Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003002
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/54400/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RICHARDS

Between

MELIKA ZARE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Woodhouse
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by Miss Zare against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 16 January 2026 to dismiss her appeal against the decision of the Respondent on 22 March 2024 to refuse her application made on 3 September 2022 to join her mother in the United Kingdom under the family reunion provisions of the Immigration Rules.
2. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal that decision to the Upper Tribunal and on 21 May 2026 the same Judge who made the decision of 16 January 2026 refused permission stating that there was no arguable error-of-law in his decision.
3. The Appellant renewed their application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal and on 17 June 2026 UTJ Bruce granted permission without restriction on the Grounds of appeal, albeit with some caveats as to the prospects of success.
4. The case came before me on 18 September where I heard submissions from both parties and considered the bundle of 223 pages. Ms Everett had not received the bundle, but she submitted that she had had sight of all the relevant documents and was content to proceed without it.
5. No anonymity order has been made in this case, both parties submitted that one was not necessary in this case, and I do not make one of my own volition because of the importance of open justice.
6. The hearing was audio recorded and thus the submissions are not recorded here. At the conclusion of the hearing I announced that I would reserve my decision, which I am delivering here.
Grounds of appeal
7. Ground 1 asserts that First-tier Tribunal Judge Fisher (“the Judge”) made contradictory findings in relation to the financial support that the sponsor was said to have provided the Appellant.
8. Ground 2 asserts that the Judge failed to adequately assess the emotional dependency between the sponsor and Appellant by: failing to give adequate weight to the mental health of the sponsor and Appellant; making a finding without basis on the closeness of the Appellant’s relationship with a friend; and by failing to put to the sponsor in questioning the issue of whether the Appellant could look to her aunts for emotional support.
9. Ground 3 asserts that the Judge’s finding that family life does not exist is flawed as a result of a flawed assessment of emotional dependency as outlined in Ground 2.
10. Ground 4 asserts that the Judge failed to make adequate findings about the impact of the decision to refuse entry clearance on the sponsor.
Error-of-law
Ground 1
11. The findings that are criticised in this ground of appeal are found in [10-11] of the Judge’s decision:
10. I have considered whether the Appellant has shown that she is dependent upon her mother for financial and emotional support. I am prepared to accept that her mother left jewellery with her grandmother when she left Iran in September 2019 which could be sold for the benefit of the Appellant. I have considered the email from Felour Moghadam who explains that she loaned £100 in cash to the Sponsor on 25 November 2024, which was obviously some time after the date of the decision. I also considered the information from Zare Khosrow, who has similarly lent over £750 to the Sponsor since May 2024. That is consistent with the documentary evidence of transfers from May 2024 to January 2025.
11. However, there was no satisfactory documentary evidence before me of any financial support provided to the Appellant by her Sponsor prior to the date of the decision. She told me that she had only started to assist financially after relocating from Glasgow to Newcastle. There was no documentary evidence of any borrowing on her part prior to the date of the decision. There was no evidence as to whether the Appellant’s aunts in Iran are working, or whether they provide her with any degree of financial support. Furthermore, and perhaps just as significantly, there was no evidence before me to demonstrate the Appellant’s financial needs. She has to demonstrate financial dependency, and the straightforward provision of funds by one individual to another does not necessarily equate to a dependency. It may be, for example, that funds are provided for luxuries.
12. Mr Woodhouse argued that when the Judge found that the sponsor left jewellery in Iran which could be sold for the benefit of the Appellant, that this was sold and was financial support provided to the Appellant prior to the date of decision. In oral submissions he also highlighted [10] of the Sponsor’s witness statement and said the Judge ignored her evidence regarding sending money via money exchange services to the Appellant and providing two receipts of this.
13. In my judgment it is incorrect to equate the Judge’s finding that jewellery could be sold to benefit the Appellant with a finding that the jewellery was in fact sold to benefit the Appellant. The former is a finding of the sponsor’s intent when leaving Iran and of the communication she gave to those in whose keeping she placed the jewellery; the latter is a finding that an event (the sale and disposal of proceeds) actually occurred.
14. Further I find it is incorrect to state that the Judge ignored the sponsor’s written evidence on financial matters. In my judgment the Judge in the last two sentences of his [10] and in [11] deals satisfactorily with the sponsor’s evidence, referring to numerous details of the financial provision, and the findings that he makes were open to him to make.
15. In my judgment the Judge has not made contradictory findings relating to financial dependence and the findings he made were open to him and this ground of appeal amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings and does not demonstrate an error-of-law.
Ground 2
16. The pertinent passage of the Judge’s decision is at his [12-13]:
12. I now turn to the issue of emotional dependency. The limited evidence of translated communications between the Appellant and her mother did reveal a close and supportive relationship. It appears to cover the period from August 2020 onwards, prior to the date of the decision. I accept that both the Appellant and her mother have experienced issues with their mental health. The evidence from Iran refers to the Appellant’s history of severe headaches, migraines and mood disorders. She has received counselling and has medication for severe depression and anxiety. I felt unable to attach a great deal of weight to the letter from West Farm Surgery on the Sponsor which is dated 28 October 2024 as it only refers to a reported deterioration in her mental health following the refusal of her daughter’s application. It is too brief and there are no clinical observations in it. I attached more weight to the letter of 13 February 2025 from the Angelou Centre, where the Sponsor has been receiving counselling for her low mood, isolation and anxiety. I accept that there is a degree of emotional support between the Appellant and her mother.
13. It was clear to me, however, that the Appellant benefits from other sources of emotional support. Her mother confirmed that her daughter has friends in Iran. Indeed, in her witness statement, she referred to an occasion when she visited the cinema with one of her friends. I appreciate that the visit did not end well. However, she explained in her statement that her grandmother was in attendance when she was released, despite the difficulties in their relationship, and it was her friend’s father who paid a bribe to secure her release. I conclude that she and her friend must have been close if he was prepared to assist to that extent. I am also not persuaded that the Appellant could not look to the aunts with whom she lives for emotional support. As a result of these several considerations, I do not find that the Appellant has demonstrated that she is dependent on her mother for financial support.
17. The first aspect criticised on behalf of the Appellant in this passage is that the Judge failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of mental health problems for both the Appellant and Sponsor. However in my judgment, mindful of the proper role of an appellate judge, it would wrong of me to interfere with the Judge’s findings because in my view they were findings that were open to him to make on the evidence. It is clear from [12] that the Judge has read and engaged with the evidence relating to mental health and has made rational findings on these, in combination with the other evidence available to him.
18. Mr Woodhouse argued that certain aspects of the documentary evidence (pg 45 and 118 of the bundle) relating to the role that familial separation was playing in the mental health of the Appellant and Sponsor was not put directly to the Sponsor during the course of their oral evidence at the First-tier Tribunal. However as I reminded Mr Woodhouse, he has not sought nor adduced a transcript of the First-tier Tribunal hearing nor produced a witness statement from himself as to what occurred during the hearing and served it on the Respondent. As such I reject this aspect of the appeal as evidentially unfounded.
19. For the same reasons I reject the part of Mr Woodhouse’s argument that the Judge failed to put to the sponsor in questioning the issue of whether the Appellant could look to her aunts for emotional support.
20. The final aspect of this Ground argues that it was not open to the Judge to conclude that the Appellant and her friend must have been close in [13]. In his written grounds Mr Woodhouse stated:
In evidence, when asked by the judge whether the Appellant spends time with friends the sponsor replied ‘Not a lot.’
21. Again, Mr Woodhouse has not provided a transcript of the hearing nor a witness statement, and I find that I cannot rely on what he has written. It is devoid of context, includes a summary based on Mr Woodhouse’s deductions as to what the judge in fact asked rather than an accurate quotation.
22. Further in my judgment the judge has not made irrational findings, he has attached weight to different factors as was open to him, and this Ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings and does not constitute an error-of-law.
Ground 3
23. I find there is no error-of-law in Ground 3 as it was predicated on there being an error-of-law in Ground 2. I have found no error-of-law in Ground 2 and thus Ground 3 also does not amount to an error-of-law.
Ground 4
24. Ground 4 is predicated on family life existing, and as I have found that there was no error-of-law in Ground 3, i.e. that the Judge’s finding that family life does not exist is legally without material error, then consequently Ground 4 cannot and does not amount to a material error-of-law. Mr Woodhouse accepted that if Ground 2 was not made out then Grounds 3 and 4 fall away.
Conclusion
25. In summary, in my judgment none of the Grounds of appeal amounts to an error-of-law such that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 16 January 2026 is upheld.
Notice of Decision
The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 16 January 2026 did not involve a material error of law and stands.

Judge Richards

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 October 2026