Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002869
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68745/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOBBS

Between

CC
ANONYMITY ORDER MADE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Not represented
For the respondent: Ms. J. Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of her family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of her family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cohen (the “Judge”), dated 22 March 2026, in which he dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse her protection claim. CC is a national of Algeria. Her minor daughter is dependent on her claim.

2. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Brannan in a decision dated 3 June 2026 as follows:

“2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in:
a. finding the appellant was not a victim of domestic violence and
b. its conclusion on risk due to her family status as being unacknowledged by her father

3. The appellant has provided with her grounds of appeal a report from Hillingdon Council corroborating the rape claim. This ought properly to have been provided prior to the hearing for consideration by the judge. The judge appears to have decided that this claim was an attempt to bolster a weak asylum claim (see paragraph 48). While there is a Lucas direction in paragraph 21, it is not explicitly applied in paragraph 48. The appellant does not speak English well and was unrepresented. Her minor daughter was a dependant on her claim. The best interests of that daughter are strongly tied to a claim about domestic violence. It is an arguable error of law that the Tribunal failed to properly assist an unrepresented appellant in a case involving a child in relation to the relevant evidence of the claimed rape, and failed to consider the issue of domestic violence discretely bearing in mind the situation of the child, when considering Article 8. Permission to appeal is granted on this limited ground.

4. The judge provides adequate reasons for the conclusion that there is no real risk of persecution in relation to the original claim relating to her identity. Permission to appeal is not granted on this ground.”

3. There was no Rule 24 response.

The hearing

4. The appellant is unrepresented. She attended the hearing together with her son. She was assisted by the interpreter, Mr. G. Ali, who confirmed before proceeding that they both fully understood each other. The language used was Arabic (North African). Mr. Ali attended remotely. There was no objection to him doing so, and I was content that the appellant was able properly to understand him, and to participate.

5. At the hearing I stated that I found the decision involved the making of a material error of law, and I set the decision aside. I gave brief reasons for my decision, which I explained to the parties, and I then explained to the appellant what would happen next. My full reasons are set out below.

Error of law

6. I find that the Judge failed properly to assist an unrepresented appellant and that consequently the hearing was procedurally unfair.

7. I have carefully considered the decision and find that there is no indication that the Judge properly assisted the appellant. Under the heading “The Hearing”, the Judge states at [6]:

“The hearing took place by video on the Cloud Video Platform. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.”

8. This is the extent of his summary of the hearing. There is no reference to the fact that the appellant was unrepresented. There is no reference to the presence of the interpreter, or the steps taken to ensure that the appellant and interpreter were able to understand each other. There is no indication that the Judge explained to the appellant how the hearing would proceed, and no reference to any steps taken to ensure that she had all of the documentation before her.

9. The Judge next sets out the issues at [7]. He states:

“The parties agreed that that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:”

10. He then sets out from (a) to (q) all of the issues which he states that the parties have “agreed”. There is no reference to any explanation given to the appellant of these issues, and no indication that these issues were discussed with her. At (n) and (p) the Judge refers to a “Prima Facie” case. It is hard to see how unrepresented appellant from Algeria would have knowledge of English law such as to understand what a “Prima Facie” case is.

11. There is a further section headed “Legal Framework” from [9] to [22]. Again, as with my concerns set out above, there is nothing to indicate that this was explained to the appellant. Further, at [17] it states:

“The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are: [Insert relevant paras, usually no need to cite the full provisions unless they are in dispute]”

12. The next section is headed “Facts”, but it is in effect the Judge’s findings. In relation to the appellant’s claim to have been subject to domestic violence and rape the Judge states:

“35. The appellant claims that in the UK she was subject to domestic violence and rape at the hands of her husband. The appellant claimed to have reported this to the police. The appellant has referred to crime reference numbers. She has however failed to provide evidence concerning what was reported to the police or to demonstrate that they investigated any such claim. The appellant has failed to produce evidence to indicate that she suffered any injuries in the UK at the hands of her husband or that she attended hospital or her GP in connection with the same. The appellant only raised the claim of domestic violence after her asylum claim was refused. She was content for her husband to be treated as a dependent of her claim up until that point. I find that the appellant has fabricated her claim to have been the subject of domestic violence and rape at the hands of her husband in order to attempt to enhance and bolster a week asylum claim and I find this to be further damaging to her credibility.

36. The appellant has submitted what she claims are threatening messages from her husband in support of her claim. In considering the same I apply Tanveer Ahmed and in the light of my findings herein, I attach no weight to the same and find that they have been manufactured purely to attempt to enhance and bolster the appellant’s asylum claim.”

13. With her application for permission to appeal the appellant provided an assessment from her local council’s Children and Family Services in relation to her dependent daughter. She stated in her application:

“This report conﬁrms that I was a victim of serious domestic violence, including rape, strangulation, and threats to my life. It also conﬁrms that the perpetrator was arrested and that I reported the abuse to the police.”

14. Ms. Isherwood raised with me the fact that this evidence had not been before the Judge. However, as stated by Judge Brannan when granting permission, the issue is whether the appellant was properly assisted in relation to the provision of evidence. This is especially the case as it appears from the respondent’s review that the respondent accepted that the appellant had been the victim of domestic violence. Ms. Isherwood acknowledged that this was case. The review states:

“The respondent has taken the appellant’s circumstances into consideration, and whilst the respondent does sympathise with the appellant’s situation, there is no evidence that the appellant’s husband has returned to Algeria. The respondent submits that such events occurred in the United Kingdom and not in Algeria. There is no evidence provided to suggest that her husband is a state actor or holds any power over the authorities in her country of origin. There is also no evidence that he would have the ability to be able to locate her if she were to relocate within Algeria, even if he was in the same country. The respondent wishes to rely on the same CPIN stated above within this review.” [17]

15. The respondent “sympathises” with the appellant’s situation and refers to the events having “occurred in the United Kingdom”. Her submission in relation to the rape is that there is no evidence that the appellant’s husband would be able to harm the appellant were she to return to Algeria. At [18] the respondent refers to the fact that “no documentary evidence has been provided in relation to the above circumstances”, but she does not state that she does not accept the appellant’s own evidence as a result of the lack of documentary evidence.

16. However, the Judge finds that the appellant “fabricated her claim to have been the subject of domestic violence and rape at the hands of her husband in order to attempt to enhance and bolster a week asylum claim”. There is nothing in the decision to suggest that the respondent’s representative made any application to withdraw the concession. There is no evidence that the Judge put to the appellant that he did not accept her evidence of the domestic violence. He found that the text messages were “manufactured purely to attempt to enhance and bolster the appellant’s asylum claim” but the respondent raised no such concerns. These text messages were before the respondent when she consented to the new matter of the domestic violence being considered by the Tribunal. The Judge had referred to them at [8] as evidence “of having reported her husband to the police for rape and domestic violence”, but then found that she had “manufactured them”.

17. The assessment report provided by the appellant is dated 4 August 2025, so had she been asked whether she had any additional documentary evidence, she would have been able to provide it. There is nothing in the decision to show that the importance of such evidence was explained to the appellant, especially in circumstances where the respondent had accepted the fact of the domestic violence and rape. I find that the Judge’s approach to the evidence of the domestic violence and rape is procedurally unfair.

18. I find that this error affects the decision as a whole, as it has affected the Judge’s credibility findings. As referred to in the decision of Judge Brannan granting permission to appeal, this includes his consideration of Article 8 with reference to the appellant’s minor daughter.

19. I note further errors in the Judge’s decision, references to Bangladesh ([43], [48] and [51]), and references to the appellant in the masculine ([39], [43] and [48]). Again, while these are not errors of law, they point to the fact that the Judge did not give adequate consideration to this particular appellant.

20. I am also mindful of the Equal Treatment Bench Book. Chapter 1 is headed “Litigants in person and lay representatives”. At [18] it sets out that the aim is to ensure that litigants in person “understand what is going on and what is expected of them at all stages of the proceedings”. [59] and [60] deal with “Difficulties at the hearing and how to help”. There is no evidence in the decision that any of the assistance set out there was given to the appellant.

21. I find that the Judge made a procedural error of law in failing to ensure that the appellant was properly assisted to put forward her case. I find that she was effectively denied a fair hearing. I find that the decision cannot stand.

22. Although the grant of permission was limited to the issue of domestic violence, given that the appellant did not have a fair hearing, the findings in relation to the appellant’s claim of her lack of status in Algeria are also set aside.

23. In considering whether this appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal or remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be remade I have taken into account the case of Begum [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC).  At headnote (1) and (2) it states:    
   
“(1)    The effect of Part 3 of the Practice Direction and paragraph 7 of the Practice Statement is that where, following the grant of permission to appeal, the Upper Tribunal concludes that there has been an error of law then the general principle is that the case will be retained within the Upper Tribunal for the remaking of the decision. 
 
(2)    The exceptions to this general principle set out in paragraph 7(2)(a) and (b) requires the careful consideration of the nature of the error of law and in particular whether the party has been deprived of a fair hearing or other opportunity for their case to be put, or whether the nature and extent of any necessary fact finding, requires the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.”      

24. I have carefully considered the exceptions in 7(2)(a) and 7(2)(b).  Given that the appellant has been denied a fair hearing, it is appropriate to remit this appeal to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.      

25. I explained to the appellant that I had set aside the decision and that there would be another hearing of her appeal. On the day prior to the error of law hearing, she had contacted the Upper Tribunal asking for it to be adjourned as she was trying to seek legal representation. However, given my decision, and given that I remitted the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, this was not necessary or in the interests of justice. I explained this to her.

26. I told the appellant that she would receive notification of the date of the next hearing from the First-tier Tribunal. Her last hearing was over CVP, and it was explained to her that she could also go in person to the hearing centre at Hatton Cross if she preferred. She said that she was still trying to obtain legal representation. However, in the event that she is unable to do so, I explained to her the importance of providing any documents she wanted the court to take into account as soon as possible. She has previously uploaded documents to the Tribunal system.

Notice of Decision     
 
27. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves the making of a material error of law and I set the decision aside.  No findings are preserved.  
 
28. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh. 
 
29. The appeal is not to be listed before Judge Cohen.

30. The appeal is to be heard at Hatton Cross.  The previous hearing was held over CVP from Hatton Cross, but it was explained to the appellant that she could attend in person if she wished.

31. The appellant will need an interpreter in Arabic, North African.

  
Kate Hobbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
1 October 2026