Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002947
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60664/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

28th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

ABDALLAH DAHER
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Yaqoob, Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 October 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant is a citizen of Palestine who was born and raised in Saudi Arabia. He arrived in the UK in October 2020 on a short-term student visa. He claimed asylum on 8 January 2021. His protection claim was refused, and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 17 February 2026. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.

Background

2. The appellant claims that he and a friend were arrested and detained in Saudi Arabia after drugs were found in the car they were travelling in. The appellant claims that, after he came to the UK, he found out that he had been convicted and faced a prison sentence in Saudi Arabia.

3. The respondent did not accept any of the appellant’s account of events in Saudi Arabia and refused his protection claim.

4. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Sangha on 3 February 2026.

5. The Judge did not find the appellant’s account to be credible. The Judge did not find the appellant to be at risk on return. Judge Sangha dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

6. The appellant submitted grounds of challenge which he had drafted himself. By decision dated 9 June 2026, First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner granted permission on the following terms:

1. The application is out of time. The Appellant explains that as an unrepresented Appellant, he sought to upload the appeal document and grounds without success. The application for permission to appeal is late by only a few days. Noting the explanation and minimal delay in submitting the application, I find that it is fair and in the interest of justice to admit this late application.

2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in misdirecting themselves on the evidence regarding the Appellant’s nationality and residence status in Saudi Arabia. The Appellant is accepted as a Palestinian national who was born in Saudi. The decision letter notes that the Appellant will not be returned to Gaza but to Saudi Arabia. The issue as to whether the Appellant retains any form of legal basis of residency in Saudi Arabia was not specifically raised in the skeleton argument by the Appellant but it was raised by the Respondent in the decision letter and noted by the IJ in the determination. It could also be considered as a ‘Robinson obvious’ point, i.e. if the Appellant no longer has status in Saudi Arabia as a Palestinian national, how can he be returned. The IJ concludes that the Appellant ‘may be eligible for citizenship’ on the basis of his mother being Saudi Arabian. The Respondent relies on a footnote in the decision letter as the basis for this assertion but the IJ fails to consider this evidence or reference any other evidence to support this conclusion. This is an arguable error of law.

3. It is further argued that the IJ makes negative credibility findings in relation to the Najiz system without referencing objective evidence. The Appellant has not cited the objective evidence that he argues the IJ failed to consider however it is noted that the determination is silent on the issue. This may be a further arguable error of law.

4. The Appellant finally argues that the IJ fails to consider any article 3 ECHR argument in the context of him being returned to Gaza. The decision letter clearly states that the Appellant would not be returned to Gaza. This point is not argued by the Appellant in the skeleton argument. This is not an arguable error of law.

5. The Appellant has identified two arguable errors at grounds 1 and 2. Permission to appeal is granted.

7. Thus, the matter came before me to determine whether Judge Sangha’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

The Hearing

8. Mr Yaqoob relied upon the grounds of appeal on which permission had been granted (grounds one and two) and expanded on them.

9. I did not need to hear substantive submissions from Ms Rushforth regarding the respondent’s case.

10. After hearing the submissions, I informed the parties that there was no error of law in the Judge’s decision and that my written reasons would follow.

Discussion and Analysis

11. When considering whether the Judge made a material error in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, I have reminded myself of the following principles.

12. It is not permissible for the Upper Tribunal to simply disagree with the result or the way in which it was reached (see paragraph 36 of South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33).

13. I take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal confirmed that unless the First-tier Judge’s findings are “rationally insupportable”, the Upper Tribunal should not interfere with findings of fact by the First-tier Judge who had seen and heard the oral evidence.

14. I also remind myself that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 26 of Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201.

15. The grounds were drafted by the appellant without legal assistance. Mr Yaqoob and Fountain Solicitors only came on record after permission had been granted. Mr Yaqoob did his best to present the appellant's case. However, having considered the grounds in detail, I conclude that they are not made out.

16. Ground One is hampered from the outset by the fact that the appellant never put forward a case that he no longer had residency in Saudi Arabia until his grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal.

17. I asked Mr Yaqoob if he could indicate anywhere in the evidence where the appellant detailed that he no longer had residence in Saudi Arabia and he was unable to do so.

18. The appellant claims that there was “oral and documentary evidence” that his Saudi residency had expired and that the Judge has ignored this. However, there is no record of this in the Judge’s decision. At [9] the Judge records the agreed issues which are the credibility of the appellant’s account of events in Saudi Arabia. There is no reference to the appellant not being removable to Saudi Arabia.

19. The only matter Mr Yaqoob was able to point to was a reference in the respondent’s decision and the Judge’s decision that the appellant may be eligible for Saudi citizenship through his mother. Even if the Judge were wrong to state that the appellant may be eligible for Saudi citizenship through his mother, that would not amount to a material error because the relevant question was whether the appellant could return to Saudi Arabia, not whether he had a route to citizenship.

20. Thus, there is no evidence to indicate that the appellant raised a positive case that his residence permit in Saudi Arabia had expired and he would not be able to return.

21. I highlighted to Mr Yaqoob the Court of Appeal decision in AAZA (Yemen) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 705, which resolves any remaining dispute regarding Ground One. At [31] of AAZA (Yemen) the Court stated,

“The general rule is well-established by decisions of this court such as HF (Iraq) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 1276 and MA (Ethiopia) [2009] EWCA 289. If an Appellant alleges that he will not be allowed to enter the country to which it is proposed he should return he will be expected to have made an application. As Elias LJ said in MA (Ethiopia) the "tribunal could in the normal case require the applicant to act bona fide and take all reasonably practicable steps to obtain the requisite documents for her to return."”

22. There is no evidence that the appellant had undertaken the necessary bona fides enquiries to ascertain whether he would be granted further residence in Saudi Arabia as he had previously. It is of note that the appellant’s Saudi mother remains in Saudi Arabia. Thus, the appellant’s claim on this basis fails applying MA (Ethiopia).

23. In summary, there was insufficient evidence before the Judge to establish that the appellant was unable to re-enter Saudi Arabia and, applying AAZA (Yemen), the appellant had not undertaken the necessary enquiries that would ordinarily be expected before such a claim could succeed.

24. Therefore, there is no merit in Ground One.

25. Ground Two is similarly lacking in merit. It is suggested that the Judge rejected the credibility of the court order produced by the appellant “solely based on its digital delivery.” In his skeleton argument Mr Yaqoob referred to [14] of the Judge’s decision and stated that “the Tribunal’s rejection of the assertion that the court order was received online does not appear to be reasoned at all.”

26. The difficulty for the appellant is that in [14] the Judge does not reject the court document on the basis that it was received online. The Judge refers to the appellant receiving a court order online, but it is the delay in receiving the order which the Judge is criticising and not the method of delivery.

27. Ms Rushforth helped Mr Yaqoob by intervening during his submissions and pointing out [17] of the Judge’s decision. This paragraph does refer to the Judge finding it implausible that the authorities would provide a court order by text message. However, there was no background information before the Judge demonstrating that court orders in Saudi Arabia are issued through an online platform or by SMS.

28. More fundamentally though is the fact that the Judge gives many reasons for rejecting the court order. The Judge does not rely solely on how the court order was served. The Judge clearly considered all the evidence in the round before rejecting the reliability of the court order. In [14], [16], and [19] the Judge provides more than sufficient reasons for rejecting the reliability of the court order.

29. The Judge considered the document in the round correctly applying the principles in Tanveer Ahmed.

30. Therefore, Ground Two has no merit.

31. Overall, the grounds disclose no material errors of law. The Judge’s decision was detailed and comprehensive and gave more than sufficient reasons for reaching a legally sustainable conclusion.

32. Therefore, in conclusion, for the reasons above, I find the Judge did not make a material error of law in their decision.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have made an error of law material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. The determination shall stand.

C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 October 2026