Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002896
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68080/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SEELHOFF

Between

SH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hill, Counsel instructed by Venire Solicitors (by Video link)
For the Respondent: Ms Mackenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer (by Video link)

Heard at Field House on 17 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of Afghanistan who entered the UK on the 9th October 2022 and claimed asylum on the 11th October 2022. The application was refused on the 9th July 2024 and the Appellant appealed.

Proceedings Before the First-tier

2. The appeal was heard by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Row in the virtual region on the 30th January 2026 and was dismissed in a decision dated the 1st February 2026.

3. In rejecting the appeal the Judge found that the Appellant’s claims about being persecuted by the Taliban were untrue but accepted that he had sold alcohol in the past. The Judge did not accept that the Appellant was at risk on the basis of the accepted facts.

Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission to Appeal

4. Permission to appeal was sought on four grounds and Judge Clegg of the First-tier tribunal granted permissions on grounds 1, 3 and 4 on the 8th June 2026.

Hearing

5. At the hearing Mr Hill confirmed that his instructions were that paperwork may have been sent to the Tribunal in error seeking to renew ground 2, but that there was in fact no intention to seek permission in respect of that ground and that we only needed to look at the papers on which permission had already been granted.

6. Mr Hill expanded on the grounds noting in particular that the significance of grounds 1 and 3 were intertwined as ground 3 goes to the materiality of ground 1. Ms Mackensie responded and Mr Hill then clarified some points in response.

7. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give.

Decision

Ground 1

8. In this ground it is complained that on the basis of the accepted facts the Judge was required to conduct a global assessment of the risk on return taking into account the following factors;

“(i) return from the West,
(ii) illegal exit,
(iii) prior sale of alcohol,
(iv) alleged westernisation”

9. It is said that the Judge erred because he considered the impact of each factor separately rather than their cumulative relevance.

10. The Judge considered return from the west and noted that “nothing” was before him to suggest that any risk arose from this. [68]

11. No evidence has been identified which supports a proposition that any risk arises from illegal exit and it was not raised in the skeleton argument before the First-tier. It is not apparent that this was a factor advanced before the First-tier but in any event the lack of evidence to show that material risk arose from it confirms that this would not be material even in the context of a cumulative assessment.

12. In respect of the prior sale of alcohol, it was clear that the judge’s assessment was that no risk at all arose from this, and that it would only arise if the Appellant sought to sell alcohol on return which would be a crime under the law in Afghanistan now. Having found that there was no risk from this at all, it follows that it was not a factor that would have been relevant in a cumulative assessment. Further, as Ms Mackensie noted this would be a fear of prosecution not persecution which the judge identified [65].

13. In respect of westernisation, the Judge considered this and noted that the evidence did not suggest any risk would arise from this if the Appellant had not come to the attention of the authorities before which he found the Appellant had not. [67].

14. Of the four factors, the Judge only accepted that any risk could arise from Westernisation. In that context any failure to consider the factors cumulatively could not be material.

15. Ultimately the assessment of risk was open to the Judge and it was clearly open to him to reach the decision that he reached.

Ground 3

16. Ground 3 notes that the judge relied on CPIN Afghanistan: Fear of Taleban Version 4.00 August 2024 when the version before the tribunal was the version of the document from 2025.

17. Although the grounds assert that the CPIN identifies certain risk factors, it does not identify how the 2025 document differed from the 2024 document.

18. In the rule 24 response the Respondent acknowledged;

“the Respondent accepts that the Judge failed to engage with the most recent CPIN. Nonetheless, this is not material to the outcome of the case, and the Judge would have reached the same conclusions, namely that the appellant had not come to the adverse attention of the Taliban and that he would not be at risk on return”

19. Accordingly I accept that there has been an error here.

20. I have considered whether or not this error was material. Although Mr Hill took me to various references in the 2025 document he did not identify any material differences between that and the 2024 version. The references he took me to at 16.3.1, and 16.33 refer to a 2023 source. The reference at 16.5.3 is to a June 2023 source and that at 8.2.3 is a May 2023 source. There is no reason for me to believe on the basis of the evidence before me that those sources were not in the 2024 version of the document nor that any relevant materials were not considered by the judge.

21. I do not find that this amounts to a material error of law.

Ground 4

22. Ground 4 asserts that the Judge’s approach to Section 8 of the 2004 Act was flawed because they treated the Appellant’s credibility as being damaged by the failure to claim asylum in a safe country when he had in fact claimed asylum in France.

23. In the refusal letter the Respondent noted;

“You failed to claim asylum in Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Switzerland before arriving in the UK. Your explanation that you were under the control of the agent (ACQ) is not accepted. As in your screening interview and asylum interview, you advised you were able to attempt claim asylum in France.”

24. In his witness statement the Appellant addressed the failure to claim asylum in Bulgaria but not the failure to claim in Austria, Hungary or Switzerland. Mr Hill suggested that the Appellant’s references to being under the control of an agent at paragraph 10 of his statement addresses those failures but I disagree.

25. The failure to claim asylum in Austria, Hungary and Switzerland was put in issue in the decision letter, and was not answered. Accordingly the judge was entitled, and almost certainly obliged to proceed on the basis that the Appellant had failed to claim asylum in safe countries without explanation and to treat that as damaging his credibility.

Disposal

26. The grounds have not identified any material error of law and accordingly there is no basis on which to interfere with the decision.

Notice of Decision

The decision does not contain a material error of law and shall stand.

The appeal is dismissed.

Adrian Seelhoff

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date 29th September 2026