Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002876

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55293/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

SM
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Uddin, Solicitor, Syed Shaheen and Partners Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 21 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh born on 27 February 1979. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Joshi (‘the Judge’) promulgated on 19 February 2026 dismissing his appeal against the Respondent's decision dated 15 February 2024 refusing his protection and human rights claims.
2. The Appellant’s case is founded upon his claimed political opinion and activities in Bangladesh. He claims that he was a member of Bangladesh Jatiyotabadi Jubodal (‘BJJ’), an organisation associated with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (‘BNP’). The Judge concluded that the Appellant had not provided a credible account of being at risk and did not accept that the Appellant had established a political profile which placed him at risk on return.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman on 18 June 2026.
Anonymity Order
4. The Judge made an anonymity order. There was no request for the anonymity order to be set aside. I conclude that the Appellant’s rights to international protection outweigh the Article 10 rights of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings.
Grounds of Appeal
5. The Appellant advanced four grounds summarised as:
5.1 The Judge failed to make findings upon the central elements of the protection claim. Those matters included whether the appellant was a member of BJJ, whether he was General Secretary of the Moulvibazar Sadar Upazila unit, whether the attacks in 2010 took place, and whether the supporting documentary evidence was reliable.
5.2 The Judge failed to consider the evidence holistically, focused improperly upon provenance and failed to apply section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and the principles in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439.
5.3 The Judge failed to consider the changed political circumstances in Bangladesh and the claimed continuing risk from Awami League supporters acting as non-state actors.
5.4 The Judge improperly considered the Appellant’s medical evidence and consequent Article 8 claims.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
Appellant’s submissions
6. Mr Uddin relied upon the grounds and his skeleton argument that were provided to Ms McKenzie during the hearing.
7. For ground 1 he submitted that a key issue was whether the Appellant was politically affiliated with BJJ. He submitted that the Judge made no express finding whether the Appellant was a member of BJJ or whether he had held the role of General Secretary.
8. Mr Uddin referred to the certificate at composite bundle page 712, the membership and committee documents at pages 713–721, the translated newspaper report at page 704 and the hospital material at pages 707–710. He submitted that these were material documents which the Judge did not mention or expressly evaluate.
9. Mr Uddin submitted that it was insufficient for the Judge simply to state that all the evidence had been considered. It was necessary for the reasons to show how the important evidence was evaluated and why the Appellant’s case was rejected in that respect.
10. Mr Uddin relied upon the Senior President of Tribunals’ Practice Direction concerning reasons and English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605 to submit that the parties and the Appellate tribunal had to be able to understand why the case was decided as it was.
11. In relation to Ground 2, Mr Uddin submitted that the Judge improperly focused upon the origin of the documents rather than evaluating what they said alongside the other evidence. He relied upon Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11 and SM (Section 8: Judge’s Process) Iran [2005] UKAIT 00116 and submitted that it was necessary for all evidence capable of bearing upon the case to be considered and afforded such weight as was appropriate.
12. Mr Uddin also relied upon SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160 and HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 in submitting that a Tribunal had to identify the most relevant evidence and provide sufficient reasons for accepting or rejecting it.
13. Mr Uddin criticised the Judge’s treatment of delay. He referred to the Appellant’s explanation that his earlier advisers had made an application for stateless leave without his proper authority and upon the information allegedly received from his mother in March 2023. Mr Uddin submitted that the Judge failed to properly account for this evidence.
14. Given the above, Mr Uddin submitted that the Judge failed to undertake the holistic assessment required by Tanveer Ahmed concerning credibility assessments.
15. For Ground 3, Mr Uddin accepted that the Awami League was no longer in government. However, he submitted that its supporters remained in Bangladesh in large numbers and operated as non-state actors. He relied upon evidence of lawlessness, political violence and alleged sabotage and submitted that the Judge failed to properly consider and assess whether the Bangladeshi state could provide sufficient protection against such persons, applying Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37.
16. Mr Uddin accepted that MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 addressed the consequences of the changed government in Bangladesh. However, he submitted that MU concerned the facts of that appellant’s case and did not establish that every BNP or BJJ supporter was safe.
17. In relation to Ground 4, Mr Uddin relied upon the appellant’s Generalised Anxiety Disorder, his length of residence in the United Kingdom, the limited number and distribution of mental health professionals in Bangladesh and his claimed lack of family support in support of his submission that the Judge had failed to properly conduct the necessary Article 8 balancing exercise.
Respondent’s Submissions
18. Ms McKenzie submitted that the Appellant’s grounds largely amounted to disagreement with findings which were properly open to the Judge.
19. For ground 1, whilst it was accepted that the Judge did not make an express finding whether the Appellant was a member of BJJ it was submitted that the Judge’s treatment of the issue was implicit throughout reasoning and explanation of the risk assessment. Ms McKenzie relied particularly upon §76 and 77 of the Judge’s decision. There the Judge found that the Appellant had not provided a credible account, considered the contemporary objective evidence and found that the attacks relied upon concerned high-profile individuals. The Judge found that the appellant did not meet that description. Ms McKenzie submitted that the reasoning implicitly proceeded either upon an acceptance that the Appellant was a BJJ supporter in consideration of the Appellant’s case, otherwise there would have been no need to determine whether his profile placed him within a risk category. Whilst Ms McKenzie accepted that there was lack of explicit analysis concerning the claimed General Secretary position and the documents relating to the 2010 attacks, she submitted that this did not demonstrate that the evidence had been ignored.
20. For Ground 2, Ms McKenzie submitted that the Judge had considered credibility holistically. The Judge relied upon the immigration chronology, the delay, the withdrawal of the 2018 asylum claim, the Appellant’s numerous other immigration applications, the documentary evidence, the Appellant’s oral evidence, the medical evidence, the witness evidence and the contemporary country position. In doing so it was submitted that the Judge was entitled to rely upon delay. The chronology was not in fact disputed. The Appellant came to the United Kingdom in 2012, claimed asylum in 2018 and revived the protection claim in 2023.
21. In relation to ground 3, Ms Mckenzie relied upon paragraph 17 of the Court of Appeal decision in MU. She submitted that the change of government had fundamentally changed the risk landscape. Consequently, she submitted that any failure to make an express finding on BJJ membership or to provide fuller reasons on non-state actors was therefore immaterial.
22. For ground 4, Ms McKenzie submitted that the Judge considered the medical evidence, considered the appellant's claimed Generalised Anxiety Disorder, considered treatment availability in Bangladesh and reached findings that were properly open to him on the evidence. There was no misdirection of law and this ground amounts to disagreement with factual findings and weight. Any challenge to the Article 8 assessment similarly amounted to disagreement with conclusions properly open to the judge.
Legal Framework
23. The Upper Tribunal is confined to considering whether there are errors of law in the First Tier Tribunal decision. In R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 Brooke LJ summarises what amounts to an error of law at paragraphs 9 and 10
9. When the court gave this guidance in Subesh, it was aware that it would not be of any relevance to an appellate regime in which appeals were restricted to points of law. It may be convenient to give a brief summary of the points of law that will most frequently be encountered in practice:
i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome ("material matters");
ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters;
iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters;
iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters;
v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter;
vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings;
vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.
10. Each of these grounds for detecting an error of law contain the word "material" (or "immaterial"). Errors of law of which it can be said that they would have made no difference to the outcome do not matter. This need to identify an error of law which would have made a material difference to the outcome…
24. For materiality, a failure to expressly address a matter does not require the decision to be set aside if the outcome would inevitably or realistically have been the same.
25. A judicial decision must provide intelligible and adequate reasons. The reasons must enable the parties to understand why they have won or lost and must enable an appellate tribunal to understand the basis of the decision; and the reasons must address the principal controversial issues upon which the outcome depends. See English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605 and South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33.
26. The adequacy of reasons is context specific. A judge is not required to deal with every piece of evidence or every argument, and an appellate court should not assume that a judge failed to take account of a matter merely because it was not expressly mentioned. See Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464.
27. In a protection appeal, the judge must consider documentary evidence in the context of the evidence as a whole. It is for the person relying upon a document to show that it can properly be relied upon. The question is not ordinarily whether it has been proved to be a forgery, but what weight it should receive when evaluated with all the other evidence. See Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439
28. Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11 establishes that the fact-finder must consider everything capable of bearing upon the claim and afford each matter the weight it properly deserves. Evidence is not to be excluded merely because it is uncertain. The need for a holistic assessment does not require the fact-finder to accept each piece of evidence provisionally or to assign it weight in isolation. The overall exercise may reveal that weaknesses in one part of the evidence affect the reliability of another. A credibility finding must not amount merely to a statement of conclusion. However, where the Judge identifies rational reasons founded upon the evidence for rejecting an account, an appellate tribunal must not interfere simply because another conclusion was possible.
29. Where persecution is said to arise from non-state actors, the Tribunal must consider whether there is a real risk of Convention persecution and whether the state is willing and able to provide a sufficient level of protection, see Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37.
30. In MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812, the Court of Appeal addressed the changed political circumstances in Bangladesh following the removal of the Awami League government in August 2024. At paragraph 17, the Court stated that the change of government had wholly changed the picture on the facts before it, such that there was no reason to suppose the respondent in that case would remain at risk of serious harm. The decision does not remove the requirement for an individual assessment, but the fundamental political change forms an essential part of any current risk analysis.
31. The Upper Tribunal must not interfere merely because it would have reached a different conclusion, even if aspects of the reasoning can be criticised (Laci v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 769; Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74).
Analysis and Conclusions
32. The Judge’s decision and reasons must be read as a whole to properly consider the grounds of appeal. The Judge recorded at §4 that the Appellant claimed to be a BJJ member, claimed to have been General Secretary and relied upon two attacks in 2010. He stated at §14 that he had considered all of the evidence whether specifically mentioned. The Judge continues at §17 that the entirety of the evidence was considered.
33. Whilst those statements cannot overcome a demonstrable failure to consider material evidence merely by asserting that everything was considered, they do form part of the decision and must be considered alongside other relevant findings. The Judge proceeds to set out the Respondent’s detailed submissions at §18 - 33 and the Appellant’s detailed submissions at paragraphs 34–48.
34. The Appellant’s case was not omitted from the reasoning process. His claimed BJJ membership, party offices, documentary evidence, attacks, injuries suffered, medical evidence, explanation for delay, country materials and submissions concerning post-August 2024 risk were all before the Judge and were recorded.
35. At §55 the Judge expressly agreed with the Respondent’s submissions set out earlier and with the Respondent’s concerns about the documents. I do not consider that the Judge was simply adopting a case which had not been explained. The Respondent’s case was recorded extensively and the decision taken following recording extensive competing submissions. The subsequent paragraphs supplied further reasoning concerning delay, oral evidence, medical evidence, witnesses, scars, documents and contemporary risk.
36. At §76 the Judge concluded that the Appellant had not provided a credible account of being at risk. He did not accept that the Appellant had established a political profile which placed him at risk on return. The Judge also considered contemporary country evidence. He found that the more recent killings and attacks relied upon concerned high-profile individuals and that the Appellant did not fall within that category. He also referred to the appellant’s claim that there was lawlessness in Bangladesh and that it was unsafe for him to return.
Ground 1: BJJ membership and the underlying documents
37. The Judge did not make a clear, express finding that the Appellant was a member of BJJ. The Judge also did not expressly state whether he accepted that the Appellant had become General Secretary of the Moulvibazar Sadar Upazila unit.
38. The underlying documents were important to this issue. They included the translated BJJ certificate dated 20 January 2011, the membership form, the committee lists, the newspaper reports and the hospital certificates. The BJJ certificate stated that the Appellant had participated in organisational activity since 2006, served as General Secretary and had faced harassment and attempts upon his life. Further, the newspaper reports attributed attacks upon the Appellant to Awami League or Chhatra League actors. Similarly, the hospital documents recorded admissions and injuries, although they did not themselves establish the identity or motivation of any assailant.
39. It would clearly have been appropriate for the Judge to have made a distinct finding on BJJ membership and findings regarding the nature and significance of the Appellant’s claimed offices. The Judge could also have connected the underlying documentary items more expressly to those findings. An express analysis would have made the route to the conclusion clearer. Having said that I do not accept the contention that the Judge failed to properly consider this issue and associated documents. The Appellant’s evidence and submissions concerning the documents were expressly recorded. The Respondent’s detailed objections were also recorded. At §55, the Judge agreed with those objections.
40. Further, the Judge considered the documents within his later findings and directed himself to the principles in Tanveer Ahmed at §75. His conclusion did not rest solely upon an inability to establish where the documents came from. The Judge assessed whether the evidence established the Appellant’s claimed political profile and whether it established a current risk. The risk assessment at §76 indicates that the Judge considered the Appellant’s case and proceeded on the basis that some political affiliation existed. The Judge found that the contemporary evidence concerned high-profile persons and that the Appellant did not fall within that category. I accept that that reasoning necessarily involved an assessment of the Appellant’s claimed political profile and this is inconsistent with the suggestion that political affiliation was not addressed.
41. The Appellant’s argument seeks to treat the absence of a separate paragraph on every document as evidence that the document was ignored. That is not the correct approach. Applying Volpi, the Upper Tribunal should not infer that evidence was overlooked merely because the judge did not refer to it individually. Therefore, whilst the reasoning could have been clearer, with an express finding upon BJJ membership this does not amount to a material error of law.
42. In any event, even if the Appellant was a BJJ member, and even if he held each position attributed to him in the documents, the remaining question was whether he faced a real risk on return at the date of the hearing. The Judge found that the Appellant had not established a high-profile position which placed him within the category identified by the contemporary country material. The documents did not explain the practical significance of the local positions or establish a continuing adverse interest. The events relied upon occurred in 2010. The alleged information from the Appellant’s mother came in March 2023. The Judge was entitled to consider the substantial intervening period and the absence of reliable evidence demonstrating continuing adverse interest.
43. More fundamentally, the political circumstances in Bangladesh had changed. The political party which the appellant said had used state power and law-enforcement agencies against him was no longer in government. In light of MU, a finding that the Appellant had been a BJJ member would not, in itself, establish that he faced a contemporary real risk of return.
Ground 2 - Failure to adopt holistic approach
44. A person is not disqualified from claiming asylum because of delay or because other immigration applications have been made. However, I do not conclude that that was the Judge’s approach. The Judge treated those matters as relevant to credibility. The Judge was entitled to rely upon delay as one feature of a wider credibility evaluation. He also considered the Appellant’s immigration applications, the withdrawal of the 2018 asylum claim, the oral evidence, the documentary evidence, the medical evidence and the contemporary country circumstances.
45. The six-year period was correctly calculated. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom in 2012 and first claimed asylum in May 2018.
46. The Appellant’s submission concerning information received from his mother in March 2023 did not explain why he had not claimed protection between 2012 and 2018. Nor did it explain why the asylum claim made in 2018 was not pursued. The Appellant claimed that advisers made a statelessness application without his authority. That concerned an application made after his asylum claim. It did not displace the chronology upon which the Judge relied. The Appellant was also able to make or participate in other immigration applications. The Judge was entitled to consider whether that affected the explanation that his health prevented him from pursuing the protection claim correctly.
47. The provenance of documents was a relevant consideration. The Appellant relied upon documents said to have originated in Bangladesh many years earlier. He said a friend collected them and that he received them in 2023. The absence of an evident chain of transmission was a matter which the Judge could properly take into account following Tanvir Ahmed. The translation of the documents by an accredited translator established the meaning of the documents. It could not establish the authenticity of the underlying originals or the truth of their contents.
48. I conclude that the Judge’s findings at §53–87 demonstrate that a cumulative and holistic assessment was undertaken. At §55 the Judge accepted the Respondent’s submissions after reciting both parties’ detailed cases. The later paragraphs then addressed distinct evidential subjects.
49. At §75, the Judge expressly considered the documents under Tanveer Ahmed. The proper question was whether the documents could be relied upon when viewed in the context of the evidence as a whole. I consider that this was the approach taken.
50. In summary, the weight attached to the delay and chronology and provenance of documents was a matter for the Judge. Consequently, there is no material error in this regard.
Ground 3: Changed political circumstances and non-state actors
51. The Appellant submitted that there was not a proper consideration concerning non-state actors and that the removal of a persecuting political party from government does not necessarily eliminate all risk from its members or supporters. A former ruling party may retain supporters, local influence and a capacity to inflict harm. The correct question remained whether this Appellant faced a real risk of persecution on return and, if so, whether the current state could provide sufficient protection.
52. The Appellant’s written evidence asserted that the law-and-order situation had deteriorated, that political rivalry and violence remained widespread and that Awami League supporters were engaged in sabotage and personal revenge.
53. The country guidance included reports of political violence after the change of government. That evidence was capable of showing general disorder and incidents involving political groups. However, general political violence or lawlessness does not, in itself, demonstrate a real risk to the Appellant for a convention reason. The Appellant was required to establish a sufficiently particularised connection between his claimed historical profile and a present risk from Awami League supporters.
54. The Judge did not specifically address non-state actors in the decision. There is therefore an absence of reasoning in this regard. However, at §76, the Judge considered the recent objective material and found that the attacks brought to his attention concerned high-profile individuals. He found that the Appellant did not fall within that category. The Judge also recorded and rejected the Appellant’s reliance upon lawlessness.
55. The evidence of political violence after August 2024 did not establish that Awami League supporters generally retained the capacity or intention to pursue the Appellant as a local BJJ figure who had left Bangladesh in 2012. It also did not establish that the current Bangladeshi authorities would be unwilling or unable to take reasonable steps to protect the Appellant from such individuals for the purposes of Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37
56. MU is important in this context. It does not establish a universal proposition that no BNP or BJJ supporter can face risk in Bangladesh. Each case remains fact sensitive. MU does, however, establish that the replacement of the Awami League government fundamentally altered the factual premise upon which claims of state persecution by that government had previously rested. Once that premise changed, the Appellant had to establish a distinct contemporary risk. The historic fact of opposition to the former government could not, by itself, discharge that burden. There is therefore no material error of law in this regard.
Ground 4: Medical circumstances and Article 8
57. The Judge considered the Claimant’s health and medical evidence §46, 68 – 69 and 86. That evidence identified Generalised Anxiety Disorder. It did not establish psychosis, major depressive disorder or full diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. The Judge was entitled to distinguish the medical report from the Appellant’s broader assertions that he suffered severe depression, memory difficulties, stress and sleep disturbance. The Appellant did not establish that the treatment required for Generalised Anxiety Disorder was unavailable to him or that he would be unable to access it.
58. As to Article 8, the Appellant relied upon his residence in the United Kingdom since 2012 and his medical condition. The Judge considered those matters. The Appellant had spent his formative years and the greater part of his life in Bangladesh. There was no evidence requiring the Judge to conclude that he would face very significant obstacles to integration on return.
59. This ground does not amount to a material error of law. It amounts to a disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of the evidence and proportionality.
Summary
60. No material errors of law are established and the appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Joshi did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Benjimin Burgher

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 August 2026