Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002910
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51339/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SKINNER

Between

JL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J. Lanigan, Counsel, instructed by KBP Law LLP
For the Respondent: Ms S. McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Albania, born on 10 April 2004. He arrived in the United Kingdom as an unaccompanied child in November 2017, aged 13. His protection claim is based upon an asserted blood feud between his family and another family. He says that the feud arose after his father’s cousin, FL, killed SV in September 2011 and that, in 2017, shots were fired at his family home. He left Albania shortly afterwards.
2. This claim has an unfortunately long procedural history. The appellant made his protection claim as long ago as 8 October 2021. The respondent refused the claim on 23 March 2022. His appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was first heard in February 2023, but that decision was found to have involved the making of an error of law by the Upper Tribunal. The appeal was remitted and redetermined by the First-tier Tribunal in December 2023. That decision was also found by the Upper Tribunal to have involved the making of an error of law. In January 2025, the Upper Tribunal decided that it was appropriate to retain the appeal for re-making. Notwithstanding that decision, in March 2025 a differently constituted Upper Tribunal directed by consent that the appeal should instead be remitted once again to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was accordingly remitted and, on 20 February 2026, the appeal was determined for a third time, on this occasion by First-tier Tribunal Judge CJ Williams (“the judge”). By a decision promulgated on 23 March 2026, the judge dismissed the appeal on protection and human rights grounds. The appellant now appeals that decision on the basis that it too involved the making of an error of law.
3. I have made an anonymity and reporting restriction order in the terms set out above. Given that this is a protection claim and that knowledge of the appellant’s whereabouts in the UK could, if his claim is true, expose him to harm, the interference with open justice that this order entails is in my judgment justified.
First-tier Tribunal’s Decision
4. The judge identified the principal protection issue as whether the appellant was at risk because of his involvement in a blood feud. The respondent accepted that an individual referred to in the Albanian court documents relied upon by the appellant had been convicted of murder. The judge also accepted the authenticity of the court documents.
5. At [12]-[13], the judge noted that there had been no incident between the two families between the 2011 killing and the shooting said to have occurred in 2017. The appellant had said that long gaps were not unusual in blood feuds and that women and children were not usually victims. The judge considered that the claim that the family home was shot at when the appellant was aged about 13 did not appear consistent with that evidence.
6. At [17]-[18], the judge found that there was no evidence demonstrating that the man named in the court documents was related to the appellant. The judge recorded that the respondent’s presenting officer had put “this point” to the appellant. He then reasoned in the alternative that, even if the man named in the documents were the appellant’s relative, the documents established only that he had been convicted of murder.
7. At [19]-[24], the judge concluded that the appellant had not established that there was a blood feud in which he was involved or that he would be at risk on return. The judge relied upon, among other matters, the absence of documents demonstrating an ongoing feud, the appellant’s lack of evidence from his mother, the fact that his father had been able to remain in Albania until his death (unrelated to the claimed feud) in 2021, and the judge’s rejection of two recent emails as having been confected for the hearing.
8. Having rejected the existence of a blood feud affecting the appellant’s family, the judge did not go on to determine sufficiency of protection or internal relocation. He then rejected the appellant’s case under paragraph 276ADE and Article 8. In that part of the decision, at [29]-[30], the judge referred to the psychological report of Dr Laura Kemmis, principally in relation to the appellant’s mental health and the asserted obstacles to integration.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. In his grounds of appeal, the appellant advances three grounds. In summary:
a. Ground 1 contends that the judge materially erred by failing to address the country expert report of Mr Vebi Kosumi;
b. Ground 2 contends that the judge failed to take account the medical report of Dr Laura Kemmis when assessing the appellant’s credibility; and,
c. Ground 3 alleges procedural unfairness in the judge’s treatment of whether the appellant was related to FL, relying in particular upon the principle that a witness should have a fair opportunity to meet a challenge to his evidence.
10. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal but granted on all grounds by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Jarvis on 22 June 2026. He considered it arguable that the judge had not made a clear finding as to the credibility of the core of the appellant’s blood-feud account and that, in those circumstances, the absence of engagement with the country and medical expert reports was arguably erroneous. Permission on Ground 3 was granted “out of an abundance of caution”.
11. There was no rule 24 response from the respondent.
12. At the hearing, Ms Lanigan for the appellant relied upon her full skeleton argument and did not repeat it in full. On Ground 1, she submitted that Mr Kosumi’s report went materially beyond the uncontroversial proposition that blood feuds exist in Albania. In particular, it addressed the shooting of a family home while the appellant was a child, the absence of any fixed expiry period for a feud, and the significance of the passage of time. She submitted that those matters bore directly upon reasons given by the judge for rejecting the claim and had not been grappled with.
13. On Ground 2, Ms Lanigan relied upon Dr Kemmis’ evidence as to the effect of trauma and the appellant’s young age upon memory, the plausibility of his explanation for the late production of documentary evidence, and his tendency to avoid thinking about his family and past experiences. She submitted that this evidence was material both to the assessment of credibility and to the judge’s reliance upon the absence of contact with, and evidence from, family members in Albania. She also submitted that the judge was required to take the appellant’s vulnerability into account.
14. On Ground 3, Ms Lanigan submitted that the respondent had not squarely identified the claimed relationship with FL as a matter in dispute and that the question asked in cross-examination as recorded at [17] did not amount to a clear challenge to the truth of that relationship. She submitted that the appellant had therefore not been given a fair opportunity to meet the point. She contended that the judge’s alternative reasoning at [18] did not cure the problem because the relationship to FL was itself material to whether the murder evidenced in the documents had generated a blood feud affecting the appellant.
15. For the respondent, Ms McKenzie opposed all three grounds and submitted that the judge had lawfully come to conclusions which he was entitled to reach. On Ground 1, she submitted that the judge’s findings were not inconsistent with Mr Kosumi’s evidence. The judge had accepted that blood feuds exist in Albania, but the question was whether the appellant had shown that he himself was at risk from one. The fact that an account was consistent with the general characteristics of a blood feud did not establish that it existed in a particular case. On Ground 2 Ms McKenzie emphasised that the judge was plainly aware of Dr Kemmis’ report, which was expressly considered later in the decision. On Ground 3, she submitted that there had been no procedural unfairness. The point to the familial relationship had been put to the appellant in cross-examination, he was represented, and there was an opportunity for re-examination.
16. In reply, Ms Lanigan emphasised that the medical report had been considered only in the context of very significant obstacles and not as part of the protection assessment, despite its relevance to the appellant’s explanation for the absence of contact with his family.
17. I am grateful to both advocates for their helpful and focused submissions.
Analysis
Ground 1
18. Mr Kosumi’s report was dated 30 July 2022 and ran to 48 pages. The respondent’s review expressly addressed it and there was no dispute as to his expertise. The report addressed both the position regarding blood feuds in Albania generally and the plausibility of the appellant’s particular account more specifically. In particular, Mr Kosumi said that contemporary blood feuds can include shootings directed at a family home, expressly referring to the appellant’s account of bullets striking the window and wall. He also explained that revenge may be taken after a long interval and that a blood feud has no expiry date. He regarded the appellant’s account as plausible and consistent with the manner in which blood feuds operate, whilst properly recognising that findings of fact and credibility were matters for the Tribunal.
19. It is right to note that the judge did not refer to Mr Kosumi’s report in his decision. However, I do not accept that the absence of an express reference to Mr Kosumi’s report demonstrates that it was overlooked. It is well established that a judge is not required to refer to every item of evidence. The report was before the judge and had been the subject of submissions. It was in the 424-page stitched bundle expressly referred to by the judge at [3]. The question is therefore whether the reasons given disclose that material evidence bearing upon the issues actually decided was left out of account.
20. Mr Kosumi’s evidence was relevant to the nature and operation of blood feuds in Albania and to the assessment of whether the appellant’s account was consistent with them. The question whether there was in fact a blood feud between these two families remained one for the judge on the evidence as a whole. Mr Kosumi’s assessment of the appellant’s particular account necessarily proceeded upon the factual account supplied to him by the appellant. His conclusion that the account was plausible accordingly did not provide any further independent evidence that the events described by the appellant had in fact occurred.
21. Ms Lanigan submits that the judge’s reasoning at [13] is inconsistent with Mr Kosumi’s evidence, which therefore needed to be expressly addressed. At [13] the judge placed some weight on the appellant’s age at the time of the alleged shooting and his own evidence that women and children were not usually victims of blood feuds. That proposition was not, however, inconsistent with Mr Kosumi’s evidence. Although it is right that Mr Kosumi had stated that “there are cases of children in Albania incarcerated in their homes”, that plainly has to be read in its proper context. Mr Kosumi’s report makes clear that, traditionally, women and children are excluded from blood feuds and should not be targeted, although there may be uncertainty as to the age at which a boy comes to be regarded as an adult. Indeed, he considered the appellant’s account consistent with Albanian blood-feud practice in that children and women were not targeted, while explaining that males over the age of 16 may be regarded as legitimate targets.
22. Ms Lanigan also suggested that there was an inconsistency between [13] and Mr Kosumi’s evidence in relation to the home being targeted. On a fair reading of [13], however, the inconsistency identified by the judge related only to the appellant's age, not to whether blood feuds may involve attacks on a family home.
23. Ms Lanigan also relied in her oral submissions on Mr Kosumi’s evidence that “there is no time limit and no expiry time for a blood feud” which she suggested had not been taken into account and which militated against taking into account the fact that the appellant’s father had been able to live in Albania until his death in 2021. The difficulty with this submission is that, regardless of whether there is a “time limit”, the Country Guidance on Albanian blood feuds (EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 00348 (IAC)) makes clear that in determining whether an active blood feud exists the fact-finding Tribunal should consider “the degree of commitment by the aggressor clan toward the prosecution of the feud”, to which the frequency of attacks will plainly be relevant, and “the length of time since the last death”. The fact that the appellant’s father was able to live safely in Albania for ten years since the last murder and four since the claimed attack on the house was plainly something that the judge was entitled to take into account. The fact that a blood feud has no fixed expiry date did not mean that the passage of time without further incident was irrelevant to whether the feud remains active.
24. Reading the decision as a whole, I am not persuaded that the absence of express consideration of Mr Kosumi’s report discloses a material error of law. On proper analysis, there were no contradictions that required resolution by express consideration of Mr Kosumi’s report. Ground 1 is accordingly not made out.
Ground 2
25. Ground 2 concerns the report of Dr Laura Kemmis, a clinical psychologist, dated 8 December 2022. The judge expressly referred to that report later in the decision when considering the appellant’s mental health and the obstacles to his integration in Albania. The appellant’s criticism is essentially that the judge did not consider this report in the context of the protection claim.
26. Dr Kemmis diagnosed Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder and considered that the appellant was experiencing a complicated grief reaction following his father’s death. She considered that his young age and fear at the time of the events described were likely to have affected his ability consistently to recall them, and that his account of the traumatic events and associated symptoms was clinically plausible. She also regarded as plausible his explanation for the late production of the Albanian court document and described avoidance of thoughts about his family and past as a coping mechanism.
27. I am not satisfied that the judge erred as suggested. This is for two reasons.
28. First, I do not accept that the judge did not take into account Dr Kemmis’ report when considering the protection claim. There is no compelling reason to depart from the assumption that the judge took the whole of the evidence into consideration. It is expressly referred to in other parts of the decision and there is nothing in the judge’s reasoning to suggest that he put it out of his mind when considering the protection claim.
29. Second, and in any event, had the judge not taken into account Dr Kemmis’ report I do not consider that any failure to do so would have amounted to a material error of law in the circumstances here. In this respect it is necessary to consider whether the matters addressed by Dr Kemmis were material to the reasons for which the judge rejected the protection claim. In that respect, much of the report did not bear upon the findings which the judge actually made in relation to the appellant’s protection claim. The judge did not reject the appellant’s account because of an inability to recall dates or other details of events which occurred when he was a child and which might have been explained by his mental health. On the contrary, at [19] he expressly took account of the appellant’s age at the time and accepted that he would not know all of the details. Likewise, the judge did not draw any adverse inference from the late production of the Albanian court documents and accepted that those documents were authentic and proceeded on the basis that the individual named in them had been convicted of murder. Dr Kemmis’ evidence concerning the possible effects of trauma upon memory, and her explanation for the appellant having forgotten about those documents, therefore did not call for consideration in order to understand the reasons which the judge gave for rejecting the claim.
30. The appellant’s strongest point in this respect is in relation to the judge’s finding at [20] that the appellant has chosen not to obtain evidence for the appeal from his mother. It is however necessary to see it in its proper context. The judge said, “The appellant at no time indicated he could not speak to his mother, simply that he had chosen not to. The appellant has been through the appeals system several times and is aware of the respondent’s case. It has been open to him with the support of his representatives to obtain evidence which would be readily available to him, and yet he has opted not to.” Dr Kemmis recorded that the appellant’s account was that he had tried to push memories of Albania and his family out of his mind and that he had found contact with his family painful. She considered avoidance to be a recognised response to traumatic experiences, and appeared to accept that this explained the appellant’s avoidance of contact with his family. While that may explain why the appellant chose not to contact his mother, it does not, however, suggest that the appellant was unable to speak to her or obtain other evidence that was available to him (with, as the judge notes, the assistance of his representatives) or that it was not genuinely a choice. It might be a difficult choice, but there was nothing in Dr Kemmis’ report to suggest that it was not a choice that he could make. Dr Kemmis’ report did not therefore undermine anything which the judge said in [20].
31. Ground 2 accordingly falls to be rejected.
Ground 3
32. Ground 3 challenges the judge’s finding at [17] that there was no evidence demonstrating that the man named in the Albanian court documents was related to the appellant. The appellant’s case was that FL, who was convicted of killing a member of the rival family, was his father’s cousin. In short, the complaint that is made is that it was not put to the appellant in cross-examination that FL was not his father’s cousin, but only that there was no evidence that he was.
33. The relevant principle has recently been considered by the Court of Appeal in MR (Pakistan) [2026] EWCA Civ 473. In summary, the so-called rule in Browne v Dunn is not an inflexible requirement that every adverse submission concerning a witness’ evidence must first have been put expressly in cross-examination. It is, rather, an aspect of the wider requirement of procedural fairness. The essential question is whether the witness had fair notice that the relevant evidence was disputed and a proper opportunity to address that challenge.
34. I am unable to accept that there was any procedural unfairness here. First, there was simply no mismatch between the finding that “there is no evidence which indicates that the man named in the documents is the appellant’s relative” and the question that, from the judgment, appears to have been put. In putting that there was no evidence of the claimed relationship, the respondent gave the appellant the opportunity to draw to the judge’s attention any evidence that there was and the respondent was accordingly entitled to submit and the judge was fairly entitled to find that there was no such evidence. In other words, I do not accept that the appropriate question was not put. Moreover, the appellant was represented and any ambiguity arising from the question or his answer could also have been addressed in re-examination or submissions.
35. Second, it is clear from the Respondent’s Review that the whole of the appellant’s account was in issue. This is not a case where the respondent has led the appellant to believe that a matter has been conceded and that therefore he has not adduced evidence on it. The appellant’s credibility generally was said in paragraph 6 to “remain[] in serious issue”. Ms Lanigan relied on the fact that in paragraph 7 the respondent had stated “He and his family’s only link with the [rival] family is that his father is related to the perpetrator of the offence as a cousin.” Stripped of context, I accept that that can be read as an acceptance or assumption that the relationship was not in issue. Read in its context, however, I do not consider that that is what was being said. In particular, immediately prior to that passage the respondent stated that she did not consider that there was a blood feud but “considers it anyway in the alternative.” What followed was therefore the respondent’s consideration of the appellant’s case on the premise that his factual case was made out.
36. If I am wrong in my conclusion that there was no unfairness, I would in any event reject this ground on the basis that any error was not material. At [18] the judge expressly considered the position on the alternative assumption that the man named in the documents was the appellant’s relative. He nonetheless concluded that the documents did not demonstrate that there was a blood feud. That conclusion has not been shown to involve an error of law for the reasons set out above in relation to the earlier grounds. The adverse finding as to the relationship could accordingly not have affected the judge’s ultimate conclusion.
37. Ground 3 is accordingly also not made out. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge CJ Williams dated 23 March 2026 does not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

Paul Skinner

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 September 2026