Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002924
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01842/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

28th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

BBS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P. Turner, direct access barrister
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bonavero, dated 8 April 2026 (respectively, ‘the Determination’ and ‘the Judge’). For the reasons given below, I dismiss the appeal.
Grounds of appeal
2. Mr Turner rightly characterised this appeal as concerning a narrow issue. Essentially, the Appellant contends that the Judge did not take into account and / or give adequate reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s explanation for his apparent omission (in his screening interview, asylum interview and first witness statement) of the fact that he had spent the period 2006 – 2021 in South Korea. His initial account, as given in the interviews and his first witness statement, did not refer to South Korea and appeared to suggest that he had at all times been in Nepal, where he engaged in political activism.
3. The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on the basis that this omission “fatally undermines his credibility” (§8). The Appellant contends that the Judge’s reasoning did not adequately engage with the explanation he gave in his second witness statement. That explanation was, essentially, that:
a. His screening interview was conducted in Hindi, not Nepali (which he speaks).
b. The Nepali calendar is significantly different from the Gregorian calendar. This caused confusion which led him to refer incorrectly to 2007 although he left for South Korea in 2006.
c. He was under immense stress at interview and was scared.
d. He did not deceive or attempt to deceive the Home Office.
4. I asked Mr Turner whether the Appellant gave any additional explanation at the hearing, to which he responded that he did not know because he was not present. No note or record of proceedings was provided, other than the brief details recorded in the Determination. I asked whether the Appellant intended to obtain the transcript of the First-tier Tribunal hearing and was told that he did not.
5. Mr Turner also made submissions that the Judge failed to take into account supporting evidence adduced by the Appellant which suggested that he remained at risk in Nepal. This was not a ground of appeal on which permission was granted and he did not invite me to grant permission on this point so I will not consider it.
6. Mr Nappey submitted that, although short, the Determination took into account all material matters. He stated that the Judge gave adequate reasons and also considered the Appellant’s case at its highest.
Analysis
7. I agree with the Respondent that there is no error of law in the Determination. The omission of the Appellant’s time in South Korea was an extremely significant element in his claim. His account in his second witness statement was that he was in South Korea from 2007 – 2021. This is nowhere present in his earlier evidence.
8. While there is some force in the points made by Mr Turner about the use of the wrong interpreter in the screening interview and I accept both the stress on the Appellant and the differences between the Gregorian and Nepali calendars, I consider that these issues were taken into account adequately by the Judge and, in any event, could not lead to a material error of law.
9. It is clear that the Judge took into account the second witness statement (to which he refers at §7). I accept that the specific issues around interpretation, calendars, and stress were not specifically alluded to in the Determination, but I am mindful of the guidance in R (Iran) v Secretary of State [2005] EWCA Civ 982, at §15, which referred to the leading authorities as “reveal[ing] the anxiety of an appellate court not to overturn a judgment at first instance unless it really cannot understand the original judge’s thought processes when he/she was making material findings.” It is perfectly clear why the Judge dismissed the appeal. This is because:
a. The Appellant had adduced evidence from the RPP (the political party with which he states he was affiliated) which referred to him “working actively in the local elections held in May and June 2017 and the general election in November and December 2017” (Determination, §13). There is no explanation of this very substantial discrepancy in any of the materials; the Appellant’s evidence in his second witness statement was that he was in South Korea at the time. The Judge notes this issue at §13. Neither the oral or written submissions or evidence on behalf of the Appellant explain this very significant discrepancy.
b. As noted by the Judge at §9, the Appellant (in response to question 37 of his substantive asylum interview) claimed to have attended demonstrations in Nepal in 2010, 2011, and 2019. This was again a very significant discrepancy which was not explained.
10. There is no error of law, in these circumstances, in the Judge’s treatment of the explanation given by the Appellant. It is perfectly comprehensible why the Judge reached negative conclusions on the Appellant’s credibility in these circumstances and his explanation did not explain the key issues with his account.
11. In any event, even if I am wrong in the foregoing analysis, it is clear that any error could not be material. At §15 the Judge explained that, even if the Tribunal were to accept the Appellant’s account, there is no real risk on return given the way in which his claimed fear evolved in the course of oral evidence. The Appellant’s oral evidence, as recorded in the Determination, was that he in fact now feared the RPP rather than fearing retaliation. There has been no challenge to the fact that the Appellant changed his account as described by the Judge, nor to the Judge’s finding that such a claim was unsupported by evidence as well as appearing implausible. In these circumstances, there cannot be any material error of law in the Judge’s determination.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 August 2026