UI-2026-002871
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002871
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/58016/2023
LP/01710/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 September 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SKINNER
Between
SM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Z. Raza, Counsel, instructed by Bukhari Chambers
For the Respondent: Ms S. McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 26 August 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Pakistan who claims to be gay and therefore at risk on return there. By a decision dated 18 March 2026, the First-tier Tribunal rejected his claim to be gay on the basis that, for a number of reasons, his account of his sexuality was not credible. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran on the basis that it was, in particular, arguable that the judge erred by rejecting the Appellant’s account based on his own assumptions and/or speculative ideas as to how a gay man in Pakistan would act.
2. The authorities make clear that, while a tribunal is not expected to suspend its own judgment and that it may be appropriate to find that an account is so far-fetched and contrary to reason as to be incapable of belief, considerable caution should be exercised before a conclusion is reached that an account is inherently incredible. This is because there is a considerable risk that it will be overly influenced by its own views of what is or is not plausible, and those views will have inevitably been influenced by its own background in this country and the customs and ways of our own society. See MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at [61]-[62].
3. At the hearing before me, Ms McKenzie, on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, conceded that the FTT had fallen into error in the way identified by Judge Loughran. That concession is in my judgment well made. In particular, each of the following findings depended on the Judge’s own view of what was or was not plausible for a gay man to do without any evidence to that effect:
a. In paragraph 28, the Judge considered it implausible that the Appellant would have discussed his feelings and sexuality with a man who he described as straight but with whom he claimed to have had a sexual relationship with in Pakistan given societal attitudes to homosexuality in Pakistan;
b. In paragraph 29, he rejected the Appellant’s claim that he and this other man were friends, on the basis that if they were friends, in a sexual relationship and in college together “photos will exist showing them together”;
c. In paragraph 33, the Judge considered that “if the appellant were genuinely gay…he would have undertaken further research [into gay clubs] and discovered this fact” that there are gay clubs who cater for the Asian population;
d. In paragraph 40, the Judge considered that if he were genuinely gay, he would have undertaken at least some of the following activities: attend gay clubs, societies, festivals or other events.
4. In my judgment an approach to fact-finding based on plausibility rather than evidence inapposite in relation to those matters and constitutes an error of law.
5. As this error goes to the FTT’s assessment of the Appellant’s credibility, the parties were agreed that it was material and that a full de novo redetermination will be required. It is accordingly appropriate that this appeal be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for that exercise to be carried out.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cohen dated 18 March 2026 involved the making of an error of law and is set aside. The appeal shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be redetermined afresh before a Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Cohen.
Paul Skinner
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
1 September 2026