by his mental health difficulties. Secondly, it is argued that the judge considered the psychiatric evidence only at [64]-[70], after having already formed an adverse view of the appellant’s credibility, rather than assessing all of the evidence holistically.
16. At [71] the judge concluded that, “[h]aving considered all of the evidence in the round”, she did not accept that the appellant’s account was reasonably likely to be true. Mr Papasotiriou submitted that the judge had not, in reality, adopted such an approach. There is some superficial force in that submission. At [29]-[62], the judge identified a number of significant inconsistencies and contradictions in the appellant’s evidence concerning events in Albania, his journey to the United Kingdom, his family circumstances and his activities after arrival. Those findings included a conclusion that the appellant had fabricated his account of having been trafficked to the United Kingdom and detained in a cannabis house for two months: see [57]. The judge then addressed section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 at [63]. It is only thereafter, at [64]-[70], that she considered the evidence relating to the appellant’s mental health.
17. Read fairly and as a whole, however, I am not satisfied that the judge materially erred by structuring her decision in that way. The judge was required to organise a substantial body of evidence and chose to do so under separate headings dealing with different aspects of the claim, including “Events in Albania”, “Travel to the UK”, “The appellant’s home and family background”, “Events after arriving in the UK” and “The appellant’s mental health and the report of Dr Hina Rauf”. The mere fact that the psychiatric evidence was discussed in a later section of the decision does not mean that it was excluded from the judge’s overall assessment. To the contrary, at [71] the judge expressly stated that she had considered all of the evidence in the round before reaching her conclusions.
18. Moreover, the adverse credibility findings reached by the judge were based upon a series of substantial inconsistencies. For example, the appellant initially claimed that he had arrived in the United Kingdom on 7 August 2022, the day before claiming asylum. It was only after the respondent had refused his claim that he advanced a materially different account, namely that he had in fact arrived in June 2022 and had spent approximately two months detained and working in a cannabis house: see [34]. The judge also noted that, during cross-examination, the appellant claimed for the first time to have reported the gang in Albania to the police, a matter not mentioned in either his asylum interview or witness statements: see [38]. Furthermore, notwithstanding the appellant’s evidence that he had lost contact with his family in Albania, the judge found that he had repeatedly informed healthcare professionals that he remained in regular contact with them: see [45]-[50].
19. In considering the psychiatric evidence at [64]-[70], the judge noted that Dr Rauf appeared largely to have accepted the appellant’s account at face value when diagnosing him as suffering from severe depression, PTSD and generalised anxiety disorder. The judge also observed that the report did not engage with the appellant’s GP records, which contained no recorded consultations or treatment for mental health difficulties prior to July 2024, several months after the respondent’s refusal decision. The judge further considered a Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (“CAMHS”) assessment dated 19 July 2024, which recorded that, although the appellant was worried about his immigration status and future in the United Kingdom, he was otherwise settled, usually happy and “feeling good”. The judge also took account of a letter from a CAMHS consultant psychiatrist dated 28 July 2025, which proceeded on the basis that the appellant’s accounts of being involved in a gang and a victim of trafficking were true, and which recorded symptoms of depression and anxiety while identifying his uncertain immigration status as a significant stressor. The judge noted that the appellant’s condition had improved with CBT and antidepressant medication. Having considered the evidence as a whole, she attached greater weight to the GP records and treating clinician’s evidence than to Dr Rauf’s report. That was an evaluative assessment that was properly open to the judge on the evidence before her.
20. Mr Papasotiriou is correct that the judge did not expressly address whether the appellant’s mental health difficulties could explain the inconsistencies identified in his evidence. The judge did, however, take account of the appellant’s young age when assessing credibility: see [28]. Nevertheless, she found that “the discrepancies and inconsistencies in his evidence are so fundamental that I find that his account is not reasonably likely to be true”. More importantly, however, I am not persuaded that any failure expressly to engage with that issue could have been material. Dr Rauf’s opinion at [13.5] of her report was that, because of his history of past abuse, the appellant might not remember events precisely or might dissociate from painful memories. That evidence was capable of providing a potential explanation for minor discrepancies in his recollection. The difficulties identified by the judge, however, were of a different order.
21. First, as Mr Simpson submitted, the grounds do not identify which of the inconsistencies relied upon by the judge could plausibly be attributed to depression, anxiety or PTSD. Secondly, the principal inconsistencies were not peripheral matters of detail. The most striking example concerns the appellant’s account of his arrival in the United Kingdom. The difference between spending one night in a cannabis house before claiming asylum and spending approximately two months detained there as a victim of trafficking cannot readily be characterised as a failure accurately to recall details of the same event. Similarly, the judge was entitled to regard the appellant’s claimed loss of contact with his family with scepticism in circumstances where he had repeatedly and consistently informed healthcare professionals that he remained in regular contact with them.
22. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant had not established that he genuinely feared persecution in Albania. Any failure expressly to link the psychiatric evidence to each of the credibility findings was not material to the outcome. Accordingly, Ground 2 is not made out.
Grounds 3 and 4
23. In light of my conclusions on Ground 2, Grounds 3 and 4 do not ultimately affect the outcome of the appeal. Questions of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation only arise if the appellant has established a genuine subjective fear of return. Given my conclusion that the judge was entitled to reject the core of the appellant’s account, these grounds are, in that sense, immaterial. I can therefore deal with them briefly.
24. Both grounds concern an alleged failure by the judge properly to engage with the relevant country guidance.
25. As the appellant was neither a trafficked woman nor a gay man, the judge was not required to consider the country guidance cases of TD and AD, AM and BM or BF unless those authorities were specifically relied upon by the parties: see Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC). As Mr Simpson submitted, neither of the appellant’s skeleton arguments before the First-tier Tribunal expressly referred the judge to those authorities, and the grounds of appeal do not claim that they were raised orally. Although the Home Office CPIN, Albania: Human Trafficking (Version 16.0, July 2024), identified risk factors at [3.3.4] which broadly reflected those discussed in TD and AD, the appellant’s skeleton arguments did not expressly direct the judge to that passage. In those circumstances, the judge cannot fairly be criticised for failing to identify and address a point which the appellant himself did not raise.
26. In any event, I accept Mr Simpson’s submission that the judge did, in substance, consider the principal factors relevant to risk on return. In particular, she addressed the appellant’s age, the availability of family support, his education, skills and employability, his mental and physical health, and the extent of the reach, influence and any continuing interest in him on the part of the criminal gang in Albania or the traffickers: see [77]-[78] and [80]-[83]. Having considered those matters, the judge was entitled to conclude that, even taking the appellant’s case at its highest, he would not face a real risk on return to Albania because he could either obtain a sufficiency of protection from the state or, alternatively, internally relocate.
27. Accordingly, neither Ground 3 nor Ground 4 is made out.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law. Accordingly, that decision shall stand.
The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13th October 2026