Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002914
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/64196/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

8th September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

KA
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Representing himself
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard in person at Field House on 18 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction & Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The appellant appeals with permission granted on 8 June 2026 against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) given on 10 March 2026 (“the FtT Decision”) to refuse the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection claim.
2. The appellant’s case is that he was subjected to physical abuse by his father whilst growing up in Iraq. The appellant fears he will be killed by his father or his father’s tribe on return to Iraq. The appellant‘s position is that there is a Convention reason of honour crimes/blood feuds. The judge in the FtT (“the Judge”) did not accept that there was a Convention reason established and whilst he accepted that the appellant had been subject to physical abuse by his father and would be at risk on return by his father the claim for humanitarian protection/Article 3 ECHR was rejected on the basis that the threat was from a non-state actor and the appellant had not demonstrated that he would be unable to obtain protection from the authorities. The Judge also rejected a claim based on lack of documentation. The appellant appeals the FtT Decision.
3. Before the FtT the appellant was represented by Counsel instructed by solicitors acting on his behalf. In this appeal before the Upper Tribunal the appellant is a party litigant and represents himself. A Kurdish (Bahdini) interpreter was present to assist the appellant. I took some time at the start of the proceedings to explain the appeal process to the appellant and, in particular, that this would not be a re-hearing of his case but would instead focus on a specific issue related to the fairness of the earlier hearing regarding the language difficulties.
Grounds of Appeal, Discussion and Conclusions
Ground of Appeal
4. In the grounds of appeal submitted by the appellant on 24 March 2026 (“the Grounds of Appeal”) he reiterated his case and stated, “I want my case to be reconsidered there have been a lot of errors in my case that I could not correct because of different dialect interpreters provided by solicitors and courts.”.
5. In granting permission to appeal on 8 June 2026 Judge Kudhail identified that the appellant had, before the FtT, stated that he had issues with previous interpreters using a dialect he could not understand. In addition, Judge Kudhail stated that it appeared his solicitors were only instructed some 16 days before the substantive hearing and claimed to be unaware of previous directions in the case related to the translation issue. Post the hearing before the FtT the appellant filed a statement via his then solicitors in which clarifications were provided of earlier evidence due to the previous issues with interpretation. Against this backdrop judge Kudhail considered that it was arguable that the non-admission of the updated statement amounted to procedural unfairness, particularly as this is a protection claim.
6. At the start of the hearing I asked the appellant if there was anything that he wished to address me on in relation to the appeal. He confirmed that he had said everything that he wished to say. Having heard submissions from Ms Lecointe I again asked the appellant if he wished to add anything further and he explained that whenever he had been given an opportunity to present his evidence he had done his best to do so by providing it in a clear way. He was not seeking to add or change anything. He explained that there is a difference in his language and dialect and he is simply trying to set out the truth of his case.
7. I have proceeded on the basis that the ground of appeal is that identified by Judge Kudhail and that the issue is one of procedural fairness and specifically whether there was a material error of law in the Judge refusing to admit the post hearing statement.
Discussion
8. The background facts in relation to the interpretation issues are as follows.
9. The Initial Contact and Asylum Registration Questionnaire was carried out remotely by phone with the appellant on 4 September 2024. The interpreter on that occasion was Kurdish Badini. The appellant then submits, in English, through his then solicitors, a response to the Home Office questionnaire on 2 January 2024 (“ACQ”) in which it states his main language is Kurdish Bahdini. In the appellant witness statement dated 13 March 2024 the appellant states that his language is Kurdish Badhini but at the end of the statement he confirms that “this statement was read and translated to me in Kurdish Sorani by the interpreter from SKUK.”
10. The Statement of Evidence Form (SEF) Asylum Interview on 18 March 2024 was by video and was with a Kurdish Bahdini interpreter (I note the different spelling of Badini/Bahdini/Badhini in the documents but proceed on the basis that all are a reference to the same dialect). In the appellant witness statement dated 15 October 2024 (which follows on from the refusal of his claim by the respondent on 24 April 2024) the appellant at paragraph 2 in that witness statement makes specific reference to a language difficulty when completing the ACQ. He states-
“In regards to credibility point 2, regarding the timing of when my father found me, I would like to clarify the source of this inconsistency. When completing the Asylum Case Questionnaire (ACQ), I was assisted by an individual who spoke Kurdish Sorani, whereas I speak Kurdish Bahdini. Due to this language difference, certain details may not have been accurately communicated or interpreted in the ACQ, resulting in a discrepancy in my account. I would like to confirm that the information provided in my witness statement accurately reflects the true sequence of events, specifically that my father found me after my mother's passing in 2021. I am confident that my Witness Statement contains the correct timeline, and I apologise for any confusion arising from this miscommunication.”
11. The case was set down for a hearing before the FtT (Judge Plowright) on 9 December 2025. The respondent sought an adjournment of that hearing in light of the comment made the appellant in his witness statement of 15 October 2024 regarding the language issue and in light of the fact that the witness statement of 13 March 2024 was read back to him in Kurdish Sorani. The appellant was represented by solicitors at that time and had Counsel in attendance at that hearing. The appellant’s Counsel opposed an adjournment but after the hearing commenced the appellant confirmed that his witness statement of 20 October 2024 had been translated to him in Kurdish Sorani. It was agreed at that point to adjourn the case for this issue to be clarified.
12. Judge Plowright issued Directions as follows:-
“By 30 January 2026, the appellant is to produce a witness statement that fully complies with section 8 of the Practice Direction dated 01 November 2024, setting out his case and explaining to what extent he understands Kurdish (Sorani), why his earlier witness statements were taken using a Kurdish (Sorani) interpreter and details of the circumstances in which his Asylum Claim Questionnaire was prepared including why he used a Kurdish (Sorani) interpreter.”
13. It would appear that at or around that time (December/January 2025/26) that the solicitors who had been acting for the appellant ceased to act. It would appear that new solicitors were instructed in or about February 2026. Judge Plowright’s direction was not complied with but on 16 February 2026 the new solicitors uploaded a signed supplementary witness statement with the following note:-
“We apologise for the delay in submitting the attached supplementary bundle [sic]. We were only recently instructed in this matter and have acted promptly upon being instructed to review the file, take full instructions, and comply with the Judge’s directions. We respectfully request that the supplementary bundle [sic] be admitted in the interests of fairness and the just disposal of the appeal.”
14. Although the new solicitors refer to a supplementary bundle what in fact was uploaded was a supplementary witness statement from the appellant. It is not clear when the new solicitors were instructed. Whilst 16 February 2026 is the first time they go on the record it may be that they were instructed at some date prior to then as by 16 February 2026 they have (in their own words) reviewed the file, taken full instructions and complied with the Judge’s directions.
15. The supplementary witness statement of 16 February 2026 is short. In it the appellant confirms that the witness statement of 13 March 2024 and the witness statemen of 20 October 2024 have been read back to him in Kurdish Badini. He makes two minor clarifications to the witness statement of 13 March 2024 which are not material to the case.
16. At the FtT hearing on 4 March 2026 the Judge raised with the appellant’s Counsel, Ms Barton, the failure to comply with Judge Plowright’s Directions. The position is set out at paragraph 11 of the FtT Decision:-
“I gave Ms Barton time to take instructions from her professional client. Upon resumption, she stated that those instructing her were not aware of Judge Plowright’s directions. The appellant’s previous solicitors did not have access to a Kurdish Badini interpreter and so they used a Kurdish Sorani interpreter for the appellant. However, both the earlier witness statements and the ACQ have been read back to the appellant using a Kurdish Badini interpreter arranged by those instructing her, and the appellant is ready to proceed. Given both parties were ready, I decided it was in accordance with the overriding objective to proceed.”
17. After the conclusion of the hearing on 4 March 2026 the appellant’s solicitors uploaded a further supplementary witness statement accompanied by a note as follows:-
“Following the hearing today, attended by our counsel, Ms Burton [sic], we were asked to confirm whether the Appellant’s Asylum Claim Questionnaire (ACQ) had been read back to him in Kurdish (Badini). We confirm that the Appellant’s ACQ has today been read back to him in Kurdish (Badini). We previously confirmed that his witness statements had been read back to him in his preferred language. The Appellant has identified certain amendments following the read-back of the ACQ, and these have now been set out in a clarification statement. Please find the statement attached for the Tribunal’s reference.”
18. In the supplementary witness statement, the appellant identified 11 errors with the ACQ and stated that he felt under pressure to proceed with a Kurdish Sorani interpreter, this is not his first language, and he cannot explain matters in detail or answer complex questions accurately. The appellant’s solicitors also uploaded a copy of the ACQ with handwritten amendments and annotations. In addition, the appellant’s solicitors uploaded four photographs purporting to show the appellant attending demonstrations.
19. The Judge declined to accept the evidence submitted after conclusion of the hearing. The reasons for rejecting the late evidence are set out at paragraphs 20 to 23 of the FtT Decision. Specifically, the Judge refers to SD (treatment of post hearing evidence) Russia [2008] UKAIT 00037 and the principles in Ladd -v- Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. The Judge did not consider that the post hearing evidence could not have been obtained previously for use at the hearing. The Judge placed weight on the inconsistency between the information provided by Counsel at the hearing and the post hearing statement. The Judge considered there would be unfairness to the respondent in reconvening the hearing and no unfairness to the appellant who had had ample time to address the interpretation issues.
20. The issue that I need to determine is whether it was a material error of law for the Judge to refuse to accept that new evidence in light of the circumstances of the case. I have set out the full background in detail to show the context within which this issue arose.
21. For the respondent Ms Lecointe submitted that the Judge had acted fairly and appropriately in dealing with the issue of the new evidence and there was no error of law.
22. I am not satisfied that looking at this matter in all the circumstances that there was a material error of law by the Judge in refusing to accept the new evidence. In considering whether or not to accept the new evidence the Judge at paragraph 20 of the FtT Decision has clearly referred to the case of SD (Treatment of post hearing evidence] Russia. The Judge has also had regard as referenced in that case to the case of Ladd v Marshall. The reasoning that the Judge sets out at paragraph 20 through to 23 of the FTT decision clearly sets out why the new evidence is not allowed. In particular, the Judge does not accept that the post hearing evidence could not have been obtained with due diligence for use at the hearing. There is ample basis for the Judge to come to that conclusion. The appellant had raised the interpretation issue as early as October 2024 when he referenced in his statement of 15 October 2024 the language problem with the ACQ. He was legally represented at that time and at the hearings on 9 December 2025 and 4 March 2026. Judge Plowright made specific directions on the issue. The new solicitors claimed later that they were not aware of those directions but that is inconsistent with what they explicitly said in the note of 16 February 2026 when uploading the supplementary witness statement that they had acted promptly to comply with the judge’s directions. In any event the directions were on the on-line system that the new solicitors had access to. The supplementary statement of 16 February 2026 specifically confirms that the two previous witness statements have been read back in Kurdish Badini, and only very minor errors identified. Counsel for the appellant was given an opportunity to take instructions on the interpretation issues at the hearing on 4 March 2026. Having taken instructions Counsel confirmed that both the earlier statements and the ACQ had been read back to the appellant in Kurdish Badini. There would have been an opportunity to clarify any errors even at that late stage.
23. I also consider that the Judge was entitled to take into consideration the inconsistency in the claim by the appellant that he cannot explain matters in detail in Kurdish Sorani yet the two earlier witness statements which were originally given in Kurdish Sorani only had very minor changes made to them when read back in Kurdish Badini – see paragraph 22 of the FtT Decision.
24. This is a protection claim and one where the Judge should proceed with anxious scrutiny when considering the issues – and that would include the issue of new evidence. However, although that is not explicitly mentioned by the Judge I am satisfied that the Judge would clearly have been aware of the type of claim under consideration and clearly has approached the whole case in the appropriate manner for a protection claim.
25. I accordingly find that there was no error of law in the approach taken by the Judge to the late production of new evidence.
26. I have also given consideration to whether or not the new evidence would have made any material difference to the outcome of the case. I am not satisfied that it would have. In the FtT Decision the Judge clearly accepts that the appellant is at risk from his father. He clearly accepts that his father did subject the appellant to physical abuse whilst the appellant was in Iraq. The changes to the ACQ which the appellant seeks to bring in have no material impact upon the essential feature of this case which is that the judge determined that the Judge was not satisfied that the appellant had demonstrated that he would be unable to obtain protection from the authorities and he has overstated the power and influence of his father (see paragraphs 37 to 39 of the FtT Decision).
Conclusion
27. For the reasons set out above I find that there is no material error of law and the appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
7 September 2026