UI-2026-002863
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002863
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60271/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
2nd November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
Between
ES
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Georget of Counsel, instructed by Malik & Malik Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 27 August 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 31 March 2026 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 25 October 2023 to refuse her protection and human rights claim.
2. The appellant was an accepted victim of human trafficking, who had been sexually exploited in the United Kingdom. She claimed to be at risk on return from the gang from whom she escaped and in general from retrafficking. Her son (who had also claimed asylum in the United Kingdom) gave evidence that the trafficking gang were pursuing him to pay a debt at least in part arising from the appellant fleeing prostitution.
3. The FtT dismissed the appeal on all grounds. It did not accept the existence of the debt or that there was any evidence that the trafficking gang had reach and influence in Albania. The FtT found amongst other things that the appellant and her son had been inconsistent about when her husband (the son’s father) had died.
4. The single ground of appeal, for which permission was given by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor in a decision dated 15 June 2026, was that the FtT had made a material mistake of fact in recording the appellant’s evidence as being that her husband had died in 2015.
5. The FtT had accepted the mistake of fact but refused permission to appeal on the basis that the mistake had been immaterial to its decision. There had been a number of other reasons for rejecting the existence of any debt, and the mistake did not in any event infect its findings on the claimed risk of retrafficking.
6. In her renewed application to the Upper Tribunal, the appellant argued that the admitted mistake had been critical to rejecting the claimed debt. The risk arising from the debt could not be separated from the risk of retrafficking. Consequently, the admitted mistake had infected the entire decision. In her rule 24 response, the respondent defended the position taken by the FtT in refusing permission.
7. The representatives supplemented their statements of case with oral submissions. Whilst I refer below only to such matter as necessary to understand my decision, I took the statements of case, submissions and the materials to which they referred into account in their entirety.
Consideration
8. The FtT’s consideration of the debt over which the appellant’s son claimed he had been attacked is given at [27]-[29]:
‘27. I shall deal with the issue of debts and loans as a basis for a risk on return. The Appellant and her son refer to debts and loans however there are some inconsistencies in their accounts. The Appellant’s oral evidence referred to a €10,000 loan that her son was attacked over. In clarification she elaborated to explain that she was contacted by a bank in Albania on her husband’s death when he stopped making repayments on a €10,000 he had obtained from an Albanian bank by forging her signature. She made a sworn statement to the bank, and the matter was dealt with and effectively the bank accepted the loan had been taken out fraudulently. She gives no other evidence of loans or debts herself and certainly none in relation to gangsters.
28. Her sons’ evidence differs not insignificantly- he refers to a €27,000 debt owed to a gang for a property and/or because of his mother escaping prostitution. He has provided no medical evidence in support of the claim that he was assaulted and severely injured. His evidence is that his father died much more recently than the date given by his mother. He claims his father died after having paid for him to travel to the UK. This evidence is wholly inconsistent with his mother’s evidence that her ex-husband died in or around 2015 – this is evident by her account that his death led to the banks seeking recovery of their 10K loan at that time, as previously he had been making the necessary loan repayments. See AIR Q105 page 729 C/B. The son says he did not report the attack to the police because the men had links to the police however he has no basis for asserting that as he did not discuss the attack with his mother at the time and had not previously, on his evidence, been aware of her involvement in prostitution.
29. In light of these significant inconsistencies between his evidence and his mother’s and considering she is the person who would know best about debts in her name, I reject his evidence as unreliable on this issue and reject any assertion that the Appellant is subject to a debt of €27,000 owed to gangsters in Albania. On the evidence available to me I find that there was only a bank debt that was resolved and there were and are no debts with criminal gangs.’
9. The respondent argues that the FtT would have rejected the claimed gang debt (and consequential attack on the appellant’s son) even if the mistake had not been made. Mr Sheikh points to the numerous other inconsistencies identified in its consideration. However, it is clear from [29] that all of the inconsistencies had been taken into account when rejecting that element of the claim, as well as its view that the appellant would know best about debts in her name. Had the supposed inconsistency been irrelevant to the FtT’s rejection of the claimed gang debt, it need not have been mentioned at all. The fact that the FtT did clearly suggests that the supposed inconsistency was material to its conclusion. As it is, the FtT in its permission decision conceded at [4] that the supposed inconsistency was ‘one of the facts I considered in the assessment of the Appellant’s son’s credibility’.
10. As an aside, I am deeply troubled by the FtT’s view that the appellant would have better knowledge of the gang debt than her son. That debt was said by her son to arise from a property and from her having escaped from them. It is unclear to me how an escaped victim of trafficking would know how much her captors would demand for her having escaped prostitution.
11. Consequently, the FtT’s rejection of the appellant’s son’s claim that a criminal gang was seeking repayment of a €27,000 debt arising at least in part out of the appellant’s escape from prostitution, and that he had been attacked as a consequence, was infected by a material error of fact such that it cannot stand.
12. The respondent argues that the FtT’s rejection of the debt issue is separable from its rejection of the appellant’s claimed risk from retrafficking. Mr Sheikh also argued that the appellant had not challenged the FtT’s consideration of sufficiency of protection or internal relocation, in particular its analysis under TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC).
13. The problem with these submissions is that it is impossible to be satisfied that the FtT would have rejected the appellant’s claim that her trafficker was the leader of an organised criminal gang if she had accepted that her son had been threatened in Albania over the claimed debt arising from her escape from prostitution. It is consequently impossible to be sure that FtT would have found either sufficiency of protection or an internal relocation alternative. As Mr Mr Georget submitted, whether sufficient protection is available from a given persecutor depends on their reach and influence. In the absence of a lawful assessment of the latter, it is difficult to see how a safe conclusion can be reached on the former.
14. The FtT’s TD and AD analysis takes the respondent no further. It considers the risk of retrafficking in general without consideration of the risk specifically from her trafficker’s gang, because of the claimed debt or otherwise. Moreover, the FtT’s analysis expressly incorporates at [58] its unsafe finding on the appellant’s claimed risk.
15. Regrettably, I find, the FtT’s admitted error of fact renders its findings on all of the principal controversial issues unsafe, and so all must be set aside. In the circumstances, I am drawn to the conclusion that it is necessary to remit the appeal to the FtT for consideration afresh with no findings preserved.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside.
2. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by another judge with no findings preserved.
Sean O’Brien
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
26 October 2026