Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002932
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/53730/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ZUCKER

Between

THRHA (IRAQ)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No Appearance
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant or members of his family, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant or members of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq, now aged in his late 40’s. On 6 March 2021 he made application for international protection as a refugee. On 30 May 2023 his application was refused.
2. The background to the Application is set out at paragraphs 3 of the Decision and Reasons of the First-tier Tribunal Judge, now under appeal as follows:
(i) The Appellant is a national of Iraq born … in Tapa Kal in Suleymania in the IKR. He is Kurdish and a Muslim. He studied to the 12 grade and worked as a builder. The Appellant returned to study but did not graduate because he could not pass his English language exam. The Appellant’s CSID card was issued in Darbandikhan. The Appellant does not know the location of his CSID card now.

(ii) The Appellant is married to [SS], an Iraqi national born in 1984. The Appellant has three children. A son called [MR] born in 2003, and two daughters called [HR] born in 2007 and [KR] born in 2011. All three children are Iraqi nationals.

(iii) The Appellant has his parents, two brothers and two sisters. His brother has fled Iraq after the Appellant had problems.

(iv) In 2012 the Appellant began a relationship with SM (AKA [SSH]). She was married to [X] who is a police director and the nephew of a senior PUK member called [Y]. The Appellant was also married at the time.

(iv) On the 16 October 2017 the Appellant formed and joined a political group called Shorshi Komari Kurdistan, formerly called Shorshi Komari Gal. This group opposed the KDP and the PUK.

(v) A member of the Appellant’s tribe called [M] and a member of the Mich Mathat told the PUK about the Appellant’s political activities. In 2018 the Appellant was arrested and detained by the PUK for his political activities. The Appellant claimed he was tortured in detention.

(vii) At the end of 2018 the Appellant was detained for the second time by the KDP due to his political activities. The Appellant was detained until his brother-in-law managed to get him out of detention. He was again ill-treated.

(viii) In November 2019 his extramarital relationship was discovered by X and the Appellant went into hiding. He left Iraq 4 days later with his wife and children. He travelled to Turkey where he was separated from his wife and children. He does not know where they are. He arrived in the United Kingdom on the 28 February 2021 and claimed asylum on the 6 March 2021.

3. Not content with the Respondent’s decision, he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was heard by a First-tier Tribunal Judge Wilding, sitting at Taylor House, on 21 January 2026. He dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
4. Application was then made for permission to appeal on five grounds:
(i) Error of law in assessment under Tanveer Ahmed;
(ii) failure to consider relevant evidence, failure to provide reasons and/or misdirection of law and/or facts in Freedom from Torture report;
(iii) procedural unfairness in failure to put questions to the Appellant at the hearing;
(iv) failure to consider relevant evidence, misdirection of law and/or failure to resolve a conﬂict when considering enforced removals to the KRI; and
(v) failure to consider relevant evidence and/or misdirection on law in relation lack of civil documentation in the KRI.

5. In a decision dated 9 June 2026, First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner granted limited permission. It appears that it was not entirely clear which grounds the Appellant had been given permission to pursue. However, on 1 September 2026 this matter came before Upper Tribunal Judge Norton Taylor. It seems that it was agreed that the grounds which the Appellant may argue were redefined as:
(i) Failure to properly consider the documentary evidence presented by the Appellant and/or failure to give adequate reasons; and
(ii) failure to properly consider the Appellant’s return to the IKR without access to the appropriate civil documentation.
(iii) Procedural unfairness in making an adverse finding on a matter not put to the Appellant at the hearing.

Preliminary Matter
6. On the morning of the hearing, it was brought to my attention that the Appellant’s counsel was unwell, unable to attend and that in those circumstances an application to adjourn had been made. However, as it appeared to me that the Appellant had an unanswerable appeal I put to Ms Lecointe my preliminary view that there had been two material errors of law in this matter.
7. The first related to the manner in which Judge Wilding had applied Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 to the documentary evidence. It has long been established (see paragraph 38 of Tanveer Ahmed) that the decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round. In this case however, it appeared that the judge determined whether the documents were reliable without any consideration of whether they were capable of being reliable and in so doing clearly gave them no weight whatsoever. This is a similar error to that identified in the case of Francois Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367.
8. The second point is that at paragraph 26 of the Decision and Reasons there was inadequate consideration of the Appellant’s ability to return.
9. I was very grateful to Ms Lecointe for the very realistic approach she took to this case. She recognised the difficulty the Respondent had in resisting this appeal and appreciated that if there were these errors of law, there was little point in adjourning the matter since the Appellant would be in no better position.
10. In all the circumstances having regard to the overriding objective to the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 and in particular rule 2 and the need to avoid delay I refused the adjournment.
Error of law finding
11. I allow the appeal for the same reasons that I indicated to Ms Lecointe that it seemed to me that this was an unanswerable appeal, as to which see above. I should say that had the Respondent resisted the appeal I would then have adjourned the matter to give the Appellant’s representative the opportunity to be heard.

Decision
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains material errors of law. The appeal is allowed. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Taylor House to be heard by a judge other than Judge Wilding.

D G Zucker
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 14 October 2026