Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2026-002969
First-tier Tribunal Number: PA/67702/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued
On 16 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WOODCRAFT

Between

SA
(Anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Z Hussain, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Heard at Field House on 5 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity.

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity, and is to be referred to in these proceedings by the initials SA. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
The Appellant
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh born on 29 January 1991. He appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 13 March 2026 which was to dismiss his appeal against a decision of the respondent dated 7 December 2023. That decision had refused the appellant's application for international protection and for leave to remain on human rights grounds. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 19 February 2022 and claimed asylum on 15 November 2022.
The Appellant’s Case
2. The appellant’s protection claim concerned his political profile as a supporter/member of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party student wing/Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal ("JCD"), alleged politically motivated criminal cases and arrest warrants in Bangladesh, and sur place political activity in the United Kingdom. He relied on expert reports to verify that the documents he produced showing the warrants for his arrest were genuine and would be enforced against him. His claim under article 3 of the human rights convention concerned his medical condition, the appellant has certain mental health issues which meant that he was unable to give evidence in person at first instance.
The Decision at First Instance
3. Dealing with the asylum claim at [55] of the determination the judge said:
“I do not find the documents received from Bangladesh to be reliable and I do not find the Appellant to be credible. I am not persuaded that the Appellant was targeted or persecuted whilst in Bangladesh by the [Awami League] or by the authorities. The Appellant may have been subject to online trolling whilst in the UK but I am not satisfied that the authorities took any interest in the Appellant’s political activities in the UK. In any event and also taking into account the Appellant’s sur place political activities in the UK, the Appellant’s political ambitions have now been realised with the ousting of PM Hasina and the removal of AL government with a caretaker government in place to oversee general elections in due course. Therefore, any fear the Appellant may have had of the AL and the government in Bangladesh has since extinguished. If there were or are any charges against the Appellant in Bangladesh, I find that these charges would now be prosecution through due process; no longer political persecution.”
4. At [56] the judge concluded:
“In any event and also taking into account the Appellant’s sur place political activities in the UK, the Appellant’s political ambitions have now been realised with the ousting of PM Hasina and the removal of AL government with a caretaker government in place to oversee general elections in due course. Therefore, any fear the Appellant may have had of the AL and the government in Bangladesh has since extinguished. If there were or are any charges against the Appellant in Bangladesh, I find that these charges would now be prosecution through due process; no longer political persecution.
5. Rejecting the Article 3 claim the judge said at [61]:
“I am not persuaded to find that the Appellant’s current diagnoses disclosed in the Appellant’s GP records … and prognosis reach the requisite severity to engage Article 3 ECHR.
6. At [62] the judge concluded, citing the test in AM Zimbabawe:
“I am not satisfied that the background evidence demonstrates that there is an absence of services and treatment [in Bangladesh] which leads to substantial grounds for believing that, as a seriously ill person, the Appellant would face a real risk of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.
7. There was very little evidence for the article 8 claim which was summarised and rejected by the judge at [63] of the determination when the judge stated: “The Appellant is an able-bodied man with full knowledge and experience of the culture in Bangladesh and now also with experience of living in the UK. On the Appellant’s particular circumstances, including the Appellant’s mental health diagnoses, on balance, I find that the Appellant will not face very significant obstacles to integrating into Bangladesh. “
The Onward Appeal
8. The appellant applied for permission to appeal on five grounds. Ground 1 was that the judge erred in law by failing to engage with material verification evidence concerning the existence, authenticity and current status of the Bangladeshi criminal cases and arrest warrants. Ground 2 was that the judge’s finding that any extant charges would now amount to prosecution through due process rather than political persecution was inadequately reasoned. Ground 3 was that the judge drew adverse credibility conclusions from omissions and lack of explanation without an adequate consideration of the medical/vulnerability evidence. Ground 4 complained of the judge’s treatment of Mr Brian C Sommerlad's scarring report when making an unsupported positive finding that the Appellant had "misled" the expert and by failing to assess the report's residual corroborative value. Ground 5 was that the conclusion regarding risk of suicide was insufficiently reasoned given the difficulties of accessing treatment in Bangladesh. The grounds themselves acknowledged that ground 5 was not the strongest argument the appellant could put forward.
9. The Upper Tribunal granted permission to appeal (in part) stating:
“The unnecessarily lengthy grounds are in many respects an attempt to re-argue the case, and the First-tier Tribunal has produced an impressively balanced and detailed decision. I am nevertheless prepared to grant permission for the Appellant to argue that there may have been a failure to take relevant information into account when the Tribunal considered whether there are in fact extant arrest warrant/s out against the Appellant. Nor is it clear that the change in government would have the effect of ceasing all outstanding prosecutions launched under the previous regime. Grounds 1 and 2 are therefore arguable. The Article 3 health claim is unarguable, and I therefore refuse permission on ground 5. Grounds 3 and 4 are weaker but given their connection to matters of credibility and risk, I grant permission to argue them.
10. There was no Rule 24 response from the respondent to the grant of permission to appeal although following interlocutory directions at an earlier stage in the proceedings, the respondent had produced a substantive review of the case.
The Hearing Before Me
11. In consequence of the grant of permission the matter came before me to determine in the first place whether there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal such that it fell to be set aside. If there was then I would make directions on the rehearing of the appeal. If there was not the decision at first instance would stand.
12. For the appellant counsel argued that there was no evidence to support the position that cases issued under the previous regime would now be treated differently. The main grounds of appeal were 1 and 2. 3 and 4 were “left in focus”. As to ground 1, Mr Islam was an independent lawyer. Directions were given when the matter was first adjourned by the First-tier because some of the processes in verifying the documents had not been fully identified but that was addressed during the period of the adjournment. That more than one lawyer in Bangladesh was used was relevant to a potential preliminary point raised by the respondent regarding the authority of PJ Sri Lanka.
13. The judge posed the question why a third advocate was used in Bangladesh. The judge had provided no reason why he would doubt an independent lawyer. In a letter the lawyer set out what was done in obtaining the appellant’s court records, what fees were paid, how long he visited to obtain the documents. The judge's reasons were wrong. It was factually incorrect for the judge to say that there was no explanation. They had been adduced by an independent lawyer and there was no way that the appellant could have planted these documents in a court file. The first reason why an advocate was instructed should be because of their independence and that was exactly what was done. The criticism by the judge of the independent lawyer did not go into much detail. If the judge thought that the verification might be false there would have to be some reasoning given how a document could be inserted onto a file
14. As to ground 2 the judge noted that the Awami league were not in power. That was accepted by the appellant. The current government in Bangladesh said there would be a committee to look at matters (such as outstanding judicial complaints) and there was no up-to-date CPIN cited. However there was a report from a retired judge Mr Al Amin who gave background evidence. The judge declined to accept Mr Al Amin’s view on what would happen to the appellant upon return. Mr Al Amin’s report was to the effect that cases lodged had not been resolved for example the police were 80% still pro Awami league. Ground 3 was a matter of credibility. The judge pointed to gaps in the evidence which the appellant had not addressed. It had to be borne in mind that this was an appellant who did not give oral evidence as he suffered from mental health issues.
15. There had been a small discussion on the day of the hearing in the First-tier as to the condition of the appellant and whether he would give evidence at first instance. The judge accepted that the appellant could not be cross-examined and therefore there was a live issue about the appellant's ability to give evidence. As to ground 4 the report of Mr Sommerlad, the consultant surgeon, was not criticised. The appellant had not misled the expert by being unable to say how other injuries he had suffered had been caused. It was not clear why the judge came to the conclusion that he did (that the appellant was seeking to mislead the doctor) as there was no evidence to support it.
16. The appellant's bundle had not contained the letter of instructions to Mr Sommerlad as a result the judge did not have the letter. It was not raised by the judge at the hearing that no letter of instructions had been given. It was a very large bundle. That did not detract from the submission that it was a serious allegation to say the appellant had misled the doctor.
17. In reply for the respondent the presenting officer said he was in some doubts on the question of the extent and relevance of the authority in PJ. The trial judge at first instance had acknowledged that UK solicitors had instructed Mr Miah. There was no express reference to United Kingdom solicitors directly instructing Mr Islam. There were very serious credibility points. The authorities had apparently approached the appellant but not arrested him and these were documents verified by the Bangladesh lawyer. There was evidence of how one can obtain these documents and how the expert personally got them. Mr Al-Amin was a country expert and other judges may have given more weight to these reports.
18. Ground 3, the judge could only make findings based on the evidence before him. A judge is entitled to make adverse findings. There was a question as to whether the appellant was diagnosed with mental health issues at the time of his interview. It was not for the judge to speculate that the appellant was ill. The judge's findings were based on medical evidence and the evidence from the Bangladesh lawyers, the documents regarding the arrest warrant and the first information report. Regardless of the appellant's mental health issues, he was not arrested and the lack of an arrest could not be explained away by mental health issues. The judge referred to Mr Sommerlad being misled, other judges might not have used that term. It was noticeable from Mr Sommerlad’s report that he found it difficult to give scores to the scars on the appellant (in accordance with the Istanbul criteria). The judge was saying that an important part of the appellant's account was not presented to Mr Sommerlad.
19. In conclusion counsel for the appellant argued that the position overall was very clear. There needed to be evidence in support of the finding that Mr Sommerlad had been misled. Although Mr Sommerlad pointed out that the appellant could not tell him which injury was caused by which weapons the injuries were highly consistent with what the appellant was saying. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion and Findings
20. At the outset of the hearing I drew to the attention of the advocates that Judge Bruce in granting permission to appeal had referred to it not being clear whether the change in government in Bangladesh might not have the consequence of annulling politically motivated complaints and arrest warrants. This raised the question of whether there had been recent country guidance from the courts and/or the CPIN relied upon by the respondent. The Court of Appeal have recently considered the question of the political changes in Bangladesh in the case of MU (Bangladesh) [2025] EWCA Civ 812 . (in which the Secretary of State was the appellant). The Court noted the background evidence which affected their decision whether to remit the appeal before them back to the Upper Tribunal or whether they should remake the decision themselves.
21. In deciding on the latter course of action the court stated: “[the] decision is affected by a fundamental change in the circumstances underlying the respondent's human rights claim. In August 2024, … the Awami League government was overthrown and replaced by an interim government under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, who belongs to no political party. In December 2024 the Secretary of State issued a new CPIN. So far as relevant for our purposes, I need only refer to the executive summary which contains the following statements:
"Leaders, members, and supporters of political groups are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from non-state and/or rogue state actors. Although politically motivated violence occurs, it has generally declined since the July and August protests. The number of people who are affected remains low in proportion to the size of the major parties.”
22. The Court of Appeal concluded at paragraph 17 that “The truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the [claimant in the case] will be at risk of serious harm if returned.”
23. Much of the debate in this appeal is rendered irrelevant given the very clear acknowledgement by the Court of Appeal of the changes in Bangladesh. The country background material demonstrates that the changes following the overthrow of the Awami league means that those who might have been at risk from the Awami league as the appellant in the instant case claimed to be are no longer at risk because the Awami league is not the government. Thus even if the appellant's difficulties in explaining to Mr Sommerlad exactly what hit him and where are considered, the fundamental change in the situation in Bangladesh means that none of these issues are relevant. The judge did not accept that the appellant had been politically persecuted and as Judge Bruce pointed out when granting permission to appeal much of the grounds of onward appeal are simply an attempt to re-argue the case.
24. The core of the appellant's appeal before me was a reliance on cases such as PJ Sri Lanka that a foreign lawyer who has given evidence that documents showing an individual is subject to court or other sanctions can be relied upon unless there is some strong evidence that they should not be. That makes very little difference to the case before me because even if the appellant can show to the lower standard that these documents really were issued against him and had threatened him the documents and court cases no longer have anyone to continue them. Counsel for the appellant sought to argue that these documents were in the system and might therefore be activated in the event of the appellant's return to Bangladesh. That concern is dealt with by the judge in the determination when he says that if the documents are used against the appellant that will be prosecution not persecution.
25. The appellant's argument that he has a report from an expert that arrest warrants and other actions are still taken against supporters of what was formerly the opposition but is now in effect, the government have been wholly undermined by the Court of Appeal authority of MU. The other matters being raised by the appellant in his onward appeal were not pursued with much force before me. That must be right. As Judge Bruce pointed out the other matters raised are largely an attempt to reargue the case. The appellant’s participation in sur place activities may or may not be genuine but either way will not bring him to the adverse attention of the authorities since as the judge pointed out, they are the ones for whom the appellant was demonstrating.
26. Even if the judge was in error in discounting the expert report that had found the documents complained of by the appellant to be genuine, that error was not material. The change in circumstances in Bangladesh is so fundamental, as the Court of Appeal pointed out that there is no risk to those who previously were being pursued by the Awami league and its supporters. In the circumstances therefore the appellant cannot demonstrate a material error of law in the determination since the judge was well aware of the changing circumstances in Bangladesh and factored that into his determination, see for example [17] and [18]. I find that the appellant is not able to demonstrate any material error of law in the determination and I dismiss the onward appeal.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and uphold the decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal
Appellant’s appeal dismissed

Signed this 9th day of October 2026

……………………………………………….
Judge Woodcraft
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge