Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2026-003027
[PA/75991/2024]

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Promulgated

28th August 2026

Before

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL

Between

A P
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at FIELD HOUSE
on 14 August 2026

Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss K Wass, Counsel
(instructed by Barnes, Harrild and Dyer)
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appealed with limited permission granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Jepson on 10 June 2026 against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Row who had dismissed the appeal of the Appellant against the refusal of his international protection claim. The decision and reasons was promulgated on 19 April 2026.

2. The Appellant is a national of Iran, of Kurdish ethnicity, born on 1 April 1994. The Appellant’s claim to be at risk upon return to Iran was advanced on the basis of his involvement with the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (“the KDPI”). He said that he and his father worked as tailors. They sympathized with the KDPI. The Appellant was never a member. The Appellant and his father made uniforms for the KDPI in their shop. The Iranian authorities found out. On 9 November 2021 the security services raided the shop and arrested the Appellant’s father. The Appellant was not there at the time. He hid and left Iran three days later. He went to Turkey. He travelled to Austria. He stayed there in a camp for a year. He then travelled overland to France where he spent five months in the jungle at Calais, from where he travelled by small boat to the United Kingdom.

3. The Appellant has attended 27 demonstrations in the United Kingdom. He has never been an organiser. He has held placards and shouted. He said he would come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. The Appellant opened a Facebook account. He has posted uncomplimentary things about the Iranian regime. He maintained that if he returned to Iran he would be arrested and harmed.

4. After reviewing the evidence the Appellant presented and the account he provided, including his immigration history, Judge Row reached comprehensive adverse credibility findings. Judge Row said (see [41] of his decision):

“I take into account that even if the Appellant is not telling the truth about events in Iran that sur place activities could get him in trouble with the Iranian authorities.
42. The appellant’s failure to claim asylum in safe countries damages his credibility. His failure to seek to obtain evidence which might have been readily available to assist his case damages his credibility. There are discrepancies in significant parts of his account. This damages his credibility.
43. I do not find that the appellant was involved in the manufacture of clothing for the KDPI in Iran. I do not find that his father was arrested. I do not find that the authorities in Iran are looking for him. I find that his account is made up.
44. I do not find that the Facebook entries have been kept in place and can be seen by the public. I do not find that they have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities.
45. I do not find that the Appellant has had any significant involvement in political events in the United Kingdom. There is nothing to show that he was not simply photographed at a demonstration and then left. I do not find that his attendance at demonstrations has come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. I find that the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations has been contrived to support a false asylum claim.
46. I do not find that the appellant has any genuine political beliefs. I find that this is feigned to support an asylum claim.
47. It is accepted that the appellant left Iran illegally.
48. He would come to the attention of the Iranian authorities if he applied for a travel document and on his arrival in Iran.
49. I take into account the country guidance in XX (PJAK sur place activities-Facebook) Iran CG [2022]. The evidence is that Iran does not have the capability to monitor Facebook activities routinely. If someone is of interest to the Iranian authorities they will make it their business to investigate Facebook activity and that person may be at risk. I have found that the Appellant is not of interest to the Iranian authorities. His Facebook entries do not put him at risk on return.
50. Even if his Facebook activities were still available to be seen he can delete them. I have found that he does not have any genuine political beliefs or opinions. He can honestly tell the Iranian authorities that on his return. It does not compromise a man’s integrity to tell the truth. I find that this is what he will do on return.
51. I have found that he has not come to the attention of the Iranian authorities before. There will be nothing about his activities in the United Kingdom about which the Iranian authorities will be aware. 52. The Appellant is not at risk in Iran because of his previous activities there. He is not at risk because of his sur place activities. The Appellant does not succeed in his claim as a refugee.”

5. Judge Jepson’s grant of permission to appeal was in the following terms:

“The application is in time. The Appellant is unrepresented. Ground one argues a material error of law arose through comment at [38] of the judgment that the Appellant could have posted and then deleted Facebook material. That is criticised as being speculative. Nothing in the determination suggests that was put to the Appellant in court or directly raised by the Respondent. Although not the only factor considered in relation to Facebook evidence, it is arguable the Tribunal fell into error by not giving the Appellant an opportunity to address the concern. That may have been all the more important given the lack of representation. Ground two submits the Tribunal wrongly applied the balance of probabilities standard throughout the determination. At [5]-[6], the Judge set out the respective burdens correctly. Nothing from the judgment supports the Appellant’s contention. This ground is not arguable.
Ground three asserts the Tribunal failed to conduct an adequate assessment of risk from sur place activity. Any criticism encompasses a failure to factor in elements such as ethnicity and lack of consideration as to whether the Appellant’s political views are genuinely held. At [46] the Judge found the Appellant’s claimed beliefs were feigned. No basis for that conclusion was given. Although illegal exit was briefly mentioned at [47], no analysis was seemingly made as to what effect that might have as to risk on return. There was no mention of the Appellant’s ethnicity as a possible factor. Taken together, those aspects mean this ground is arguable.
Ground four argues the Tribunal placed an unreasonable burden on the Appellant in expecting corroborative material to be produced. At [27] of the determination, the Judge made clear there was no requirement for supporting evidence. Nothing supports the contention the Tribunal then went on to consider the absence of corroboration as significantly damaging. The Judge held certain material could at least have been requested. No error of law arose from placing some weight on a failure to do so. This ground is not arguable.
6. Ground five suggests the Tribunal placed undue weight on a failure to claim asylum in safe countries. Nothing indicates the Judge treated that element as anything other than one factor amongst several which undermined credibility. Contrary to what is claimed in the grounds, at [34]-[36] the Tribunal considered the Appellant’s explanation for not seeking protection before reaching the United Kingdom. This ground is not arguable.
Ground six argues the Tribunal failed to properly apply XX (above). Criticism is made that any analysis at [49] was limited to the comment that the Iranian authorities lack capacity to routinely monitor social media. The Appellant contends the Judge should have gone on to consider aspects such as the scrutiny faced by individuals on return. This ground overlaps in large part with grounds one and three. It is arguable the assessment conducted at [49] lacks sufficient detail. For the same reasons as ground one, it is arguable a material error arose.
Ground seven effectively repeats that set out in ground one. It is arguable for the same reasons.
Permission to appeal is granted on grounds one, three, six and seven.”

6. There was no rule 24 notice but Mr Sheikh indicated that the appeal was opposed on all grounds raised.

Submissions

7. Miss Wass for the Appellant relied on the grounds of appeal for which permission to appeal had been granted. There was an element of duplication between grounds 1 and 7. The Judge’s findings about the Appellant’s Facebook account were speculative and unsupported. There was nothing in the evidence to show that the Appellant’s posts had been deleted. The Appellant had produced numerous posts and some had been translated into English. The issue of deletion had not been put to the Appellant at the hearing. In effect the Judge had reversed the burden of proof. That was a material error of law.

8. Counsel submitted that grounds 6 and 3 were linked. The Judge had not applied XX (above) correctly. The risk on return presented by the Appellant’s sur place activities had not been properly assessed and the Judge’s reasoning for his findings was inadequate. The decision should be set aside and the appeal reheard before another First-tier Tribunal Judge.

9. Mr Sheikh for the Respondent submitted that there was no material error of law, merely disagreement with a decision properly open to the Judge. Grounds 1 and 7 were linked. The decision showed that the Judge was aware of the law. His findings about the Facebook account were not speculative but were firmly based on the rejection of the Appellant’s core account of political alignment. The reasons the Judge had given for rejecting the core account had not been challenged. [41] to [44] of the decision showed that the evidence had been examined in the round. [28] and [29] of the decision were important: the Appellant’s claim not to have been in contact with his family in case it caused them difficulty was inconsistent with his claim to have been posting anti-regime material on Facebook.

10. The Judge had summarised XX accurately at [49]. He noted that XX showed that social media postings could be manipulated. He was entitled to apply that finding.

11. As to grounds 3 and 6, the Judge had assessed the Appellant’s sur place activities at [37] to [40] and had applied XX. The Appellant had not been approached by the Iranian authorities. The fact that the core claim had been found not credible undermined the whole case. The appeal to the UT should be dismissed.

12. In reply Miss Wass submitted that the Judge had erred about translations of the Facebook postings. The Appellant should have been questioned about modifications to his posts. The sur place activities should have been examined in more detail.

No material error of law finding

13. The Tribunal reserved its decision, which now follows. The Tribunal is not persuaded by any of the submissions as to material error of law made on behalf of the Appellant. In the Tribunal’s view, the errors asserted to exist in the decision are based on misapprehensions and a failure to read the careful decision and reasons as a whole.

14. The Tribunal accepts Mr Sheikh’s submissions on behalf of the Respondent. There was no flaw in the Judge’s risk assessment of the return process and the very experienced Judge’s careful and balanced findings were open to him. The first and most important point is that the Judge wholly rejected the Appellant’s core case of KDPI association. He gave detailed and sustainable reasons for reaching his adverse credibility findings about that, none of which has been challenged. He found that the Appellant’s story about his activities in Iran were a fiction. The Judge was entitled to take that fundamental lack of credibility into account when assessing the Appellant’s post arrival activities, including his Facebook account.

15. The claimed impact of the Appellant’s Facebook account was discussed and firmly rejected in the Respondent’s review. Thus the Appellant was on notice that the Facebook element of his claim was challenged and had the opportunity to defend his position. There was no requirement for any specific cross-examination. The burden of proof was not reversed by the Judge. The Judge also considered an alternative situation at [50]: see above. There was thus the detailed consideration which Ms Wass had submitted was missing.

16. The Judge did not state that the Appellant’s voluminous posts were not translated. At [37] he observed, correctly, that most were untranslated. As Mr Sheikh pointed out in submissions, the Appellant’s concern not to contact his parents in Iran for fear of causing harm to them was completely inconsistent with his making anti-regime postings by the thousand.

17. The Judge’s summary of XX at [49] has already been reproduced at [4], (above) of the present decision. It is clear, concise and accurate, and was applied correctly. This was an appeal properly found entirely lacking in credibility and so it was right to approach the assessment of the Appellant’s sur place activities with appropriate caution, the more so because they only commenced after the Appellant’s claim had been refused.

18. The grant of permission to appeal was in the Tribunal’s view generous at best, even in limited form. The Tribunal finds that there was no material error of law in the decision challenged. The onwards appeal is dismissed. The anonymity direction is maintained.

The Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant without her express consent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION

The appeal is dismissed

The making of the previous decision did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision stands unchanged, including the anonymity direction.

Signed R J Manuell Dated 18 August 2026
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell