Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002889
UI-2026-003519
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/72966/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

G A
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hussain, Legal Representative instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 14 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Hillis) promulgated on 1 April 2026. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 3 October 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The appellant is a national of Somalia who entered the United Kingdom on 3 March 2024 and made a claim for asylum. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 3 October 2024 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality, the respondent rejected the factual account given by him concerning the events in Somalia. The respondent in the decision letter and the review set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim.
4. The factual background to the claim was summarised in the ASA as follows: The appellant is a national of Somalia and belongs to a Gaboye clan. The appellant arrived in the UK on 03.03.2024 and claimed asylum in the UK. The appellant travelled through different countries, including Turkey, Greece, and France. He was following the instructions of the agent and was asked to get on a boat, which brought him to the UK.
5. The appellant’s father was working as a soldier and was killed in combat. The appellants' paternal uncle was killed by Al-Shabaab because of the land dispute, which Al-Shabaab wanted to take over. Since the death of his father and uncle the land inheritance came to the appellant therefore, Al-Shabaab wanted to kill the appellant to take over the land.
6. The appellant was taken by Al-Shabaab to become a part of their group. When the appellant refused, he was threatened that his leg would be cut off. He later accepted being a part of them but never performed any activities for them due to his injuries. They kept the appellant for 5 months, and later he fled once he recovered from his wounds. The appellants' other uncle, who was his caretaker, was later killed by Al-Shabaab as they wanted to take over his land. The appellant fears that he will be killed if he is returned to Somalia. The men of Al Shabaab are present in every city of Somalia. The Appellant cannot relocate or hide.
7. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 1 April 2026, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 14-38. The FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Somalia on the factual basis as he had claimed. The FtTJ concluded at paragraph 33 that the appellant was not a credible and reliable witness in the key material facts of his claim, namely, he is not at risk as a minority clan member, that he was not targeted for recruitment by AS, nor that his father and his uncle were killed due to AS trying to take the family’s land and, finally, or that the Appellant was attacked and abducted against his will to join AS and escaped during Friday prayers. As to internal relocation, the FtTJ considered the objective material and the relevant CG decions and concluded that he did not find the appellant credible in his claim that he has no-one left in Somalia he can turn to for help even if he could not return to his home area. He would be able to safely relocate in Mogadishu and turn to relatives or his minority clan members for help on return. He dismissed the appeal and all grounds.
8. The appellant sought permission to appeal on four grounds.
9. Permission to appeal was granted by a FtTJ on 6 June 2025 only on grounds 2-4 but on renewal of ground 1 permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan on 18 July 2025.
10. The hearing took place on 14 October 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was present at the hearing and was represented by Mr Hussain, his legal representative who appeared by remote means. The respondent was represented at the hearing centre in person by Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer. Whilst there was some background noise initially, I am satisfied that this did not affect the submissions of Mr Hussain and he did not raise any issues in this regard during the hearing.
11. Mr Hussain submitted that he relied upon the grounds of challenge and the Rule 25 response he had provided. He also provided his additional oral submissions on the 4 grounds as advanced on behalf of the appellant.
12. Mr Tan in behalf of the respondent relied upon the Rule 24 response and that the appeal was opposed on all grounds and provided his oral submissions in response to those of Mr Hussain. It is not necessary to set out the submissions and they will be considered in the context of the grounds advanced on behalf of the appellant.
13. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion:
14. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
15. There are four grounds of challenge. Ground 1: Procedural unfairness, reliance on immaterial considerations and/or failure to give reasons – the screening interview. Ground 2: Reliance on immaterial considerations and/or failure to consider material considerations – inherent plausibility and the medical evidence. Ground 3: Failure to give reasons – section 8. Ground 4: Failure to resolve material matters, and resolution of matters not in dispute – Article 3 ECHR and internal relocation.
16. There are two important overarching considerations when approaching my assessment of whether the judge materially erred in law. The first is the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Over the course of many years, the higher courts have emphasised the importance of the application of such restraint before interfering with a first-instance decision. Examples include: Biogen Inc. v Medeva plc [1996] UKHL 18, at [54]; SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL; [2008] 3 WLR 832, at [30]; Fage UK Ltd. v Chobani UK Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 5, at [114] and [115]; UT (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [19]; MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC, at [45]; Lowe v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 62, at [29]; Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2]; HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, at [72]; Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51]; and most recently Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47].
17. For present purposes, the essential principles derived from these authorities can be summarised as follows:
(a)   Although "error of law" is widely defined, the Upper Tribunal is not entitled to set aside the decision of the FTT simply because it does not agree with it, or because it thinks it can produce a better one ;
(b)   An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that the judge was "plainly wrong";
(c)    What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached;
(d)   The judge must consider all the relevant evidence relied on by the parties, although it need not all be specifically addressed in the judgment;
(e)    The weight attributed to relevant evidence is pre-eminently a matter for the judge;
(f)     An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable;
(g)   The reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract;
(h)   Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account;
(i)     When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out.
18. I confirm that I have had regard to these propositions, amongst others, when considering the challenges brought to the decision.
19. Before turning to an assessment of those substantive grounds, I remind myself of the guidance given when considering the assessment of a FtTJ and the findings of fact an assessment of the evidence undertaken. It is important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view. These are not controversial observations: see Customs and Excise Commissioners v A [2002] EWCA Civ 1039; [2003] 2 WLR 210; Bekoe v Broomes [2005] UKPC 39; Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318; [2006] UKCLR 1135".
20. The grounds refer to the adequacy of reasons. In this respect I remind myself of the scope of the duty to give reasons as set out MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and reiterated in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC) at [43]:
“[The duty to give reasons] does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the Judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. […] It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the Judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision.” (citing English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605)
21. The SPT’s Practice Direction of June 2024 on Written Reasons is also of relevance, particularly paragraph 6 which sets out the following
“6. Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.
Ground 1:
22. Dealing with ground one, it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that there was procedural unfairness in the assessment made of the evidence by the FtTJ between paragraphs 19 – 21 of the decision.
23. Mr Hussain relied on the grounds and submitted that the appellant was at a disadvantage as he had not been provided with a screening interview. He submitted that the FtTJ treated the screening interview as a “secure benchmark” and as such this was procedurally unfair.
24. Having considered the grounds of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and in the context of the evidence before the FtTJ and his decision, I am not satisfied that there was any procedural unfairness on the basis advanced on the grounds. My reasons for reaching this conclusion are as follows.
25. Mr Tan on behalf of the respondent submitted that while the grounds referred to particular submissions being made on the case law set out at paragraph 5 of the grounds, it had not been demonstrated that those decisions had been referred to. Those authorities were not raised in the ASA (see paragraph 20 of the ASA). As established, without evidence of what took place before the FtT there is no evidence in support of that submission. The grounds do not prove themselves. Nonetheless I have assessed that ground based on submissions made by Mr Hussain. The grounds rely on JA (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 450. In that decision the Court referred to the obligation to give anxious scrutiny to the evidence and the obligation on a Judge to have regard to the circumstances in which evidence comes into existence, identifying that which comes in a screening interview, and the requirement to consider with care how much weight is to be attached to the evidence. The decision refers to the possibility of errors and mistakes and misunderstandings taking place. The decision maker is able to take into account what was said by the appellant in relation to the interview responses and to resolve this when considering what weight to attach to the evidence. It is therefore not a matter of admissibility but really a question of what weight should be attached to the evidence.
26. Having considered the decision in the context of the evidence, the FtTJ addressed his credibility findings by reference to all the evidence that was before him. There is no dispute that the appellant’s credibility was at the heart of the decision letter and those issues were identified at paragraph 8 , they were relied upon in the respondents review at paragraph 8. They identified a number of inconsistencies in the factual claim given by the appellant relating to events in Somalia and the reasons why he left his country of nationality. The appellant when interviewed on 13 September 2024 following the screening interview which took place in March 2024, gave an inconsistent account as identified in the decision letter. The appellant was given the opportunity in the substantive interview to provide his explanation for those inconsistencies ( see Q75 and the appellant’s response recorded at page 146).
27. The FtTJ considered the evidence holistically including the evidence and the screening interview but also the evidence that he gave in the witness statement (paragraph 17) and also his evidence given by way of oral evidence (see paragraph 19). In my view the judge was entitled to consider the evidence as a whole when considering what weight to give to the evidence of the screening interview alongside the other evidence. It is clear from the decision that the FtTJ did not believe the appellant’s oral evidence and the explanation that he had given for failing to mention the reason subsequently given for leaving Somalia, which included a later claim that he left Somalia due to discrimination from his clan, that Al Shabab wanted him to work as a spy and also in relation to the identity of the person who was in fact killed by Al Shabab. In undertaking his assessment, the FtTJ of credibility he considered all the evidence. He looked at the screening interview 4.1, where the appellant had been asked briefly to give ALL the reasons why he could not return to Somalia and what the appellant had said at 4.1 ( see p119). This was as follows:
“Al-Shabab is trying to kill me.
Q. I know this is difficult, but could you explain to me why they are trying to kill you?
A. My father had land and my father had been killed because of the land, my uncle was responsible for the property and we inherited if from my father but we were children but my uncle was also killed because of the property. Then our responsibility were taken by my maternal aunt and husband to take care of us. They people have also killed the husband of my aunt; they also tried to cut off my leg. I was saved by my mother and aunt and she connected me to an agent that took me out of that country.
Q. Firstly I’m sorry you’ve experienced this; can you tell me when this happened?
A. End of 2022 was happening to me.
Q. Are there any other reasons why you are claiming asylum?
A. I just want safety from this government and to have access to education.”
28. The FtTJ considered and rejected the appellant’s oral evidence that he was not given sufficient time to give each reason why he had left Somalia. He took into account the questions that were asked and he was entitled to conclude that the appellant was asked to tell the interviewing officer why Al-Shabab wanted to kill him and if there were any other reasons he could not return to Somalia. As the FtTJ stated, “this provided him with every opportunity to briefly state why he left and could not return.” As Mr Tan submitted this was consistent with the written evidence and that the interviewer had not simply recorded what the appellant had said but had given him the opportunity on two occasions to provide further details. Thus, the FtTJ is entitled to take into account how the information and been given but also the explanation given by the appellant in his oral evidence concerning the contents of the screening interview. He did not solely rely upon this in isolation but by reference to the evidence as a whole.
29. At paragraph 20 the FtTJ assessed the claim relating to the circumstances of where, when and how the appellant’s father was killed. It is clear from paragraphs 20 – 21 that the FtTJ did not reach conclusions on the appellant’s credibility based solely on the answers given in the screening interview but also the light of the other evidence given in the witness statement alongside the oral evidence and the contents of the screening interview. This was set out at paragraph 20 and the FtTJ took into account the appellant’s explanation for the inconsistency when he was asked to account for this in his substantive interview and that it was a misunderstanding as he meant that it was his uncle that was killed in the land dispute. The FtTJ assessed the evidence as a whole including the witness statement and his oral evidence and that when he was young and his father died and having been raised by his aunt and her husband and that he referred to his aunt’s husband as his father as well as referring to biological father as his father. The FtTJ assessed the evidence but concluded that in his judgement the appellant had clearly drawn a distinction between his “aunt’s husband” and his father in his answer at 4.1 and that he had clearly stated that his father had been killed because of the land dispute and that, “they people have also killed the husband of my aunt..” The judge also set out what the appellant had stated, “but my uncle was also killed because of the property.”
30. Consequently, the FtTJ did not consider the evidence in the screening interview in isolation. There was no evidence before the judge that the appellant was unwell at the time of the screening interview, he had been asked to clarify his answers a question 4.1 and also provided with the opportunity at the end of the interview to make any additions he thought necessary and stated that he had understood the interviewer. He was also given the opportunity in this substantive interview to give reasons for the inconsistency and the judge considered his oral evidence as well as the written responses. Considered overall it has not been demonstrated that there was any procedural unfairness in those credibility findings made by the FtTJ.
Ground 2:
31. Turning to ground 2, Mr Hussain submits that the FtTJ erred in law set out in the grounds and that the FtTJ when reaching his findings of fact relied on his own subjective views as to the inherent probability of the account and this was contrary to the decision of HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037.
32. Mr Hussain directed the tribunal’s attention to the findings made between paragraphs 24 –28. However, as Mr Tan submitted the grounds only sought to challenge paragraph 24 and paragraph 26 ( see grounds at paragraph 7 and 8). Whilst Mr Hussain went beyond the grounds to challenge additional paragraphs, I am satisfied that the additional challenges made are not established. The FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons between paragraphs 24 – 28 when considering the appellant’s account concerning his claim to have been forced to join Al Shabab. Between those paragraphs, the FtTJ assessed the points raised in the evidence and in the decision letter relating to credibility and on the factual account given by the appellant that he was forced to join AS when they tried to cut his leg off using machine (see paragraph 23 for the account given).
33. Contrary to the grounds, the FtTJ did not rely on inherent plausibility, but addressed the claim by reference to the country material and expressly referenced the relevant CPIN Somalia- Mogadishu: Al Shabab and the security situation version 2.0 June 2025 paragraph 3.1.3 at paragraph 24. He assessed the appellant’s claim was not credible or reasonably likely that having attempted to cut the appellant’s leg off with the machine which then broke that they would not simply finished doing so with a machete given their known brutal tactics. Thus, it was not a case of the FtTJ engaging in speculation but setting his finding in the context of what was known of Al Shabab’s brutality and by reference to that brutality in the context of the objective material in support. As Mr Tan submitted, the reference to a machete at paragraph 24 was not a reference to any area of the evidence and not central to the finding made. What the FtTJ was stating was that the actions of Al-Shabab and as described by the appellant were not consistent with what is known of Al-Shabab.
34. Paragraph 25 was not directly challenged in the grounds. However, it is also a finding made in the context of the material relating to Al-Shabab and the evidence given by the appellant. The FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant’s claim that they had used this tactic to persuade the appellant to become a soldier and asking him spy for them was not consistent with AS using those tactics. In a regular army as opposed to an Islamic terror group it would normally result in the soldier being discharged on medical grounds. The claim made was that AS was doing this to persuade him to be a soldier for them. In those circumstances the judge was entitled to make the finding at paragraph 25. This is not speculation but an inference properly drawn from the material both relating to AS but also the factual account given by the appellant.
35. By reference to paragraph 8 of the grounds and the submission made by Mr Hussain, I reject the submission that there was any procedural unfairness relating to the assessment of the injury. It is submitted that at paragraph 26 the FtTJ found an inconsistency in the appellant’s explanation of them trying to cut his leg where the medical evidence referred to “ foot”. It is therefore submitted that this was not a point put to the appellant.
36. When considering issues raised of procedural unfairness, it is of relevance here that there is no record of proceedings nor is there any note from counsel as to what was said or what was put to the appellant either in evidence in chief or cross examination. It is for the appellant to make their case on procedural unfairness and the grounds do not prove themselves. In this respect it is clear that the decision letter and the respondent’s review of the appellant’s account that what occurred to him in Somalia was an issue and expressly challenged the account of his injury and in the context of the medical evidence. The appellant had provided the medical evidence in the hearing bundle.
37. The FtTJ assessed the medical evidence between paragraphs 27 – 28 and set out that the reference was made to the injury to the foot rather than having suffered an attempt to cut his leg off with the machine which broke down. This was the factual account as given. The FtTJ referred to the medical notes at paragraph 26. At paragraph 27 the FtTJ recorded the medical notes that the appellant had pain in his right leg, cannot walk well and that the cause of this was AS cutting his foot in 2022 which is scarred over but causing great pain. As the FtTJ set out at paragraph 27, he found no reference to the appellant claiming AS tried to cut his leg off and recorded that he had not been directed to any such entry in the papers submitted. The FtTJ set out that there was a reference to the appellant claiming that tried to cut his foot off and that there had been attempted amputation of his right foot two years previously and there was evidence of scarring and reduced ankle activity.
38. The FtTJ was entitled find on the evidence that the appellant’s account of the injury was not consistent as to where on his body the injury occurred, but also at paragraph 28 the FtTJ was entitled to make the finding that there was no expert medical or scarring report to support the appellant’s claim that the scarring was diagnostic or even consistent with someone trying to cut his foot or his leg off with a machine or any deliberate act of violence suffered at the hands of another person.
39. The appellant and his legal advisers were plainly on notice that this was a factual issue but there was no evidence provided in support and in the circumstances the findings made by the FtTJ were open to the FtTJ to make the evidence and it has not been demonstrated that there was any procedural unfairness. I accept the submission made by Mr Tan that the ground is no more than a disagreement and respondent’s reliance upon the decision in Abdi &Ors v ECO[2023] EWCA Civ 1455 is a point well made. There is no obligation on a tribunal to raise all matters ( see decision in Abdi at paragraph [29]). Where a party has made inconsistent statements ( here by reference to the medical evidence), a party has the choice of addressing them proactively or focusing attention elsewhere. If they choose not to address this, fairness will not usually require the inconsistencies being put to them. The Tribunal can usually remain silent especially if the parties are represented (see Abdi [29-[30] and by reference to SSHD v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173).
40. Returning to the grounds, the findings made by the FtTJ were based on the medical evidence provided on behalf of the appellant and therefore they had the opportunity to address any discrepancies or additional credibility issues during the evidence or in any submissions.
Ground 3:
41. Turning to ground 3, Mr Hussain relies on the grounds and the submissions made that the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons by reference to Section 8 of the 2002 Act. In his submissions, Mr Hussain submitted that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s explanation as to why he lied about his age. Mr Hussain submitted that the appellant had admitted that he was an adult and thus the conclusions were insufficient.
42. There is no error of law in the assessment of the evidence as related to section 8 of the 2004 Act. At paragraph 30 the FtTJ took into account the evidence that the appellant claimed to be a child when first interviewed. There is no dispute that when the appellant arrived in the UK on 3 March 2024 and when asked to give his date of birth he told the immigration officers that it was 15 April 2007, thereby making him a minor on his arrival. The appellant was interviewed on 3 March 2024 about his age because the age given did not seem to be consistent with his appearance and was thus “age disputed” ( see p156). It is recorded that ,” Quite developed as an adult. Deep frown lines” and “Deep voice. Maintained eye-contact with professionals.” Also, it stated that initially appeared to be confident and was stubborn that he is 16 years old.”
43. At the start of the interview, he was given the opportunity to give his date of birth again which he gave as 15 April 2007. He was asked questions about how he knew his date of birth and in particular if he had a birth certificate. He claimed to have lost his birth certificate it “having fell through his pocket”. When being asked how he knew his date of birth he said that his aunt had told him, but when asked to recall what year that was, the appellant stated that he could not recall. Other questions were asked and it is recorded that “When did you start school? A. I started school in 2020, before that I was attending Quran school. Applicant was challenges as he wrote his name in English, he claimed that he attended Quran school. He said that he can’t speak or understand Arabic, but Quran is in Arabic. The individual is not telling the truth. When challenged, the individual got upset. Overall, he is lying as he knows on what basis he can claim asylum by saying that he started school in 2020. The applicant eventually claimed to be that his original date of birth is : xxxxxxx. He has been asked to signed the pocket notebook and he is admitted his age.”
44. The FtTJ’s assessment on section 8 issue was that this was one factor to be weighed in the balance of the evidence as a whole. The FtTJ found from the evidence that this was to prevent him being sent back to Somalia. The FtTJ’s assessment of the evidence was that this was a deliberate lie and therefore engaged section 8 (2) of the 2004 Act. The FtTJ did not make that finding in isolation and contrary to the grounds the FtTJ had regard to the appellant’s explanation but rejected it finding that it was not a reasonable explanation that he lied about his age having been told to by his agent.
45. This was a finding reasonably open to the FtTJ to make and as Mr Tan submitted, there was no indication of the evidence given that he had been coerced by the agent. The reasonable inference as drawn by the FtTJ was the real reason for someone to lie when they were an adult with no identifiable vulnerabilities at the time, was to frustrate removal. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to identify relevant behaviour (see Section 8 of the 2004 Act) and to attach some weight to that finding. It is of note that the FtTJ did not treat this finding as determinative of the claim (see paragraph 30 ) and at paragraph 31 when considering a further section 8 issue resolved that in favour of the appellant.
Ground 4:
46. Turning to ground 4, this is based on the premise that the FtTJ failed to resolve material matters identified as Article 3 of the ECHR. The grounds set out at paragraph 11 that it was contended on behalf of the appellant that there was an independent Article 3 ECHR claim based on harm in Somalia which the judge did not address. At paragraph 12 of the grounds it is said that to the extent that there was an overlap, the judge at paragraph 36 and 37 found that there was no general breach of Article 3 of the ECHR in Mogadishu and no cogent evidence to depart from the country guidance cases but that it was argued that there was a freestanding Article 3 risk at the point of return, which would be Mogadishu for this appellant because he met MOJ headnote (xii) and ) OA headnote [14]).
47. Mr Hussain in the oral submissions admitted that this was a discrete claim that there was a barrier to his relocation and that he was a member of the minority clan. He therefore submitted that the assessment between paragraphs 36 – 37 was inadequate and the FtTJ did not properly explain his reasoning.
48. Mr Hussain submitted that he was not being asked to decide whether there was a general Article 3 risk in Mogadishu and he did not deal with the distinct question raised by the appellant’s case is recorded at paragraph 6 at the decision and the Gaboye clan status ( see Rule 25 response).
49. Mr Tan relied upon the rule 24 response. The respondent’s position on the grounds was that they sought to argue that the judge had failed to assess his claim under article 3 based on his return as a civilian. In any event, the article 3 aspect of the claim had not been identified prior to the hearing nor raised in any previous representations made by the appellant. That submission is supported by paragraph 6 of the FtTJ’s decision where it is recorded that there was a discrete claim under Article 3 as his tribal ethnicity will prevent him relocating safely to Mogadishu.
50. Mr Tan submitted that the FtTJ assessed the country guidance decisions and the point relied upon in the grounds was brought to the attention of the judge at the hearing but had not been articulated in the ASA and it is not known how the submission was in fact articulated before the FtTJ.
51. The parties appear to be in agreement that the argument relied upon in the grounds was not an argument raised as one of the principal controversial issues and was raised for the first time at the hearing. That is supported by paragraph 6 of the FTT decision and by reference to the ASA where the following was stated:
“It is submitted that the issues in dispute between the parties are as follows: i. ii. Has the Appellant proved he is a Somali national. Has the Appellant established that he would be at risk if returned to Somalia due to fear of Al-Shabab. Has the Appellant provided a credible account. Does he qualify for Humanitarian Protection” (p28). The submissions as to humanitarian protection refer to the CG decision of OA and the general humanitarian crisis (paragraph 30) and at paragraph 31 the ASA set out, “ While the situation was dire, the Tribunal did not find that conditions in all parts of Somalia were so severe as to automatically engage a risk to life or ill-treatment for every returnee. Nevertheless, the claim for asylum was likely to succeed for those at heightened risk, such as those with links to the government or those who had previously been targeted by insurgent groups.”
52. It is not known how the argument was articulated before the FtTJ. The ASA set out that the argument was based on the humanitarian circumstances in Somalia and that this was the basis upon which the judge considered the claim ( see paragraph 36).
53. The evidence in the appellant’s witness statement was that he had no family in Somalia to support him if he returned and had no money to survive . It was stated, “If Al-Shabaab finds me, they will kill me right away. Al-Shabaab can find me anywhere in Somalia, as they are present in every city in Somalia. Many local people collaborate with them, and they can inform the members of Al-Shabaab. There are no sources I could get housing or work if I returned. I don’t speak any other languages or dialects. I do not know where my aunt is, if she is still alive, has left the country, or has been killed by them.”
54. Having considered the decision of the FtTJ, it has not been established that the FtTJ fell into error in the way the grounds assert. I would agree that the FtTJ’s decision might not have been as expressed as clearly as it might but the FtTJ did address the Article 3 risk based on the evidence that was before him which included return to Mogadishu.
55. The FtTJ set out his assessment at paragraphs 36 – 38. He took into account the relevant CPIN at section 3 and that AS do not target ordinary civilians particularly in Mogadishu, notwithstanding that they continue to launch attacks in Mogadishu which are mainly targeting people places linked to the Somali government or its allies. 3.1.3:
“Al Shabab targets people who support or are perceived to support the FGS or resist the group's control. Sources agree that Al Shabab continues to be able to launch attacks in Mogadishu, mainly targeting people or places linked to the government and its allies, including African Union support forces. It has also targeted business people, NGOs, international aid workers and journalists. The group has reportedly attacked businesses in retaliation for installing surveillance cameras which might detect Al Shabab members linked to the group’s ‘tax’ collection activities. Sources are, however, consistent in stating that Al Shabab does not target ‘ordinary’ Somalis but it has shown little regard in preventing ‘collateral damage’ - civilian casualties – when targeting the government and its allies. Al Shabab uses a range of methods to attack its targets including suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and assassinations (see Al Shabab – Targets).”
56. The FtTJ recorded “I have not been directed to any evidence relied on to show that the CPIN is incorrect in this assessment of the appellant’s claim.”
57. He then went on to consider the CPIN Somalia: humanitarian situation in Mogadishu version 2.0 July 2025 (CPIN 2) and section 3 recorded that the general humanitarian situation living conditions in Mogadishu are not so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm or treatment that would engage Immigration Rule 339C and/or 339CA (iii).
58. At paragraph 37 the FtTJ stated, “I have not been directed to any cogent evidence that would permit me to depart the country guidance in MOJ& Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014) UKUT00442 or OA (Somalia) CG [2022] UKUT 00033. At paragraph 38 the FtTJ set out his findings and that “I do not find the appellant credible in his claim that he has no one in Somalia he can turn to for help even if he could not return to his home area. He will be able to safely return in Mogadishu and turn to relatives or his minority clan members for help on return.”
59. When assessing the claim made the FtTJ was entitled to take into account the factual findings made which were summarised as paragraph 33.
60. They are as follows: that the appellant had failed to show that he was a credible and reliable witness in the key material facts of his claim, namely, he is at risk as a minority clan member, that he was targeted for recruitment by AS that is father and his uncle were killed due to AS trying to take his family’s land and, finally, that the appellant was attacked abducted against his will to join AS. Thus, insofar as he had claimed in his witness statement that he would be at risk from AS and the claim made in the ASA that he was targeted by an insurgent group were not facts which the FtTJ had found on the evidence before him.
61. The country guidance decision of OA (Somalia) ( as cited) sought to address the conditions in Mogadishu in the light of the further country information provided post- MOJ ( see paragraph 218 of OA). As set out, the issues are interconnected, for example an individual’s exposure to the potentially harsh humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu are affected by a range of factors such as clan connections, access to remittances, employment prospects and access to accommodation.
62. The grounds refer to paragraph 14 of headnote in OA (Somalia) as cited. It reads as follows:” It will only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which would be reasonable for internal relocation purposes.”
63. As Mr Tan submitted whilst the appellant had set out in the witness statement saying that he had no family in Somalia and no job, the country guidance cases make the same point that the burden was upon the appellant to show the circumstances on return ( see decision in MOJ). The appellant was still required to show risk and there was no objective or supportive evidence put before the FtTJ beyond the appellant’s witness statement to show that his case was made out. I have not been pointed to any objective evidence as to the minority clan as was before the FtTJ. Consequently, the judge considered the evidence before him and made his assessment on risk based on his assessment of the evidence that was before him.
64. The FtTJ took into account the relevant CPIN’s at paragraphs 36-38 when assessing risk to civilians in Mogadishu. The FtTJ recorded “I have not been directed to any evidence relied on to show that the CPIN is incorrect in this assessment of the appellant’s claim.”
65. He then went on to considered the humanitarian situation in Mogadishu by reference to the CPIN and was entitled to find that the conditions were not so severe to show that there were substantial grounds for believing that there would be a real risk of serious harm or ill treatment.
66. The Respondent’s Review cited the CPIN by reference to the ASA (paragraph 23) stated that the Somalia CPIN Humanitarian situation 3.1.15, states ‘There are no clan militias in Mogadishu, no clan violence, and no clan based discriminatory treatment, even for minority clan members’.
67. The FtTJ took into account the country guidance decisions ( see paragraph 37) and when making his findings at paragraph 38, “I do not find the appellant credible in his claim that he has no one that in Somalia he can turn to for help even if he could not return to his home area. He will be able to safely return in Mogadishu and turn to relatives or his minority clan members for help on return.”
68. It has not been established that those findings made were not open to the judge on the evidence or that they did not address risk in Mogadishu. In relation to assistance from family including financial assistance , the FtTJ rejected his account that he had no one left in Somalia that he could turn to for help . The evidence before the FtTJ was that the appellant’s departure from Somalia was funded by family members and having rejected that his father and uncle were both killed, they are still available to provide financial and other assistance. Thus, having found that he still had family ties to Somalia and who had financed his journey to the United Kingdom that they could support him on return. The FtTJ’s assessment was consistent with headnote 1 of OA (Somalia) and that the appellant was not at a real risk of destitution or Article 3 risk on return.
69. For those reasons and having considered the decision of the FtTJ in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

18 October 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds