UI-2026-002954
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002954
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58618/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4th of November 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP
Between
AY
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms G. Rea, Counsel instructed by Elder Rahimi
For the Respondent: Mrs R. Arif, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House via CVP on 23 October 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the Judge of the First-tier Tribunal dated 16 February 2026 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The Judge dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal to grant his protection claim.
2. The appellant is a 27-year-old Tajikistani national. The appellant’s claim for asylum is based on persecution for his religious beliefs having been caught and arrested for having participated in private religious instruction on the Quran from a friend of his father. While in custody he was beaten and forced to sign papers without knowledge of their contents and had to pay $15,000 for his release.
3. He entered the UK on a seasonal workers visa on 3 June 2022 and subsequently claimed asylum on 23 November 2023.
4. The appellant claimed, whilst in the UK, to have become a follower of Salafi Islam which is unlawful if practised in his home country.
5. The respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim on 14 March 2024 on the basis that the appellant’s account of events lacked detail and elements lacked plausibility and were inconsistent with external information.
6. The Judge dismissed the appeal and held that there were numerous inconsistences between the appellant’s witness statement and his asylum interview, placing particular emphasis on the number of people at the illegal Quran lesson which led to his arrest. Similarly, the Judge found that there was little evidence to support the appellant’s claim that he now followed Salafi Islam.
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal on 27 February 2026 on two grounds: (i) the Judge made adverse credibility findings in relation to events in Tajikistan which was unfair in light of the appellant not having been cross-examined on his evidence and (ii) the Judge adopted a materially flawed analysis of whether the appellant had adopted Salafism.
8. Permission to appeal was granted on the first ground alone by First-tier Tribunal Judge Robinson on 10 June 2026.
The Respondent’s concession
9. Mrs Arif referred to her Rule 24 response which contained a concession that the respondent accepted the Judge had putatively erred on the basis set out in the permission to appeal:
"It is arguable that the Judge had erred in making adverse credibility findings in respect of an issue on which the Appellant was not cross-examined, namely the credibility of his account of events in Tajikistan with regard to TUI Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48D and Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455.”
10. Mrs Arif requested that the concession be withdrawn referring to paragraph 25 of the decision and noted that that whilst the Judge had recognised that the respondent had chosen not to cross-examine the appellant on his recent evidence, the Judge had taken this into account and held that he had to reach his own conclusions on the credibility of the evidence before him. This had been overlooked in the respondent’s decision to concede the error of law.
11. Mrs Arif was directed to the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in MR (Pakistan) v Secretary of State [2026] EWCA Civ 473, particularly paragraph 78. Though given the opportunity, Mrs Arif did not address the judgement.
12. Ms Rea objected to the withdrawal and referred me to MH Albania [2025] UKUT 00351 and in particular paragraph 3 of the headnote which requires that any withdrawal to be in the interests of justice which necessitates there to be good reasons for it and absence of prejudice to the appellant. She contended that in this case no good reason had been established and given the absence of any notice of the withdrawal there would be prejudice to the appellant. Additionally, the Rule 24 response, containing the concession, was made on 29 June 2026 some three months after the judgement in MR Pakistan and this should have been taken account of by the respondent in making the concession.
13. I am not persuaded by Mrs Arif’s submission for withdrawal on the basis advanced. It is not a good reason for withdrawal that underlying the concession was a misunderstanding of the decision itself - no basis for that misunderstanding was advanced nor why that misunderstanding impacted on the legal reasoning advanced in the concession. Further, no explanation of why the application to withdraw was only brought to the notice of the appellant on the day of the hearing. Accordingly, I have concluded that it would not be in the interests of justice to permit a withdrawal on that basis.
14. Having said that, I have to consider, notwithstanding my rejection of the withdrawal on the advanced basis, whether I can be bound by a concession which is itself based on a misunderstanding of the law.
15. MH Albania contains a helpful summary of the case law relating to the treatment of concessions with much of it relating to the circumstances where a withdrawal of a concession is permitted on the request of the party who made it. There are, however, a number of cases which discuss the ability of a judge to decline to be bound by a concession which is based on a view of the law which does not accord with that of the judge.
16. The leading case is the House of Lords judgement in Bahamas International v Threadgold [1974] 1 WLR 1514 which considered whether a concession that was made on the construction of a written contract was binding on a judge’s determination of a rectification claim. Lord Diplock stated at 1525:
“In a case which turns, as this one does, upon the construction to be given to a written document, a court called upon to construe the document in the absence of any claim for rectification cannot be bound by any concession made by any of the parties as to what its language means. This is so even in the court before which the concession is made; a fortiori in the court to which an appeal from the judgment of that court is brought. The reason is that the construction of a written document is a question of law. It is for the judge to decide for himself what the law is, not to accept it from any or even all of the parties to the suit; having so decided it is his duty to apply it to the facts of the cases. He would be acting contrary to his judicial oath if he were to determine the case by applying what the parties conceived to be the law, if in his own opinion it was erroneous.”
17. Similarly in Armstead v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Co Ltd [2025] AC 406 at 46 the Supreme Court held “[i]t would be inappropriate to decide this appeal in reliance of a concession that we did not think legally correct”.
18. Recent cases in the immigration and protection arena have come to a similar conclusion. In Rauf v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1276 Sir Ernest Ryder acknowledged that a concession based on an erroneous reading of the immigration rules “has any prospect of not being withdrawn where there is no prejudice to the appellant”.
19. Accordingly, I have to determine whether the concession is based on a misunderstanding of the law and, given that the sole basis for the appeal equates with the concession made in both scope and reasoning, I will consider both the legitimacy of the concession with the appeal itself.
Discussion and decision.
20. The sole issue is whether the Judge erred in his consideration of the appellant’s evidence of events in Tajikistan. The Judge noted, at the outset, at paragraph 23:
“I note that Mr Hall chose not to cross-examine the Appellant about his account of events in Tajikistan, instead choosing to focus on the issue of becoming a Salafist in the UK. Mr Hall also made no additional submissions about the Appellant’s initial claim for asylum and just relied on the RFRL and Review.”
21. The Judge, whilst expressing his surprise at this approach, continued at paragraph 25:
“However, the lack of direct challenge to the Appellant’s more recent evidence does not mean that I must accept it. The account must be considered with anxious scrutiny before reaching any conclusions. The fact that the Respondent chose not to challenge parts of the Appellant’s evidence is a consideration in my assessment, but I must reach my own conclusion.”
22. The Judge then looked at the evidence before him and concluded that given the discrepancies in the asylum interview and the witness statement and despite the lack of specific challenge by the respondent at the hearing the appellant failed to demonstrate that his account of events was reasonably likely to be true.
23. The grounds submit that the Judge made an error of law by so concluding given the appellant did not have the opportunity through cross-examination to address these concerns and so was denied a fair trial solely relying on Tui in support, although I note that the grounds were prepared prior to the decision in MR Pakistan.
24. The starting point is to determine in what circumstances the failure to cross-examine a witness can undermine a fair trial and the recent Court of Appeal judgement in MR Pakistan is the leading case and is particularly relevant given its immigration context. Elisabeth Laing LJ used Tui as her starting point in setting out the principles behind the rule at paragraph 73:
“The judge has to ensure that the trial is fair. In general, a party must challenge in cross-examination the evidence of any witness if he wishes to submit that the evidence should not be accepted on that point. That gives the witness a chance to explain 'any contradiction or alleged problem with his evidence. If a party has decided not to cross-examine on a particular important point, he will be in difficulty in submitting that the evidence should be rejected' (paragraphs 42 and 43). What matters is 'the fairness of the legal proceedings as a whole' (paragraph 43). The 'prevention of surprise' is also an important factor (paragraph 44).”
25. The Judge then went on to explain the limits on the rule, in the context of an immigration appeal, at paragraph 78:
“It is necessary to identify, first, the nature of the 'rule' which was at issue in TUI. The rule is not a rule that (subject to exceptions) a party to litigation may not make submissions impugning the credibility or reliability of the evidence of a witness unless the witness has been cross-examined about those points. The rule as explained in the cases summarised by Lord Hodge is narrower than that. It is based on fairness, and on the principle, referred to by Bean LJ in his dissent, that litigation should not be conducted by ambush. The rule does not apply if the witness already knows, because the questions have been articulated earlier in the litigation, that his evidence is disputed, and, he is not, therefore, taken by surprise. The rule, rather, is that if he does not know in advance about the disputed matters, and has not been cross-examined about them, submissions cannot be made impugning his credibility (unless an exception to the rule applies).”
26. The Judge concluded that given the appellant had known about the Secretary of State’s position since the respondent’s reasons were set out in refusal letter, which were maintained in the review, the appellant had the opportunity to deal with the concerns in his witness statement and consequently there had been no unfairness to the appellant.
27. The position set out in MR Pakistan is exactly the position in this case. The reasons for refusal letter clearly set out that the respondent did not accept the appellant’s account of his religious practice in Tajikistan and gave detailed reasons for treating his evidence as inconsistent and lacking in detail. Similarly, paragraphs 11-21 of the respondent’s review confirm her reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account of events. As such, the appellant had every opportunity in both in his witness statement and his oral testimony to address the issues raised by the respondent and there was no basis to suggest that he was taken by surprise on the issues which the Judge took into account in his analysis of the appellant’s credibility.
28. The terms of the concession also refer to Abdi which is distinguishable from the current appeal given in that case the matters which were the subject to challenge related to issues not previously raised by the respondent.
29. I note Miss Rea’s submission that the respondent should have been aware of MR Pakistan at the time of making the concession and it would be unfair to allow it to be withdrawn on that basis. Whilst I acknowledge the position is far from ideal; the position set out in both Bahamas International and Armstead is clear - I am not required to decide this appeal on a legally incorrect concession.
30. In light of my analysis, I conclude that the respondent’s concession was based on a misunderstanding of the law and that I am not bound by it.
27. For the reasons set out above and applying the ratio in MR Pakistan I find that the Judge made no error of law in his treatment of the appellant’s evidence and the appeal should be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
For the reasons set out above, there are no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and I decline to set the decision aside.
Mark Stamp
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30 October 2026